

Fr. Lonergan.

QUESTIONS (1)

Thursday 12-8-71

(1) a) You have referred on numerous occasions to God's gift of his love in Romans 5.5. Which of the various meanings do you intend? (i) God's love for us; (ii) God's gift making it possible for us to love him; (iii) or some interaction of divine gift and human response.

b) You say in Insight p 698 that "a man or woman knows that he or she is in love by making the discovery that all spontaneous and deliberate tendencies and actions regard the beloved". In the case of love between man and God, to what extent is this description applicable, on both sides?

(2) You have spoken of the grace of God filling our hearts as the indispensable moving-force in religious conversion. In the present context you have appeared to treat one's awareness of grace as self-authenticating. But in an early unpublished work (see footnote<sup>3</sup>) you said, "...ipsa gratia supernaturalis non subest scientiae humanae". Is there a real difference between your thought then and now? How, and how far, can one be aware of the grace of God working in oneself?

◆ Analysis Fidei, Toronto, 1952

Ulterius concludi potest cur criteriis externis est innitendum:  
Primo, quia gratia Dei nos illuminat ad inquirendum et ad perspicendum evidētiaē sufficientiam. Alia ergo est gratia Dei, et aliud id in quod inquiritur et in quo sufficientia perspicitur.

Deinde, convenienter hoc aliud est quid externum, puta, miracula, prophetias, ipsum signum inter nationes elevatum. Eiusmodi enim res sunt clarae, obviae, fere palpabiles. Sed de elevatione doctrinae quisquis iudicat secundum propriam intelligentiam, scientiam, et sapientiam, quae alia in aliis esse solet. De factis vero internis psychologicis, etsi miraculose esse possent, a mera abnormalitate non facile discernuntur.

Tertio, uti in tractatu de gratia stabilitur, ipsa gratia supernaturalis non sub-est scientiae humanae. Quamvis enim coniecturare possimus de proprio statu supernaturali, eundem statum esse supernaturalem non possumus scire; actus enim supernaturales sunt talem propter objecta supernaturalia quae imperfecte tantum intelligimus, DB 1796.

(3) What were your reasons for including a discussion of categories in the chapter on foundations? It would seem that the distinction between general and ~~special~~ special ~~categories~~ categories might be more easily understood in the chapter on systematics?

b) Would it be true to say that the cultural lag involved in Humanae Vitae is a failure of systematics?

→ 4. Q. 1. from P. IV

QUESTIONS (I) cont.

(4) (Ross Collings ODC) Yesterday you referred to the apophatic theology which arose out of mystical experience. Granted the continuing presence of mystical experience in the Church, can you foresee any particular ways in which the horizon of interiority might transform mystical theology? Would the data for such a theology be limited to the mystical experience of a person working theologically in the horizon of interiority, or could the writings, both the descriptive and the theoretic, of earlier mystics (e.g. Sts Theresa and John of the Cross), also provide data?

It would seem that the existential character introduced by interiority into other areas of theology (e.g. Fr. Crowe's Complacency and Concern) is tending to cover the same area as was previously the predominant mark of spiritual theology, namely concrete religious experience. Would a properly developed theology of grace, the theological virtues, the beatific vision, written from within the horizon of interiority, render the further department of "Spiritual Theology" superfluous? If not, what would distinguish this further department from the others?

(5) In early lectures you spoke of the need for people to accept the God-question, let alone its answer. In speaking of Rabut's analysis today, you spoke of the need to let oneself experience the love of God. Without imposing a crude chronology, I would like to know whether

- it is authentic to "start the process" by letting oneself be moved by intimations in one's life of what may be the love of God, and
- whether this "letting oneself go" is a help, and if so a necessary one, towards recognizing and then answering the God-question.

(6) In Insight (p 507) you say that one aspect of the significance of metaphysical equivalence is that "it provides a critical technique for the precise control of meaning".

Would it be useful to clarify what you mean by feelings, conversion, etc. to specify their metaphysical equivalents?

Would it help to clarify intellectual conversion for example to use ~~some~~ metaphysical categories and to specify what changes in intellect and will it involves?

(Incidentally, does it involve a change in willingness or only in understanding and judgment?)

(7) You speak of a certain similarity between traditional Fundamental Theology and Foundations. In the light, however, of your stress on the state of being in love with God as the centre of Foundations would it not be the case that foundations is more closely related to De Gratia than to Fundamental Theology? Please comment.

b) Is your analysis of Grace in Gratia Operans a proper metaphysical equivalent to your intentionality analysis of Love, or is this statement an oversimplification?

11. Thursday, 12th. August

1. In the application of a doctrine to different types of conscience, how does this differ from what you call 'relativism'?
2. In view of your recent stress on value, and the denial of the primacy of the speculative intellect, would you say that the first part of Insight should be re-written in such a way that there should be discovered there not three but four fundamental operations?
3. You have approved the sublation of the desire to know into the pure desire for value. Could one still speak of God, even in his most fundamental meaning, as the object of this pure desire for value?
4. You speak of a certain similarity between traditional fundamental theology and foundations. In the light, however, of your stress on the state of being in love as the center of foundations, would it not be the case that foundations is more closely related to De Gratia than to fundamental theology? Please comment.
5. Is the permanent element in doctrine always a structure (e.g., the preface of the Mass of the Trinity); or can there be a determinate meaningful content at all stages, and if so, how could such a content be determinable from culture to culture?
6. You have in a number of your writings spoken of the heuristic character of the 'homousion' of Nicea. Is there a heuristic element in all dogma, and if so, is the heuristic element relevant to the permanence of dogma through cultural change?
7. I do not understand how you can justify the permanence of dogmas by the fact that they are revealed truths. You have often pointed out that truth never exists independently of minds. Presumably dogmas exist in human minds, and are subject to all their conditions and limitations. Therefore, the truth of dogmas would seem to be no more (though no less!) permanent than any other human truth. Would you agree?
8. In speaking of the truth of systematic theology, you said that generally it will attain to probability only. But presumably there will be lesser and greater degrees of probability. What will be the criteria of making such judgments?

questions III 22th August

1. (from Fr Gutheinz)

In connexion with your reposition of the distinction between truth and understanding the truth, I would like to ask whether the fuller sense of Scripture (sensus plenior) could be understood in the same way?

2.

To what functional specialty of economics does economic theory belong? It seems to aim at systematic understanding yet it differs from "policies" which you place on the level of understanding in the second phase.

3. (from Fr Tekippe)

I would like to press again my question whether there isn't a considerable difference between the universal viewpoint of ch 17 of INSIGHT - proximate achievement, the basis of an actual hermeneutical method - and the comprehensive viewpoint of dialectics - high and distant goal.

(See separate sheets for Fr. Lonergan giving reasons for this)

4.

Could you indicate in what way Method can be a guide in setting up a properly ordered division of subject matter within the subject specialty systematics e.g. is there a proper order in which the natural theology that is ~~within~~ within systematic theology can be (~~related to~~ related to the traditional De Deo Uno and the other treatises?

Again, does your method provide a clue as to what the proper sequence in the tractates on grace, Christology, Trinity, Eschatology would be.

5.

You seemed yesterday to distinguish between oppositions that are non-dialectical and ones that are really so. The criterion of the latter is that they cannot be removed outside the context of a conversion. Is this an accurate surmise? If so would you agree that opposition of A and B because B has higher viewpoint in a field F, in which A has lower viewpoint, is non dialectical in this strict sense and is removed by the mere developments of A. Would you agree that, re a characterization of dialectical situations as situations which are concrete dynamic and contradictory, dialectic in the strict sense is an instance or species of this and that it is the revelation of these strictly dialectical oppositions which is the basic axis of dialectics as a functional specialty?

6.

In your talk on dialectic you did not have time to treat the last two sections of dialectic II where you were dealing with certain objections. Could you briefly indicate the core thrust of sections 8 & 9?

To P1.

1V .Thursday 12th Aug.

1. Would you please comment on the inadequacy of analysis in explaining what might be called the 'inspiration of a masterpiece'. I am thinking of a particular case, where detailed study of a poet's sources, his psychology, his education, his religious background, etc., falls far short of accounting for a poem. (Fr. S.O' Mairthuille, S.J.)
2. Would you agree that the 1<sup>a</sup> 11<sup>ae</sup> of St. Thomas' Summa Theologiae is a thematization of moral conversion?  
How would you compare what you call 'feelings' with what Aquinas spoke of under the headings 'passiones' and 'caritas'?  
Is there a similarity between Aquinas' 'cognitio per conaturalitatem' and your 'apprehension of values through feeling'?
3. In Insight you spoke of values as the good of order as the possible object of rational choice. Particular goods could be chosen only as subsumed under some order. You now speak of values in what seems to be a wider sense. Does the older definition still hold? Can particular goods be values? Are ontic values to be defined in relation to a more basic act of will than choice, such as Aquinas' complacentia?
4. Sir, your definition of culture is 'a set of meanings and values that inform a common way of life', and there are as many cultures as there are distinct sets of such meanings and values. This definition of culture seems to be an oversimplification of a complex reality that one might perhaps abstract from Toynbee, but which in the context of cultural pluralism (about which you have spoken) seems to me to be insufficient. This is evident in your reference last Tuesday to Humanae Vitae as a 'cultural lag'. What is the basis of these 'sets of meanings and values that inform a common way of life, and in particular, where does that hallmark of ~~XXXXXXXX~~ classicism, the natural law, fit into your scheme of things?
5. In speaking of history you noted that the human scientist dealt with the recurrent, systematic aspects. To what specialty of a human science does such systematic understanding belong? It does not seem to be either of those on the fourth level, nor does on the first. Nor does it seem to correspond to doctrines and systematics, for you allotted policies and planning to those. It does not seem to belong to interpretation, for it depends on interpretation - to understand a social system one must first understand what people say. Finally it does not seem to belong to the third specialty of the first phase, for that is history, from which you have distinguished it.
6. Granted for the moment that the development of historical knowledge is similar in development to that of common sense, do you hold that, as distinct from its development, it is similar in its intentionality to common sense? I mean things this way: critical history seems to be concerned with 'movement' as related to movement irrespective of the relations of such series or sets of related movements to each other. e.g., the historian might be interested in the relations between republicans and anti-republicans in the 1871 Government of National Defence, their different class allegiances and hopes and how the interaction of these contributed to an on-going process without any common sense limitations.

QUESTIONS IV

(7) On Monday you said that Marx was just as generous with necessity as was Hegel. It is of course true that Marx uses the ~~same~~ language of necessity with the gay abandon of the Hegelian "free spirit". Still, you have in Insight distinguished between Freud's involvement in mechanistic determinism and the scientific discoveries he formulated in such determinist terms. Would your reading of Marx predispose you to consider the possible validity of a similar distinction with respect to his work?

(Parais Reamonn)

(8) What do you mean by "social context"? (Parais Reamonn)

#### IV

9.

I have a question about your meaning for 'feeling'. You did not seem to have specified limits of its application. The same seems true re 'image' which you use in your relational definition of feeling. As a help in clarification would you care to comment on whether you distinguish between 'volitional resonance' as analysed by yourself in DDTTrino etc & Crowe in 'Complacency & Concern', and feeling. Also feeling as you use the term and 'passio' as used by Aquinas ub ST I II.

10.

My problem concerns the criterion of morality, namely the actian of the virtuous man. Since the knowledge which guides his action ~~is normally~~ will normally be merely on the level of common sense how can there be a systematic ethics? will ethics be merely a consideration of "cases"?

11.

What is the difference between an image, metaphor, anthropomorphism, sign, symbol and mystery?

- 12 Why do you think it is that so many who otherwise find your analysis of the "positions" on knowing, being and objectivity quite adequate, cannot move towards an affirmation of the complete intelligibility of the real. Does not a full acceptance of the "positions" include the view that the real might not be completely intelligible?

13.

A phenomenon of the modern world (eg since Rousseau's cult of the noble savage) seems to be the idealizing of the situation of undifferentiated consciousness. The feeling is that differentiation of consciousness is bought at a high price : it entail the loss of a simplicity. Can you comment on this?

14.

What implications does your conception of theology as a complexus of 8 specialties have for the organisation of a course in philosophy and theology for students? Would you care to comment on the fallacy of complete coverage.

15.

In response to a question you said that functional specialisation would apply only in a partial fashion to human sciences such as psychology. Why should this be so? Even if it is true of the human sciences as they are now, can the methodologist not make normative statements about what should be so, because of his understanding of cognitional structure?

16.

Re the Aristotelian concept of science: you once said that you refer to the common interpretation, that further research might show Aristotle as modern. Is this still possible?

## Addition to IV 3

In answering my question yesterday, you affirmed that there was no discrepancy between the universal viewpoint of Insight and the comprehensive viewpoint of dialectics. I would renew my suggestion that there is a real difference between the two, and offer in evidence the following textual study:

### Universal Viewpoint

1. The basic problem of scientific interpretation is to grasp the habitual development of all audiences and to find a mode of expression which escapes relativity to particular audiences (564). The solution is found in the universal viewpoint (587), which constitutes the basis of a methodical hermeneutics (564,5,7,78,81,5,7,8,90,2). Nothing suggests that this solution is purely potential.

2. "... if there is no possible universal viewpoint, there is no general possibility of rising above one's personal views and reaching without bias what the personal views of another are. Again, if the possibility of the universal viewpoint exists but is not exploited, then objective interpretation is possible but does not occur. Finally, since scientific objectivity is to be reached only through the universal viewpoint, there is no question of a confirmation that is independent of the universal viewpoint."

This suggests that one must affirm either, on the one hand, relativism, the absence of any objective interpretation, and the impossibility of confirming any interpretation, or, on the other hand, the possibility of the universal viewpoint.

Answer to an objection: You said that the universal viewpoint is only potential. True, it is defined as a potential totality of genetically and dialectically ordered viewpoints (564). But it is potential in the sense that it is not a) universal history, b) an Hegelian dialectic independent of matters of fact, or c) an already determinate Kantian a priori to be simply imposed on experience. Again, not only the totality is potential, but the ordering is also, while the materials to be ordered themselves advance from the general to the specific (566). The universal viewpoint is only a heuristic structure (564). Still, nothing suggests that the structure itself is potential. Indeed, it has its base in an adequate self-knowledge and

### Comprehensive Viewpoint

"Besides the materials of dialectic, there is its aim. This is high and distant. As empirical science aims at a complete explanation of all phenomena, so dialectic aims at a comprehensive viewpoint... Besides the conflicts of Christians and the distant goal of a comprehensive viewpoint... By dialectic, then, is understood a generalized apologetic conducted in an ecumenical spirit, aiming ultimately at a comprehensive viewpoint, and proceeding towards that goal by acknowledging differences, seeking their grounds real and apparent, and eliminating superfluous oppositions."

The underlined words stress the comprehensive viewpoint as a distant goal to be striven for. There is nothing to suggest that the comprehensive viewpoint, at least within dialectics, is actually attained.

cont'd.



in the consequent metaphysics (565). Nor is this a distant ideal, for there is a particular philosophy, ~~xxx~~ namely your own, which can ground a universal viewpoint (568).

Would you comment on this suggestion?

T. Tekippe