

Lonergan

Questions:

3 August 1971

I. Questions from Monday, 2 August:

1. Yesterday in the question period you hesitated to call theology a "science," preferring the term "scholarship." May I press the question: Utrum sacra doctrina sit scientia?
2. Your statement this morning that philosophy is no longer to be considered the ancilla theologiae and that it was not a matter of importing philosophy into theology sounds similar to Oscar Cullmann deploring the importation of Greek metaphysics into theology. To what extent do you agree with his position?
3. What is the relation between transcendental method and the "universal viewpoint" of Chap. 17 of Insight?
4. How does Fr. Lonergan see the difference between "Transcendental Method" in the way he uses the term and "Transcendental Method" in the way used by, e.g., Coreth, Muck, Rahner?
5. Do you think that in the following limited sense, it is true to say that an insight cannot be experienced?
The act of insight, the actual transition from not seeing the point to seeing it, seems always to occur so suddenly that one cannot attend to it as it occurs; one only knows that it has occurred.
In the case of unravelling a complex problem, calling for many insights, while there can be a sense of growing discovery, a feeling of being on the right track, the actual progress seems to take place by means of a series of such sudden flashes which one cannot attend to as occurring, but only as having occurred.

Drop?

II. Questions from Tuesday, 3 August:

1. Did Fr. Lonergan say that the good conscience of the virtuous man was the criterion for a judgment of value?
If so, how did the virtuous man become virtuous or get his good conscience except by making right judgments? What then was the original criterion or where did the push of the will come from to accept the first judgment of the intellect as good, as of value. Would you explain how this is not a vicious circle?
2. Can values be objects of belief?
3. Can you please explain what you mean by "the virtually unconditioned?"

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Questions from Wed. and Thurs., 4 and 5 Aug.

4 Aug. 1971

I.

1. You say that the question of God arises inevitably when one questions the morality of the universe, when one questions one's own questioning of the moral values.

However, many philosophers hold that the question of God need never arise when one questions one own questionign of morality. It can arise, either because one already has an idea of God, or just spontaneously; there is no inevitability involved. This would be against your opinion that man has a native orientation towards God. (G. Reilly)

2. In Insight you say: If the real is completely intelligible, God exists. But.... Therefore.... implicitly
In recent lectures you seem to be at least/saying:
If the real is unconditionally worthwhile, God exists.
But the real is unconditionally worthwhile.
Therefore God exists.

Would you relate the intelligible to value in the context of the God problem. Is it necessary to prove that being is not only completely intelligible but also unconditionally ~~warrant~~ worthwhile in order to prove that God exists?

II.

1. Often one has insufficient knowledge, when one makes a judgment of value. One does not know what is good and one has to choose one. One chances a judgment. Is one actually irrationally.

Not clear

↳ ? →

If one actually judges correctly, has another element entered in? grace? intuition? Or is there an unconscious response of our whole personalities to situations, etc., which affect our judgments?

A person may say, "I'm inclined to think this is right, but I can't prove it."

2. In Insight it is stated that a value is an object of rational choice and must be apprehended by intelligence in order to be chosen. Is it only on the level of the supernatural that love is prior to intelligence?

III.

1. Could you indicate the precise distinction between a model & a hypothesis? Is your thematization of cognitional process a model rather than a hypothesis?
2. Are the first 4 chapters of Method interrelated in an explanatory fashion? Could you in any case explain why the chapters are in the particular sequence they are in? Why, e.g., does the chapter on the good precede the chapter on meaning?
3. Is the chapter on meaning explanatory or phenomenological? To

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put this in another way, are the differentiations of meaning you describe interrelated in an explanatory manner? if this is the case, could you briefly indicate how the different modes of meaning are explanatorily interrelated?

4. Would you please comment on the ordering of the various early chapters in Method in Theology? Why this particular sequence? Is self-transcendence the operating center?
5. You spoke this morning of the problem for theology now as being the integration of the heritage of past theology with the new methods of historical & critical research developed in the 19th century.

Would you elaborate further on the historical & theological perspective within which the problem of method in theology has emerged, to which your work is addressed?

- IV. 1. The Christian solution to the problem of subjective & objectified evil (basic sin) is talked about in Insight (e.g., p. 700) & in some late articles. The basic structure of a reply seems to be in terms of meeting of evil with good. Could you specify through examples some instances of this meeting of evil with good in action? (Andy Johnston)
- V. 1. You spoke earlier of a change in your thinking from faculty psychology to a study of consciousness. Does this involve a rejection of faculty psychology or simply an addition to it & a new foundation for it?
- VI. 1. How does the development of feelings relate to intellectual growth?

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Questions from Wednesday August 4 & Thurs. 5 Aug.

- VII.
1. Would you relate your distinction between the categorial and the transcendental to your discussion of God in Insight.
 2. In what sense is it proper to speak of God as an object and in what sense is it incorrect?
 3. In Foundations of Theology Prof. Gilkey objects that Ch. 19 of Insight is not intrinsically related to the first eighteen chapters. You reply that it is related and that the use of the term intelligible in Ch 19 is the same as in the earlier chapters. Could you elaborate on your stress on the fact that in Insight the primary meaning of the intelligible is always the same, even in your discussion of God?
 4. In what sense does the question of God of more importance than the proof of God's existence?
 5. Could you relate questioning questioning, enquiring about enquiring, reflecting about reflecting, deliberating about deliberating, to your proof of God's existence in Insight?
 6. How would you conceive of a contemporary natural theology in terms of your shift from metaphysics to interiority?
 7. Is it not true that your proof of God's existence in Insight is basically in terms of interiority rather than metaphysics?
- VIII.
1. It seems to me that there is a heuristic principle Fr Lonergan tends to overlook. It concerns the functional specialty of research into the data. The researcher, it seems to me, must be able to experience and describe not only the occurrence of the data but their quality. The style of a poem, the tone of an utterance, the atmosphere of an epoch, the event-quality of an incident.
More than natural aesthetic sensibility is needed to experience the quality of the data proper of the data proper to theology. The basic tone of S Augustine or S Theresse, of Lisieux is grasped only by one who is sympathetically attuned to them through continuity with them in charity, in the spirit - in other words by a fellow Christian. Thus at the pre-interpretative level (research) the theologian needs to be attuned to his data by the theological virtue of charity. Hence the need for a praying theology, for a theologian who does not pray cannot appreciate the quality of his data. Cor ad cor loquitur. (Joseph S. O'Leary)
- IX.
1. What is the difference between the 'horizon of conversion' and the 'horizon of belief'?
 2. Why does the fifth functional specialty - 'foundations' - come only in the fifth place? It seems to me that the reflection on conversion must come in the first place in order to clarify the horizon of conversion within which theological work is done. (Luis Gutheinz)