

I N S I G H T

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LECTURE II

INSIGHT -as the basis for an integration of the Sciences.

If you recall again the properties that have been found in contemporary science as it has actually evolved the fundamental problem is the problem of integration, namely, it is not merely the fact that there are new sciences that are giving us new conclusions, the fundamental problem arises from the fact that there has been an evolution, a development in the notion of science itself. What we need therefore if we are going to think towards an integration of the different disciplines is a notion of science that admits such development, a notion of science that can be taken first, as the basis of the Aristotelian type of conception and secondly as the basis for the modern type of conception that will provide not only a single theory covering both ideas but also a single theory that will make possible the criticism of both ideas. Now, that means that we are asking what precisely is science. How does one go about getting hold of that notion, -and indeed the notion not as it is based on good english usage, not as it is based on genuine authorities (good english usage is an anonymous authority, the genuine authorities that have their reasons have names), but what we want to do is each one of us get a hold for himself of fundamental ideas regarding the activity that for one reason or another, one degree of perfection or another is called science.

PROCEDURE

The procedure I shall follow is, first of all, to appeal to an experience, an experience in the process of learning in which first, one learns something, secondly, one attends not merely to what is learned but also to the process of learning itself, to the intellectual acts, -not merely to the objects that the intellectual activities regard. I believe that the decisive moment in that process is insight and I shall try, first of all, to

- a. communicate to you just what an insight is,
- b. secondly, to indicate descriptively what an insight is,
- c. thirdly, to show how that notion can be expressed in Aristotelian and Thomist terms,
- d. fourthly, to show how it can be expressed in entirely different contemporary terms.


The third and fourth will be equivalent but the expressions and the basis for the expressions will differ entirely in the two cases.

a) & b) Communication and descriptive indication

rding to St. Thomas insights occur with respect to phantasms, that is, images -phantasmata are images. And to help your imaginations we use diagrams. Now, I gave an example of a very simple type of insight in the little book that has that name. "What is a circle?" means why is this plane curve perfectly round? And the answer to that question "why is this perfectly round?" is that all the radii are equal. Why is that answer so? There is an event that will occur in so far as each one of you is intelligent, namely, in the sensible data, in what you imagine you grasp necessity and impossibility. Necessity is not something you can see, -anything you see or imagine is just de facto so. Similarly, impossibility is not something you ever take a look at. It is something you know in so far as you understand. You can all see that if any of the radii were unequal then necessarily there would be bumps and dents. And you can see that if they were all absolutely equal then necessarily this curve is perfectly round. In the sensible data you grasp necessity and impossibility and that act of insight enables you to repeat intelligently the definition of the circle. Anyone can learn off by heart from a book on geometry that a circle is a locus of coplanar points equidistant from a centre. "Why do you say that?" "Well, that's what's in the book!" If you get no further than that then if you forget what is in the book you don't know what a circle is. You're not even able to say it. But if you get the insight and forget what's in the book you'll always be able to make up a definition for yourself. You'll be able to say that when the plane curve and all the points in the plane curve are equidistant from a given point that necessarily that curve has to be perfectly round. You can see it. It is a matter of the intelligence operating on the sensible. Notice the difference between that and the doctrine that we know universal principles by comparing abstract concepts. You see the nexus between the concepts. That's good scotist doctrine, but it isn't what is happening here. There is only one abstract radius. But here you are imagining an infinity of radii, you are imagining a radius vector that goes around and if it remains constant the thing has to be perfectly round. It is not a matter of comparing abstract concepts and deciding that that they are necessarily conjoined or that they possibly can be or they are incompatible. It has nothing to do with abstract concepts; it is understanding in the image, the intelligence working upon the data of sense reproduced in schematic fashion in the imagination and the image represented diagrammatically, schematically by a drawing. The drawing needn't be accurate because you understand what I mean.

FIGURE 1

THE EQUILATERAL TRIANGLE



Now, let me illustrate insight in another fashion. The first proposition of the First Book of Euclid's Elements is to construct an equilateral triangle on a given base AB in a given plane, the plane of the blackboard. (Fig. 1). And he says: take centre A and radius AB and draw a circle; take centre B and radius BA and draw a circle. Call the point of intersection C. Join CA and CB. Then CA and BA are radii of the same circle, they are equal. CB and AB are radii of the same circle, they are equal. Things equal to the same thing are equal to one another, therefore these two (i.e., CA & CB) are equal to one another since they are both equal to AB. You have your equilateral triangle.

Now, what is the fallacy? What is it that Euclid did not prove in establishing and asserting that ABC is the required equilateral triangle? And not only what is it that he didn't prove but what is it that can't be proved from Euclid's set of definitions, postulates and axioms? You can grant the lot and defy him to prove it, namely, that the two circles will intersect at the point C. They'll intersect, it is perfectly true that they will. But you can't deduce that from Euclid's definitions, postulates and axioms because modern geometers who do euclidean geometry -not non euclidean geometry but euclidean geometry- introduce some axiom or postulate that regards such questions of intersection. They have a notion of "between-ness" or "included" and they define it and have axioms that regard it in some way or another and they are able to demonstrate that that will be an equilateral triangle, that those two circles will intersect. But Euclid hadn't got those definitions or axioms and no one missed them for over two thousand years. How was it that everyone got the right answer for over two thousand years and didn't have the right premises? They had the insight. They understood in the concrete instance the necessity of those two circles intersecting. By understanding with respect to the sensible, imaginative representation they knew what was true under euclidean assumptions. They arrived at the same conclusions Euclid did and it was only in the later development of a rigid, logical procedure that the necessity of going about things differently was discovered.

Now, you may say: "That's just a problem."


(Euclid divided his propositions into problems and theorems. A problem -How do you do something? A theorem -Why is something so?) Is it true that Euclid also slips up in the logic of his theorems? We'll see.

Still in the First Book, about proposition 14

-I don't remember exactly- he proposes to demonstrate that the Exterior angle of a

FIGURE 2

THE EXTERIOR ANGLE OF A TRIANGLE



angle is greater than the interior opposite. And his construction is to bisect BC, join AE, to produce AE so that AE is equal to EF, to join FC. (Fig. 2). Then by that construction opposite angles are equal. This line BE is equal to this line EC by construction, and this line AE is equal to this line EF by construction. We have two similar triangles similar in all respects. This angle FCD therefore is equal to this angle AE, manifestly, the whole is greater than the part. The exterior angle is therefore greater than the interior opposite.

Now, why will the modern geometer reject that proof? Well, Euclid doesn't prove that FC falls within the angle BCD. If FC came down here (F') then obviously the interior angle would be greater than the exterior opposite. The whole is greater than the part again only you get the contrary conclusion. How does he know that FC falls within that angle? There is no proof for it in euclidean terms. However, by an imaginative experiment -the thought experiment, as they call it, is simply a matter of imagining- you can see that FC does de facto have to fall in that angle. Why? Well, imagine we have rods and that they are linked with rings in the right way so that the construction and all the parts in the construction will remain observed and start moving. As you move B over F will start moving over. But you can see that B can't get to the line ACD before F does, and you can also see that B will get away from this line quicker than F does. (You have to use your imaginations on the way these rods will move!) Anyway, that's how you know that the proposition is true and that's how people knew it for over two thousand years before the demonstrators came along with a different set of axioms and postulates.

Insight occurs with regard to sensible data, sensible presentations. I have given three examples, the circle, the equilateral triangle, the exterior angle. There are all sorts of instances in the euclidean presentation of geometry in which there occur casual insights that are necessary for the argument, that are true on euclidean presuppositions, that can be axiomatized, formalized if one goes about it the right way, but Euclid didn't go about it that way. Now, that fact that I have been illustrating from Euclid... from our point of view it illustrates the fact of insight into phantasms, namely, understanding occurs with respect to sensible data, imaginative data. As Aristotle put it in his DE ANIMA as quoted on the frontespiece of Insight "that the forms are understood by the intellective principle in phantasms,

images." Aristotle had hold of a fundamental point when he spoke of understanding occurring with respect to imaginative representations. You have the same thing in St. Thomas. For example, in the Summa Theologiae I.q.84, a.7. We can't understand anything at all in this life no matter how perfect<sup>ly</sup> you know your science, how perfect a habit you have without an image. Understanding is what occurs with respect to images and it is only after you've understood that you are able to define or that you are able to set down a set of definitions and postulates, a hypothesis or a theory. Definition, hypothesis, theory are in the conceptual field, in the order of thought and they result from an act of understanding.

Now, that is an attempt to convey to you the experience of understanding, to describe the circumstances under which it occurs.

An incidental remark. The reason why the modern mathematicians go into mathematical logic, a symbolic logic is that they want to know exactly what they are presupposing. When they get off into this stratosphere they have to be absolutely aware of everything they are presupposing; they can't tolerate the possibility of casual insights coming along and giving them right results and they don't know the basis of their results. To eliminate the possibility of casual insights they use symbolic or mathematical logic which runs on its own like a machine. No intelligence involved at all. It is simply a matter of manipulating the symbols according to the rules and it keeps things tight and rigorous. If you want further illustrations of insight I can only refer you to my book, namely, I give illustrations from mathematics, physics and from common sense, three fields in which insights occur continuously. The difference between a man's being stupid and intelligent is that insights occur rarely or easily and frequently. But insight is the keypoint in intellectual development.

c) Aristotelian-Thomist expression of the notion of insight

Now we have to consider two ways of formulating just what happens when you understand. I have given a few examples, a couple of instances. But what is it that you know when you understand? For example, we say that the proper object of sight is colour. And you can find out what seeing is quite easily. You just open or close your eyes and you see and don't see. And you can have colour pointed out to you,, and you can correlate seeing and colour. And when you have that correlation clear you are aware of what the experience seeing is and not seeing and aware of colour by looking at it. You can go



on and add that sight also has a common object, something known by other senses, -motion and rest, number, shape and size. Objecta sensibilia communia they are called. Common sensibles. What is it that stands to understanding as colour stands to sight? That's a 64 dollar question! And there are two ways of going about the answer to that question. One way is the Aristotelian-Thomist way which was through developing a logic and a metaphysics, and the other way is to relate understanding, the experience, your experience of understanding to other activities, to other cognitional activities that go on within you, such as, -we have related it to imagination and to sense and conception- to relate it to enquiry, reflection, judgement, willing(?), to study the psychological structure of the knower. So there are two approaches: one by relating the act of understanding to the internal psychological structure of the knower, the other to try and pick out what the object of the act of understanding is. And that was the way Aristotle went about it, and you can -this is an interpretation of Aristotle, of course, but I think it makes sense- see that the meaning of the logic and the meaning of the metaphysics is an attempt to state in terms of objects what it is that you know if and when you understand.

First of all then let me present the Aristotelian Thomist approach to state in general terms what happens when you understand and then later we 'll go on to the other approach. We will find that the two are connected with the two views of science. And as we see how the two are connected we 'll be able also to relate the two views of science and we 'll be able to move on to the problem of integration. First of all then, to make more explicit this business of the Arist.-Thomist expression of the content of the act of understanding/ we have acquired some familiarity with the act of understanding from three examples. (Some people may say, "Why geometrical examples? I never could do geometry?" Well, the answer is unless one takes a sharply defined field such as mathematics or geometry or physics one doesn't know just what one has understood, whether one has understood anything or not. By taking these examples with the chance that you wouldn't be familiar with them you'd have the experience of learning something and you could pinpoint just what you had learned and just what all the implications of that were. You can compare a modern presentation of euclidean geometry with Euclid's and the thing is all worked out in detail.) Now with regard to the Arist. Thom. formulations, systematic formulations, systematic context for the act of understanding.....In the first place I started from experience, but so did Saint Thomas. Some people say we know our own minds by analogy. Just as we see with our eye so there is a spiritual eye inside our heads by

when we look at universals. And that's knowing one's mind by analogy. That is not the procedure we have used. We have been aiming at proper knowledge not analogous knowledge of our own intellect. And we have appealed to the experience of an act of understanding. To see precisely why that triangle is an equilateral triangle and why the exterior angle is greater than the interior opposite. The Summa q.84,a.7 he states:

"Anyone can experience in himself that whenever he tries to understand something he forms in his imagination some images by way of examples in which he, as it were inspects, sees by inspection what he is trying to understand."

"quilibet in seipso experiri potest, quod quando aliquis conatur aliquid intelligere, format aliqua phantasmata sibi per modum exemplorum, in quibus quasi inspiciat quod intelligere studet."

Saint Thomas is appealing to an experience that he says is absolutely universal. Whenever you try to understand...

Again, in the Summa Theologiae I.q.88, a.1. He is talking of the knowledge of the separate substances and he says:

"According to the opinion of Aristotle which is more in accord with experience..."

"Sed secundum Aristotelis sententiam, quam magis experimur, intellectus noster secundum statum praesentis vitae naturalem respectum habet ad naturas rerum materialium: unde nihil intelligit nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata...."

Not from the analogy from the corporeal eye there's a spiritual eye; it isn't a question of analogy at all, it is a question of experience and Aristotle's view fits in better with experience.

Again, in I. q.88, a.1. (following on the above quotation):

"Et sic manifestum est quod substantias immateriales, quae sub sensu et imaginatione non cadunt, primo et per se secundum modum cognitionis nobis expertum intelligere non possumus."

Contra Gentiles, Bk II. c.76 -and if you use the Loeb edition and count the paragraphs then par. 17- he says:

"Man abstracts, for otherwise we wouldn't know anything about abstraction from phantasms or the reception of intelligibles in act unless we had experience of it."

"homo enim species abstrahit a phantasmatibus et recipit mente intelligibilia acti; non enim aliter in notitiam harum actionum venissemus, nisi eas in nobis experiremur."

When Thomas is talking about abstraction from phantasms he isn't talking about some

metaphysical sausage machine in your head that starts from the sensible data and something goes on that is perfectly unconscious and at the end you have a universal concept you take a look at. No! He says we wouldn't talk about abstraction from phantasms unless we experienced it. We wouldn't talk about the reception of intelligibles in act unless we experienced it. It is a question then of not analogous knowledge based upon sense but proper knowledge based upon experience.

In the Commentary on the DE ANIMA in Bk III, 1.9 (par. 724 in the manual editions) he says:

"Just a moment ago the Philosopher, that is, Aristotle examined the nature of  
.....?"

....there exists in Aristotle and St. Thos. the appeal to experience. Moreover, there is a technique. They don't call it introspection but they had an explicitly formulated technique. .II de An., lect. 6 par. 305-308. In the First Chapter of the Second Book of the De Anima Aristotle works out the definition of the soul. He then asks: "How do we know about different souls?" -the souls of plants, the souls of animals, the souls of men?" And he says: "The method is as follows:- (He doesn't use the word method but that's what it comes to.) First of all you pick out the objects and then the acts corresponding to the object and the potencies are known by the acts. From the acts you go to the potencies and from the potencies you know the essence of the soul." Soul in general is the first act of an organic body, actus primus corporis organici vel corporis potentiam vitae habentis. But a specific soul such as the human soul is the first by which we live, sense and understand, primum quo vivimus etc. And the potencies define the essence of the soul. Therefore, not only is there knowledge of objects, -the sound corresponds to hearing, colour corresponds to sight, something we haven't mentioned yet corresponds to understanding. Through these objects you get to pin down the acts, from the acts the potencies, from the potencies the essence of the soul. There is a method there and that method recurs whenever St. Thos. talks about the soul's knowledge of itself. For example in the Summa I. q.87 on the soul's knowledge of itself.....

Summary: So we have in Aristotle and St. Thos. the appeal to experience -we wouldn't know about these things such as abstraction unless we experienced them. Secondly, a technique for examining these experiences. What do you do? You get the object and connect the object up with the act just as colour and sight.

Now, what is the OBJECT of the ACT of UNDERSTANDING?

We said that Aristotle's logic can be interpreted (this is an interpretation of Aristotle, but I think that you are using your head in reading Aristotle and there is nothing against that in principle!) in terms of the act of understanding and his metaphysics can be interpreted as an attempt to formulate the objects of the act of understanding. In the logic he distinguishes three figures of the syllogism but the first one is the real one, the Syllogismos Epistēmōnikos, the scientific syllogism in which the middle term is the reason for, the cause of the predicate being in the subject.

E.g., Why is the moon a sphere? Because it goes through these phases. If the moon were just a disc you'd always see a white round circle no matter where you stood or you wouldn't see any light at all. But if it is a sphere then the light falls on it on one side and as you walk around you see all the phases of the moon. The phases are the reason why you know the moon is a sphere.

Phases supply a middle term that explain the predicate spherical of the moon. Now that "reason why" for predicates being in the subject, that middle term - Aristotle's logic is fundamentally the study of middle terms - regards an act of understanding where the subject is already presupposed. You have to have the concept of moon to start with.

What about the first concept, the concept of the substance? How does Aristotle deal with that? Well, - this is partly from the Posterior Analytic and the final touch is from the Metaphysics - in the Metaphysics Bk Zeta (7 in the Latin commentaries) c. 17, the last chapter, - all during Bk Zeta Aristotle is banging around the question: "What is ousia?" "What is substance?" - he says: "Let's have a final go at it. Let's try again and see if we can pin down just what ousia is!" He explained in the Posterior Analytic that in certain cases the meaning of the question: "what is it?", is just the same as the meaning of the question: "Why is that so?" What is it (ti esti) and diati touto esti are the same question. He gave an example of the eclipse. You can ask what is an eclipse and you will wonder: "Well, what do you want to know when you ask WHAT?" - Socrates had gone around asking people what's this and what's that and they knew perfectly well what the answer was but the "what" part had got them stumped. - Aristotle wanted to pin down the meaning of the what. "What's what?" "What do you mean?"

The question of the eclipse.<sup>cf. interch.</sup> (\*) There is, in some cases at least, an equivalence between the question TI ESTI and DIATI ESTI; QUID SIT & PROPTER QUID ITA SIT:

DIATI & WHY. What means the same thing as why. But does it work when you are using simple terms such as "man"? What is a man? How do you make that into a WHY question? What is a house? How do you break house up so you can say: "Why house?" or "Why man?" How do you get that to make some sense? If you leave it to just one term, man, you can't make sense, but it is quite easy to get another term. Why is THIS a man? Why is THIS ESTI a man? And the answer is he has a soul, a rational soul; he has a human form. And so... "Why is this a house? Why are these timber and stones a house?" Because of the form of the house. The form says that the timbers and stones have been arranged in a certain fashion, according to the idea of a house. That is a DIATI, the reason why the matter is something. DIATI TI ESTI... WHY IS IT SOMETHING? The mere matter of itself isn't anything: in the limit it is prime matter. What makes it into an ens, into a something? It's the form.

Bk Zeta c.17 (The text has been interpolated in various ways; not everything is is certain but the following seems certain.)

First of all, the PRŌTON AITION TOU EINAI, the prima causa essendi, the first cause of being is the WHY IS THIS A MAN, the WHY IS THAT A HOUSE, the FORM. The form that comes to the matter is the causa essendi. It is the OUSIA in Bk Zeta -he changes his tune in the text Bk where he starts talking about the ousia as the compound, the SUNALON, but in Bk Zeta it is the form that is the ousia. And it is also the PHUSIS, the nature. What are phusis, causa essendi, ousia, form, to ti ēn einai. The definition -to ti ēn einai, what is it. But Aristotle has another queer thing, the TO TI ĒN EINAI. This to ti ēn einai is the form. It makes the matter into a something. (It isn't universally that in Aristotle. At times it is just the universal content, the fundamental universal content. But it also seems form.) The soul is the to ti ēn einai tō triōdi sōmati, the what it was to be for such a body. One of the definitions of the soul in the beginning of the Second Book of the De Anima.

What am I trying to say? I'm trying to say very briefly this. You can take Aristotle's ~~xxxxxx~~ Logic and his Metaphysics and his Psychology and find them trying to express the object that is known in as much as you understand. Just as in these three diagrams you got hold of an idea, you understood something, something clicked, something that if Euclid had worked out his geometry with perfect rigour should have put down in axioms and postulates, so when you understand ~~xxxxxxxx~~ an organic body the sensible data stand to the act of understanding as matter to form. Insight stands

to bridge the form to matter and the development in Aristotle of those two notions was simultaneous. He thought of form and matter to express what he got hold of when he understood. In any case, this much is certain, namely, there is a solidarity, a functional unity between, on the one hand, the act of understanding in Aristotle and on the other hand, the metaphysical expression of the object of the understanding. What do you know when you understand? You know the quod quid erat esse, the what it was to be. You know the form, you know the causa essendi. Those terms develop in Aristotle -I've been trying to say be able to express what you know when you understand- but at least, they develop in functional unity with his grasp of the act of understanding. You know the act by the object and the object by the act. The object that corresponds, the metaphysical statement of the object that corresponds to the act of understanding is form in the Aristotelian sense, the "what you know when you understand". What is form? It's what you know when you understand.

Now, to pearl off what I have said...

I introduced the experience of an act of understanding. I showed or tried to indicate how the object, the attempt to express systematically the object of that understanding can be tied up with Aristotle's Logic, his explanatory syllogism and his prolongations into a metaphysics. What we'll have to do the next time is show how a different approach can be used to make exactly the same statements with this difference that, where Arist. himself expressions uses, has to use a metaphysics, develop a metaphysics simultaneously, on this other approach we needn't develop our metaphysics until later on. We can develop our account of knowledge in such a manner that we'll have foundations for metaphysics or anything else we want to deal with.

To come to the conclusion...

Knowledge of knowledge is, in a certain sense, knowledge of the objects of knowledge, and consequently, knowledge of knowledge, qua, (in as much as) it is knowledge of the objects of knowledge is a sort of basis for the integration of the sciences.

LECTURE III

.....I'll give you my interpretation of the Thomist account of the process of abstraction. You have intellectus agens, phantasm, sense, possible intellect, species impressa, actus intelligendi, verbum, definition.

Intellectus agens: metaphysically, intellectus agens; psychologically, WONDER..the spirit of enquiry( What is it? Why do you say that?), not as put in those words but the impulse that leads to enquiry.

The image: The image gives you the matter. The act of understanding is not simply a repetition of that matter; it is an understanding of it, it is a grasp of form with respect to that matter. What you grasp in the diagram of the circle.....(cut).....  
.....

We raised the question of the learning process in quite general terms. We tried to communicate the experience of an insight and the problem of formulating just what ~~happens~~ an insight is, what object (?) is grasped in an insight. The first level is simply experience in particular cases and we took the circle, the equilateral triangle and the exterior angle of a triangle. I then tried to suggest that you view(?) Aristotelian logic as an expression of what happens ~~when~~ in an insight: the middle term explaining the predicate, and in the limit, the middle term as accounting for the subject, for the first subject such as man or house or any simple term - not merely when you start out with the substance and then add one property and then another property using the first property as the middle term: the question remains, "well, where do you get the idea of the subject, where does the subject come from?" And you have the insight as promoting the experience of the matter, of the sensible data to the level of a THING which provides you with the subject of the syllogism such that the insight corresponds to what Aristotle calls the first cause of being, the reason why it is something, the reason why these data are not merely data but something. And you see that by that analysis of the subject one steps from logical analysis into metaphysics. The causa essendi, the form is the reason why this matter is a man or those stones and timbers are a house.

a) A new and contemporary context

Now what we want to attempt today is to equate the experience of this insight in an entirely different context; not in a context of logic and metaphysics but in a context of cognitional theory. The reason for that attempt is that metaphysics gives rise to

endless disputed questions and the whole meaning of the logic and metaphysics as the expression of the object of the insight gets lost. The critical problem is not merely a problem of arguing with Idealists and Empiricists. Speculative theology in particular is strangled by an endless supply of disputed questions. And at the present time when in theology so much attention has to be paid to historical questions, the interpretation of the Old and New Testaments, of the Fathers, of the Councils, of the theologians, of the heretics... the load imposed by having a host of disputed questions with no answer to them is something that is destroying Dogmatic Theology. Unless we can solve our critical problem, eliminate at the root, get to the root of all these disputed questions the theologian is under a terrific handicap. Consequently, I shall speak to you in this first lecture, first of all, on the IDEA OF STRUCTURE, secondly, of CONDITIONAL STRUCTURE, thirdly, of the STRUCTURE OF OBJECTIVITY and in the second lecture, perhaps, I will be able to get on to the discussion of the PROCESS FROM PRESENCE TO SELF TO KNOWLEDGE OF SELF, from consciousness to self affirmation.

i) The idea of structure

First of all, with regard to the notion of structure, it seems a very modern word. As a matter of fact it is the old idea of the whole and the part. Parts may be material. You arrive at material parts by division. E.g., a piece of pie, a slice of meat are material parts. A semi-circle is a material part: first of all, you have to define a circle and then you cut it in two by division and you get a semi-circle. A semi-circle can be defined only as half a circle. Now, drop aside material parts and stick to formal parts or functional parts. In a pie the functional parts are the crust and the filling; the crust contains and the filling is contained. And you can express that in a proportion:-

"Crust is to filling as container to contained". Crust and filling are formal or functional parts in a pie. In a clock... a person can be able to take a clock apart and follow a diagram and put the clock together again without understanding anything. He is dealing simply with material parts. "What's inside the clock?" "The works, the wheels." If one understands the clock then one thinks of the main spring as a source of energy, the wheels as a series of levers that reduce the force of the spring to a minute fraction of itself, the escapement is a little gate, - on one side it slows the pendulum forward and on the other side it locks off the mainspring, the pendulum is a constant oscillator, the pendulum causes the movement of the clock to be a uniform movement. "What is a clock



piece?" "Why is a time piece a time piece?" It's a uniform movement. The spring causes the movement, the pendulum causes it to be a constant movement at a constant rate. It doesn't run fast in the morning and slow in the afternoon because the pendulum always goes back and forth at the same period. When you understand the clock as composed of a source of power and of a series of levers and an escapement <sup>as</sup> and the cause of constant movement you are understanding the parts. The parts are promoted from something you merely see to something you understand. That is the notion of the functional part.

The functions of the parts are partial and complementary. A pendulum is not a clock, yet it's part of a clock. And you can't predicate the part of the whole or the whole of the part. There is a further point to be noted. When functions are partial and complementary... a pendulum isn't enough, you need something else; a pendulum and a spring are not enough, they complement one another the spring causing the movement and the pendulum making it constant, but you need some further parts with other functions because the spring can't act directly on the pendulum. But this process doesn't go on to infinity... you get a rounded whole, a complete set of functions, an internal and complete set of partial and complementary functions. Each is related to all the others and each complements what the others do. And the whole is precisely that internal closure of the partial and complementary functions of the parts. And what does the word STRUCTURE mean? Structure can be used abstractly or concretely. Abstractly structure denotes the internally closed set of relations between the parts: concretely the structure is the set of parts, the complete set of parts as informed by those relations, and consequently, the structure is the same thing as the whole qua whole, the whole plus the reason why it is a whole. "What makes the clock the whole clock?" Because you have all the partial and complementary functions fulfilled.

Now, that notion is familiar to you from your ontology. What are matter and form? They are parts in the ontological constitution of material things. The form of this dog stands to its matter as the form of that dog stands to its matter. You have a proportion. A proportion is a brief way of expressing the relation of formal parts to one another. Aristotle therefore used structural analysis in his ontology. Saint Thomas took the further step. The essence of this horse is to its existence as the essence of that horse is to its existence. Again you have two parts of one thing compared to two parts of the other thing and the

relations in the two cases are the same.

That notion of structure is relevant not only to ontological analysis but also to cognitional analysis and that is why we are interested in the question of structure. One can go on to distinguish isomorphic and analogous structures and dynamic and static structures and so on but we can miss that for the moment.

ii) Cognitional Structure

Cognitional structure is opposed to cognitional Atomism. An ontological atomist will say: "prime matter either is a thing or it is nothing." Any Aristotelian will say: "it is neither a thing nor nothing; there's something in between, there's the ens quo, a principle by which a thing is constituted as a thing."


(...That's O.K. I take it then! In ontology the difference between atomism and a doctrine of structure. One can say existence either is a thing or it is nothing.

No! It is neither a thing nor nothing. It is a constitutive principle of a thing...) Similarly, in a cognitional theory an atomist will say: "seeing is knowing, hearing is knowing, understanding is knowing, judging is knowing, thinking is knowing, they are all knowing. Either they are all knowing or they have nothing to do with cognitional activity." And that is a cognitional atomism. "What do you know when you think?" "You know the possibles. Real possibles. You have to be knowing something, otherwise it wouldn't be a cognitional activity. Cognitional, knowing denotes a common feature to be had in all instances of cognitional activity, and if those common features are not found in any instance then that is not a cognitional activity."

On the other hand, if a person holds that knowledge is a structure of cognitional activity then he will not say that seeing is knowing or that hearing is knowing or that enquiring is knowing or that imagining is knowing or that understanding is knowing or that thinking is knowing. They'll all be like prime matter or form or existence. They'll all be parts within a whole. They'll be cognitional in so far as they are parts within the whole. Consequently, on the view that our knowing is a structured set of activities knowing is had when there is the structured set. It is not when you experience or when you understand or when you answer: "Yes!" to a question or "No!" Is the answer to the question QUID SIT, is that knowing? Or is the answer to the question AN SIT, is that knowing? Or is it only when you have both together? The atomist will say you know

FIGURE 3

ONTOLOGICAL ANALYSIS



when you answer the question QUID SIT, and you have another act of knowing when you answer the question AN SIT. But if one holds a structural theory of knowing he will say that you know only when you answer both questions. Otherwise you only have a partial component within knowing. Just as a pendulum is not a clock so experiencing is not knowing. Just as the wheels are not a clock, the series of levers are not a clock so understanding is not knowing, and just as the spring is not a clock so judgement isn't knowing. But all together in a given instance are an instance of knowing. Just as in the ontological order prime matter isn't a thing, material form isn't a thing, existence isn't a thing, but all three together give you a thing.

What we have been doing then is taking out of the ontology the notion of structure, putting it in general terms np., a structure is an internally closed set of partial and complementary functions, and applying it to our cognitional activity. And you have then the opposition between the two views of what human knowing is. On the one view there are a set of activities that each one is equally knowing because each one has the common features that make up the definition of knowing. On the other view, each one, each of the activities by itself is not knowing. Thinking is not knowing. When you think of a universal triangle, the universal triangle.. does it exist? It doesn't not-exist! Well, you know it doesn't exist; no universal exists. But if you think that thinking either is knowing or else it is not a cognitional activity at all, it 's just like sneezing or being tickled, then you 'll have to say if thinking is knowing: "well, you must be knowing something, there must be something known that the universal triangle....." And so on all along the line. On the structural analysis thinking is not knowing, it is a component in knowing. When it combines with the other activities you get an instance of knowing and otherwise you do not.

Now, we have to apply that to our transformation from an ontological analysis of cognitional activity to a structural analysis of cognitional activity. St. Thos. says that whenever you understand anything you imagine examples, so we give you a schematic diagram.(Fig. 3). First of all, on the ontological analysis:-

Intellectus agens, sense, imagination, intellectus possibilis which receives, species impressa, act of understanding, verbum incomplexum, definition, theory, hypothesis (a hypothesis is a set of definitions plus a few axioms and postulates), the act of reflective understanding (intellectus agens also leads to the further verbum in which we say:

"that is so!" or "that is not so!")?


In Saint Thomas you will find explicitly intellectus agens, sense, phantasm, intellectus possibilis, species (he doesn't use the word impressa but that is what he means), the act of understanding, the verbum incomplexum, the verbum complexum, the composition vel divisio per affirmationem vel negationem. The act of reflective understanding appears in St. Thos. in so far as he speaks of the judgement being true when you properly effect the reductio ad principia.

Now, in that analysis of cognitional activity he is presupposing a whole metaphysics. The difference between agent and possible intellect is a difference in potency; one is an active potency, the other is a passive potency. The species impressa is a form, an intentional form of the object (the esse intentionale(?) is the result of your understanding). The image is an instrument employed by agent intellect to impress the species on the possible intellect. The act of understanding follows from the form as a body's fall is what results from the form gravitas in Aristotelian physics. The act of understanding produces the definition and similarly, the act of reflective understanding produces the judgement. Throughout the analysis presupposes a metaphysics. And if there are disputed questions in the metaphysics eo ipso, sheer necessity, all the disputed questions recur in the psychology. What we want is to take the same fact, the same psychological fact and express it without the metaphysics. And what we have done is to take the structure of the metaphysics, the notion of structure in metaphysics, we generalized it to a pure notion of structure, and now we apply the notion of structure to events that can be identified in consciousness. (What consciousness is we'll go on to later on; how you introspect and what that means) But first of all under pressure of the brief time at our disposal we'll give you the FEEL of what there is to be found, of what the words mean.

There is the intellectus agens. Aristotle also says that WONDER, to thaumathein, is the beginning of all science and philosophy. The difference between the state of consciousness of the man lying on the beach with the bright sun pouring down on him-and he, perhaps, sees the clouds go by but he doesn't see anything more, he isn't wondering about anything,- and in the second place, the state of consc. when you become intellectually alert,-some question comes to mind, something starts to puzzle him, to perplex him. He is in the state of wonder. He is not merely sensing. We have sense experience which is fairly easy to identify. The whole problem in

FIGURE 4

STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS



cognitive analysis is to discover that there is something else there besides sense. What are we looking for when we are looking for intellect? We are usually looking for something like a sensation and it is Nothing like a sensation. (Fig. 4).

This state of wonder leads to the formation of images that simplify the sensitive data, that throw it into schematic constellations digestible for limited human understanding and there occur acts of insight. They may not occur as vividly as they did to Archimedes when he shouted: "I've got it!" and ran out of the baths of Syracuse along the streets with the great Archimedes. But when you understand something something happens, and you know something 's happened. You mayn't be able to say it 's an insight. Archimedes probably wasn't able to say he had an insight but what got him so excited is what we are talking about.

The insight looks for expression, for formulation, and an adequate formulation is not easy. Really what you need is a whole series of insights and a central formulation to express it(?). Euclid gathered together the previous insights of the Greeks in the geometry into an ordered build up of geometry. He didn't do quite a perfect job as we say yesterday. He didn't hit on a completely adequate formulation. But if you have the insights without any attempt at formulation they come and they go. "I had a bright idea but I just don't know what it was!" This formulation is just thinking. It is not knowing what is possible and it is not knowing ~~xxxxxx~~ what is necessary, it is not knowing a priori and it is not knowing a posteriori. It is not knowing at all. It is thinking, and thinking isn't the same as knowing. The insight isn't knowing. It is not knowing form and it is not knowing causa essendi. It is grasping an idea, and grasping an idea may turn out to be a component in knowing but of itself it is like the pendulum in a clock. The insight isn't knowing; the pendulum is not a clock. Sensing isn't knowing, imagining isn't knowing.

Because thinking isn't knowing you get the further question, the reflective question: "Is that so?" "Are you certain?" Now, the ordinary expression for what happens ... ?... for what I call the reflective insight is that one marshals the evidence, one weighs it, one finds it sufficient and the sufficient evidence qua sufficient grounds the judgement. And that is a beautiful collection of metaphors! How do you marshal the evidence? Is the evidence like troops? Where are the scales

on which you weigh it? What do you mean when you say that you marshal the evidence? that you weigh the evidence? How much evidence is sufficient? You're certain you are sitting in this room with those books in front of you and the pencil or pen in your hand. You are absolutely certain; the evidence is sufficient. -How much is that? When have you got sufficient evidence? What on earth does that mean?

I worked out in Insight in chapter 10 a formulation that I think holds in all instances of what precisely is grasped(? happening) when we do what we call grasping the sufficiency of the evidence as sufficient. And I expressed it in terms of the UNCONDITIONED. The unconditioned may be FORMALLY unconditioned; it has no conditions of any kind whatever. And that unconditioned is God and only God. Only God has no conditions of any kind whatever. There is also the VIRTUALLY unconditioned. It has conditions but those conditions are fulfilled. And any contingent being is a virtually unconditioned. It has conditions but the conditions happen to be fulfilled. I happen to be in Dublin at the moment. The conditions had to be fulfilled before I got here. A whole series of conditions...a trip in the plane, a successful trip on the condition that the plane didn't flop, and so on and so forth. When the conditions are all fulfilled the conditioned becomes a virtually unconditioned.

That notion of the virtually unconditioned is an interpretation of syllogism.

If A, then B.  
But A.  
Therefore B.

A and B each stand for one or more propositions.

In the major B is presented as a conditioned -if A, then B.

In the minor the conditions are given as fulfilled -but A.

And when you think of the argument as a virtually unconditioned the function of the syllogism is to present the conclusion B as a virtually unconditioned; something that has conditions np., A, which however are fulfilled and so B becomes a virtually unconditioned.

Note that on that interpretation syllogism is not a tool of scepticism. If you think of the syllogism... "Ah, yes! You prove the conclusion if you have the major and the minor and to prove the minor you need two more premises and for each of them you need two more and for each of them two more and so on."



And similarly with regard to the major. You go off to infinity if you think of proving the premises. But if you think of the syllogism as an expression of the virtually unconditioned then the whole attention centres on B.

Now I believe, and I gave a series of instances in the 10th chapter of Insight, that any act of reflective understanding, any instance in which we grasp the sufficiency of the evidence qua sufficient can be formulated in terms of the virtually unconditioned. By that I do not mean that every judgement is an inference, an explicit inference in which the major is a true judgement and the minor is a true judgement. The major may be simply something within the structure of knowing. The minor may simply be sensible data, or the minor may again be simply the data of consciousness. There is a process from the data to the thought and the subjecting of it to the question: "Is that so?" When you have a thought submitted, subjected to the question: "Is that so? Are you certain? Mightn't you be wrong?", the thought is transformed into a conditioned. Between these two points there is a process that is directed by your intelligence and your rationality. And your intelligence and rationality as directing the process from the data to the "is that so?" is the link between the conditions, the data, and the conditioned, the what you ask is that so about. And so in the general case, any judgement can be taken as presenting a virtually unconditioned because, in the last analysis, the fulfillment of the conditions are the data of sense or consciousness and the conditioned is a product of the process from the data to the conditioned you are thinking and asking about.

The step I've been attempting to make is from a metaphysical analysis of cognitional activity to a purely structural analysis in which no ontological terms occur. We 'll be able to build up our metaphysics critically on the basis of an exact account of what our knowing is if we don't mix in the metaphysics with the account of the cognitional process.

Now, I've spoken of a structure of cognitional activity, and we 'll leave it at that. I have a third step to take. Structure, Cognitional Structure, -and the third step is a Structure of Objectivity.

### iii) Structure Of Objectivity

What do you mean by a statement's being objective? A judgement's being objective?

Three types of criteria occur when we say this or that is not objective. (Note that the cognitional analysis in terms of structure doesn't say anything about objectivity. Structure is the internally closed set of relations between functional parts. Objectivity asks about the relation between the structure and what is known. Metaphysical and causal analysis examines the structure in terms of potency, form and act and efficient and final and instrumental causality. We suppose cognitional structure and ask about objectivity, its relations to something else.) And we say objectivity means three entirely different things. E.g., someone says my hand is white. I say: "look!" What am I doing? I simply present the data. I don't argue in any way whatever. I ask you to use your eyes. It is an EXPERIENTIAL objectivity. The paper is obviously white but my hand isn't the same colour as the paper. But I do not put the argument. I just draw your attention. Again someone says: "No valid proposition regards all classes." Russell's postulate has been expressed in that form. If someone makes the postulate then someone says: "Your postulate is a proposition, it regards all classes, therefore, it is not valid!" An entirely different approach to the question of objectivity. It is in terms of norms, of necessities. If a proposition contradicts itself or makes itself out to be invalid it cannot be objective. That type of criterion is entirely different to the criterion I employed before; I simply said: "Look!" There's a third meaning to the word objectivity and it is an ABSOLUTE objectivity in concrete matters of fact. E.g., you are in the woods and your companion says: "Look! A wolf!" You say: "Are you absolutely certain? Mightn't it be a dog?" You ask for absolute certainty; not about something that involves a contradiction or a non contradiction. It is not a mathematical question at all, it is a question of this particular animal that you are looking at and you want absolute certainty. "Are you absolutely certain?" "Mightn't it be a dog?" It isn't a question simply of looking as in the first case.

We have three types of objectivity then, -EXPERIENTIAL, NORMATIVE (that appeals to rules about contradictions, methods and canons of method, logic and so on), and in the third place an ABSOLUTE objectivity. Which is the REAL objectivity?

...I'll leave it there. You can answer that question while you are having your coffee...!

#### LECTURE IV

I am trying to point out that the term objectivity or objective seems to be used in three entirely different senses. A purely experiential type of objectivity which appeals to a look: you tell a person to look. A logical, normative type of objectivity which argues to the statement of internally incoherent or something else like that. And thirdly, an absolute objectivity in contingent matters of fact. The wolf needn't exist and if some animal does exist it needn't be a wolf and so you ask the man if he is absolutely certain.

Now, that there should be three entirely different meanings to the word objectivity, three entirely different types of criteria invoked involves no surprise if you hold that knowing is a structure of different kinds of activities, that the different kinds fit together the way the different parts of a clock fit together. The whole is knowing but none of the parts by itself is knowing because each of the parts has its own special type of objectivity. Just as we said of knowing that it was a structure of experiencing, enquiring, imagining -to simplify the experience-, insight, thought, reflection, unconditioned or virtually unconditioned and judgement. The knowing doesn't consist in any one of these parts itself or any two or three, it is the structure of experiencing, understanding, judging. Experiential objectivity regards the first part. E.g., If I see in the wall a crack and an enormous spider come out of it I'd be having an hallucination. People do have hallucinations of that type. The datum is perfectly valid, -not, however, for biology but for abnormal psychology; the abnormal psychologist has to explain it, not the biologist.- It is given. You have the experiential type of objectivity. The absolute objectivity is obviously connected with the virtually unconditioned and the judgement. "Are you absolutely certain?" If you have an unconditioned you have an absolute, and if you have an unconditioned your assent is unconditional and what you assent to is unconditioned. You can be absolutely certain it's a wolf, or a dog and not a wolf at all. And in between the two, between the experiencing and the virtually unconditioned there is process and that process is subject to norms. The normative objectivity regards that process. Consequently, just as there is a structure in the knowing, so also there is a structure in the meaning of the word objectivity.

What do you mean when you say it's objective? Well, you can use the word objective simply as an intensive. When I say know-

ledge is objective I mean that really and truly it is knowledge. That's objective knowing. It's merely and intensive. It's an undifferentiated use of the word. But when you appeal to specific criteria with regard to particular statements then you appeal to different kinds of objectivity. The objectivity that is grounded in data is settled merely by taking a look. Someone says my hand is white. I hold it up. You see it is pink. But I don't have to say anything about it's colour. You just present the datum. "No valid proposition regards all classes." This is a proposition and it regards all classes, therefore it is invalid. A different type of objectivity. That is a normative objectivity that governs the process from experiencing to the judgement. Again, "this is a wolf!" "Are you absolutely certain?" The absolute objectivity evolves on the third level of reflection and the virtually unconditioned and the judgement.

Now, because objectivity is split up into three kinds the three, nonetheless, form a single objectivity. The virtually unconditioned, as we saw, involves a link between the conditions and the conditioned....IF---THEN, the fulfillment of the conditions and the absolute objectivity that results. The absolute objectivity you have in the virtually unconditioned. The fulfillment of the conditions you have from the experience. The link between the conditions and the conditioned is the normative objectivity. The three of them together constitute a single objectivity just as the many activities together constitute a single instance of knowing. And when you break objectivity up into experiential, normative and absolute to see how they fit together into a single structure you have a differentiated notion of objectivity.

While one can arrive at a differentiated and integrated notion of objectivity it is also possible that one doesn't, that one thinks simply of one kind of objectivity that tries to account for the whole of knowledge in virtue of one kind. If the only kind of objectivity that one is willing to think about when one uses the word objective is experiential objectivity then one will be philosophically an EMPIRICIST. If it's experience, well, then that's all we have in knowing. And the parts of knowing that aren't experience...well, what about them? They're subjective. Inquiry and insight and thought and reflection and virtually unconditioned and judgement...that's what goes on inside your head. That isn't knowing. It is useful. You get scientific theories that way, but in so far as a scientific theory is knowing

it simply enables you to go from these data to produce these other desirable data. But it can't be objective because it is not experience and the objective means experiential. So we can see how the failure to differentiate the different elements in objectivity, to pick out just one and neglect the others, will cause a collapse in the structure of knowing. Some one element will be picked out as constitutive of objectivity and the others will have to be forced into the shade.

Again, to take another example of picking out one ~~element~~ element. If one thinks of objectivity as simply a matter of normative objectivity one gets an IDEALISM. What the idealist means is not that you don't know anything. That isn't the idea of idealism. The idea of idealism is that knowing is not the sort of thing you think it is. You think knowing is knowing ABOUT something. The idealist says no. It is knowing because the process occurs in the right way. If your process goes on in the right way then it is knowing in the idealist sense of knowing. And why does he pick out just this one element of your process going on in the right way? Because the only objectivity he can think of as knowledge is the normative objectivity. Experiential objectivity, the empiricists get into all sorts of difficulties and the idealists do a beautiful job in refuting empiricism. They show that the empiricist can't even say what his own doctrine is in terms merely of experience. All he can do is experience the way an animal does. But the idealist at least wants to be a man. He studies formal logic. He goes on to work out a transcendental logic too on the possibility of experience. And what satisfies the transcendental logic is valid experience. Is it valid experience because you know something? Well, not in the ordinary sense. You have to be critical. The only possible meaning for objectivity is normative objectivity as expounded in the formal logic and that transcendental that reveals the conditions of the possibility of experience. And so you get the critical idealism of Kant. Or one can with Hegel say that, after all, for Kant knowledge of the world and of human civilisations and so on was a matter of a snuff box here and a candlestick there, and we want to understand the universe and develop instead of the transcendental logic a dialectical logic; Kant's transcendental logic is on the level of understanding and we want something up to the level of reason. What is Hegel's dialectical logic? It sets norms to express an objectivity. Again, we have a case. What do the idealists do? They pick out one type of objectivity and make it function for everything and they get an original notion of what knowing is.

That analysis of objectivity also has a bearing on the problem of REALISM. There are all sorts of realists. There are the thomists and the scotists, the followers of Occam, the followers of Suarez and so on, all along the line. Aristotle seems to have been a realist, too. And they don't mean the same thing when they are talking about anything. How do you get the different realisms? Supposing you don't pay any attention to this notion of cognitional structure. Then every activity has to be an instance of knowing, else it isn't a cognitional. ~~activity~~ When you see, that's knowing; when you understand, that's knowing; when you think, that's knowing; ..etc. Listen to the consequences if you suppose that thinking is knowing. You think of a universal therefore, you know the universal. Is the universal then ante rem, vel in re, vel post rem, only in the mind or is it just the flatus vocis? The medieval problem of universals comes right out of the idea that thinking is knowing. And what makes it a problem is that when you make the judgement: "Universals don't exist!" You can think about the first unicorn. That's a particular unicorn, the first one. You know it doesn't exist. What do you know when you think about it, then? Thinking has to be knowing, I'm a cognitional atomist. If thinking has to be knowing then the first unicorn has to be the possible first unicorn, a reality of the possible order. (.....cut.....)

Gilson had a great deal of trouble with the concept of existence. He wanted to separate the existential judgement from the attributive or predicative judgement. And he wanted to have knowledge of existence only in the judgement. And that's perfectly true. You arrive at knowledge when you arrive at the judgement in any case so it's also true with regard to existence. But he wanted to have that so at least for existence, and he didn't want to have to admit any concept of existence. Why not? Well, if you conceive existence you don't get any difference between existence and essence. But there obviously is a concept of existence. You ask: "Does it exist?" And before you know the answer you are at least using the notion "exist" to put the question. You have a concept of existence but that concept is merely thinking, it is not knowing.

Again, if one is a cognitional atomist, experiencing, seeing, hearing, tasting, touching-and above all, touch is putting your hand on something solid-, that is knowing. It is not merely a matter of experiential objectivity. It is also absolute objectivity. You have an absolute manifesting of objective material reality

on the level of sense. You don't have to wait for the judgement to reach any absolute, an unconditioned. The unconditioned is right down on the level of sense, otherwise it wouldn't be properly knowing. And if people hold that, well, what do they do? They provide the occasion for PHENOMENALISM. The phenomenalist comes along and examines his experience and he doesn't find any absolute objectivity in it and he doesn't find any normative objectivity in it. He says it is just experience. And he doesn't bother to look for normative objectivity elsewhere or absolute objectivity elsewhere. The experience is reduced to mere phenomenon. You have the SEMI-PHENOMENALISM of Berkeley. External objects were merely phenomena; esse est percipi. Berkeley inside he really know and he built a metaphysics on that to go off to God. But Hume had the internal as merely phenomenal, too. And where does this phenomenism come from? It comes from the exaggerated claims of cognitional atomists who <sup>want</sup> the level of experience to contain, not merely experiential objectivity - something that's given is given and that's all there is about it-, but they want it to have normative and absolute objectivity as well.

Idealism -first of all you have the cognitional atomists; they were met by the phenomenists who ~~refute~~ refute the exaggerations of the atomists on the one hand, and on the other hand do not restore what belongs elsewhere. Idealism arises as an answer to mere phenomenism. Kant is an answer to Hume. And just as the idealists go on from the phenomenists so the EXISTENTIALISTS go on from the idealists. The idealist has formal logic. transcendental logic of Kant, dialectical logic of Hegel. There are lots of logics. You can throw in mathematical logic, too. There are lots of them. This is normative objectivity. Is normative objectivity the same thing as the logic? The logic is simply the expression of the normative objectivity. The normative objectivity itself is something proper. Logic wasn't entirely new to you the first time you studied logic. Logic wasn't something entirely new after Aristotle wrote his Organon which he knew nothing about beforehand. The process of writing a logic or studying a logic is a process of objectifying, putting in concepts and judgements and words something that is already there. And what is it that is already there? It's the fact that you are intelligent, it's the fact that you are rational. If you enquire, if you wonder, you have an exigence for something intelligible, something that can be understood. That exigence has set criteria with regard to what is

intelligible and what is not intelligible. Your rationality sets criteria with regard to what can be and what cannot be affirmed or denied. On the side of the subject, prior to any objectification in any logic, in any set of canons of method, there is the intelligence in act, there, rationality in act of the subject. And that is the locus of normative objectivity.

The Existentialists throw aside all these logics of the idealist. The existentialists are anti-idealist. They have the subject with his normative exigencies not merely for knowing but also for being, for existing as an intelligent and rational and responsible being. And that subject is tragic. Because they don't know about the structure of knowing and the structure of objectivity they are not able to get out of the subject. Heidegger is open to what is beyond; he is the subject with the exigence for authentic being, he is of it, he wants to get on to the ontological but he hasn't got there yet. You see, therefore, you have more or less boxed the compass on the analysis of objectivity.

#### iv) Process from Presence to Self to Knowledge of Self

We have used the word SUBJECT a couple of times and now that's what we have to get hold of a little more fully.

Structure, cognitional structure, structure of objectivity and the way that structure can break up. When it is merely absolute objectivity one is a SCEPTIC. One is asking everyone: "Prove it to me!" "Give me the proof!" And the man gives you a syllogism. And you say: "Well, give me the proof for the major!" You want another syllogism. "And the proof for the minor!" And then for more premises you want more proofs. You know about absolute objectivity, you know what's required for it but you don't know how to get the answers, how to supply it. You haven't got hold of the reflective act of understanding which supplies the unconditioned. Anyway, some notions on that. Structure, cognitional structure, structure of objectivity, and when the structure comes apart, when it isn't seen as a whole in all its relations the way you can derive seminal ideas -not all the details, circumstances and so on, they can't be derived or deduced, but seminal ideas- on the totally different philosophies that can arise from the different emphases and oversights with regard to knowledge and objectivity.

Now, we want to try and get hold of the notion of the subject, -and it is



the big hurdle.

First of all, what do we mean by the subject? Well, we have spoken of activities. Besides cognitional activities there are practical activities. Loving and hating, desiring and fearing, enjoying and enduring, deliberating, deciding, choosing and sticking to one's resolutions, carrying them out. Both practical and cognitional activities are both psychological activities. And with regard to those activities you can distinguish, on the one hand, SUBJECT, and on the other hand, OBJECT.

E.g., I see colour.

I do the seeing; seeing is the activity; colour is the object.

I understand how to make an equilateral triangle.

I -subject; understand -act; how to make an equilateral triangle, the problem of constructing an equilateral triangle -object.

I love listening to lectures.

I -subject; love -activity; listening to lectures -object.

The meaning is perfectly simple. On one side of the activity you have SUBJECT and at the opposite side you have OBJECT.

Now, that subject is present, and the word present is triply ambiguous. You can say that the statue is present in the courtyard. It is merely local presence; where it is. You can say the object is present to the subject. You are present to me. I see you. The fact that I see you you are present to me. But you couldn't be present to me unless I were present to myself. And that third type is the type with which we are concerned. The presence of the statue in the courtyard is PRESENCE IN; the presence of the object to the subject is PRESENCE TO, and the presence of the subject to himself is a PRESENCE TO, but those two instances of 'presence to' are quite different. And that's the whole catch. The object is present to the subject as spectacle to spectator, but the subject is present to himself not as part of the spectacle. He is present to himself as spectator. If you introspect, well, you may get a spectacle. But you are already present before that and it is that prāpr presence that counts. It is a presence not of a man asleep in his room and dead to the world; he's in the room alright but he isn't present in any psychological sense. The object

is present to the subject but the subject has to be present in a different kind of way for anything to be present to him. And that is a fundamental element in what we shall be talking about, a presence on the side of the subject, the presence of the subject. That is there whenever there is any psychological activity whether cognitional or practical. You are there, not as an object, not as anything thought about, but as what does the thinking, not as anything seen but as what does the seeing -and seeing doesn't occur when you're absent, when you're dead to the world, when you're asleep without a dream. It is not what is understood, it is what understands, not what is affirmed but the one who affirms, not what is grasped as unconditioned but what grasps the unconditioned, not what is questioned but what asks the questions and does so present. (If you get hold of that notion of the subject properly you have passed a big divide.)

That presence of the subject to himself is not homogeneous. There are different kinds of ways in which one is present to oneself, and those different ways build up in a structure. We spoke about the man lying on the beach and enjoying the warmth of the sun. He is empirically conscious -conscious is the same thing as presence in the third sense of presence. Consciousness is always consciousness OF and it is never consciousness of the object. You see the object, hear it, smell it, touch it, taste it, imagine it, understand it, grasp it as unconditioned, affirm it. The cognitional activities regard objects. Consciousness is of the acting subject. It is a presence of the acting subject to himself. And the acting subject qua merely sensing is merely an empirical subject. He is present, he is given, too. The colour is given but so too is the subject. And (the subject) is seeing and it's given in a different kind of way on the other side of the fence from the object. If you try to objectify it you are getting away from it because when it is objectified there is someone looking at it too, and it's the fellow that's doing the looking then that counts as the subject.

Not only is the subject empirically present, he is also intelligently present. The second level of the subject. He asks why and what. He wants to understand; he does understand and in so far as he understands he defines, he puts forth an hypothesis, a theory -"Might it not be this or that?"

There's a third level of the subject. He wants to be absolutely certain, -"Is that true?" The rational subject, the rationally conscious subject.

And if he makes the judgement of value: "This is good stuff! I have to learn this!" "I have to do that!", and so on, he becomes the subject on the fourth level, the responsible subject. By our choices not only do we decide about objects, we decide what sort of people we are to be. We settle ourselves, our own quality. We build up our habits, -something they talk to you about in retreat. The retreat is addressed to the subject on the fourth level, the subject that makes himself the kind of subject he is to be by his choices, the subject that consents.

I've been describing the subject as empirically, intellectually, rationally and responsibly present to himself or conscious. What we have to do now is move from PRESENCE TO SELF to KNOWLEDGE OF SELF. You are empirically, intellectually, rationally, responsibly conscious before you ever heard any of those words used. The fact that we are using the words is part of the process of moving from merely being present to oneself to knowing oneself. Knowing consists in a structure of activities, and just as that structure may occur with regard to sensible experiences so it may occur with respect to the presence of the subject to himself in the whole set of activities. Just as there are the data of sense so there are the data of consciousness. Just as the data of sense are not knowing -they are merely data, merely seeing, merely hearing, not understanding anything yet, not making any judgement yet,- so the fact that you've been present to yourself for a long, long time, except at the time when you're sleeping, is just a first step towards knowing yourself. It is the experiential component. You have yet to ask the question: "What am I?" And you provide yourself with images in which you can have insights and formulate a theory about the subject and the structure of his cognitional and psychological activities and ask: "Is that really so?" and reach the unconditioned and affirm yourself as a subject performing activities in such and such a structure. And when you go through all that rigmarole you've effected the transition from presence to self to knowledge of self. Knowledge is not just one activity it is a structure of activities, cognitional activities, and presence to self is only one component towards knowledge of self.

I started off by saying that presence to oneself is, as it were, ~~experiential~~ experience. That isn't quite accurate. What is called introspection is the business of effecting the transition from the subject as present to himself to some association

with objects. In the process from presence to self to knowledge of self one is objectifying the subject. When one knows oneself one is both the subject that knows and the object that is known. When one is present to oneself without knowing oneself one is the subject that knows but the object can be anything at all. To reach knowledge of self, to make the subject the object as well as subject -he always is the subject, but to make him object as well,- there has to be a transference from the subject as subject to some association with objects so that we are able to deal with through insights and thought, reflection and judgement with the subject as an object.

In that transference that is called INTROSPECTION there are two pitfalls. The first is the PSYCHOLOGICAL FALLACY. This is most easily illustrated when you're reading psychological literature but it can also occur in your own efforts to know yourself. The psychological fallacy is substituting the concept, the definition, the explanation, the judgement for an experience. It is quite obvious, for example, if you are reading a description of an emotion that the description has to be put in concepts and perhaps a bit of explanation thrown in and some judgements. And no one will imagine that the concept is the emotion or that the explanation is the emotion. But when you talk about an act of understanding the confusion very easily occurs. The difference of an experience of understanding something and the concepts psychologists have to use to describe that experience are two different things. In the first ten chapters of Insight I try to acquaint the reader through experience of himself of what his own acts of understanding, direct and reflective, are. If a reader thinks not of his own experiences -he doesn't bother about getting any experiences, or if he gets them he interprets what I say not by his own experience of acts of understanding but by some definition of what understanding is or some explanation. He's in the psychological fallacy. He is substituting concepts for the conceived, explanation for the explained. What we are talking about has to always be the insight qua experienced, not qua defined and so forth.

The other pitfall is the INTROSPECTIVE PARADOX. You want to get hold of an insight, an experience of an insight. If you want to attend to the insight you tend to neglect the object of the insight, and if you neglect the object of the insight .....(..cut.....ten minutes of the lecture lost).

## LECTURE V

We move on to the expression of the nature of our knowledge as an internal structure, and objectivity as a structure and finally, the subject as what is behind the structure. The structure is the link, the structure is a set of activities, each activity regards an object, the subject is what does the regarding, not in any homogeneous fashion -there is a difference between the empirical, the intellectual, the rational and the responsible subject,- and now we have to consider the matter more concretely. People aren't just knowers. We have been speaking of the subject as the subject of cognitional activities, but really that's a particular type of subject. The average man is the man of daily life. You have not simply got a structure of experiencing, enquiring, imagining, understanding, thinking, reflecting, grasping the unconditioned and judging. That is mixedxxx in and forms just a part of a differently structured subject in which practical activities play a very conspicuous and predominant role. Besides purely cognitional activities there are affective acts, loving and hating, desiring and fearing, enjoying and enduring, deliberating, choosing, carrying out one's decisions... and in the SPONTANEOUS SUBJECT all those activities form a single, integrated, interdependent whole. He does not simply know. His sensing is connected immediately with affectivity. His understanding and judging lead immediately to deciding, and he only thinks about and seeks to understand and judge the things he's going to do. In contrast, the THEORETIC SUBJECT is engaged simply in knowing. His affectivity is brushed aside. It may come up occasionally...e.g., "What a wonderful thing this knowledge is, all this study is!", or he uses his will to keep his nose in the book. But his will is not an integral part of the functioning of his cognitional activity. That makes me provide an account of the fundamental difference between the spontaneous subject and the theoretic subject.

### Spontaneous Subject and Theoretic Subject Compared

In the spontaneous subject the internally closed set of partial and complementary activities includes not only cognitional activities but also practical activities. It is as if you had two different kinds of clock and in one there were many more functions than in the other and it forms a different type of whole. One clock is just to know by, all its parts are interrelated intelligibly<sup>each</sup> to all the others. In the spontaneous subject that structure is different. It doesn't violate cognition but its cognitional activities

are tied down to what's useful, to what's practical, to what's worth while. He wants it to lead somewhere. He doesn't waste his time on all this theory. "What's the good of that?" Perhaps I can make the difference between the two subjects clearer by saying that they have two quite different apprehensions of the world. The spontaneous subject knows particular, concrete reality. He deals with persons. He doesn't study person as such but he knows Tom and Dick and Harry and he knows what to say to one and what not to say to him, and what to say to the other and what you can do with the third. All his knowing regards what's to be said, what's to be done, what's not to be said, what's not to be done in each of a variety of situations in which customarily he finds himself. If he finds himself in a new situation he has to catch on to something more. He lives in the concrete. It is the whole man that operates -not just a knower but the whole man. And his world is the world of persons and things. Eddington. I think it was, spoke about his two tables. One was of a certain polish and size and weight and strength and the other was a slightly denser collocation of electrons than the surrounding air. Now, that difference between the two tables is a difference that extends all along the line. The average man and the biologist go into the Zoo and they look at the giraffe. And both understand the giraffe as an animal, an organic unity of parts. And there's an internally closed set of partial and complementary functions that make up the giraffe as an animal. Now, the parts that make up the animal for the average man are the head and the neck and the trunk, the legs and the tail. For the biologist the parts are systems. There's a respiratory system, a digestive system, a vascular system, a locomotive system, a sensory system and so on. And each of these systems consists in a set of organs. And each of the organs consists in myriads of cells and each of the cells has its structure. And once you get below, once you get further down you get to the chemical compounds that are in constant process of change within the cell. And below the chemical compounds you have the subatomic protons and neutrons and so on. It is an entirely different view of the giraffe. Both can see the giraffe as made up of an organic unity of parts. But the first fellow stops at what he can see. The other fellow finds that the parts are systems and that the systems have other parts and the parts have smaller parts and so on until you get right down to the point where you have something that you can't imagine at all. All along the line, not only tables but with regard to everything the theoretic subject has an entirely different apprehension of the world. Any single

scientist is that to conspicuous ends(?). Eddington noticed the business about the tables. The biologist would notice the different apprehension of the animal, and so on, all along the line. But if you combine all the sciences then your apprehension it's the same world, the same concrete reality that he is knowing, but he knows it through the mediation of theory. And he can know through the mediation of theory because as a subject he is not a spontaneous subject that can't think without feeling. He is the theoretic subject that can put his feelings aside, his practical concerns aside, his decisions aside and get on with the business of knowing all by itself. There are then two structures of the subject, two apprehensions of the world. And if you don't want to think of all the sciences together think of metaphysics. You go home and speak to your young brothers and sisters about matter and form and essence and existence and they won't know what you are talking about. But you'll be talking about the things that they know very well. Theory provides a new apprehension of everything.

As there are different structures of the subject, different apprehensions of the world, so there are different processes of learning. Whenever the scientist or metaphysician learns anything he moves on to universal principles. If it isn't universally true, true in absolutely every case, it is no good at all. But the man of common sense doesn't learn things that way. His learning is expressed in proverbs, and proverbs don't have to be true in every case. They are just useful. They are like the rules of grammar; lots of exceptions but, nonetheless, useful. You use them when the occasion arises. Both science and metaphysics and common sense are habitual accumulations of insights but the accumulation takes place with different purposes in view and with different criteria. The common sense subject wants to understand enough about persons and things so that in any concrete situation he'll know what to say and do to get by. But the theorist wants to know what will hold in absolutely every case and he wants an exact formulation of that. The theorist moves off to universal principles, to universal truths; the man of common sense is never interested in anything but the concrete situation he's dealing with. He knows that the more successfully he deals with concrete situations the better he'll be able to do so with future situations that arise. He builds up his experience. But his building up of experience doesn't consist in putting down definitions that hold *omni et soli*. "What's a dog?" "Well, a dog is what anyone calls a dog and that's all there is about it!" He knows what dogs are and that's enough. On the other hand, the

theorist abstracts from his feelings. For the man of common sense feelings are the most important part of in personal situations. You must figure out how the other fellow is feeling or perhaps, you'll put your foot in it by saying it today instead of waiting until he feels better this evening, and so on. The theorist abstracts from practical concerns; the man of common sense is interested in nothing else. The theorist abstracts from the particular and the here and now, and the particular here and now is what alone has any importance for the man of common sense. But though the theorist abstracts, he gets away from the practical and from feelings and so on, he comes back. He not only withdraws but also returns and he transforms the situation in which the man of common sense lives. Look at all the gadgets of modern life.

Fourthly, they have different languages. The theorist develops his technical language to express his own ideas and concepts, and the man of common sense just doesn't know that language. Not only is that so, but also the theorist transforms ordinary language. The clearest examples of that appear when you compare a pre-theoretic culture with a theoretic culture. Both the HEBREWS and the GREEKS knew and they talked and they learned. But the same words have different meanings in hebrew and greek and the different meanings correspond to the differences between the spontaneous subject and the theoretic subject. For the hebrews was not merely the knower; the knower was also the doer. Saint John says in his first Epistle, -I think it's Chapter 2, about verse 3:

"You will know Christ if you observe the commandments."

Knowing Him is a matter of observing the commandments. When the hebrew taught he taught the Law, and he taught it in such a way that people jolly well observed it. There was no point teaching it if people weren't going to observe it. It is a practical type of teaching. It is learning in the sense of the old expression: "I'll learn him by giving him a good licking!" Learning is not a merely cognitional activity. It is the total man that entails the unity of all psychological activity. So not only does the theorist bring in his own technical language but he transform the pre-existing language. As someone remarked, the greeks took words such as truth (aletheia) and wisdom (sophia) and so on, epistēmi, ..they were in current greek use, and the philosophers gave these terms a meaning they had not previously possessed. And where did that new meaning come from? It came from the gradual realization of the theoretic subject, the theoretic



apprehension of the world and the creation of a special language for theoretic subjects and their mode of learning and their apprehension of the world.

there are two societies. There is the society of men of common sense, -each belongs to his own family; if it's relatives, the friends of the family, the town or part of the town, the district in the country,- and the rest of the world is made up of foreigners. His common sense is built to deal with the things that he has to handle and the persons he has to deal with in his ordinary life. At home and at work his common sense is determined by his social situation, and since he acts according to his common sense for the most part and his actions determine the social situation there is a mutual interdependence between the social situation and the common sense to which it gives rise and which perpetuates it. On the other hand, the theoretic subject sets aside feelings, friends, practical concerns, practical interests, and as such subjects multiply they form a distinct society that transcends social classes and political frontiers. It forms a sort of Cosmopolis, people with the theoretic mentality, the theoretic apprehension of the world, masters of the language (theoretic language) and cut into the theoretic mode of learning. But this theoretic society, so to speak, because science is also practical comes back and transforms the spontaneous society of spontaneous subjects.

A sixth difference regards ultimate criteria. The spontaneous subject and the theoretic subject both acknowledge unity and truth, virtue and value, reality and so on. They are fundamental criteria common to all men. The spontaneous subject knows them simply in actu exercito, -if I may use the latin expression. He knows it in so far as he does it. He observes the principle of contradiction but he never heard of the principle of contradiction. He observes the principle of excluded middle without ever hearing of that either. He is logical in a natural fashion. He has natural knowledge of first principles as St. Thomas and Aristotle would put it. The principles are part of his intelligence, part of his rationality, and because he is intelligent and rational the principles are observed. He never adverts to the principles and in so far as he does then, necessarily, his expression is symbolic. A symbol is an affect laden image, it is an image which pours over into affectivity, that conveys a meaning and mediates an apprehension of value. IMAGE...AFFECT...MEANING...VALUE..., four elements. And the symbol is the normal expression of the spontaneous subject. As soon

as he stops dealing with persons and things in the concrete situations in which he lives, to take him beyond that you have to deal with him in symbolic expressions. (I'll have something more to say about symbols later on.) But you can see that the spontaneous subject is the whole man in which knowledge is not a specialized part, in which everything functions as a single unit, that his expressions of his ideals, of his norms, of his ultimate criteria will be through symbols. On the other hand, the theoretic subject...-of course, he has this natural knowledge of first principles but he also objectifies that natural knowledge to a certain extent. In Parmenides it is the distinction between the way of seeming and the way of truth. In Plato it is the distinction between *dialektikē* and *aristikē*, between *aristicks* and *dialectic*, *-aristic* being the fellow that argues to win and *dialectic* the fellow who argues to let the truth appear. In Aristotle it has a magnificent formulation in his *Logic*. The Stoics express their criteria in a moral code. The modern scientists in their scientific method.

So we have compared the spontaneous subject and the theoretic subject. Two structures of consciousness, two apprehensions of the world, two modes of learning, two languages, two societies and two manners in which ultimate criteria are apprehended.

#### The Critical Subject

Now, there are not only spontaneous and theoretic subjects. The theoretic subject uses the specialized structure of knowing to apprehend reality, the real world, objects through the mediation of theory. But there is a further possibility. Yesterday we spoke of the transition from presence to self to knowledge of self. And in so far as I got across the notion of that transition you can see that besides the spontaneous subject in which knowing and feeling, deciding and doing are all a single unity, and the theoretic subject who is engaged in knowing objects through the mediation of theory, there is also the reflective structure of consciousness in which the subject knows himself, now the man of common sense, now the theorist and in the third case as knowing himself, as performing this tricky business of introspection and understanding what it is to understand and what the implications of that are. Understanding knowledge as a structure and objectivity as a structure and himself as a structure. In so far as you have a subject that combines common sense and theory and reflection, self knowledge,

you have what we call the CRITICAL SUBJECT. It isn't critical in the Kantian sense, because Kant denied the possibility of self knowledge in any serious sense. But it is critical in the sense in which I think we 'll be justified before we finish. Let me compare the critical subject with the spontaneous and theoretic. Where the spontaneous subject knows particular, concrete reality, the theoretic subject apprehends the universe through the mediation of theory, -of Physics, Chemistry, Biology and so on, the Social Sciences, the Human Sciences,- the critical subject knows himself, knows his knowing, and because all knowing is knowing of objects, in so far as he knows common sense knowing he knows the spontaneous subjects and the objects of their knowing, in so far as he knows theoretic knowing he also knows the objects of theoretic knowing and in so far as he knows his self knowledge be able to pull together those three types of knowledge, to be able to use them together without confusion, to be able to determine their relations and their limitations and to combine them. Consequently, this self knowledge provides, as it were, the crossways, the focus, the centre from which all knowing and consequently, all objects can be considered (?consistent). Both the spontaneous subject and the theoretic subject have their quite distinct modes of learning and the critical subject learns the nature of learning. He is able to differentiate between the learning of common sense and the learning of the theorist. Both the spontaneous subject and the theoretic subject each has his own language; the critical subject is concerned with the transcultural, the relations between common sense language and theoretic language, the effect of the development of theory on a pre-theoretical society or culture, the type of culture that you have when the society is pre-theoretic and so on. He is concerned with the problems involved in the total changes of meanings of words that occur in so far as there is development from spontaneous subjects to theoretic subjects and then further on from theoretic to critical subject. I spoke of two societies; the theoretic society that sets up a cosmopolis, a universal norm, what ought to be done, and tries to get the League of Nations or the United Nations to realize these ideal norms in human society to some extent, and the spontaneous subject who lives in his own country and looks upon the rest of man as mere foreigners. The critical subject is historical. Because he understands common sense he is able to understand the changes of common sense. The common sense in England is one thing and the common sense in Ireland is another, and there are still bigger differences when you go to France or

Italy and still more when you go to Germany and Spain, and vast differences when you go on to Russia. Common sense is a function of the social milieu. It has general invariants but there are all sorts of variations. Through a study of history and the understanding of man a critical subject sees himself within the historical process. He is engaged in understanding the historical process, and his judgement and decision occur consciously within the historical process has a bearing on his future. He is a HISTORICAL subject. And finally, with regard to ultimate criteria the critical subject brings the question right out into the open. The spontaneous subject is intelligent and rational and responsible and he knows the criteria implicitly, so to speak. He can't formulate them but he observes them. He expresses them, if at all, symbolically. The theoretic subject expresses them objectively in a formal logic, in canons of a method, in a moral code, in a transcendental logic, in a dialectical logic too, if you wish. The critical subject reverts to, wants to know the subject qua intelligent and qua rational as the ground of all criteria and norms, as the immediate ground of them in so far as they are known by us. But while the critical subject can bring the question right out into the open, the question of ultimate criteria, on the other hand, he can't bring the solution out into the open. The solution has to occur within each critical subject in so far as he knows himself. There is no doubt that each of you is intelligent. You can give external signs of your intelligence. But the external signs are not the intelligence itself. That intelligence in itself is accessible only to each one of you. If anyone wants to deny consciousness and insight as distinct from conceiving insight you can't do anything about it; he has to find out for himself whether he has ever had the experience of understanding something. The critical problem, its solution is always a personal problem. It is self knowledge, and <sup>in</sup> self knowledge one and the same knows and is known, one and the same experiences and is experienced, understands and is understood, affirms and is affirmed. It is -the solution to the critical problem in the sense in which I am conceiving it- necessarily an event that occurs within the inner forum of each individual. You can cross out (?talk out) dialectical arguments, -as Aristotle said: "Get the sceptic to talk!" If he talks he won't talk utter nonsense and so there will be some recognition of rationality and intelligence in his talk. But the real issue and the real solution is for the subject to know himself, each one do it for himself. There are undemonstrable first principles. Why? Because the first principles

lie in the subject as empirically, intellectually, rationally and responsible conscious. The first principles not in the sense of objects of propositions. The first principles in the sense of a concrete reality; -the concrete reality that each one of us is. When St. Thomas speaks of the basis of judgement being the reductio ad principia he explains what he means by principia, and they are not universal propositions. The principia are intellectus and sensus. They are the capacities of the subject to experience and understand. (Dr. Hawkins has remarked that I do not acknowledge the priority of the ontological. You can take the ontological in two senses. Either you mean ontology which is a department of knowledge learned in first year philosophy or you can mean by the ontological a concrete reality. I do not acknowledge the priority of ontology. What I am talking about is the priority of the concrete reality that is the experiencing, intelligent, rational subject.

#### Horizons

We'll just raise the question of HORIZONS. We have described three subjects, the spontaneous, theoretic and critical and the basis of the distinction in each case, -the distinction runs along through apprehension of the world, mode of learning, language, society, ultimate criteria, but the fundamental basis of the distinction is the structure of consciousness. Prior to the greek distinction between the theoretic and practical life, the bios theoretikos and the bios praktikos, well, there were different ways of achieving the end, like the Eliad (?) speaks to the medicine man of central Asia as archaic techniques of mysticism, and there's this mystical tendency in Indian, development in Indian culture, development of the subject. All I said to you about the subject, those fundamental notions can be had in the Upanishad and it is supposed to be an influence from the Upanishad on Plotinus, but that's a different question. However, in western culture the Greeks effected that distinction between the spontaneous subject and the theoretic subject and they effected it by becoming theoretic subjects. Now and similarly the critical problem becomes formulated fully and clearly, -there were critical subjects before but they didn't have the tools to express it. That difference in the structure of consciousness between the spontaneous <sup>structure</sup> ~~subject~~, which is the whole man, and the theoretic structure, cognitional, forming a closed unit and engaged(?) on objects, and the reflective structure, cognitional, a closed unit turned in on itself effecting

the transition from self presence to self knowledge.. those structures are associated with horizons. The formal object of our intellect is ens, omnia, everything. The proper object is quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens. But besides the formal object and the proper object which set absolute limits to our understanding there are further limitations imposed if one is merely a spontaneous subject. You have no capacity for theoretic apprehension; Or if one is a spontaneous subject and a theoretic subject there's no capacity, proximate capacity for self knowledge. The fact that one is merely a spontaneous subject gives one a horizon. Upwards one can see billions of light years away, but on the level because of the surface of the earth one can only see as far as the horizon. What's beyond that has no meaning for me. It is meaningless. It has no significance for me. I couldn't care less. It is not necessary for it to be meaningless to every man but it is meaningless for every spontaneous subject. And what is beyond the horizon of the theoretic subject is meaningless for him.

The theory is meaningless for the spontaneous subject. For example, the spontaneous subject is having tea with a celebrated physicist or mathematician or chemist and naturally he wants to profit by the occasion. And he begs the expert:

"Really, tell me something about it. This is an advantage and an opportunity that I mustn't miss. However, none of this technical language, please, none of that nonsense. I don't want to hear any of that stuff at all. Just put it in plain ordinary language that a simple person like myself can understand. And all those details that you learn in school, and so on, all those learned questions that you get at the University and so on,... just give me the broad idea, all I want to do is understand it!"

In other words, he wants the fruits of learning without the means. Moreover, if the theorist happens to say something that the spontaneous subject understands well, naturally, the spontaneous subject wants to assimilate it, that is, to fit it in with his view of the world, -he isn't aware that the theoretic apprehension of the world is an entirely different thing. He wants to fit it in with his own common sense view and it won't fit, it can't fit. It fits very well into a theoretic apprehension which is mediated by theory but it can't fit into a common sense apprehension. Because it can't fit in a person has difficulties:-

"You know, I'm very stupid, but really, I'd like you to

explain this to me. It seems to me that this simply  
can't be that way and that must be this way!"

You see, what they are doing is expressing their horizon, the fact that theory is something that cannot be fitted in within a common sense apprehension of reality. Further, if the theorist happens to offer some explanation the same difficulty recurs again. There is no possibility of dialogue because the spontaneous subject is asking for theory to be placed within the common sense horizon and theory is simply what's beyond that horizon.

Similarly, critical questions and answers are beyond the theoretic horizon:-

"An account of one's knowledge that can be verified only in one's own personal experience? Well, what on earth does that mean? Aren't there any proofs? Aren't there any demonstrations?"

"I can say I experience an act of understanding but that isn't a proof. A proof is a syllogism! Are there no arguments at all? Nothing you can get hold of?"

Because the theorist always deals with objects and <sup>what</sup> the critical subject is talking about is the subject. Or the critical question will be transposed within the theoretic horizon. You suppose that it is a question of a new metaphysics or a new science or a new common sense; it has to be one of the three: anything else lies beyond the theoretic horizon. But the question is whether knowledge exists, not whether some particular fact or aspect of knowledge exists but knowledge in general. It is a quite useless question. The theoretic subject cannot conceive -precisely because he always thinks in terms of objects- that it is possible to know human knowledge not by analogy but properly, not in terms of metaphysics but in terms of cognitional activity, to know what common sense is and what theory is and what self knowledge is and what are the limitations of each of the three, and how the three are related to one another and how one can use all three simultaneously and interdependently and without confusion. To conceive the critical subject as bringing one's mind to the point where one's thinking is transcultural and historical does not arise within the field of theory which is simply a matter of setting out (?) objects.

LECTURE VI

Further, there is the EXISTENTIAL ASPECT: "What am I to be? Am I to be a spontaneous subject, a theoretic or a critical subject?" And while it is true that theory is beyond the horizon of the spontaneous subject and that critical questions and answers are beyond the horizon of the theoretic subject, still that 'being beyond' is not absolute. The formal object of the human intellect is always ens, omnia, the object of intellect qua intellect -that's what the formal object of intellect means. And the proper object of human intellect, the object of intellect qua human in this life is always the intelligibility to be grasped as existing in corporeal matter. And because these objects transcend the horizon of the spontaneous subject and the horizon of the theoretic subject there is always the potentiality for the existential question to arise. The spontaneous subject is not by nature a spontaneous subject; by nature he is a man. He has a horizon in so far as his development has not got beyond the level of common sense. But because he is a man he can go beyond common sense, he can have an uneasy conscience about the fact that he has never taken the trouble to get hold of any theory. And similarly, the theoretic subject is not a theoretic subject by nature; by nature he is a man, he has the same formal object and the same proper object of his intellect as even the critical subject. However, the question of going beyond the horizon of the spontaneous subject and of going beyond the horizon of the theoretic subject is an existential question, that is, it is a question that is answered, not by an answer, but by a development. One does not change the structure of one's consciousness, one's apprehension of the world, one's language, one's mode of learning, one's society, one's apprehension and manifestation of ultimate criteria by saying yes or no to a question, by reading off a list of propositions and saying: "Such are my sentiments!" The spontaneous subject can repeat off all the true propositions and say yes to each one of them and still remain a spontaneous subject. What is needed is the inner transformation of the structure of consciousness and of its consequences that effect the difference between the spontaneous and the theoretic subject. The spontaneous subject can become a mathematician or a physicist or a chemist or any other type of scientist or a metaphysician without leaving the horizon of the spontaneous subject. All he does is distort everything in the theory. He says: "Now, this is what they have in the book but what that really means....etc..." He'll put it into common sense terms for you.



And similarly, the theoretic subject can distort everything that the critical subject says by fitting it into a theoretic viewpoint. And you'll get something entirely different. The existential question is a question that is answered by a CONVERSION, by a PURIFICATION, by a REVOLUTION; call it what you please, but what is meant is a DEVELOPMENT. And the lack of that development is what accounts for the decadence of philosophical and scientific schools. The school can flourish and also can decay, and it can have a second spring. And the reason for that decadence is that the adikoi, the epiginoi do not meet the existential question. They repeat the formulae with meticulous fidelity but they've lost the meaning. They can use the techniques with full dexterity but they don't grasp the significance of the techniques. And with that when the tradition goes down, when there is a contraction of the horizon the original meaning disappears, the key points in the doctrine are dropped, the things that are really significant, and the things are brought down to the good, solid level of sane common sense. All that suffers is that the theory qua theory loses its meaning and one gets a surrogate, a bit of ersatz. That does for most people. Most people are quite content to remain spontaneous subjects when question is the theoretical question, or to remain theoretic subjects if the question is the critical question.

Not only is there the problem, so to speak, of AUTOGENESIS, of the development of each individual -each one of us starts from the tabula rasa to which Aristotle compared the intellectus possibilis and the development occurs within his life span; it is only slowly, step by step, that he gradually assimilates the doctrine even of the school when it is flourishing, and he has very little chance of getting beyond that if the school is in decay. But besides the autogenesis, the development of each individual, there is what corresponds, so to speak, to PHYLOGENESIS. There are critical subjects before the time at which criticism has become a publicly accepted technique. I quoted you St. Thomas who spoke about experiencing abstraction from phantasms and the reception of intelligibles in act in our intellects and what anyone can experience whenever he tries to understand anything. St. Thomas knew his own intellect by experiencing it but he didn't have at his disposal the tools of introspective psychology, the acceptance of that type of analysis and explanation. And even if he had invented it it is most unlikely that he would have been understood. Even what he did say was in the terms of reference of his age was not understood. What

it led to was the terrific row at the end of the thirteenth century, the Augustinian-Arist. controversy when they wrote the *Correctoria Fratris Thomae* and the *Correctoria Correctorii Fratris Thomae* and so on. A first class debate went full swing and ended up with decadent scholasticism in the fourteenth century. There can be then theoretic subjects before the time in which theory is developed but they have not at their disposal the development of ~~xxxxxxx~~ civilisation and culture in which to put across the theoretic idea. I spoke to you of the aristotelian notion of science as being in the locus of doxa, of opinion. Aristotle conceived science as taking opinions and showing the necessary reason why that must be so. There is not in Aristotle a complete separation between a common sense view of the world and a theoretic view of the world. There are the beginnings of it but the thing isn't put through right to the limits. On the other hand, at the present time we have such a large number of sciences having reached the explanatory viewpoint it is quite easy to illustrate the fact that a theoretic view of the world is an entirely different sort of thing from a common sense view of the world. Not only then are there theoretic subjects when the language <sup>and the thought</sup> of the theoretic is merely that of the spontaneous subject, and critical subjects before their time, there is also the inverse phenomenon of decadence when the critical elements are reduced to theoretic and the theoretic elements are reduced to spontaneous viewpoints because subjects have not met the existential issue: "What am I to be?" They have not met it -they have met it in words but they have not met it by a development, by conversion, by purification, by revolution (you'll find all these words used by philosophers at one time or another.)

So much then for three subjects, the spontaneous, theoretic and the critical, their three apprehensions of the world, their three languages and modes of learning and societies and ways of dealing with ultimate criteria. And now I want to say something on the topic of realism.

### REALISM

Realism occurs on three levels, the spontaneous, the theoretic and the critical.

i) For the spontaneous subject what is realism? It is really and truly there exist dogs and cats, horses and cows, sheep and goats, lions and tigers, sparrows and swallows, plants and trees, earth and sky, men, women and children -and the list can continue indefinitely. Reality for the spontaneous subject is the aggregate of concrete, particular

realities. And he is able like Adam to give them their names. He is able to deal with persons and handle things and he is able to do so in expert fashion in so far as they enter into situations in which he lives.

ii) The theoretic subject acknowledges that concrete, particular realities really and truly exist, but he says: "That isn't all there is to be known about them." He adds a further dimension, a further level to his realism: he adds a theoretic apprehension of the totality of concrete, particular realities. And that theoretic apprehension runs all along the line from the apprehension of sub-atomic particles right up to human nature, God, the angels. The theoretic subject is the natural corrective to two grave dangers to the spontaneous subject. Because the spontaneous subject is a man he wants to know the natures of things, not merely how to deal with them in concrete situations. But because he is not theoretic - to know the nature is to move towards being a theoretic subject -, because the proper expression of anything that lies beyond the dealing with concrete situations in the spontaneous subject is merely symbolic, he'll think of nature symbolically and be unprotected against magical tendencies. And magic isn't something that went on millenia ago. In the Belgian Congo a man visited a leprosarium and in it there were tens of thousands of people; they'd have their disputes, and so on, and they were trying to keep to the processes of law. They discovered that most of the questions that were brought up for the popular court were questions, accusations that so and so was using magic for this or that purpose and they couldn't eradicate this conviction of the existence and effectiveness of magic in peoples minds. Similarly, the formal object of human intellect is omnia, ens. The spontaneous subject can apprehend that only symbolically and so he is <sup>un-</sup>protected against myth. If you are interpreting the totality of realities through an affect laden image that conveys a meaning and <sup>apprehension</sup> mediates ~~any~~ of value the step from valid symbol to a myth is very slight. In so far as there is the development of the theoretic subject within the cultural milieu there is the corrective, the natural corrective of the magic and myth to which the spontaneous subject is prone.

iii) The critical subject and critical realism includes all the apprehension of concrete realities in which the spontaneous subject is an expert; it includes all the theoretical apprehension of reality of the metaphysician and all the scientists. But it goes beyond this; it adds foundations and unifications through the theory of knowledge which is

based ultimately on self knowledge.

All three are equally realisms. In all three knowledge is a matter of experiencing, understanding and judging. In all three -although all three do not analyse it out- objectivity is experiential objectivity, normative and absolute. In all three the REAL is WHAT IS -not what is seen but WHAT IS. The definition of truth, VERITAS EST ADAEQUATIO INTELLECTUS AD REM et VERITAS EST FORMALITER IN SOLO JUDICIO very briefly is WHAT IS KNOWN IS, WHAT IS AFFIRMED IS; the res is what IS and the intellectus is WHAT IS KNOWN. And you can make that identification because in the true judgement you reach an absolute, an unconditioned, something independent of the subject. What is seen is related to the subject; it depends on whether he is astigmatic or not. What is imagined obviously depends on the subject. What is understood, -well, it depends, ~~some~~ people understand things better than others: you think about what you please; what seems to me may be so and may not be so. But what is known, what is grasped as unconditioned has no conditions and consequently no conditions in the subject. What is independent of the subject is not merely affirmed, IT IS. From the criterion of truth, the unconditioned, you can deduce the definition of truth, the adaequatio intellectus ad rem.

The spontaneous subject with his spontaneous realism cannot say: "I have no need of a theoretic realism!" He has a great need of it because, as we remarked, the spontaneous subject as such is unprotected against magic and myth. And the totalitarian state knows it and the advertisers know it and the social engineers know and they use it. Similarly, the theoretic subject may say: "I've done metaphysics; I know what is; I have no need of going on to critical questions and answers!" But the theoretic subject is divided. He has two structures of consciousness and he can move from one to the other, he has two apprehensions of the world and they differ all along the line, they start from the same data but they diverge forever after, he has two modes of learning, two languages at his disposal, he can belong to two societies and he has two ways of employing ultimate criteria. Which is the real world? What is reality for him? Does he settle what really and truly is when he is the whole man, affectivity and choice and action integrated with knowing? What is correlative to that fully integrated subject, is that the real? Or is when he is dealing with the equations of quantum mechanics, spinning out mathematical theories about physics, -is that really what's real? The two are disparate. It is not a question of their contra-

dicting one another. They are disparate. What is real for him? What does he take his stand on? He can be a man of common sense only in so far as he doesn't mix his common sense with the theory and he can be a theorist only in so far as he doesn't mix the common sense with the theory. Which is he to be when it comes to the pinch, when it comes to the crucial issue? Is he to decide, to make up his mind, to judge on things that really matter qua scientist, qua theorist or qua spontaneous subject, qua man of common sense? There is a need for a decisive judgement to be made and the theoretic subject is not prepared to make that decisive judgement. It is only in so far as he moves to the reflective structure of consciousness, only in so far as he moves from self presence to knowledge of self and knowledge of his knowledge and its different kinds and the relations between them that he'll be able to make the judgement that regards the interrelation and the mutual complementing of the spontaneous subject in his common sense knowledge and the theoretic subject and his theoretic knowledge.

I said that the theoretic subject and theory provide the NATURAL remedy for the magic and myth to which the spontaneous subject is prone. And the critical <sup>questions</sup> ~~xxx~~ and answers provide the NATURAL answer to the division of himself and his world that the theoretic subject experiences. But there are in this world order, de facto, not only natural remedies. It lies in the SUPERNATURAL remedies that, de facto, realism as a philosophy has developed from the historical viewpoint. Etienne Gilson has devoted a very long and learned life to the thesis that realism, scholastic realism is a philosophy that has been simply detached from a theology. What was done in the middle ages was theology. A certain number of philosophic questions were handled on the way but they were handled from a theological viewpoint. When you detach the x philosophical questions and answers from that theoretical context you get, de facto, realist philosophy. And that scholastic realism is in its origins, in its historical ~~xxx~~ milieu a theology. Now, I don't think that fact is disputed but what we want to do is understand it. You'll be able to understand a fundamental point about realism.


THE WORD OF GOD is a word addressed to spontaneous subjects. In the Bible there is no theory either in the Old Testament or the New. There is narration. Who is God? Is He *ens infinitum*, *perfectio ens infinitum* and so on? God is THE ONE WHO did this and this and this and this and this and is going to do that and that and that and that. God is known the way a human person is known, as the

one who dealt with our Fathers Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, as the one who used Moses and Aaron to deliver us from Egypt, to take us across the Red Sea, to guide us in the desert, as the one who brought us into the land of Canaan. God is known through hebrew history. God is known not only by narrative but also by promises, by his threats, by his commands, by his exhortations. The word of God, in the first instance, is the LAW, it is the truth that has a moral implication. The word of God, in the second place, is the word of the PROPHETS who begin their utterances with: "Thus saith the Lord. Oraculum Yahweh." The word of God is the word of WISDOM in the Sapiential Books. So much for the O.T. In the New Testament the word of God is the KERUGMA, the Good Tidings, the spoken Gospel and then it is the written Gospel. The word of God as speaking through the ECUMENICAL COUNCILS is: "Si quis dixerit, A.S." If anyone says such and such, let it be anathema. In all these manifestations of the word of God we are dealing with propositional truth, with truth that is not claimed to be the truth of true judgement but, de facto, is the truth of true judgement, -true judgements in the practical order about what is to be done and what is to be feared and what is to be hoped for; true judgements that are implicitly in the theoretical order in so far as what God does and what he says are manifestations of what he is. The word of God is primarily a message of salvation for mankind but implicitly is a realism; its emphasis is always on propositional truth. It does not appeal to experience in the ~~ordinary~~ obvious sense of experience, the experience of the moment. It will recall the dimly remembered experiences of Israel's past; it will talk about the unexperienced woes of the damned and the unexperienced joys of the blessed, but its appeal is not to experience, its appeal is <sup>not</sup> to understanding. The word of God is a word of MYSTERY, something beyond human understanding. The whole emphasis is on the absolute objectivity of truth and that is why theology -well, first of all, the word of God, Revelation, the Tradition of the Church, the decrees of the Councils and Dogmatic Theology are all, by implication, realist. They place an emphasis on the true judgement that is lacking in any other philosophy. The empiricists haven't got it, the idealists haven't got it, the existentialists haven't got it. From that emphasis on true judgement there can be detached a philosophy which we may call DISCURSIVE REALISM. It takes two simple propositions: (a) Veritas est adaequatio intellectus ad rem, and (b) veritas est formaliter in solo iudicio, and it concludes that for every true judgement there must be some corresponding aspect or part of reality,

and if that particular judgement were not true but false then that aspect or part of reality would be really different. The Councils say: "If any man says,...let him be anathema." But if he were to say: "Oh, I won't say that but it isn't true!", he would also be anathema, or if he said: "It's true but there's no reality corresponding to it!", he also would be anathema. There is in the word of God and its historical ~~expansion~~ expansion in Hebrew and Christian religion implicit a realism, implicit a discursive realism that equates the real with true judgement.

Now, I have described six types of realism, the realism of the spontaneous subject who knows about the wolves and bears, the realism of the theoretic subject who apprehends the same reality through theory, the realism of the critical subject who finds a basis both for the spontaneously known world and the theoretically known world, the realism implicit in the word of God, in the gospels and in the teaching of the Church, the realism implicit in dogmatic theology and finally, the realism that may be detached from theology, and that realism has as its fundamental point the equation between true judgement and reality. You can define true judgement in terms of reality and you can define reality in terms of true judgement. But there is another realism which I shall call MYTHIC REALISM. It starts off symbolically. I said that a symbol is an affect <sup>BUT</sup> laden image that conveys a meaning and mediates an apprehension of value. First of all, the IMAGE:- Jack or Jill holds up a hand and looks at it. You imagine someone looking at their hand. Secondly, the AFFECT:- "Wouldn't it be terrible if he were blind?" "He wouldn't see his own hand held up.", and feel that with the fulness of human feeling. The image and affect conveyed a MEANING and the meaning is transcendent. I gave you a theoretic account of transcendence by going from the unconditioned to what is known in the *adaequatio intellectus ad rem*. But the spontaneous subject doesn't deal with theory he deals with symbols, and obviously the eyes aren't the hand, there's a distance between them and when you get a spacial distance things are very, very different. One is not the other. It isn't merely a matter of something being true, it is something you can see. Not only is there a distance but you see across the distance, you transcend. The eyes transcend themselves to reach the hand. And just as it would be a terrible thing for Jack and Jill to be blind and not see a hand how much worse would it be if we weren't realists, we wouldn't know anything at all, we'd just know our thoughts. So realism is apprehended as a VALUE.

That symbol of realism...there's nothing whatever wrong with it. Spontaneous subjects have a right to apprehend these 'isms' and symbolic apprehension is the only apprehension possible for them. However, the transition from symbolic apprehension to mythic apprehension is always very simple. Identify the symbol with the symbolized, say that the essence of realism is 'taking a look', that knowing is knowing in so far as it is like seeing, ~~that~~ Intellect knows in so far as you can find some similarity between your understanding and your eyes. But if there's no similarity, it can't be knowing. Seeing is self explanatory and every other part of knowing either has to be like seeing, or else it can't be knowing. Now, you'll find that that identification, that mythic identification of transcendence with some analysis of seeing, the identification of realism with the transcendence that's identified with seeing has had a terrific effect in the history of scholastic philosophy. The point can be illustrated in detail. Scotus threw out the fact of insight into phantasms because, as he said, either there's a universal in the phantasm or there isn't. If there is then it can't be a proper universal or it can't be a proper phantasm because imagination is of the singular and not of the universal, and if there's not then the insight must be an illusion, it is seeing what isn't there. Therefore, we don't see the intelligible in the sensible, but when we understand, when we have a concept we also have an image, there's a concomitance. Again, the same idea of knowledge applied to Father, Son and Holy Ghost yields the *distinctio formalis a parte rei*. God the Father knows himself as God with a perfectly objective intuition. Either there's a distinction prior to any look on his part or not. If there is you have your *distinctio formalis a parte rei* and if there is not then when the Father knows the Son he must know the Son either as identical with the Father or as not God because, if there's no *distinctio a parte rei* antecedent to the look then if the Son is identical with God he is identical with the Father and if he's not identical with the Father he's not God. There you have the proof of the *distinctio formalis a parte rei* as it is worked out by Scotus. And so on, you can trace the influence of that mythic identification down the history. And it is impoverishing, it blocks any satisfactory working out of metaphysics and it completely destroys the possibility of an accurate account of human understanding as God made it.





APPENDIX

Question Time

A. In a review of your book the author says that you confuse philosophical and psychological problems: (quotation) "... After reading the book it is not clear what processes are involved in the ? when it is classified as insight, nor is it clear what is the analysis of such concepts as understand, judge, intuit, or other gothic words. The book brings home vividly the gulf which separates scholastic method from the philosophical methods practiced today as the result of the work of ? , Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein. It is difficult to sympathize with your intelligent(?) approach. This is not to ~~wxy~~ minimize the value of the book. Nevertheless, one must conclude that little is achieved by the methods that you use towards a clearer understanding of the meaning of insight or the possibility or conditions of insightful behavior/." (End of Quotation). I would like to know why do the British Empiricists find it hard to accept your book?

Ans.

Well, a complete answer would involve some study of the linguistic analysts. Very briefly, then. I spoke about the horizon of the spontaneous subject. What's beyond that horizon is meaningless to him. Now, the spontaneous subject can develop a technique of linguistic analysis and show that this is beyond the horizon of the spontaneous subject and this is beyond the horizon of the spontaneous subject and so on, all along the line, and so eliminate what traditionally has been known as philosophy. Now, that's a very rough approximation but it corresponds in some fashion to what is being done.

(The following is a series of answers to undecipherable questions.)

I. They won't have anything to do with theory. They originally were logical positivists, but positivism is a theory and logic is a theory and they dropped both. However, that's simple and brief, see. There's a lot more to be said on a subject like that.

II. He has animal knowledge. We are dealing with human knowledge. There can be merely animal knowledge in a man. Just as the moralists distinguish between actus humanus, the human act for which you are responsible, and the act of a man, actus hominis, which occurs in you but there's no moral guilt, there's no merit involved, so also in the field of knowledge. You can talk about the knowledge that OCCURS within a man.

but isn't human knowledge. There can occur within a man animal knowledge. It is very rare, I think, that it does because in man there is always the symbolization, at least, of some sort.

III. Just as I refuse to call a pendulum a clock. I don't mean by that that clocks get along very well without pendula. What I mean is that knowledge is a whole, sensation is a part.

IV. Ah, yes! But animal knowledge is a different type of knowledge. Anyway, when you talk about animal knowledge and human knowledge and use the same word there's an equivocation.

V. Well, the integration, I believe, has to be ~~done~~ on the side of method. And anyway, it is not to be an integration that takes scientific results. There can be that but that regards the consequences. The fundamental work has to be on the side of method. And the reason for that is that the sciences are constantly developing. Particularly with regard to the human sciences it is most important for the thomistic, the scholastic or catholic thinker to have an influence on method because there we are dealing with man. In the empirical, human sciences the question is not about homo per se or homo in puris naturdibus, human nature. The question is with regard to man as he actually is in this world. Man as he actually is in this world is free and responsible. In so far as the empirical, human sciences attempts to imitate physics or chemistry and predict it is supposing that liberty has nothing to do with it. In so far as he aims at being a consultant to Government and using his predictions that way you have what is called creeping socialism. The Government needs ever more and more power to carry out the good advice given by the human scientists. And the problem in the human sciences is to find a method that aims at presenting responsible individuals with an exactive account of the alternatives before them on which they exercise their liberty. Now, in so far as such decisions often have to be collective decisions there also has to be developed a mechanism through which the collective decisions would work. But the human sciences, unless they are under the influence - and I don't say of catholic philosophy but of catholic theology, are missing something out.