what counts is not the number of propositions that assign the *propter quid*, nor the name of definition or postulate given the propositions that assign the *propter quid*, but only the *propter quid* itself.~~whether-assigned-in~~ Either there is or there is not an act of understanding in which we grasp that the necessary and sufficient condition of circularity is equality of radii. If that act exists, it makes no difference whether we express it in the single proposition of an essential definition, in the three propositions of a scientific syllogism, in the two propositions that are premises to the scientific syllogism; ~~or-finally~~ it makes no difference whether one of the premises is named a definition and the other a postulate; it does not make any real difference even if we have no single word but only a clumsy circumlogution to express circularity.

Casting about for further instances of the *propter quid* we observe that the Euclidean definition of the straight line is not essential but nominal. It reads: A straight line is a line ~~that~~ which lies evenly with the points on itself. (def 4 H I 153) In his commentary Sir Thomas Heath points out that, while the wording of this definition is obscure, still what Euclid had in mind is not really doubtful; the straight line is the line that does not involve any irregularity ~~or-differentiation between-its-parts-that-would-serve-to~~ differentiating one part or side from another [H I 167]. This enables us to use the ~~xkxx~~ name, straight line, correctly; it does not tell us why straight lines cannot help being straight; it is the type of definition that is parallel to saying that a circle is a uniformly round plane curve.

unities ~~of~~ each with its respective imagined multiplicity. Clearly this process cannot go on indefinitely, and so one must posit a basic multiplicity of imagined elements that admit only nominal definition.

There is an important corollary. The material part ~~element~~ of the object of a science ~~lies~~ consists of the imagined elements that are nominally defined. The formal part of the object of a science consists of the supervening and informing intelligible unities. The object of the science is the combination of both, not on an equal footing, but with significance centered in the formal part. As we shall see, geometry deals with points, lines, angles, and areas as with matter; it deals with correlations of points, lines, angles, areas as with form; its object is correlated points, lines, angles, areas with significance residing not in the correlated but in the correlations, not in the unified but in the intelligible unifications.

Among Euclid's definitions at least one is essential, namely, the definition of the ~~cirlce~~ circle. For equality of radii is the *propter quid* of circularity. If radii are all equal, the curve *must* be uniformly round; if they are not, the curve *cannot* be uniformly round. The "must" and "cannot" reveal understanding, and what is understood is not the name, circularity, but the quality that circularity names.

It will serve to illustrate the view-point of the present study if we add at once that Euclid's geometry would have been essentially the same if Euclid had defined the circle nominally as a uniformly round plane curve and then added to his theoretical postulates the assertion that in ~~situa~~ any given circle all radii are equal. For, from the view-point of the present analysis,