

Horizon + Philosophy

THE DILEMMA OF THE SUBJECT, *Subject + Horizon*, *Horizon + Dread*, *Horizon + History*.

1. The major premises of the dilemma is that either the real for me is defined as the immediately given or else it is the object known through the true tamquam per medium in quo.

The minor premises is the psychological fact that, without introspection, the subject is never the object and, even in introspection, the difficulty is not eliminated but merely displaced, since the subject as subject is never the subject as object.

Hence, if the real-for-me is the immediately given, then there follows the existentialist opposition between objective science and, on the other hand, real knowledge of the subject which is non-objective, hence, exclusion of metaphysics in any traditional sense; invention of new types of metaphysics, for dealing with all that concerns man.

On the other hand, if the real-for-me is what is known through what is true, then I am confined to a universe of objects; the subject as subject is inaccessible to me; and because the subject is inaccessible. I remain the victim of unscrutinized horizons, incapable of taking a place on the contemporary level of philosophic discussion, capable of complete openness of horizon only per accidens and not philosophically.

2. Subject: many meanings in different contexts. Grammatical s.: a word or phrase fulfilling a specified function in a sentence.

Logical s.: whatever admits a predicate, has one; red is a colour scientific s.: subject : habit :: object : act.

psychological s.: the human conscious subject.

3. Conscious; predicated of subjects, acts, processes.

Subjects: he was knocked unconscious; dreamless sleep; dreaming waking. acts: growth of beard, metabolism of cells, vs. seeing, suffering, processes: circulation of blood, digestion of food (in no malfunctioning), vs. inquiring to understand, reflecting to judge, deliberating to decide, deciding to enter course of action.

4. Object: the motive, product, end of conscious act. ^Mmotive: colour moves sight, illuminated phantasm moves intelligence. Product: imagining produces image; understanding produces concept, end: ens, verum, bonum; biological ends.

What conscious act centers on, brings about, heads for.

5. The ambiguity of awareness, presence.

I see colours, but I do not see seeing, I do not see myself seeing.

In seeing colours, the colours are present (presented) to me, but they are presented not to me as absent but as present.

Inasmuch as colours are presented to someone also present, there is consciousness in the direct act of seeing; I do not see unconsciously, though I may see indeliberately, inadvertently, without noticing what none the less I see.

Consciousness is not a matter of reflex activity, of introspection; it is the possibility of reflex activity having something to turn back on, of introspecting having something to introspect.

Consciousness is a property, quality, of acts of a given kinds; sensitive and intellectual, cognitive and appetitive.

Consciousness always accompanies waking and even dreaming states. The direction of attention to the conscious component in such states is a secondary phenomenon that would be meaningless aimless where their not the primary phenomenon.

Consciousness of Christ.

Presence, awareness, ambiguous.

Presence of objects to the subject and, concomitantly in a quite different sense, presence of the subject to whom objects are presented.

Object is present as intended.

Subject is present as intending.

Object is what one is aware of, what one sees, hears, desires, fears, investigates, understands, conceives.

Subject is one who is aware, and one cannot be aware and be unconscious, just as one cannot see and be unconscious, etc.

But "being aware" is quite different from "being what one is aware of".

Hence in primary stream of consciousness (a) the subject is never without an object and (b) the subject is never the object. Between Subject and object there is a cleavage, a radical opposition.

In infinite act, subject, act, primary object coincide; in finite act, act and object differ, for act is limited by something, by what it is about; in human act, subject, act, object differ, for not only is act finite, but also subject does not know himself by his own essence.

6. Introspection does not eliminate but displaces cleavage.

In an incomplete and elusive fashion the subject can shift his attention from object to act and subject.

On this basis he can proceed to classify, describe, relate explain from hypotheses theories systems devise tests verify judge: subject, capacities, habits, acts, objects.

Apart from its basis in shift of attention, this process is essentially the same as in all human knowledge.

Experience: Understanding conception: Reflection judgment.

Moreover, just as in knowledge of other objects there are known, known unknown, and unknown unknown, so also in knowledge of the subject.

The phenomenon of the horizon remains, only here the horizon is more difficult to tackle because of the difficulty of the basic shift of attention.

Throughout this process the cleavage remains.

The human subject does not know himself by his essence; he begins from objects, defines acts by objects, habits by ranges of acts, potencies by ranges of habits, essence of soul by sets of potencies.

In shift of attention: What is attended to, who attends; what is attended to is subject as object; who attends is subject as subject, so that subject still remains inaccessible except as peculiarly present.

What is classified, described, understood, is not the subject classifying, describing, understanding.

Hence, Hume (a) knowledge he describes (b) knowledge he uses.

7. The Dilemma

If real is known through true, then only subject as object known; if only subject as object known, the whole inquiry is conducted within horizon, prejudged by horizon, and no possibility of philosophic attack on radical problem of horizon.

If real is the immediately given in its immediate intelligibility (phenomenology a la Heidegger), if immediate truth is this uncovering, re-vealing, if judgment is just the articulation of what is reavealed.

Again, if no idea of unconditioned, true, ens (Jaspers, Marcel) then either new type of metaphysics concerned with the reality of the subject as subject or at least Existenzerhellung or truth as Unverborgenheit d-xyon.

SUBJECT AND HORIZON

I. The Notion of Horizon.

1. Human knowledge is in process.

Intellect: quo est omnia facere et fieri; but though unlimited in range, it begins from tabula rasa.

Process is raising and answering questions: Quid, Propter quid, An, Utrum. Or, manifestation of process is...

2. Hence at any stage of development, a threefold division.
Known: the range of questions I can raise and answer.
Known unknown: the range of questions I can raise, find significant, worthwhile, know how they might be solved, but de facto cannot answer and know I cannot answer. Docta ignorantia.
Unknown unknown: Indocta ignorantia; the range of questions that I do not raise; if raised, I would not understand nor find significant nor judge worthwhile nor know how to go about solving.
3. The horizon is the limit, the boundary between docta and indocta ignorantia.
 What is beyond my horizon consists not merely of answers but also and principally of questions that are beyond me, meaningless-to-me, insignificant-to-me, not worthwhile-to-me, insoluble-to-me. "I haven't got a clue."
 As defined, the horizon is a relative term: what is meaningless-to-me may or may not be meaningless absolutely.
 By way of contrast, we shall also speak of the field: What is beyond the field is meaningless absolutely, insignificant absolutely, insoluble absolutely.
 The field is the universe, but my horizon defines my universe.
 Both are relevant to metaphysics: for metaphysics deals with ens, with omnia, with the universe.
 The field regards metaphysics as such, but the horizon regards metaphysics as possible-to-me, relevant-to-me.
4. The existence of the horizon comes to light not directly but indirectly.
 Not directly: it can be sharply defined only by going beyond it, by reaching a wider horizon in which the old appears as a part. From within any given horizon, its limits are not clear and sharp and in focus, but obscure, hazy, distant: for what is beyond the horizon is what we pay no attention to, and what is at the horizon is what we pay little attention to.
 Indirectly: for we can study instances in which the recession or contraction of the horizon occurs.

II. The Horizon in Science (or Mathematics).

1. The scientific (or mathematical) horizon recedes if there occur:
 - (a) A crisis: existing theories, methods, modes of thought cannot handle the facts, results, satisfactorily.
 - (b) A fundamental revision of concepts, postulates, axioms, methods.
 - (c) The development of a radically new scientific structure. e.g., non-Euclidean geometry, calculus, Galois, Einstein, Quanta, Copernicus Darwin Freud.
2. Recession of the horizon meets with resistance.
 Max Planck on what makes a scientific theory accepted: not clarity of observation, exactness of measurement, coherence of hypothesis, rigour of deduction, decisiveness of verification, but retirement of present generation of professors.
3. Eventually the resistance is overcome.
Universally: Scientific results are equally accessible to all; at any time, roughly, contemporary scientists are abreast.
Permanently: the new theory covers all the old facts, and many more; there is no tendency to revert to earlier positions, to revive old views.
4. Hence, science is characterized by such universality and permanence, by the contrasting absence of permanent division into opposed schools of thought, of the survival and revival of what to others seems to be definitely superseded.

Resistance to scientific advance is a subjective phenomenon; it is eliminated by a new generation of professors.

The old have intellectual habits without the suppleness needed to develop new habits; they have invested their intellectual capital in a point of view, and they are not prepared to declare themselves bankrupt.

III. The Horizon in Human Science, Philosophy, Theology.

1. In these fields there occur recessions of the horizon in the same fashion as in natural science or mathematics. i. e., crisis, radically new viewpoint, radically new structure.

Plato: aisthnta vontá; the vontá are ovtws ovta

Aristotle: the vontov is the aitiouv tou eivai immanent in the material object; extrapolation to immovable movers.

Augustine: real is body; real is true.

Aquinas: a transformation of existing theology (Gilson; Scotus was the traditionalist, augustinisme avicennisant)

Descartes: philosophy as an independent and separate subject; not merely distinction but separation from theology.

2. In these fields the recession of the horizon does not result in a straight forward universal and permanent difference.

Not universal: per se, an original philosopher founds a new school; he changes philosophy only secundum quid; he gives rise to new topics, new approaches, new techniques, but the basic differences remain -- there is a family resemblance between different realizations of the materialist, idealist, realist tendencies respectively, from 4th century Athens to today.

Not permanent: the original thinker founds a new school, but the school splinters.

Further, there occur periods of decadence, loss of vigor, of influence.

as there occur insensible changes with changing times, in which the original message can be lost; devaluation of meanings so also there occur revivals, second spring, recoveries of vigor and influence

3. The difference between the phenomena of the horizon in maths and natural science, on the one hand, and in human science, phil., theol., on the other is not too difficult to account for.

In the latter case the new horizon on the object involves a new horizon on the subject; for the subject is one of the objects.

And a new horizon on the subject involves not merely new concepts, postulates, axioms, methods, techniques, but also a conversion of the subject, a reorientation, a reorganization.

A new concept of oneself, new principles to guide one's thinking, judging, evaluating, all that concerns oneself, is a conversion.

Without the conversion, the new ideas not only are inoperative in one's own living, but also they are insignificant, without real meaning, without any vital expansiveness, in the domain of objects.

The original thinker founds only a school, because he cannot effect the conversion of subjects, he can only promote conversion in for the more ready.

His school splinters, is subject to periods of decadence and revival, because even his followers can succeed in subjective conversion only up to a point.

IV. The Existential Gap.

1. The existence of philosophical and theological schools, the possibility of decadence and revival within any given school (the words of the master are repeated but his meaning is lost), the fact that human science to be science systematically tends to omit what is human, reveal the fundamental significance and importance of horizon in studies concerned with man, directly or indirectly.

This significance is: The reality of the subject can be beyond the horizon of the subject.

The subject can suffer from an *indocta ignorantia* with regard to himself.

This *indocta ignorantia* is not a matter of what the subject might very well be excused from knowing; depth psychology, social conditioning, history, biology, bio-chemistry.

It is a matter of the subject's own intelligence, his own reasonableness, his own freedom and responsibility.

On the one hand, he is intelligent, reasonable, free, responsible, he manifests these characteristics in many fashions; he would be insulted if told he was stupid, unreasonable, irresponsible, a victim of catch-words.

Yet at the same time in a very true sense his own intelligence, his own reasonableness, his own freedom and responsibility stand beyond his horizon.

2. The existential gap is the difference, greater or less, between one's horizon on oneself and what really one is.

Again, the existential gap is the gap between what is overt in what one is and what is covert in what one is.

What Hume asserted human knowledge to be; the knowledge Hume manifestly employed in stating proving his assertion.

3. The existential gap is not eliminated by affirming the propositions that are true and denying the propositions that are false.

The decadent school repeats the propositions of the master, but it has collapsed the master's meaning into something less than will fit into a contracted horizon.

The problem is of the existential gap the problem of a conversion that is proportionate to the objective development; it is not the problem of agreeing with Augustine that the real is the true; it is the problem of meaning as much as did Augustine when he spoke of *veritas*.

4. Hence study of the existential gap is concerned with immediacy: not a matter of true or false props, but of conversion.

obnubilation: discovery movement from covert to overt, genuine authentic.

norms: there is something normative; conversion should occur;

freedom, responsibility; else norms really meaningless.

transcendent: the norms involve an absolute value; the subject takes his stand by them even against the world, against himself, finds in them a symbol, an indication of God.

Existenz: the subject becomes himself in his relation to Transcendent.

HORIZON AND DREAD

1. The horizon is grounded in the subject: it is the boundary at which begins his *indocta ignorantia*.

Still this is merely an objective aspect of the horizon: it is defined in terms of what the subject not only does not know but also considers meaningless insignificant insoluble.

We have to inquire into the subjective phenomena of horizon: How is it constituted; how is it maintained.

2. To consider single acts involves violent abstraction.

Sensitive acts are involved in a multiple correlation: see: approach, look, focus.

Intellectual acts suppose sensitive, operative with respect to sensitive stimulus and manipulation of sensitive flow.

Hence, study of consciousness is study, not of isolated acts, but of flow, stream, direction, orientation, interest, concern.

3. Study of such streams of consciousness, at a first approximation, is erection of ideal constructs.

Cf. motion of mass in central field of force, Carnot cycle,

Hence, patterns of experience:

(1) Biological: beast of prey and quarry.

(2) Aesthetic: release from biological interests: free creation.

(3) Dramatic: primary aesthetic creation is in oneself and with regard to others; extravert if successful; else introversion. One is the hero in one's dreamland - one has to make, constitute, oneself.

(4) Intellectual: Thales and milkmaid; Newton working on gravitation.

(5) Practical: getting things done.

4. Limit to patterns of experience: underlying biological manifold has to have higher sensitive integration.

A stream of consciousness that runs too freely has the nemesis of compulsions, invasions, neurotic phenomena, anxiety crises.

Anxiety crisis: breakdown of stream, pattern; objects there but meaningless, no dynamic significant integration.

Anxiety: minor phenomena; development of a type of consciousness takes place along lines of minimum anxiety.

Abnormality: development has had to avoid anxiety by extreme measures.

5. A world: what lies within a horizon; a totality of potential objects. Not some particular object, but a possibility of some types of objects and not of others.

World, horizon, corresponds to the concrete synthesis that is my conscious living, and that concrete synthesis does not admit change without experience of anxiety, dread; it is not the reality of my world that is the anchor, the conservative principle; it is the dread I experience and spontaneously I ward off whenever my world is menaced.

My concrete synthesis in conscious living is (a) integration of underlying neural manifold (b) set of modes of dealing with Mitwelt of persons and Umwelt of tools; or any other combination.

To change it, to be converted to new world, to let my horizon recede is to invite experience of dread and to release a spontaneous, resourceful, manifold, plausible resistance.

This dread and release not a function of objective evidence for my world; it is a function of my mode of life, my solution to total range of problems arising in my concrete living.

6. Hence, a series of corollaries: (1) Conversion a leap.

To convert someone, to be converted oneself, is not exclusively a matter of proofs arguments evidence:

There is for everyone a problem of integrated conscious living. In childhood: illness, fever, easily moves to delirium, if I may quote my own experience.

The problem is solved only more or less satisfactorily: whole range of types of unsatisfactory solutions, from psychoses to neurotic phenomena of minor type.

The problem exists because man is capable of free images: Kohler's apes; literature to develop imagination; to provide intelligence with a tool that will make possible the movement of intellect to ens, omnia; and because free images is not an unlimited, unconditioned freedom.

Conversion, moving to new horizon, entering into new world, is tampering with a hitherto successful solution to the problem of conscious living.

If I can get by the initial anxiety, I shall be better off; just as analyse and if he can stand anxiety involved in cure will be cured.

But not merely a problem of standing the anxiety; it is also a problem of dealing with the resistance.

The would-be convert appeals to his Selbstverständlichkeiten; he indignantly appeals to what is obvious to everyone with an ounce of common sense; he moves round in a circle within his established horizon; and as long as it remains, his brand of logic and his set of premisses will be unshakable-to-him.

Moving to new horizon, conversion, involves a leap: a leap from Selbstverständlichkeiten, which are mostly misunderstanding what in some sense is true, but also are props to present position, to another concrete solution to problem of conscious living.

To experience such dread, seriously suppose that some philosophy (that is not your own) were true.

Real distinction: not a problem of distinction but a problem of reality, of what really is, of horizon, of horizon buttressed by dread, and avoidance of dread rationalized by Selbstverständlichkeiten.

7. Corollary (2) The Self-constituting Subject.

Freedom of will: rational alternatives and free choice.

Prior freedom: the solution that has been the concrete synthesis in my living.

Cooperation of subconscious, imagination, intelligence yielding projects within aesthetic (play), dramatic, practical, intellectual, patterns of experience.

The drama we do not think out and then execute; the drama that spontaneously arises already charged with image emotion appetite.

It is a freedom not had by animals.

It is an "ontological" freedom by which the conscious subject is this conscious subject, develops this solution to the problem of concrete living.

It is that by which we become what we are before we are able to think out alternative courses of action and choose between them.

It sets the horizon within which occurs our thinking and choosing, so that while any particular project can be vetoed, yet the veto has to have its grounds within my world, my horizon and no project can arise unless it is such as to fall within the world that is mine.

Still, if we have made ourselves without any awareness of what we were up to, so we later can remake ourselves in the light of better knowledge and with a full responsibility.

Nor is the refusal to remake ourselves any escape, for that is just assuming responsibility for whatever we happen inadvertently to have made ourselves in the past.

8. Corollary (3) The basic function of philosophy.

Philosophy is the attempt to illuminate the effort of intelligent, reasonable, free, fully responsible self-constitution.

Hence, philosophy is concerned with good: what is freely and responsibly chosen and effected; what is concrete (verum et falsum in intellectu; bonum et malum in rebus)

Point of comparison with scholasticism is with school. account of good.

bonum particulare: corresponds to particular appetite

bonum ordinis: series of particular goods, series of coordinated activities, habits of apprehension appetite, interpersonal relations (communication in good, congruent with coordination of activities, rising from habits)

bonum per essentiam: the absolute norm; possibility of individual willing good against world, others, self; transcendent.

Concern with good.

- (a) Concerned with improving my operating solution, functioning synthesis in concrete living; with transition from freedom of images to freedom of enlightened responsible choice; conversion.
- (b) Concerned improvement as mine; not truths but the truth I live by, that is involved in my free self-constitution; not notional but real apprehension and assent.
- (c) Concerned with a solution of living; not abstract living but living in a world, with others, in a technical civilization; study critique of personal relations, of technical society.
- (d) Concerned with concrete possibility of that living at its highest point; ultimate self-affirmation-constitution in relation with transcendent, as person, Thou (Marcel), with my existenz as awareness of self as gift given to self (Jaspers)
- (e) Concerned with history; as everyone, philosopher responds to problems of age; his specific character is to respond to these common problems at deepest level, at point of maximum consequence for human welfare or human disaster. Jaspers: primitive cultures; organized civil.; Achsenzeit; present as momentous as discovery of fire tools speech; old ways relentlessly being dissolved; masses; one world history.
- (f) The philosopher is open: by definition, going beyond horizon based on dread; philosophers his educators qua obscure, for such obscurity is revelation of my blind spots, my horizon.
- (g) The philosopher has to be genuine; not talking beyond his own horizon, devaluating the currency, collapsing the great into a narrow horizon world.
- (h) Philosophy has to be relevant; not analytic propositions; not analytic principles with a per se relevance, that is per se only because fact of horizon overlooked; not relevant to man in general, but to me in my age and those with me.
- (i) Philosophy can only illuminate; it looks not to a theoretically compelled assent, but to a free conversion; one cannot be another do his thinking, judging, deciding, living for him.

HORIZON AND HISTORY

1. An enlargement of the significance of the existential gap.
Not merely a matter of a difficult and doubtful technique in the study of the totality of philosophies, but a critical issue within the historical process.
Existential gap is not merely a call to authenticity of subject in his private existence; it is a call to authenticity in all subjects, an invitation to understanding at a critical moment in human history, a summons to decisiveness, an exploration of the techniques of communication. (Existentialists write novels, plays).
History, as total field of human operations in this life.
2. Begin from notion of dialectic.
Familiar: dialectic of an idea; eg dialectic of rigour; exclude casual insights; axiomatization; paradoxes; new basis.
Unfamiliar: dialectic of a reality, of man, of history.
Still, if dialectic of an idea, there is some dialectic of man, of history.
Not of man as what recurs by reproduction; no transmission of acquired characters.
But of man as technical, social, cultural; for in these respects, what man is, results from man's ideas on man.
Man as technical, as using tools: not merely satisfies animal necessities, but creates human environment, the city, the state, as a totality of material products facilities.
Man as social, as organizing and organized; institutions such as family, education, economic system, political system, systems of alliances and enmities.

Man as cultural (culture in anthropological sense): the current effective totality of.

Immanently produced and symbolically communicated contents of imagination, emotion, sentiment: of inquiry, insight, conception; of reflection, judgment, valuation, of decision, implementation.

In these respects man (a) presupposes nature but (b) makes himself by taking thought.

Man as technical social cultural is difference between aggregate of babies born and abandoned in jungle and the aggregate of human beings operating in a civilization.

3. The objective Functioning of the Dialectic.

(a) There is a circuit, a mutual causation, in man's making of man as technical social cultural.

The objective situation (technical social cultural) is at once a product of and an occasion for

imagination, sentiment, emotion; inquiry, insight, conception; reflection judgment evaluation; decision policy implementation.

(b) As product the objective situation objectifies, reveals, what man has been feeling, thinking, deciding about man.

As occasion, the objective situation suggests and motivates changes in what man has been feeling, thinking, deciding.

(c) In so far as there is an effective existential gap, an operative limited horizon, the situation as product will objectify and reveal the existential gap in overemphases and oversights, but the situation as occasion will be powerless to suggest and motivate the correct solutions, remedies, as long as existential gap remains; hence, situation progressively deteriorates; more and more liberal use of useless solutions, remedies, in the sight, either existential gap is closed, or else the civilization liquidates itself.

4. Resolute and Effective Intervention in the Dialectic.

(a) Everyone participates: everyone contributes to the production of human situations; everyone has to respond to the human situations in which he finds himself.

Still such participation may be mere drifting: one does not understand what is going on; one has no clue as to what is wrong; one has no idea what one could effectively do about it.

Man as historical, man as making man, is beyond man's horizon, is in a dreamland.

(b) Resolute and effective intervention presupposes subjects in which the existential gap has been is being closed; else they will merely increase the confusion and accelerate the doom.

Resolute and effective intervention means that these subjects do not remain within an ivory tower admiring their own deeper profundity, the incomprehension of the mass of men.

(c) Resolute and effective intervention heightens the operation of the dialectic.

The situation objectifies the existential gap; intervention crystallizes the objectification; it is there; it is obscurely EVIDENT to everyone; but it is not articulate, it is unexpressed, it is not effectively noticed.

The situation suggests and motivates the necessary changes in the subject; intervention clarifies the suggestion and drives home the motivation; clarifies, by linking old errors with present evils; drives home, to retain errors is to perpetuate evils.

Intervention constitutes the correction by communication;

(1) What man felt, thought, decided, made things as they are.

(2) Different feelings, thoughts, decisions will make them different

(3) Communication results in different feelings, thoughts, decisions.

5. The Essence of the Dialectic.

(a) Lies in a conflict between what man is, is to be, and what man feels, thinks he is, is to be.

Objectification is of what man thinks; but the objectification is also a revelation of overemphases and oversights, in so far as there is a conflict between man's plans for himself and what man really is.

Revelation is motivation for change, in so far as what man has made of himself is in conflict with what man really is.

(b) The dialectic then does not operate within the field of concepts and judgments, terms and propositions; it is not based on a conflict between opposing philosophies.

It is based on a conflict between any defective philosophy (implicit or explicit) and what man really is, is to be.

(c) The verdict of the dialectic is not a label of approval on a philosophy; it lies in the facts of the situation, in its tensions, its basic hopefulness, its ultimate desperateness, its stimulus to affirmation or its imposition of nihilism. (nihilism: don't care; what happens to me, to man, could not mean less than it does to me)

Still the facts are significant only to those whose horizon does not preclude knowledge of what it is to be a man. If the facts are not significant, then they are destructive of societies; because the effective horizon continually forces a misinterpretation of the facts.

6. In first lecture, concluded that there exists a valid and important field of inquiry concerned with subject in his immediacy; obnubilation, capacity for change, authenticity, freedom, responsibility.

Now must further conclude that such a field is also relevant to man as technical social cultural.

History is concerned to bring to light man as he really is; hence to study this generalized existential field is to get to the heart of historical process.

Again, study of horizons eliminates the horizon that keeps man as historical beyond one's field of vision.

HORIZON AS THE PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY

1. De facto there exist many horizons; this is also de iure since man makes man (generation, technique, society, culture) and within these limits man makes himself if he chooses or drifts into what he happens to be if he fails to choose.

2. This multiplicity may be considered as a mere matter of fact: history of culture, thought, opinion as a problem to be explained: Psychologie der Weltanschauungen as an issue calling for judgment, decision, philosophic issue.

3. The multiplicity of horizons as philosophic issue arises when we ask:

(a) Is some horizon the field, or is there not field?

(b) If some horizon is the field, how can it be determined?

To deny that there is a field, is to deny that philosophy has a positive content; still that denial is itself philosophic though perhaps unconsciously so.

Positivism: let's do science.

Pragmatism: let's experiment, see what happens.

Scepticism: let's inquire some more.

Relativism: There are no definitive answers, just points of view.

To affirm that there is a field, involves one in the second question which is at once ontological and epistemological.

It is ontological in its consequent: beyond such and such a limit there is nothing to be known and so no indocta ignorantia; it settles where reality ends, where meaninglessness begins.

It is epistemological in its antecedent; to define the field raises the questions of the truth of the definition; and the definition is true in virtue of known evidence; what then is the evidence? This evidence is of some reality; hence ontological also in antecedent.

4. The simultaneity of E and O is intrinsic to the positive answer.

Simultaneity: E as antecedent; O as included in antecedent, though not O as formulated in consequent. It is the antecedent ontological evidence or "ontic" evidence that in existentialism gives rise to metaphysics. In detail:

(a) Any determination, justification, evidence for a horizon, arises within a stream of consciousness and so arises within what already is constituted as a horizon.

(b) The justification of the horizon cannot rest on the consequent ontology, on the realities known within the horizon for then every horizon would automatically be self-justifying; and that is the negative solution.

(c) It cannot rest on the norms, invariants, principles that de facto characterize, determine, constitute any given horizon; for again on that showing, every horizon would be self-justifying.

(d) It has to involve a discovery of the evidence, norms, invariants, principles; that naturally, ontically, possess a cogency, inevitability, necessity, normativeness; that thereby constitute a self-justifying horizon, stream of consciousness, and so field; that none the less admits the possibility of other horizons, through the whole gamut of human differences; that accounts for the actual existence of these differences at least in principle; that account for them in such a manner that at the same time it discredits them, reveals them to be, not self-justifying, but self-destructive; that discredits them in such a manner that none the less their actual occurrence remains possible, plausible, convincing.

(e) The prior reality that both grounds horizons and the critique of horizons and the determination of the field is the reality of the subject as subject.

It is not any object known objectively and it is not the subject known objectively, for all objects are known within some stream of consciousness and so within a horizon; and it has been contended that such objects cannot justify any horizon without thereby justifying all horizons.

It is the reality of the subject as subject; for the subject as subject is both reality and conscious.

The subject as subject is reality in the sense that we live and die, love and hate, rejoice and suffer, desire and fear, wonder and dread, inquire and doubt. It is Descartes' "cogito" transposed to concrete living. It is the subject present to himself, not as presented to himself in any theory or affirmation of consciousness, but as the prior (non-absence) prerequisite to any presentation, as a priori condition to any stream of consciousness (including dreams)

The argument is: the prior reality is not object as object or subject as object; there only remains subject as subject; and this s as s both reality and discoverable through consciousness.

The argument does not prove that in the s as s we shall find the evidence norms invariants principles for a critique of horizons; it proves that unless we find it there, we shall not find it at all.