

Lecture Notes on Existentialism

by Bernard Lonergan, SJ

Notes distributed by the author  
for is course during the summer  
session at Boston College, July,  
1957.

## NOTES ON EXISTENTIALISM

These notes are on lectures given by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, SJ, to a group of scholastic philosophers at Boston College, Summer 1957, originally reprinted by the Thomas More Institute. To this reprinting have been added a few schematic section headings, outline numeration, and continuous pagination. All additions are indicated by brackets, i.e., [...], and in the pagination the top number corresponds to the original pagination.

### [PART ONE: THE BASIC THEME OF EXISTENTIALISM]

#### I. GENERAL ORIENTATION

1. By "existentialism" we shall understand the types of method and doctrine exemplified by K. Jaspers, M. Heidegger, J.-P. Sartre, Gabriel Marcel.

The name is admitted by Jaspers and Sartre; it was admitted for a while by Marcel who after Humani Generis and, perhaps, to disassociate himself from Sartre, rejected it; Heidegger says he is concerned with Ek-sistenz.

Jaspers is Kantian and Lutheran; Heidegger an agnostic; Sartre an atheist; Marcel a convert to Catholicism.

2. They are concerned with what it is to be a man, not in the sense of having a birth certificate, but in the sense employed by President Eisenhower last fall when, asked whether it was not risky to send the fleet into the Mediterranean during the Egyptian crisis, answered "We have to be men."

"Being a man" in the sense that results from a decision, is consequent to the use of one's freedom, makes one the sort of man one really is, involves risk (in the present instance, the risk of nuclear warfare and all that it implies).

3. It is anti-positivist: "being a man" is not any set of outer data to be observed, any set of properties to be inferred from the outer data, any course of action that can be predicted from the properties; it springs from an inner and "free" determination that is not scientifically observable.

It is anti-idealist: the various transcendental ego's are neither Greek nor barbarian, neither bound nor free, male nor female; they don't suffer, they don't die; we do.

Positivism and idealism have been major determinants in producing the contemporary world; in the measure that the contemporary world is found unsatisfactory or, frankly, disastrous, existentialism has a profound resonance.

Sein und Zeit quickly ran through five editions; Jaspers' Geistige Situation der Zeit was through five editions in about a year and has been translated into six languages including Japanese; Sartre was a cafe hero in Paris.

This contemporary resonance fits in with existentialist concern for time and for history.

Since "being a man" is not a fixed essence with which we are endowed from birth but the result of the use of our freedom, and further, since "being a man" is not a property that necessarily remains with us but is maintained by us precariously in the continuous use of freedom, "time" is an intrinsic and necessary component in "being a man". Hence, Heidegger's Sein und Zeit, Marcel's Homo Viator. However, concern with history on the grand scale appears only in Jaspers, e.g., Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte.

4. It is unconcerned with propositional truth and with what man's per se capacities for truth or anything else.

This unconcern arises in Heidegger, Sartre, from phenomenological concentration on the sources, grounds, whence spring concepts and judgments.

It arises in Jaspers from Kant who is believed to have shown that any objective statement deals only with appearance.

It arises in Marcel from his concern with being a good man as opposed to mere existence as a man, and the common attitude (but-tressed by dissatisfaction with idealism) that technically correct propositions have little or nothing to do with what you really are.

In all, it arises from a turning away from the universal, necessary, abstract, per se, to the unique individual, the contingent, the concrete, the de facto.

Jaspers repeatedly insists that freedom is not definable; Sartre establishes the fact of freedom by asking whether you have been in the torture chamber with the Nazis and made the experiment of freedom by not giving you comrades away; none of them would dream of discussing "man" as what is common to mewling infants, people sound asleep, and the mature man facing a crisis in his life.

Gabriel Marcel: "Plus il s'agit de ce que je suis et non de ce que j'ai, plus questions et réponses perdent toute signification. Quand on me demande, ou quand je me demande, en quoi je crois, je ne puis me contenter d'énumérer un certain nombre de propositions auxquelles je souscris; ces formules, de toute évidence, traduisent une réalité plus profonde, plus intime: le fait d'être en circuit ouvert par rapport à la Réalité transcendante reconnue comme un Tu." Quoted by R. Troisfontaines, De l'existence à l'être, II, 352.

5. This unconcern with propositional truth and this distaste for the per se is de facto connected with an incapacity to provide foundations for either propositional truth or the per se.

It is my firm conviction that, while there is much in existentialism on which we should practice the patristic maxim of despoiling the Egyptians, still we cannot simply take existentialism (even Marcel's) and incorporate it within scholasticism.

6. Existentialism is concerned with the human subject qua conscious emotionally involved, the ground of his own possibilities, the free realization of those possibilities, the radical orientation within which they emerge into consciousness and are selected, his relationship with civilization, other persons, history, God.

7. G. Marcel is not a systematic thinker; in his preface to R. Troisfontaines' De l'existence à l'être, he congratulates the author for having done for him what he could not do for himself.

G. Marcel is a penetrating thinker and an extremely effective writer; he can put a concrete idea, orientation, criticism of life, across with extraordinary brevity and skill.

He reviews his intellectual history in "Regard en arrière," a paper added to the collection Existentialisme chrétien: Gabriel Marcel, introduction by E. Gilson; contributors include De l'homme, Troisfontaines, et al. See J. Bochenski, Contemporary European Philosophy.

His Journal Metaphysique, I, was published in 1927, the date of Sein und Zeit. His background is idealism (including Bradley) and Bergson; Kierkegaard is acknowledged to have influenced him indirectly

8. K. Jaspers began with abnormal psychology of which he became professor and wrote various technical articles; he has a profound respect for science and is a mordant critic of scientists; forty years ago he was ridiculing the mythology of the brain and the mythology of the unconscious in the psychologies of his time.

He is a Kantian with the Critique of Practical Reason brought to life by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.

He is the most broadly cultivated of the existentialists and with the widest range of interests; he writes very intelligently, explains exactly what he means, strikes one as very balanced and sane.

In his Philosophie (1932), he explains that Existenz and Transcendenz correspond roughly to what are named the soul and God by mythical consciousness.

Since then, he has developed the notion of das Umgreifende (which corresponds roughly to the notion of being in Insight) and has come to place a great deal more emphasis and reliance on reason (more perhaps to disassociate himself from Sartre and similar tendencies that from assignable grounds) and to speak openly of God (as a necessary philosophic postulate).

9. M. Heidegger is perhaps the most profound and original of the lot; his immediate source is Husserl; from Heidegger by way of a strong dose of French clarity comes Sartre, who figures as the reductio ad absurdum of the movement.

## II. ON BEING ONESELF: /GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE THEME/

1. Subject is subject of .....; a relative term; meaning varies with correlative.

Grammatical: function in sentence.

Logical: function in proposition

Metaphysical: recipient; matter, form; potency, act,...

Psychological: subject of stream of consciousness.

2. Consciousness streams in many patterns: dream, biological, aesthetic, intellectual, dramatic, practical, mystical.

Contrast: subject of stream as oriented on knowing, and subject of stream as oriented on choosing.

Of old: speculative and practical reason; now: concrete flow orientated on knowing and orientated on choosing.

3. Intellectual pattern is intellectual by its detachment, by non-intervention of alien "subjective" concerns, by concentration of attention, effort, on observing, understanding, judging.

Subject is involved, but as involved he is subordinated to dictates of method, to immanent concretion within himself of principles of logic, of scientific aspiration, of absolute criteria: commitment is to submission to norms.

Subject is headed towards object, universe; he himself enters into picture only within objective field, as a particular case in a broader totality; that data of his consciousness may be a source of information, but they are not relevant qua his.

Subject has a responsibility: his judgment is his, and "personne se plaint de son jugement"; still, it is a limited responsibility, for he can frame his conclusions as positive or negative, certain or probable, etc.; in brief, he is bound to say what he knows and no more than he knows, re object and re mode, but he is not committed to reaching definite results.

4. The practical pattern of experience demands the intervention of the subject.

He may choose A or B, A or not-A; or he may consent to drift, permit himself to be other-directed, where however the consenting and permitting are equivalent to choosing, though an inauthentic equivalent.

The choice, decision, drift, are determined neither externally, biologically, psychically, nor intellectually.

Even when one knows everything about everything, an operable cannot be demonstrated; it admits no more than rhetorical syllogisms. But in fact, I do not know everything about everything; I do not know everything that ultimately is relevant to the choices I have to make, and none the less I already am alive, thinking, acting, under a perpetual necessity of drifting or choosing, choosing A or not-A, B or not-B, ...

Hence, choosing is within an atmosphere of incertitude, and so it involves an acceptance of risk.

Choosing not only settles ends and objects; it gives rise to dispositions and habits; it makes me what I am to be; it makes it possible to estimate what I probably would do; it gives me a second nature, an essence that is mine in virtue of my choosing; still it does not give me an immutable essence; achievement is always precarious, and a radical new beginning is always possible.

In choosing, I become myself; what settles the issue is not external constraint nor inner determinism nor knowledge, but ut quo my will and ut quod; in the last analysis, the ultimate reason for my choice being what it is is myself; if left to mere balancing of motives, impulses, etc., then I consent to drift; I consent to being other-directed; I implicitly choose as myself the On, Man -- inauthenticity.

If not left to mere balancing of motives, impulses, then I intervene, I knowingly assume risk, responsibility.

In either case, what ultimately is operative is purely individual, unique.

In the drifter what results is another instance of the average man in a given milieu.

In the decisive person, what results is what he chooses to be.

In the drifter, individuality is blurred; his individuality is his consenting to be like everybody else.

In the decisive person, there comes to light both his individuality and the total-otherness of other individuals; my choice is what it is because that's what I choose; yours is because that's what you choose; even when what is chosen is the same, still the sources are simply different.

Finally, there are limiting situations; the drifter can no longer just drift; and the decisive person is powerless to change things by deciding. In general, such situations are the historical period in which one lives, the social milieu of birth, opportunities, being male or female, old or young; in particular, there are death, suffering, struggle, guilt.

Confronted with limiting situations, the drifter may try to forget, but ultimately he cannot succeed; he is totally involved, all of him is involved, and he is totally unprepared. On the other hand, the decisive person can be as decisive as he pleases, but the limiting situation is not thereby removed.

5. Oneself is the irreducibly individual element whence spring the choices of the decisive person and the drifting, forgetting of the indecisive.

What springs from that source is free; for it, one is responsible.

What results from that source is not only the sequence of activities but also the character of the man, the second nature, quasi-essence, by which precariously one is what one is.

Nor does choosing wait upon learning, the acquisition of as much knowledge as might be relevant; it involves risk and incertitude.

Finally, in choosing is involved everything that concerns me.

6. Being oneself is being the subject of fine acts. It is existential existence. In the limit, ex-sistence implies the transcendent, the absolute.

Within a satisfactory synthesis, there is possible an alternation, a withdrawal and return, a mutual complementarity.

In the intellectual pattern of experience, I am choosing because I choose to submit entirely to the exigences of knowing in order to know, and without that knowing, there would be, not merely a residual incertitude and risk to choosing, but a total blindness that makes choice indistinguishable from mere force, instinct, passion.

In the practical pattern of experience, there is an ultimate moment of "being myself", of incertitude and risk, and nonetheless, total commitment; but it is a known ultimate moment, and it is within a context of knowing and with respect to a largely known.

### III. ON BEING ONESELF: PHILOSOPHIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE THEME

1. It provides a ready rationalization for those who do not wish to endure the restraints of knowing. Let's drop philosophy, speculative theology, science.

Love of neighbor, zeal for souls, dialogue, disponibilit  , prayer.

2. Breaks through positivist science of man.

It denies that there is any ready-made essence or nature with predictable properties.

L'homme se d  finit par une exigence.

Eisenhower: "We have to be men." It implies that we might be less than men, that there is an exigence for us to be men, that the exigence is to be met by a decision.

3. Breaks through pragmatist science of man.

One learns from experience about things, about one's own potentialities.

But the issue is not one of knowing whether a priori or a posteriori; given all the knowledge possible, all the human experiments desirable, there still remains the whole issue of deciding, which, even then, would involve incertitude and risk.

And meanwhile one already is living, and one has only one life. The decision to risk nuclear warfare is not justifiable pragmatically.

4. Breaks through the idealist view of man.

The idealist's absolute or transcendental ego is neither Greek nor barbarian, neither male nor female, it neither dies nor suffers,

nor acknowledges guilt.

The idealist's world is a world that is pure intelligibility, rational throughout; it is not a world of free choices springing from individuals that are totally concerned in the once for all of the momentous moment.

5. Sets problems for contemporary scholasticism.

a. What meaning is possible for the fact that I become myself?

An ambiguity comes to light in the metaphysical theory of the person, i.e. subsistence. It rests on the issue: is metaphysics knowledge of things through their causes or through the decem genera entis? Is the thing just its substance or is the thing a whole that includes both substance and accidents?

b. Verum et falsum sunt in mente, bonum et malum sunt in rebus. But in the concrete, there are no abstractions, and so there is no abstract good. But there remains for each one to work out concretely what the good really is.

There remains an order of the universe, but it is not an order deducible from abstract essences and schematic hierarchies; it is a concrete unfolding in concrete situations; and the concrete situations are proximately the product of individual decisions about the concrete good.

There remains the natural law (situations do not change moral precepts); but there arises the significance of kairos, of my situation, my opportunity, my duty; and while these can be illuminated by moralists, by spiritual directors, the ultimate issue is whether or not I am to take a risk and assume a total responsibility and rise to the occasion.

There is to the order of the universe the emergence of good from evil, the heightening of evil to a maximum that sets the alternative of conversion or destruction, where the evil is to be met, not by being included as intelligibility within the order, but as a surd violating the order, as a demand, not for justice, but for self-sacrifice and charity.

The order of the universe is not a mechanistic plan flowing from essences; it may descend to that through sin, but it rises from it inasmuch as the order is a matrix, a network of personal relations. [In brief,] Situation, surd, kairos, charity.

c. There is the need of an ancilla that will supply theology with the categories necessary to assimilate the doctrine of the Bible.

The possibility of such an ancilla: can existential questions be handled by the Catholic philosopher?; do they not suppose knowledge of theology by their very nature?

d. Withdrawal and return: this is not simply a matter of the mutual dependence of willing to know and knowing to will. There is the problem of conversion (reorientation, reorganization of mind and life). Kierkegaard's spheres: aesthetic, ethical, religious A&B.

Upward change is not in virtue of knowledge on lower plane; it is not in virtue of will following knowledge on lower plane. There has to be the apparent irruption of a latent power, the possibility of a radical discovery where the discovered has been present all along, the fact of an obnubilation that prevented prior discovery. This sets the radical question in all philosophizing.

It is relevant for scholastics with their innumerable disputed questions, and no method of solution, not only in sight, but not even desired, sought, seriously believed in. In various measures it is the concern of the thinkers named existentialists.

Proposal: to face our existential question and through it to move towards some understanding of this question for others.



## [PART TWO: PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD: GENERAL ACCOUNT]

### PHENOMENOLOGY: NATURE, SIGNIFICANCE, LIMITATIONS

#### I. NATURE

Phenomenology is an account, description, presentation of the data structured by insight.

1. Of data, what is given, what is manifest, what appears.  
Not just external data, phenomena; but also inner; hence, opposition to mechanism, behaviorism.  
Not exclusively inner data: the inner intentional act terminates at the outer datum; and the outer datum is just the term of an inner intentional act.  
No exclusions: not primitive as opposed to derived, natural as opposed to cultural, sensitive as opposed to intellectual, cognitive as opposed to emotional, conative.

2. Data structured by insight (my way of putting it).  
Selective; not exhaustive description of all and any data; significant; seeks basic universal structures; Eidetic, Wesensschau, Aristotle's "parts of the form," in Metaph., Z, i.e. Book 7/  
Takes time, effort; not first bright idea, but calls for scrutiny, penetration, contrasts, tests; may have to overcome spontaneous tendentiousness, systematic oversight, common over-simplification, preconceptions arising from "scientific", "philosophic", or other sources.

3. Not insight as such  
Extremely elusive  
Would lead immediately to unity (viewpoints, higher viewpoints, theory of judgment)  
There is no such tendency toward unity in Husserl (he is forever discovering new field to be explored), and similarly there is no such tendency in his successors.

4. The data as structured by insight and not the subsequent conceptualization, definition, theoretic statement of the data in their essential features.

Perpetual appeal to prepredicative manifestation  
Basic distinction between what is given, manifest, appears and the thematic treatment of the given by the phenomenologist (phainomena legein).

#### II. SIGNIFICANCE

1. It provides a technique for the exploration and presentation of whole realms of matters of fact that are significant and have been neglected or treated superficially.

Bias in favor of outer data, in favor of measureable, countable; "Scientific" psychology, comparable in this respect to the opening of new vista and fields effected by Freud.

Traditional psychology: either rough and ready statement of what was presumed to be obvious, or, when effort for precision attempted, bogged down in account of "indefinable something".



Husserl on perception: Abschattung and Horizont

F.J.J. Buytendijk, Phénoménologie de la Rencontre (Desclée, 1952), La Ferme (Desclée, 1952 or earlier) perhaps, Wesen und Sinn des Spiels (Berlin, 1933).

S. Strasser, Das Gemut (Freiburg i. B., & Herder, 1956). Le Problème de l'Âme: Études sur l'objet respectif de la psychologie métaphysique et la psychologie empirique, French trans. by P. Wurtz, (Desclée). [Also in English, translated as The Problem of the Soul in Metaphysical and Empirical Psychology, (Duquesne University Press)]

M. Merleau-Ponty, La Structure du Comportement, 1942; La Phénoménologie de la Perception, (Paris: Gallimard, 1945). [both trans. in English: SC, as The Structure of Behavior, tr. by Alden Fisher, Beacon Press, 1961; and PP, as Phenomenology of Perception, tr. by Colin Smith, 1963, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul)] He is brilliant on the significance of one's own body in one's perceiving; sentient and sensible (spatio-temporal); neither purely pour-soi nor purely en-soi; not ghost in machine, but incarnate subject; neither subject nor body intelligible without the other.

2. It provides philosophical psychology and philosophy with a powerful instrument.

Husserl's quest: Logische Untersuchungen; Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie; Formale und transzendente Logik; Erfahrung und Urteil.

Strasser; Merleau-Ponty (Une philosophie de l'ambiguïté)

Heidegger: A man's understanding of himself as implicit in his projects is the intelligibility of that man, the de facto Sein of that Seiende; just as phenomenology has to bet beyond the obvious and superficial, so must each man; hence, inauthentic and authentic living and priority of the inauthentic.

L. Binswanger, Traum und Existenz; dreams of night (somatic determinants) dreams of morning (the human subject begins the projection of a world; interpretation of dreams in terms of itself vs. interpretation as fragmented waking, conceptualization of dream symbols).

H. Bultmann, Pistis is christliche Seinsverständnis, the rest is myth (what is objective is science or myth, and Christianity is not science).

H.W. Bartsch, Kerigma und Mythos. I, II, III, IV, and V; and Beiheft to I, LL. (Hamburg: 1948-55).

R. Marle, Bultmann et l'Interpretation du Nouveau Testament, (Paris: Aubier, 1956. Théologie 33.)

## II. LIMITATIONS

1. As phenomenology is essentially prepredicative, so also essentially it is preconceptual and prerational.

It provides the evidence in which the phenomenologist and his reader can grasp the virtually unconditioned; but, as far as I know, it has not penetrated to the analysis of that reflective rationality; and so it fails to give due weight to it in psychology and in the consequent philosophy.

Hence, its criterion of the true is the manifest, the evident; what becomes manifest, evident, when one lets phenomena appear, does not brush them aside, is not living the life of an escapist.

Per contra, as affirmation is based upon manifestness of what is, so negation is based on manifestness of what is not, of nothing,

In heidegger and Sartre, the basic role given to the anxiety crisis as the manifestation of Nothing.

3. Hence, the possibility of Husserl's Epoche: withdraw from interest in, concern with the "really real"; concentrate on intending and intended.

Radical difference between direction and redirection of attention, and the als ob of suspension of judgment; the possibility of the Epoche is connected with this ambiguity.

4. Hence, the impossibility of return from the Epoche.

If by intentional acts I regard the given as just what appears, (and I can do so), then by what sleight of hand can another intentional act of affirming, or anything else, restore the "really real"? cf. H.J. Pos.

See Problèmes Actuels de la Phénoménologie: Colloque Internationale de Phénoménologie, (Bruxelles, 1951; and Desclée, 1952), edited by H.L. Van Breda.

There is a real difference between

- a) natürliche Einstellung, Santayana's "animal faith",
- and b) reaching the absolute "is" through a grasp of the virtually unconditioned.

Hence, the incapacity of phenomenology for dealing with issues of speculative thought. E. Fink, loc. cit.

"... das Seiende ist Phänomen und weiter nichts. Eine Prüfung dieser Unterscheidung liegt gar nicht im Bereich der phänomenologischen Methode, weil sie all und jede Prüfung grundsätzlich als Ausweisung des selbstgegeben Phänomen versteht." (p. 72)

"Dass das Ausweisbare allein ist ... kann nicht wiederum durch Ausweisung dargetan werden. Das Erscheinen des Seiendes ist nicht etwas, was selbst erscheint." (p. 70)

5. Hence, Heidegger is bogged down in remote criteria of truth and untruth: "being in the truth" and "being in the untruth."

A. deWaelhens, Une Philosophie de l'Ambiguïté: L'Existentialisme de M. Merleau-Ponty, (Louvain: 1951).

M. Merleau-Ponty is preparing a book to be called L'Origine de la Vérité. M. M-P was still working on this at the time of his sudden death in 1961. At that time, he had finished about 1/3 of the manuscript and had extensive work notes for the remainder of the work. This was posthumously published under the editorship of his friend Claude Lefort, under the title Le Visible et l'Invisible, which would have been the title Merleau-Ponty would have used had he lived to complete it. A. de Waelhens, Phénoménologie et Vérité (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953).

Das Seiende: brute existence. Sein: its intelligibility which is in man and from man. Heidegger confined to art.

Lotz: Heidegger's method excludes the possibility of his proving the existence of God.

[PART THREE: PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD: HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER]

I. HUSSERL: LATER PERIOD

1. Enormous literary remains, mostly in shorthand, preserved at Louvain and being classified and edited under H.L. Van Breda, O.F.M.; there is some parallel institute at Cologne.

[Our concern is with] Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie, edited by W. Biemel, and published at The Hague by M. Nijhoff, 1954.

This is Husserl's last work; about the first third was published in his lifetime, and the rest was put together from his remains; probably owes something to the stimulus of his most brilliant (and disowned) student, Heidegger.

A general idea of this work provides a good introduction to Heidegger and offers the advantage of not involving us in the complexities of the development of Husserl's ideas on Phenomenology, Reduktion, Epoche.

2. "It might seem paradoxical to speak of a crisis in modern science: its achievements are unmistakable; its labors in endless fields continue apace; and what unsolved problems there are will be solved either by the methods of the past or by the discovery of new methods to complement and perfect those of the past.

Still the need of new methods can be discovered only by a critical survey; and if the need exists at present, then the survey will not only discover the existence of the need but also provide a sign-post to point the way towards a solution.

Such a survey demands a criterion, and the criterion that can hardly be rejected is an act of recall in which we reenact within ourselves the original intentions of the scientific enterprise.

These intentions had two principal manifestations: fourth century Athens; and the Renaissance.

3. "The formulation of the formulation of the aim of science in fourth century Athens consisted in an Umdeutung (shift in meaning) of popular notions of sophia, aletheia, episteme; this shift took place through the Platonic contrast of episteme and doxa, of dialektike and eristike; it consisted in setting up an ideal of knowledge and truth that involved (1) a sustained effort; (2) a methodical procedure; (3) a rigor; (4) an attainment of evidence; (5) a solid immovable basis in certainty, all of which simply were not contained in the previous customary connotation of such terms as aletheia, episteme; finally, it unfolded in the works of Aristotle, Euclid, Archimedes, the historians, and the medical doctors.

4. "The Renaissance brought forth a far more grandiose proposal; it discovered in the ancients;

- (1) an ideal of knowledge and truth vs merely traditional opinion.
- (2) as a principle of transforming society vs merely traditional power.

In the measure that that ideal and that principle are valid, Western man is the exemplar of mankind, the realization of the meaning of what it is to be a man.

In the measure that that ideal and that principle are not valid, man is just another anthropological classification; he is of concern to us, not because of any intrinsic value or significance, but merely because he is the type or species to which we belong.

5. "Hence, if we are to judge modern science by the criterion of its original intentions, we must ask what hope modern science offers:  
(1) of the attainment of knowledge and truth,  
(2) of a principle that frees man from merely traditional opinion and power, and enables him rationally and responsibly to place human society on a basis of truth and reason, freedom and responsibility.

6. "Judged by this criterion, modern science can be criticized:  
(a) for its tendency to splinter into specialties; see any university catalogue; congresses; "Deus scientia Dominus".  
(b) for the autonomy of the splinters; what counts effectly within each of the departments, sections, subsections, is what is recognized as "good" within that department, section, subsection.

Discussions of knowledge, science, truth, are just so many other specialties, and their relevance to other fields is a mere matter of opinion.

(c) for the drift to the criterion of technical competence.

Upon a background of traditional norms that are not questioned, (Selbstverständlichkeiten), the effective principle of change is technique: what counts ultimately is "getting results", and what counts proximately is the approved technique, how one goes about it, all the wrinkles of observation, experimentation, all the apparatus of bibliography and footnotes.

(d) for the position of the human sciences.

Scientific medicine is based upon scientific anatomy, physiology, pharmacy, chemistry, physics; folk medicine (recipes, cures) has disappeared; but for human society the only medicine remains folk medicine; endless nostrums are proposed and, scientifically, they are of no value; de facto, techniques are unified by totalitarian state and mass democracy: unifications of state and reason. (for the impossibility of a reorientation of the present basis.

A reorientation demand a general view, and no general view is possible; only a shifting set of best available opinions in more or less unrelated fields. A general view is the work of a mind, and no mind can master all the techniques, and so no mind can present a scientifically respectable general view. Bodenlosigkeit!

7. "If we have found that modern science does not fulfill its original inspiration, intention, aim, we can go further and ask if there has been some radical defect or oversight in its program. Husserl's diagnosis of the malady is that scientific clarity floats on popular obscurity, scientific evidence on popular Selbstverständlichkeit (Marcel: tout naturel); in brief, the real basis of science has not been explored, examined, evaluated.

(a) for there exist two truths and two worlds.

There is popular truth in the sense of telling the truth in the home, in business, in law-courts, in newspapers and periodicals, in autobiography.

There is also scientific truth in the sense of a validated set of propositions: logic, mathematics, physics, chemistry, etc.

These two reflect the original duality and bifurcation of doxa and episteme, of setting up a scientific ideal within a context of popular notions (one might compare the Hebraic ideal of "man before God" within the unity of Hebraic tradition).

There is the popular world of poets and men of common sense, of everyday assumption, opinion, activity.

There is the quite different world of the scientist and the philosopher: mass instead of weight, temperature instead of heat, dimensions instead of size, elements instead of bodies.

(b) There have occurred a series of Unterschiebungen.

The scientific or philosophic world is shoved under the popular world as the underlying reality, as what really is "out there". Popular notions are considered mere ignorance or naiveté.

(c) But the fundamental truth and the really basic world is not the scientific or philosophic but the popular.

One has only to take any scientific procedure or conclusion and with a little probing it will come to light that the ultimate evidence lies in the popular world, the Lebenswelt with its Selbstverständlichkeiten.

Scientific claims to rest on experience, but what is experienced is not the scientist's "real world" but the "popular world".

Science rests on the testimony of observers, experimenters, etc. and they are operating (1) in the Lebenswelt and (2) after the fashion of the Lebenswelt. E.G., there is not investigation of the psycho physical parallelism (or whatever you please) that has to be postulated to proceed from the results observer by Michelson and Morley to the conclusions announced by Michelson and Morley. Indeed, scientists may find this objection a mere oddity, but it is an oddity, not from any scientifically established view point, but merely from the viewpoint of the Selbstverständlichkeiten of common sense.

8. If a malady and a diagnosis, then also a remedy, cure.

(a) The priority of the subject: the subject is the source of truths and both worlds. There is a natürliche Einstellung that yields popular truth and the popular world. There is a cultivated (Athens, Renaissance, Aufklärung) Einstellung that yields the conceptual worlds of scientists and philosophers.

(b) What the subject is the source of is intentional, namely, what he means, symbolizes, represents, intends,.....

Cf. Cassirer, Essay on Man, Man is the symbolic animal

Cf. Köhler's apes, incapable of free images; man's capacity for free images is also man's capacity for envisaging a world, in fact, many incompatible worlds.

(c) What is needed is a return to Descartes' Cogito.

Let the subject realize that all he thinks, believes, is certain of, whether on popular, scientific, philosophic grounds, is just intentional.

Let him ask how much he can primarily, irreducibly, immutably hold: e.g., "I doubt", "I think thoughts",.....

Let him refuse to leap from Cartesian acceptance of Cogito to Galileo's mathematized world of real bodies.

Similarly let him refuse to leap from the intending "I" to Descartes metaphysical substance, the soul.

For both of these leaps are erroneous, they postulate an objective reality that is more than and other than the range of the intentional products of the constructing subject.

And both of these transitions are disastrous. For while everything comes from the subject, still science has a "real world" of protons, electrons, etc., and an utter incapacity for Geisteswissenschaft, and scientific psychology is an absurd attempt to study the subjects (from which everything proceeds) in terms of the outer observable objects.

(d) The solution is the identity of Transzendente Phänomenologie, T. Psychologie, T. Philosophie.

Epoche: the immediately evident is the intentional (withdraw from interest in, concern with, commitment to the "really real," the way a man forgets his business to live in the intimacy of his family, or vice versa).

Transcendental Reduction: not the mechanist or behaviorist reduction of the intentional to the "real" but of all intended terms to the intending subject.

Secure science and philosophy an immovable ground; not some flimsy ideal construction within an obscure context of Selbstverständlichkeiten; not the dubious products of some historical cultural process; but seek in the Lebenswelt what is primarily given, really primitive.

## II. CRITIQUE OF HUSSERL'S KRISIS

(1) There is a real problem set by science and especially human science; and its only solution lies in a philosophy.

Natural science can get along somehow (with a bias towards practical and neglect of basic research) by relying on pragmatic criterion of success; but human science, since the scientist is one of its objects, is involved in philosophic indeed theological issues (Cf. problem of synthesis today and in the Middle Ages).

(2) Husserl pursued philosophy als strenge Wissenschaft, as grounded in necessity and yielding absolute certitude.

This ideal with its Greek and Cartesian antecedents is in need of distinction.

All human judgements rest on virtually unconditioned; they are true as a matter of fact; the pursuit of absolute necessity and absolute certitude is doomed to failure because it seeks more than there is to be had.

(3) The correlations of Abschattung-Horizont and Einstellung-Welt are valuable contributions analysis.

Still the alleged two worlds are but one set of beings considered from two standpoints: as relevant to human living; as constituted by inner relations of things to one another; "being" is the unifying notion.

Again the alleged two truths are simply the result of applying the different criteria relevant and appropriate to the different standpoints.

(4) Science does not rest de facto on evidence and procedures of Lebenswelt.

There has been a failure to attempt the phenomenology of the scientist and phenomenologist: Thales, Archimedes, Newton, Einstein are just odd and strange from common-sense viewpoint.

This failure has been buttressed by subsequent exclusive concern with "engaged" as opposed to contemplative consciousness.

One must not expect scientist to be able to detail what he really does. Einstein's advice to epistemologists: Don't listen to what scientists say; watch what they do.

(5) Greek, Renaissance, subsequent normative accounts of truth, science, method are not just artificial ideals floating on popular obscurity, though their non-philosophic or inadequate philosophic statement may be such. They are expressions and clarifications and objectifications of the immanent normativeness of human intellect itself, which is participatio creaturae lucis increatae. This fact coming to light in Heidegger's Erschlossenheit.

(6) There is a real priority of the subject in knowledge.

Human sensitive psyche is not animal; free images development of imagination. Rather, there is a participatio creaturae ground of questions, intellectual activity.

But this priority is not to be interpreted in Greek and Cartesian fashion with their exaggeration of absolute necessity and absolute certitude. Moreover, epoche is involved in a confusion of "animal faith" with "rational judgment", and the transcendental reduction properly is to "being" and not to "intending" which also is.

### III. MARTIN HEIDEGGER: /EXPOSITION/

- (a) What he has to tell us about man.
- (b) What he thinks about being.
- (c) What he thinks of the learning of Philosophy.

#### 1. Phenomenology as Method.

Phainomena: Whatever is manifested, appears.

Not appearance vs underlying reality.

Not sense vs art, culture, sentiment.

Not outer public vs inner private.

Not immediate but also what takes time, attention, scrutiny.

Legen: Read off, let appear, discover, un-veil.

Truth: Based on evidence of letting phenomenon appear, what is true is what is manifest, un-covered, un-veiled, re-vealed.

#### 2. Transcendental Phenomenology.

Eidetic, it is concerned with ego as transcendental as constituted by the characters necessary for any possible "intending"; it is what has no presuppositions; it is what must be presupposed by every other knowledge (since every knowing is an intending), it provides the rock on which all philosophy, all science, can be securely founded.

#### 3. Heidegger: phenomenology of conscious living, of stream of consciousness.

Let stream appear, come-to-light, reveal itself.

Since no inquiry, no knowledge, can occur except within a stream, a phenomenology of the stream is basic, first, presupposed by all others.

Since the eidetic is universal, necessary, abstract, it can not but omit the individual, the existential, the concrete.

Hence, a phenomenology of conscious living is a fundamental ontology, the sole basis from which one can tackle the question 'what is being?'

#### 4. The stream is basic: not only as the basis of horizon, but also from the viewpoint of a phenomenology.

For the stream of consciousness is itself manifesting, a coming-to-light; it is not just living, but conscious living; it is the coming-to-light of a consciousness-in-its-world.

If the stream is only a partial coming-to-light, then phenomenology will discover what remains to come to light.

It will distinguish authentic and inauthentic conscious living.

The truth of phenomenology will be a discovering what it is to be in the truth, and what it is to be in untruth. It would seem that only by being in the truth can one hope to have a stream of consciousness in which one truly can come to answer the question 'What is being?'



5. Now if there is a stream of consciousness, the streaming, flowing, direction, postulates a finality, a basic drive, and this, as conscious, as the root of consciousness, is Sorge, Besorgen, Fürsorge, (Concern, Preoccupation, Care for).

Because the stream is an organizing of contents, it is an in-der-Welt-Sein.

Insofar as the organizing rests on Besorgen, the organized consists of tools; the referential system of tools linked to one another for the stream is Zuhandenheit; and the total complex of tools constitutes the Umwelt.

Insofar as the organizing is Fürsorge, there is the Mitwelt of persons that also use the tools.

Because the stream is self-organizing, there are Verstehen: a preconceptual grasp of concrete possibilities of the stream; Entwurf: the project of what is to be done; Rede: the articulation of Entwurf, the seriation of its elements; and Sprache: the concretization of this articulation.

Because when one is conscious, one already is concerned, preoccupied, caring (the condition of the stream as a stream), there is Befindlichkeit: le sentiment abrupt de se trouver-là/De Waelhens/; Geworfenheit: the sentiment of being tossed into the world, abandoned, /Thrown-ness/.

Because the being of a stream is its flowing, it is essentially temporal: Sein und Zeit, Homo Viator.

Because the being of a stream of consciousness is a flow of presentations to one present, it is Da-sein, where the Da is pregnant; "there", not the way a stone is present to a stone, not the way things are present to us, but the way we have to be present for things to be present to us.

## 6. Inauthentic Dasein.

Dependence on world: any possibilities I can realize involve me in a network of conditions; there are plenty of alternative possibilities, but none without an involvement in the network.

As Jaspers would put it: technical society

(a) creates the possibility of the masses 109 increment in 150 years and thereby ensures its own necessity.

(b) It defines the set of jobs to be done. There is some optimum use of tools, machines, etc. in the total process of extraction, transformation, distribution; the actual is the best approximation possible to this optimum (or else obsolescence and elimination), and man's work is residual.

(c) It defines the product and creates man's world: What is produced is what can be produced, and, through advertising techniques, sold to the masses, to the average of desire and taste.

(d) Standards, ideals, and values are basic; and criticism is irrelevant: The one question is to keep things going; if that is not your norm, standard or rule, then you are uncooperative, a trouble-maker; and an unwanted conformist comes to the top where his freedom is the hazard of making misjudgments of significance on matters of grand scale significance.

(e) Personal worth: skill, experience, character tend to be vanishing; jobs are standardized, and you have departments of standards; the person has to meet average standards as a replaceable, interchangeable part.

(f) Field of freedom contracts: carrying out ideas rising from my creative imagination, not as mere eccentricity, but as a significant contribution.

Flight into world: Inauthentic Dasein wants things that way; he wants to be a realization of On, Man, One.

He wants release from being one's own self, from freely and responsibly discovering and realizing one's own potentialities with all the risk involved.

He finds security, assurance, peace of soul in being like everyone else.

Why? It is Selbstverständlich, evidence journalière, "obvious" in the sense that it does not seem helpful to call it in question, that commonly it is taken for granted, that obviously there are so many other ways of occupying oneself.

Gerede: Bavardage, quotidien, talk, idle-talk. the  
This cuts the articulation of Verstehen from the real; means becomes an end; Mitsein becomes talking to one another, being pre-occupied with talking.

Authoritative: this are so only because they can be said to be so.

All-embracing: only from and against talk can one reach the genuine.

Evident and certain: doubt excites deep indignation, resentment, because talk hides inauthenticity.

Curiosity: concerned with the new because it is new; and not wanting to understand anything, but to be distracted, to escape.

Ambiguous: I talk about everything, but really understand nothing; I am doing all sorts of things, yet noting that is my doing.

Verfallenheit: All this is without any effort; with taking thought, a spontaneous accomplishment in which we become estranged and uprooted from ourselves, the selves that really are ours.

This is permanent aspect of human existence, and a new civilization would only involve superficial change; there are only two basic alternatives: this is one, and the other is intolerable.

There is a permanence of instability: changes have to keep coming; no device of the escapist is effective for any length of time.

## 7. Authentic Dasein.

The Critical Experience: Angst, the anxiety crisis, the collapse of the stream of consciousness as organized.

The Discovery of the aggregate of brute existents, of existents as stripped of all the meaning and significance conferred upon them in the stream of consciousness.

The discovery of Sorge (the root of the stream, the reality of Dasein).

Etre déjà jeté dans un monde dans lequel il s'est perdu.

Summation of anticipations, projects: the ultimate project is dying, quitting the world.

Selbst, Selbstheit (the opposite is Man-selbst): the tension through time of the authentic and inauthentic modes of Dasein.

The unauthentic mode concerning death: all the ways of hiding it; slip it into generalities; everyone dies.

The authentic mode concerning death: Durchsichtigkeit, fact it; Erwarten: I am expecting; Freiheit zum Tode, detachment about it.

This is not a matter of stopping living, projecting, doing, but a matter of continuing without being a dupe.

Earlier: there was the tragic attitude. Later: the emphasis becomes more and more on art, poetry, and finally, a nature mysticism conferring an intelligibility on the existent.

## 8. Heideggers Claims.

His explicit claim is only to have made a beginning, a fundamental-ontologie.

He explicitly rejects as a misunderstanding almost all interpretation of him.

However, Dasein is a fundamental fact; the stream of consciousness in its basic formulation influences all subsequent philosophic efforts at creating a horizon.

Tools solidify into things: Dasein interprets itself as a thing; Deus se habet ad naturalia sicut artifex ad artificiatum.

Heidegger claims philosophy to have taken a wrong turn with the Greeks; we have to go back to the early nature philosophers.

Existent: What's there in the anxiety crisis.

Sein: Intelligibility conferred on existent and on self by Dasein; rather "being in truth" of authentic Dasein, than the "being in untruth" of inauthentic Dasein; yet it remains the negation of a value judgment.

## 9. Heidegger's Position in the History of Philosophy.

Descartes: Rational Cogito; Absolute object in Spinoza; switch through Kant to the Absolute Subject in Fichte, Hegel, Schelling.

Material substance as extension; mechanism; empiricist philosophy informing scientific thinking; elimination of man as man in drift of modern civilization.

Late Schelling: From the indifference of Subject-Object to a Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation.

Post-Idealists: Kierkegaard, Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, Dilthey.

Heidegger's Dasein is an indifference or rather simultaneity of subject-object in a concrete living; it is an abstract indifference in present("s" "intention").

## IV. CRITIQUE OF HEIDEGGER

(1) H.S. Sullivan: psychic development occurs along lines of minimum anxiety.

(2) Psychic development in man is liberated above the flow of animal consciousness; understanding and free image go hand in hand; this is the basic feature of the stream of consciousness.

(3) The stream of consciousness defines a horizon, and horizon is a philosophic concept of fundamental importance; nor can the constructed horizons of the philosophers ignore the fundamental horizon of Dasein. In terms of Insight: Self-appropriation = Fundamental-ontologie.

(4) Much of human living is infra-rational tribal consciousness, group feeling, group decision, with a pragmatic tendency in science and logic (cf. Trobriand Islanders); modern civilization is a drift determined mainly by the technical possibilities of production, and the organizing of human living by social engineers (advertising, the press, escape-literature, state-education).

(5) Comparison of the Categories of Insight with those of Heidegger

(a) Sorge -- the Pure desire to know. Limit effect in common to many scientific endeavor.

(b) Truth as "letting appear" -- Truth as Unconditioned.

(c) Being as simply intelligible, God, ens per essentiam; Material being: simply intelligible as form; differently intelligible in other, as potency, as act.

(d) This is intellectualist. But the intellectual pattern of experience is the sole absolute; it knows and judges others; to do so, it has to differentiate itself and, once it has done so, then it can bring action and feeling into line.

Summary of Parts One to Three and Transition to Part Four

Next we shall turn to discussions of "Horizon" because the topic is conceived as "What about existential..." rather than "What is Existentialism ..."

Existentialism is an attempt, carried out in a variety of manners, to do justice to the facts of human living (freedom, responsibility, commitment, interpersonal relations, communications, death, God),

Without breaking though the frontiers of knowledge set by Kant, namely, that sense alone is not constitutive of human knowing and that true judgment can be the medium in quo the real is known only if the real is already known prior to true judgment.

Heidegger: preliminaries to a solution that, in thirty years, has not been reached.

Sartre: a premature ontology that is sheer negation though its coherence and penetration light up the insufficiencies of existentialist thinkers.

Jaspers: a full and brilliantly technical exploitation of the resources at his disposal.

Marcel: detached from theoretical issues; he reaches true concrete conclusions about being through the "good".

We cannot do justice to the details of these efforts in the time at our disposal; but there is no great point in attempting to do so, since the brilliance of the efforts is matched by the failure to break out of the closed circle.

On the other hand, there is a notable point in attending to the significance of existentialism for scholasticism.

Scholasticism is a philosophy of being, but it suffers from a multiplicity of schools; it rests upon a bog of disputed questions; it is not marked by any conspicuous desire and labor to eliminate QQ DD, because of a half-hearted acceptance of the theorem that truth is the medium in quo the real is known -- this is not denied, but very commonly it is not really believed. And the result is that it has enormously weakened its capacity to influence, ground, and unify the sciences and to be useful to theology.

Existentialism invites scholasticism to move from the per se (subject, principles, etc.) to the actual order, to move from being a philosophy among philosophies to being a philosophy of philosophies, from being non-historical to being historical.

PART FOUR: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EXISTENTIALISM FOR SCHOLASTICISM --  
SUBJECT, HORIZON, AND THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY

I. THE DILEMMA OF THE SUBJECT

1. The major premise of the dilemma is that either the real-for-me is defined as the immediately given or else it is the object known through the true tamquam per medium in quo.

The minor premise is the psychological fact that, without introspection, the subject is never the object and, even in introspection, the difficulty is not eliminated, but merely displaced, since the subject-as-subject is never the subject-as-object.

Hence, if the real-for-me is the immediately given, then there follows the existentialist opposition between objective science and, on the other hand, real knowledge of the subject which is non-objective, and hence, the exclusion of metaphysics in any traditional sense. To fill the gap created by this exclusion, new types of metaphysics have been invented for dealing with all that concerns man.

On the other hand, if the real for me is what is known through what is true, then I am confined to a universe of object; the subject-as-subject is inaccessible to me, and because the subject is inaccessible, I remain the victim of unscrutinized horizons, incapable of taking a place on the contemporary level of philosophic discussion, capable of complete openness of horizon only per accidens and not philosophically.

2. The term subject has many meanings in different contexts. We speak of the grammatical subject, i.e., a word or phrase fulfilling a specified function in a sentence; the logical subject, i.e., whatever admits a predicate has one, i.e., red is a color; the scientific subject, i.e., subject:habit; object:habit; and the psychological subject, i.e., the human conscious subject.

3. The term conscious is predicated of subjects, acts, and processes. Of subjects, we say that 'he was knocked unconscious' as opposed to such things as a dreamless sleep, dreaming, and waking which we also predicate of subjects. Of acts we speak of the growth of one's beard and of the metabolism of cells as opposed to seeing and suffering. Of processes, we talk of the circulation of the blood and the digestion of food (in no malfunctioning) as opposed to inquiring to understand, reflecting to judge, deliberating to decide, and deciding to enter upon a course of action.

4. By the term object we mean the motive, product or end of conscious activity. Some examples would be: (a) of motive-- color moves sight, illuminated phantasm moves intelligence; (b) of product-- imagining produces image; understanding produces concept; and (c) of end -- ens, verum, bonum, biological ends.

To put it differently, what is meant by the term object is what conscious activity centers on, brings about, and/or heads for.

5. The ambiguity of presence, awareness.

I see colors, but I do not see seeing, nor do I see myself seeing.

In seeing colors, the colors are present (presented) to me, but they are presented not to me as absent but as present. Inasmuch as colors are presented to someone also present, there is consciousness

in the direct act of seeing; I do not see unconsciously, though I may see indeliberately, inadvertently, without noticing what none the less I see.

Consciousness is not a matter of reflex activity, of introspection; rather, it is the possibility of reflex activity having something to turn back on, of introspecting having something to introspect. Consciousness is a property, quality, of acts of given kinds, i.e., sensitive and intellectual, cognitive and appetitive. Consciousness always accompanies waking and even dreaming states. The direction of attention to the conscious component in such states is a secondary phenomenon that would be meaningless were there not the primary phenomenon.

Again, the notions of presence and awareness are ambiguous. In terms of the notion of presence, there is the presence of objects to the subject, and, concomitantly in a quite different sense, there is the presence of the subject to whom objects are presented. The object is present as intended. The subject is present as intending.

In terms of the notion of awareness, the object is what one is aware of, i.e., what one sees, hears, desires, fears, investigates, understands, conceives, and the subject is the one who is aware, and one cannot be aware and be unconscious, just as one cannot see and be unconscious, and so on.

But "being aware" is quite different from "being what one is aware of". Hence, in the primary stream of consciousness, (a) the subject is never without an object, and (b) the subject is never the object. Between subject and object there is a cleavage, a radical opposition. To state the matter differently, in the terminology of traditional scholastic ontology, we would say that in infinite act, subject, act and primary object coincide; while, in finite act, act and object differ, for act is limited by something, by what it is about, and subject, act and object differ not only in act finite, but also the subject does not know himself by his own essence.

6. Introspection does not eliminate, but only displaces the cleavage.

In an incomplete and elusive fashion, the subject can shift his attention from object to act and subject. On this basis he can proceed to classify, describe, relate, explain, from hypotheses, theories, systems, devise tests, verify, and judge: the subject, his capacities, habits, acts, and their objects.

Apart from its basis in the shift of attention, this process is essentially the same as in all human knowledge. Its components are: experience, understanding and conception, reflection and judgment.

Moreover, just as in the knowledge of other objects, there are factors of a known, a known unknown, and an unknown unknown, so also in the knowledge of the subject. The phenomenon of the horizon remains, only here the horizon is more difficult to tackle because of the difficulty of the basic shift of attention.

Throughout this process the cleavage remains. The subject does not know himself by his essence; rather he begins from objects, defines acts by objects, habits by ranges of acts, potencies by ranges of habits, and the essence of the soul by sets of potencies.

In this shift of attention, What is attended to? Who attends? What is attended to is the subject-as-object; who attends is the subject-as-subject. Hence, the subject still remains inaccessible except as peculiarly present.

What is classified, described, and understood is not the subject classifying, describing, and understanding. Hence, to use an historical example, the knowledge that Hume describes is not the knowledge that he uses to make this description.

7. The Dilemma.

If the real is known through the true, then only the subject-as-object is known; if only the subject-as-object is known, then the inquiry is conducted within a horizon, prejudged by that horizon, and there remains no possibility of philosophic attack on the radical problem of horizon.

If the real is the immediately given in its immediate intelligibility (phenomenology à la Heidegger), and if immediate truth is this uncovering, re-vealing, and if judgment is just the articulation of what is revealed, and again, if there is no idea of the unconditioned, the true, ens (i.e. Jaspers, Marcel), then either there must be a new type of metaphysics concerned with the reality of the subject-as-subject or at least there must be an Existenz-erhellung (Jaspers) or an unfolding in terms of truth as Unverborgenheit, dêloun (Heidegger).

## II. SUBJECT AND HORIZON

### A. THE NOTION OF HORIZON

1. Human knowledge is in process.

In traditional terms, intellect is defined as pctons omnia facere et fieri; but though it is unlimited in range, it begins from a tabula rasa. The process of human knowing is a process of raising and answering questions, which can be thematized by such basic forms of questions as Quid? Propter quid? An? Utrum? Its manifestation is the actual questions that we raise and answer.

2. Hence, at any stage in the development of human knowledge, there is a threefold division whose factors are:

- (a) the Known (Docta) the range of questions that I can raise and answer.
- (b) the Known Unknown (Docta Ignorantia): the range of questions which I can raise, find significant, worthwhile, know how they might be answered, but which de facto I cannot answer and know I cannot answer.
- (c) the Unknown Unknown (Indocta Ignorantia): the range of questions that I do not raise; if these were to be raised I would not understand them, nor find them significant, nor judge them worthwhile, nor know how to go about answering them.

(3) The Horizon is the limit, the boundary between the known and the unknown unknown. What is beyond my horizon consists not merely of answers, but also and principally of questions that are beyond-me, meaningless-to-me, insignificant-to-me, not-worthwhile-to-me, insoluble-to-me, questions to which I might say, "I haven't got a clue."

As defined, the horizon is a relative term, for what is meaningless-to-me may or may not be meaningless absolutely.

By way of contrast, we shall also speak of the field: What is beyond the field is meaningless absolutely, insignificant absolutely, insoluble absolutely. The field is the universe, but my horizon defines my universe. Both are relevant to metaphysics, for metaphysics deals with ens, with omnia, with the universe.



The field regards metaphysics as such, but the horizon regards metaphysics as possible-to-me, relevant-to-me.

4. The existence of the horizon comes to light not directly, but indirectly. It emerges not directly because it can be sharply defined only by going beyond it, by reaching a wider horizon in which appears the old horizon only as a part. From within any given horizon, its own limits are not clear and sharp and in focus, but hazy, obscure, and distant; for what is beyond the horizon is what we pay no attention to, and what is at the horizon is what we pay little attention to. It emerges indirectly because we can study instances in which the recession or contraction of the horizon occurs.

#### B. THE HORIZON IN SCIENCE (OR MATHEMATICS).

1. The scientific(or mathematical) horizon recedes if there occur:
  - (a) a crisis -- existing theories, methods, modes of thought cannot handle the facts, results, etc. satisfactorily
  - (b) a fundamental revision of concepts, postulates, axioms, methods.
  - (c) the development of a radically new scientific structure -- for example, non-Euclidean geometry, calculus, Galois, Einstein, Quantum Mechanics, Copernicus, Darwin, Freud.

2. The recession of the horizon meets with resistance. Consider Max Planck's statement on what makes a scientific theory accepted: it's not clarity of observation, exactness of measurement, the coherence of a hypothesis, the rigor of deduction, the decisiveness of verification, but the retirement of the present generation of professors.

3. Eventually the resistance is overcome. It is overcome universally in the sense that scientific results are equally accessible to all scientists, so that, roughly, at any time, contemporary scientists are abreast. It is overcome permanently in the sense that the new theory covers all the old facts, and many more, and hence there is no tendency to revert to earlier positions to revive old views.

4. Hence, science is characterized by such universality and permanence, by the contrasting absence of permanent division into opposed schools of thought, and of the survival and revival of what to others seems to be definitely superseded.

Resistance to scientific advance is a subjective phenomenon, and it is eliminated by a new generation of professors. The old have the intellectual habits without the suppleness needed to develop new habits; they have invested their intellectual capital in a point of view, and they are not prepared to declare themselves bankrupt.

#### C. THE HORIZON IN HUMAN SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY, AND THEOLOGY

1. In these fields there occur recessions of the horizon in the same fashion as in natural science or mathematics, i.e., the process of crisis, a radically new viewpoint, a radically new structure. For example, in the history of philosophy, one might sketch the

following course of development in terms of the recession of a horizon:

- (a) Plato: the distinction between the aisthêta and the noêta, and the position that the noêta are the ontôs onta.
- (b) Aristotle: the noêton is the aition tou einaï immanent in the material object, and the extrapolation to immovable movers.
- (c) Augustine: the view that the real is body gives way to the view that the real is the true.
- (d) Aquinas: a transformation of existing theology (according to Gilson, Scotus was the traditionalist, the one whose position was an augustinisme avicennisant).
- (e) Descartes: he conceived philosophy as an independent and separate subject, and not as something that was merely distinct from theology.

2. In these fields the recession of the horizon does not result in a straightforward universal and permanent difference. The difference is not universal because, although an original philosopher does indeed found a new school as such, he changes philosophy only secundum quid, that is, he gives rise to new topics, new approaches, new techniques, but the basic differences remain between the schools -- and hence, it is often noted that there is a family resemblance between the different realizations of the materialist, idealist, and realist tendencies, respectively, from 4th century Athens to today. Again, the difference is not permanent because the original thinker founds a new school, but the school splinters; and further, just as there occur periods of decadence, loss of vigor, and loss of influence, so also changing times bring insensible changes in perspective in which the original message can be lost; and, just as there occur devaluations of meanings, so also there occur revivals, second springs, recoveries of vigor and influence.

3. The difference between the phenomena of the horizon in mathematics and natural science, on the one hand, and in human science, philosophy, and theology, on the other, is not too difficult to account for.

In the latter case, the new horizon on the object involves a new horizon on the subject, for the subject is one of the objects. And a new horizon on the subject involves not merely new concepts, postulates, axioms, methods, and techniques, but also a conversion of the subject, a reorganization, a reorientation. Such a new concept of oneself, new principles to guide one's thinking, judging, evaluating of all that concerns oneself, is a conversion.

Without the conversion, the new ideas not only are inoperative in one's own living, but also they are insignificant, without real meaning, without any vital expansiveness in the domain of objects. The original thinker founds only a school because he cannot effect the conversion of subjects; he can only promote conversion in the more ready. His school splinters, is subject to periods of decadence and revival, because even his followers can succeed in subjective conversion only up to a point.

#### IV. THE EXISTENTIAL GAP

1. The existence of philosophical and theological schools, the possibility of decadence and revival within any school (i.e. the words of the master are repeated but his meaning is lost), the fact that human science, in its attempt to be science, systematically tends to omit what is human, all these factors reveal the fundamental significance and importance of horizon in studies concerned with man, directly or indirectly. This significance is the fact that the reality of the subject can be beyond the horizon of the subject.

The subject can suffer from an indocta ignorantia with regard to himself. This indocta ignorantia is not a matter of something which the subject might very well be excused from knowing, i.e. depth psychology, social conditioning, history, biology, bio-chemistry, etc. It is a matter of the subject's own intelligence, his own reasonableness, his own freedom and responsibility. On the one hand, he is intelligent and reasonable, free and responsible, and he manifests these characteristics in many fashions; he would be insulted if he were told that he was stupid, unreasonable, irresponsible, a victim of catchwords. Yet at the same time, in a very true sense, his own intelligence, his own reasonableness, his own freedom and responsibility stand beyond his horizon.

2. The existential gap is the difference, greater or less, between one's horizon on oneself and what one really is.

Again, the existential gap is the gap between what is overt in what one is and what is covert in what one is. For example, it is the difference between what Hume asserted human knowledge to be and the knowledge that Hume manifestly employed in stating and proving his assertions.

3. The existential gap is not eliminated by affirming the propositions that are true and denying the propositions that are false. The decadent school repeats the propositions of the master, but it has collapsed the master's meaning into something less than will fit into a contracted horizon. The problem with this is the problem of the existential gap, that is, the problem of a conversion that is proportionate to the objective development; it is not, for example, the problem of agreeing with Augustine that the real is the true, but rather it is the problem of meaning as much as Augustine did when he spoke of veritas.

4. Hence, the study of the existential gap is concerned with a set of notions that emerge in various places in existential thought:

- (a) immediacy: the gap is not a matter of true or false propositions, but of conversion.
- (b) obnubilation and discovery: the conversion is a movement from the covert to the overt, a movement that is genuine and authentic.
- (c) norms: something normative is involved -- conversion should occur, the gap should be closed.
- (d) freedom and responsibility: without these, the norms are really meaningless.
- (e) transcendent: the norms involve an absolute value; the subject takes his stand by them, even against the world, even against himself, for he finds in these norms a symbol, an indication of the Absolute, of God.

- (f) Existenz: The subject becomes himself in his relation to the Transcendent.

### III. HORIZON AND DREAD

#### A. GENERAL ACCOUNT

1. The horizon is grounded in the subject: it is the boundary at which begins his indocta ignorantia.

Still this is merely an objective aspect of the horizon: it is defined in terms of what the subject not only does not know, but also considers meaningless, insignificant, insoluble.

We have to inquire into the subjective foundation of horizon. How is it constituted? How is it maintained? Or to put the questions differently, What is the subjective grounding principle or foundation of horizon? What is the confirmative in the subject that keeps him at the horizon that he has, and that makes it so difficult for him to move to a broader horizon?

2. Let us begin from the notion of psychological acts.

To consider single acts involves one in a violent abstraction, for (a) sensitive acts are involved in a multiple correlation, e.g. seeing involves approaching, looking, focussing, etc.; and (b) intellectual acts presuppose sensitive flow and are operative with respect to the sensitive stimulus and to the manipulation of the sensitive flow. Hence, the study of consciousness is a study, not of isolated acts, but of a flow, a stream, a direction, orientation, interest, concern.

3. The study of such streams of consciousness, at a first approximation, involves the erection of a series of ideal constructs. For, just as in the investigations of natural science, so also in the study of consciousness, one begins from ideal constructs and moves to things that are more concrete. Take Newton's study of planetary motion for example: Newton begins from a first law of motion that bodies can continue in a uniform state of motion in a straight line as long as no force intervenes, and then he adds on the law of movement in a central field of force, and thereby he gets a second approximation to the movement of planets. Such approximations are what I mean by a series of ideal constructs.

Hence, in the study of the flow of consciousness, a series of ideal constructs should yield a first approximation. Let us begin from a notion of patterns of experience and distinguish the following types of flows of consciousness or patterns of experience (cf. Insight, pp. 181-191):

- (a) the biological pattern of experience: the type of flow of consciousness present in, for example, the beast of prey and its quarry.
- (b) the aesthetic pattern of experience: a liberation from purely biological determinance, from purely biological interests and goals, into the self-justifying joy of free experience and free creation as is manifested in, for example, kittens playing, children pretending, etc.
- (c) the dramatic pattern of experience: the primordial form of aesthetic and artistic creativity that is in oneself and is expressed in the presence of and with regard to others; the flow of consciousness

that organizes and directs the spontaneous drama of human living. If the pattern is successful, the subjects tend to be extroverts. If the pattern is unsuccessful for concretely dealing with others, the subject tends to withdraw into himself and become introverted, and, in the limit, such individuals go into fantasies and dreams in which they are the hero, the exceptional person of their merely private theatre. What is central to the pattern is the integrative notion that one has to, and does, make or constitute oneself.

- (d) the intellectual pattern of experience: what dominates, integrates, and directs the flow of consciousness is the spirit of inquiry, as is illustrated by the absorbed Thales who fell into the well while watching the stars, the concentrating Newton who pays no attention to food as he works on the theory of gravitation, the excited Archimedes who cries "Eureka!"
- (e) the practical pattern of experience: the type of conscious flow dominated by the driving motivation to get things done.

Again, it should be noted that the patterns are flexible, and not rigid, that they tend to overlap in most people's lives, that, as one pattern comes to the fore, so also it recedes and is replaced by another as new circumstances emerge; to put it differently, no one lives exclusively in one pattern, and everyone tends to experience them all at one time or another, though in each of us one pattern or set of patterns comes to play a dominant role. (added by ed.)

4. Patterns of experience are limited, and their limit lies in the fact that higher levels of patterns presuppose a successful integration of lower patterns. For example, the amount of artistry possible in a man is limited by the fact that his aesthetic pattern of experience also has to be, or presupposes, an integration of neural patterns, and the neural patterns are what govern him as a biological existent; that is, artistry can emerge (i.e. there is liberation from biological interests and goals) only to the extent that the biological pattern of experience is functioning successfully (i.e. its needs are met and hence can be presupposed).

A stream of consciousness that runs too freely tends to introduce a conflict between the orientation of the flow of consciousness and the needs of the body (neural demand functions, cf. Insight, p 190) that this consciousness informs and governs. And the result of this conflict leads toward the nemesis of compulsions, invasions of consciousness, neurotic phenomena, and, in the limit, anxiety crises.

An anxiety crisis is the breakdown of the stream or pattern of consciousness: i.e. the objects are there, but they are meaningless, for there is no dynamic significant integration of them into the pattern.

Again, there is the appearance of anxiety in consciousness as a relatively minor phenomenon. Functionally, it is, as it were, the danger signal that the flow of consciousness is running on a line which is too free, for the development of a type of stream of consciousness takes place along lines of minimum anxiety.

Finally, along the lines of the present analysis, the phenomenon

of abnormality in types of patterns of consciousness means that development has had to avoid anxiety by the use of extreme measures.

5. A world is what lies within a horizon, that is, it is a totality of potential objects. As such, it is not some particular object, nor a particular number of objects, but rather it is a sphere of objects to which we attend and with which we are concerned, a possibility of some types of objects and not of others.

A world or horizon corresponds to the concrete synthesis that is my conscious living, and that concrete synthesis does not admit change without the experience of anxiety or dread. The anchor, or conservative principle of my world is not its reality, but rather it is the dread that I experience and spontaneously ward off whenever my world is menaced.

My concrete synthesis in conscious living is a combination of (a) an integration of an underlying neural manifold, and (b) a set of moods for dealing with the Mitwelt of persons and the Umwelt of tools, or any other combination along the same line.

To change my concrete synthesis, to be converted to a new world, to let my horizon recede, is to invite the experience of dread and to release a spontaneous, resourceful, manifold, plausible, resistance. This dread and release of resistance is not a function of the objective evidence for my world; rather, it is a function of my mode of life, my solution to a total range of problems arising in my concrete living.

#### B. COROLLARIES

1. Hence, there follows a series of corollaries to the preceding analysis.

Corollary (1) -- Conversion: a leap.

To convert someone, to be converted oneself, is not exclusively a matter of proofs, arguments, and evidence.

There is for everyone a problem of integrated conscious living, and it is a problem that exists at all stages of a person's life; for example, if I may quote my own experience, in childhood, minor illness and fever quite easily moves into delirium, whereas in adulthood, delirium tends to occur only under an extraordinary stress of illness. The reason for this, I would say, is that in the child the organization and integration of consciousness has not yet achieved the facility that it has in adult living.

The problem is solved only more or less satisfactorily, and there are whole ranges of unsatisfactory solutions, from psychoses to neurotic phenomena of the minor type.

The problem exists (a) because man is capable of free images: e.g., K hler's ape's, the fact that literature helps to develop imagination, and a developed imagination in turn provides intelligence with a tool that will make possible the movement of intellect to ens. omnia; and (b) because the freedom of free images is not an unlimited, unconditioned freedom.

Now conversion, that is, moving to a new horizon, entering into a new world, involves tampering with a hitherto successful solution to the problem of the integration of conscious living, and that tampering brings with it a feeling of anxiety.

The fact of this anxiety sets a complex problem. On the hand, there is the problem of standing the anxiety, i.e., if I can get by the initial anxiety, I shall be better off; and so, for example, in the psychoanalytic situation, if the patient, upon

analysis, can stand the anxiety involved in a prescribed cure, he will be cured. On the other hand, and more profoundly, the problem is not merely a problem of standing the anxiety, but one of dealing with the resistance that the would-be convert spontaneously puts up when confronted with the prospect of changing his established mode of living, for example, to continue with the preceding illustration, in the psychoanalytic situation or in the therapeutic situation, the patient spontaneously puts up a resistance to the moods of the therapist who would bring about the cure he needs, and finds all sorts of reasons to maintain his present position, and so what has to be dealt with, what has to be overcome, is just this sort of resistance.

More generally, the problem of resistance is set by the fact that the would-be convert appeals to his Selbstverständlichkeiten; he indignantly appeals to what is obvious to everyone with an ounce of common sense; he moves round in a circle within his established horizon; and, as long as it remains, his brand of logic and his set of premises will be unshakeable-to-him.

Hence, conversion, moving to a new horizon, involves a leap: the leap is from one's Selbstverständlichkeiten --which are quite often a misunderstanding of what in some sense is true, and which are also one's props to his present position-- to another concrete solution to the problem of the integration of conscious living. Should, for example, you wish to experience such dread, seriously suppose that some philosophy (that is not your own) were true.

Thus, the problem of conversion is a problem of a real distinction: that is, it is not a problem of conceptual distinction, but a problem of reality, of what really is, of horizon, of horizon buttressed by dread, and of the avoidance of dread that is rationalized by one's Selbstverständlichkeiten.

Briefly then, the first corollary is that because a philosophy has implication with regard to the subject, a new philosophic viewpoint is correlated with a conversion in in the subject. And a conversion in the subject is also connected with his problem in conscious living, with his personal solution to the problem of the integration of conscious living. And, as a result, his emotion and his particular anxiety will be involved in any attempt to move him from one philosophy to another. To change people's philosophies is to change them. And to change them is not any simple matter of true propositions axioms and deductions, but it is a matter of changing a concrete synthesis in living. And that change involves necessarily the emotions of the subject, the whole refuge of emotion that gives rise to the odium philosophicum and the odium theologicum. And hence, such a change, i.e., conversion, fundamentally involves something of a leap in the subject. There is a pivot on which the movement or process turns, and for the person to find right where the pivot is and to turn on it is not a very simple matter. (added by ed. from tape of lecture)

## 2. Corollary (2)-- The Self-Constituting Subject.

On the one hand, we say that man has freedom of the will, which is a matter of rational alternatives and of free choice. The rational alternatives are described in propositions, and I accept one and reject the other.

One other hand, we can also speak of freedom in a prior sense, namely as the solution that has been the concrete synthesis in my living.

It involves the cooperation of the subconscious, imagination, intelligence yielding projects within the aesthetic(play), dramatic, practical, and intellectual patterns of experience. It emerges



in the drama of human living, the drama which we do not think out and then execute, the drama that spontaneously arises already charged with image, emotion, and appetite.

It is a freedom not had by animals. It is an "ontological" freedom by which the conscious subject is this conscious subject and develops this solution to the problem of concrete living. It is that by which we become what we are before we are able to think out alternative courses of action and choose between them. It sets the horizon within which occurs our thinking and choosing, so that while my particular project can be vetoed, still the veto has to have its ground within my world, my horizon; and no project can arise unless it is such as to fall within the world that is mine.

Still, if we have made ourselves without any awareness of what we were up to, so we can later remake ourselves in the light of better knowledge and with a full responsibility. Nor is the refusal to remake ourselves any escape, for that is just assuming responsibility for whatever we happen inadvertently to have made ourselves in the past.

Briefly then, the second corollary is that man is a self-constituting subject whose self-constitution is grounded in a fundamental, prior "ontological" freedom. This freedom (which is roughly equivalent to what Heidegger means by sorge, care) is what lies behind the whole flow of the subject's consciousness, and it is what determines, in a positive manner, a horizon. It is the nuclear, the fundamental element in the concrete synthesis of conscious living. It is that by which we spontaneously, and to a large extent, unconsciously, make ourselves into what we are. And, in turn, what we have spontaneously made ourselves to be and our concrete ability to constitute ourselves provide the basis for and the possibility of remaking ourselves, that is, conversion, moving to a new horizon, etc. (added and adapted from tape of lecture by ed.)

### 3. Corollary(3)-- The Basic Function of Philosophy.

Now these questions regarding horizon, conversion, the self-constitution of the subject, are concerned with the basic function of philosophy. In line with the preceding considerations, we can say as our third corollary that philosophy is the attempt to illuminate the effort of intelligent, reasonable, free, fully responsible self-constitution. (cf. Jaspers, Philosophie, Vol. 2, Existenzerhellung -- "The Illumination of One's Existenz")

Hence, insofar as philosophy is concerned with the subject in his free and intelligent self-constitution, philosophy is concerned with the good, because philosophy is itself a good, the good of the philosophic subject; it is concerned with what is freely and responsibly chosen and effected by this subject, with what is concrete (verum et falsum in intellectu; bonum et malum sunt in rebus).

Consequently, a point of comparison between scholasticism and existentialism is to be found in the realm of the scholastic account of the good.

In the scholastic account, the good is distinguished in the following manner:

- (a) there is the bonum particulare; it is what corresponds to a particular appetite.
- (b) there is the bonum ordinis; it is a series of particular goods; a series of coordinated activities, a series of habits of apprehension and appetite -- e.g. in interpersonal relations, communication is a good,

congruent with a coordination of activities, rising from habits.

- (c) there is the bonum per essentiam; it is the absolute norm, the transcendent; it grounds the possibility of an individual willing the good against the world, others, or the self.

Now what does it mean to say that philosophy, as was defined above in line with existentialist thought, is concerned with the good? How is it concerned with the good?

(a) It is concerned with improving my operative solution, my functioning synthesis in concrete living. As such, it is concerned with the transition from the freedom of images to the freedom of enlightened responsible choice, that is, it is concerned with conversion.

(b) Again, it is concerned with improvement as mine. As such, its concern is not with propositional truths, but with the truth I live by, with the truth that is involved in my free self-constitution; not with notional apprehension and assent, but with real apprehension and assent.

(c) It is concerned with a solution to the problem of living; and by living is meant, not some abstract concept of living, but living in a world, with others, in a technical civilization. Hence, it is concerned with the study and critique of personal relations within a technical society.

(d) Again, it is concerned with the concrete possibility of that living at its highest point, that is, with ultimate self-affirmation; with constitution in relation with the transcendent, as a person, as Thou (cf. Marcel); with my Existenz as an awareness of self as a gift given to self (cf. Jaspers).

(e) It is concerned with history. Just as everyone responds to the problems of his age, so also the philosopher responds to the problems of his age; but qua philosopher, his specific character is to respond to these common problems at their deepest level, that is, at the point of maximum consequence for human welfare or human disaster. (e.g. cf. Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History; primitive cultures; organized civilizations; Aschenzeit; the notion of the present being as momentous as the discovery of fire, tools, and speech; the idea of old ways being relentlessly dissolved; the notion of the masses; the notion of one world history.)

(f) Again, the philosopher is open; by definition, he goes beyond the horizon based on his personal anxiety, for he has to move to a horizon that is coincident with the field. His educators, to some extent at least, are philosophers in their obscurity to him (cf. Jaspers), for such obscurity is the revelation of my blind spots, my horizon.

(g) The philosopher has to be genuine; if he has a horizon that is not as broad as that of the philosopher which he teaches, he cannot be genuine and teach that philosopher, for if he does, then he will be devaluating the currency, he will be collapsing the great into the narrowness of his horizon or world.

(h) Again, philosophy has to be relevant: philosophy is not a matter of analytic propositions, nor is it a matter of analytic principles that have a supposed per se relevance, which relevance is supposed to be per se only because the fact of horizon has been overlooked; philosophy is not something that is relevant to man in general, but rather it is something that primarily is relevant to me, in my age, and to those with me.

(1) Philosophy can only illuminate: it looks not to a theoretically compelled assent, but to a free conversion; one cannot be another, and cannot do his thinking, judging, deciding, and living for him.

#### IV. HORIZON AND HISTORY

##### 1. Introduction.

To speak of the relation of horizon and history involves an enlargement of the significance of the existential gap. The reference of horizon to history is not merely a matter of a difficult and doubtful technique in the study of the totality of philosophies, but more profoundly it is concerned with a critical issue in the historical process.

Now by the term history, I mean the total field of human operations in this life. In this context, the existential gap is not merely a call to authenticity of the subject in his private existence, but rather it is a call to authenticity in all subjects, an invitation to understanding something about the historical process at a critical moment in human history, a summons to decisiveness at that moment, an exploration of the techniques of human communication (e.g. existentialists write novels and plays).

##### 2. The Notion of a Dialectic of Man.

Let us begin from the notion of dialectic. On the one hand, there is a familiar notion of dialectic, namely, the dialectic of an idea. For example, we can speak of a dialectic of rigor, as in the development of mathematical logic: i.e., they began from an ideal of what a deductive system should be, namely a rigorous axiomatic system which excluded casual insights, only to be confronted by a series of paradoxes, and, ultimately, by the Gödelian theorem of limitations, and hence, were forced to proceed to the development of a new basis (cf. E. Lonergan, "Lecture Notes on Mathematical Logic"). Or again, we have numerous examples of this sort of dialectic in the history of philosophy: in Plato, it is a mode of reasonable dialogue; in Aristotle, it is a review of opinions proposed by others in the hopes of selecting the elements of truth in all of them; in Hegel, it is his triadic process of thesis, antithesis, and higher synthesis. (also, cf. Insight Ch. VII, section 5).

On the other hand, there is an unfamiliar notion of dialectic, namely, a dialectic of a reality, of man, of history; and it is with this that we are concerned. What is meant by a dialectic of man, a dialectic of history?

It is a dialectic not of man as a nature, as what recurs by reproduction without the transmission of acquired characteristics but of man as a maker of man, as technical, social, and cultural, for, in these respects, what man is results from man's ideas on man.

It is concerned with man as technical, as using tools; as such, man does not merely satisfy animal necessities, but creates the human environment, the city the state, as a totality of material products.

It is concerned with man as social, as organizing and organized; as such, he creates and lives within institutions such as the family, the educational system, the economic system, the political system, and systems of alliances and enmities.

It is concerned with man as cultural (culture in the anthropological sense: as such, man is the current effective totality of immanently produced and symbolically communicated contents

of imagination, emotion, sentiment; of inquiry insight, conception; of reflection, judgment, valuation; of decision, implementation.

Now in all of these respects, man (a) presupposes that he has a human nature, but (b) makes himself by taking thought. The notion of man as technical, social, and cultural is the notion of the difference between the aggregate of babies born and abandoned in the jungle and the aggregate of human beings operating in a civilization.

### 3. The Objective Functioning of the Dialectic.

(a) There is a circuit, a mutual causation in man's making of man as technical, social, cultural. The objective situation (technical, social, cultural, is at once a product of and an occasion for imagination, sentiment, emotion; inquiry, insight, conception, reflection, judgment, evaluation; decision, policy implementation.

(b) As a product, the objective situation objectifies, reveals what man has been feeling, thinking, deciding about man.

As an occasion, the objective situation suggests and motivates changes in what man has been feeling, thinking, deciding about man.

(c) Insofar as there is an effective existential gap, i.e. an operative limited horizon, the situation as product will objectify and reveal the existential gap in overemphases and oversights; but the situation as occasion will be powerless to suggest and motivate the correct solutions, or remedies, as long as the existential gap remains. Hence, the objective situation progressively deteriorates, and one finds more and more liberal use of useless solutions and remedies, so that, in the limit, either the existential gap is closed or the civilization liquidates itself

### 4. Resolute and Effective Intervention in the Dialectic

(a) Everyone participates: everyone contributes to the production of human situations, and everyone has to respond to the human situations in which he finds himself.

Still, however, such participation may be mere drifting, for, quite often, one does not understand what is going on, one has no clue as to what is wrong, one has no idea as to what one could effectively do about it. More generally, man as historical, man as making man, is beyond man's horizon, is in a dreamland for most contemporary men in their age, is what these who make history leave to the historians of a later age to explain.

(b) Now, in order for there to be resolute and effective intervention in the dialectic, it must be presupposed that there are subjects in whom the existential gap is being closed, for unless this were so, they will merely increase the confusion and accelerate the doom.

In order to have resolute and effective intervention men further that these subjects do not remain within an ivory tower admiring their own deeper profundity, which is, to the mass of men, mere incomprehension.

(c) Resolute and effective intervention heightens the operation of the dialectic.

The situation objectifies the existential gap, and intervention crystallizes the objectification; i.e. the gap is there, it is obscurely evident to everyone, but it is not articulate, it is unexpressed, it is not effectively noticed; it is in need of intervention to bring it out into the open.

The situation suggests and motivates the necessary changes in the subject; intervention clarifies the suggestion and drives home

the motivation. It clarifies the suggestion by linking, in a concrete fashion, past errors with present evils; and it drives home the motivation by showing concretely that to retain the errors of the past is to perpetuate the evils of the present.

Finally, intervention in the dialectic constitutes the correction by communication. Briefly, the argument is this:

- (i) What man felt, thought, and decided, made things (i.e. the objective historical situation) as they are.
- (ii) Hence, different feelings, thoughts, and decisions will make things different.
- (iii) And it is communication that effects the possibility of different feelings, thoughts, and decisions.

5. The Essence of the Historical Dialectic of Man.

(a) The essence of this historical dialectic lies in a conflict between what man is, is to be, and what man feels and thinks he is, is to be.

Now the possibility of the conflict emerges in the objectification of the objective situation for, on the one hand, the objectification is an objectification of what man thinks he is, is to be; but, on the other hand, the objectification is also a revelation of overemphases and oversights in man's thought about man, insofar as there is a conflict between man's plans for himself and what man really is. And this revelation is a motivation for change insofar as what man has made of himself is in conflict with what man really is.

(b) The dialectic, then, does not operate within the field of concepts and judgments, terms and propositions; and it is not based on a conflict between opposing philosophies.

Rather, it is based on a conflict between any defective philosophy (implicit or explicit) and what man really is, is to be.

(c) The verdict of the dialectic is not a label of approval or disapproval on a philosophy; it lies in the facts of the situation, in its tensions, its basic hopefulness, its ultimate desperateness, its stimulation to affirmation or its imposition of nihilism (by nihilism, in this context, I mean the attitude which proclaims 'I don't care what happens to me, to man, could not mean less than it does to me.')

Still, the facts are significant only to those whose horizon does not preclude knowledge of what it is to be a man, that is, to those whose horizon is totally open, whose horizon is coincident with the field. And if the facts do not achieve significance within such a horizon, then they are destructive of societies because the effective horizon continually forces a misinterpretation of the facts.

6. Earlier (cf. supra pp. 23-24) we concluded that there exists a valid and important field of inquiry concerned with the subject in his immediacy, obnubilation, capacity for change, authenticity, freedom, and responsibility.

Now we must further conclude that such a field is also relevant to man as technical, social, cultural. History is concerned to bring to light man as he really is; and hence, to study this generalized existential field is to get to the heart of the historical process. And finally, the study of horizons eliminates the horizon that keeps man as historical beyond one's field of vision.

## V. HORIZON AS THE PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY

1. De facto there exist many horizons; and this fact is also the case de jure since man makes man (physically by generation, technically, socially, culturally) and since, within those limits, man makes himself no matter whether he chooses or drifts into what he happens to be or even if he fails to choose.

2. Now this multiplicity of horizons may be considered in three ways:

- (a) as a mere matter of fact: and then it provides the materials for a history of culture, a history of thought, a history of opinions, etc.
- (b) as a problem to be explained: and then one gets as a solution as book such as Karl Jaspers, Psychologie der Weltanschauungen.
- (c) as an issue calling for judgment and decision: and then it is a philosophic issue.

It is with this latter that we are concerned.

3. The multiplicity of horizons as a philosophic issue arises when we ask:

- (a) Is some horizon the field, or is there not a field at all?
- (b) If some horizon is the field, then how can that horizon be determined?

With respect to the first question, to deny that there is a field is to deny that philosophy has a positive content; and yet that denial is itself philosophic, though perhaps unconsciously so, and so, on the basis of that denial, there have arisen a number of basic philosophic positions: namely,

Positivism: let's do science.

Pragmatism: let's experiment, see what happens.

Scepticism: let's inquire some more.

Relativism: there are no definite answers, just points of view.

To answer the first question by affirming that there is a field involves one in the second question(i.e. b) which is at once ontological and epistemological.

It is ontological in its consequent insofar as a given horizon defines also the field. For outside that horizon, there is nothing, there is meaninglessness, there is nothing to be known. And in saying this, we do not mean that there is nothing for me, merely meaninglessness for me, merely nothing to be known by me, but we mean nothing absolutely, meaninglessness absolutely, nothing to be known absolutely. Outside of the horizon that is coincident with the field, there is nothing to be known, and so it follows that within this horizon there is no unknown unknown. Consequently, to answer the question as to how to select the true horizon is to lay down the basis of metaphysics, to lay down the criteria of what is and what is not, and to answer the question of what-is-being in the concrete fashion that one says that being goes so far, and there cannot be anything beyond it, or there is nothing beyond it. (expanded by ed. from tape of the lecture)

Now this consequent ontological aspect of the question is simply consequent. It is not the real issue.

The real issue is the antecedent issue that has to do with the issue of "how do you select the correct horizon?". And this antecedent issue(i.e. the antecedent of question 'b' above) is

epistemological, and also ontological, but ontological in a different sense than in the consequent. It is epistemological for to define the field raises the questions of the truth of the definition, i.e. insofar as you as for the definition of the true horizon that coincides with the field, you are led to ask why that definition is true and how you know that definition is true. Again, the antecedent issue is also ontological in the sense that the truth of the definition depends upon evidence of some sort or other, and that evidence is evident from reality, in some meaning or other of the term reality. Briefly, then, the antecedent issue is epistemological in terms of evidence, and it is ontological in terms of reality. (expanded by ed. from the tape of the lecture)

4. The simultaneity of the epistemological and the ontological is intrinsic to the positive answer to the question of how one is to select the correct horizon that is coincident with the field. By this simultaneity, I mean, as was suggested above, that to determine which is the correct horizon is a determination in virtue of an evidence, (i.e., an epistemological issue) and the evidence is evidence of some reality (i.e. an ontological issue that is included in the epistemological issue). Hence, the antecedent issue is at once epistemological and ontological. But the ontological aspect is not ontological as formulated in the consequent part of the question, but rather it deals with the antecedent ontological or "ontic" (cf. Heidegger) evidence that gives rise to metaphysics, that enables one to establish the horizon that is coincident with the field.

Let us then briefly consider what are the general characteristics of a possible answer to this question.

(a) Any determination, justification, evidence for a horizon to be the true horizon arises within some stream of consciousness, and so arises within what already is constituted as a horizon.

(b) The justification of the horizon cannot rest on the consequent ontology, i.e. on the realities known within that horizon, for then every horizon would automatically be self-justifying; and that is the negative solution, answer, to the question.

(c) It cannot rest on the norms, invariants, principles that de facto characterize, determine, or constitute any given horizon, for again, on that showing, every horizon would be self-justifying.

(d) The justification that we seek has to involve a discovery of the evidence, norms, invariants, and principles that naturally, i.e. ontically, possess a cogency, inevitability, necessity, and normativeness that thereby constitute a self-justifying horizon, stream of consciousness which

(i) none the less admits the possibility of other horizons, through the whole gamut of human differences;

(ii) accounts for the actual existence of these differences at least in principle;

(iii) accounts for them in such a manner that at the same time it discredits them, reveals them to be, not self-justifying, but self-destructive;

and (iv) discredits them in such a manner that none the less their actual occurrence remains possible, plausible, and convincing.

(e) The prior reality that both grounds horizons and the critique of horizons and the determination of the field is the reality of the subject as subject.



As such, it is not any object known objectively, and it is not the subject known objectively, for all objects are known within some stream of consciousness, and so within a horizon; and it has been contended that such objects cannot justify any horizon without thereby justifying all horizons.

It is the reality of the subject as subject, for the subject as subject is both reality and conscious. The subject as subject is reality in the sense that we live and die, love and hate, rejoice and suffer, desire and fear, wonder and dread, inquire and doubt. It is Descartes' "cogito" transposed to the field of concrete living. It is subject present to himself, not as presented to himself in any theorem or affirmation of consciousness, but as the prior (non-absent) prerequisite to an presentation, as the a priori condition of possibility for any stream of consciousness (including dreams).

The argument is: the prior reality is not object as object, nor subject as object; hence there remains only the subject as subject; and this subject as subject is both reality and discoverable through consciousness.

The argument does not prove that in the subject as subject we shall find the evidence, norms, invariants, and principles for a critique of horizons; it proves only that unless we find it there, we shall not find it at all.