

there is the blameless confusion of earlier thinkers who ~~xxx~~ treat many issues simultaneously and, perhaps, under the name of only one of them; there are the ~~xxxxxxxx~~ anachronistic confusions of later thinkers who attribute later distinctions to earlier thinkers; and there are the intolerable confusions of later thinkers who refuse to learn the later distinctions.

Now an empiricism stresses experiential objectivity. Coherently it acknowledges the data of sense and of consciousness, but coherently it cannot acknowledge as objective either understanding or judgement for their objectivity is not experiential. The basic problem of the empiricist is, then, the fact that he is neither stupid nor silly and that his intelligence and rationality have something to do, ~~with his knowing~~ if not with his knowing, at least with what he says about it.

An intuitionism acknowledges experiential objectivity and, as well, the fact that human knowledge includes an absolute valeur. But this absolute is conceived, not to emerge only with rational judgement, but to be present from the ~~xx~~ start. Experiential objectivity becomes inflated with ~~xx~~ the properties of the absolute. So M. M. Gorce attributed to sensitive knowledge an absolute value, a value independent of the mind of man. This inflation of experiential objectivity involves three consequent distortions: (1) ~~xxxxxxxx~~ consciousness is conceived, not as the presence-to-himself of the acting subject, but as a distinct activity in which the subject does an internal twist and perceives himself as an object; (2) judgement is not an original component in knowledge but a redundant activity, and the truth of judgement is merely a derivative

Idealism stresses normative objectivity. The basic norms are the exigences of the subject's intelligence and rationality. But such exigences, once objective knowledge is reached, are but a particular case of the nature of a thing; and natures are known by understanding ideas and affirming one's understanding to be true. Logically, then, an exclusive stress on normative objectivity results in an existentialism: there is the tragic subject, the phenomena that appear to him, his normative exigences, but no absolute objectivity to ground objective knowledge of norms as natures or ideas. In Platonism the problem of the objectivity of norms is evaded by conceiving the norms as eternal objects which we remember. In classical idealism the objectivity of formal logic is taken for granted and one argues for the necessity of inflating it into a transcendental logic or into an all-inclusive dialectic.