

1. By "existentialism" we shall understand the types of method and doctrine exemplified by K. Jaspers, M. Heidegger, J.-P. Sartre, Gabriel Marcel.

The name is admitted by Jaspers and Sartre; it was admitted for a while by Marcel who after *Humani generis* and, perhaps, to disassociate himself from Sartre, rejected it; Heidegger says he is concerned with *Ek-sistenz*.

Jaspers is Kantian and Lutheran; Heidegger an apostate and agnostic; Sartre an atheist; Marcel a convert to Catholicism.

2. They are concerned with what it is to be a man, not in the sense of having a birth certificate, but in the sense employed by President Eisenhower last fall when, asked whether it was not risky to send the fleet into the Mediterranean during the Egyptian crisis, answered "We have to be men."

"Being a man" in that sense results from a decision, ~~x~~ is consequent to the use of one's freedom, makes one the sort of man one really is, involves risk (in the present instance, the risk of nuclear warfare and all that implies).

3. It is anti-positivist: "being a man" is not any set of outer data to be observed, any set of properties to be inferred from the outer data, any course of action that can be predicted from the properties; it springs from an inner and "free" determination that is not scientifically observable.

It is anti-idealist: the various transcendental ego's are neither Greek nor barbarian, bond nor free, male nor female; they don't suffer and they don't die; we do.

Positivism and idealism have been major determinants in producing the contemporary world; in the measure that the contemporary world is found unsatisfactory or, frankly, disastrous, existentialism has a profound resonance.

Zeit 711111
Sein und Zeit quickly ran through 5 editions; Jaspers' Geistige Situation der Zeit was through 5 editions in about a year and has been translated into six languages including Japanese; Sartre was a cafe hero in Paris.

This contemporary resonance fits in with existentialist concern for time and for history.

Since "being a man" is not a fixed essence with which we are endowed from birth but the result of the use of our freedom, and further since "being a man" is not a property that necessarily remains with us but is maintained by us precariously in the continuous use of freedom, "time" is an intrinsic and necessary component in "being a man." Hence, Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*, Marcel's *Homo Viator*. However, concern with history on the grand scale appears only in Jaspers, e.g., *Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte*.

4. It is unconcerned with propositional truth and with man's per se capacities for truth or anything else.

This unconcern arises in Heidegger, Sartre, from phenomenological concentration on the sources, grounds, whence spring concepts and judgments.

It arises in Jaspers from Kant who is believed to have shown that any objective statement deals only with appearance.

It arises in Marcel from his concern with being a good man as ~~an~~ opposed to mere existence as a man, and the common sense attitude (buttressed by dissatisfaction with idealism) that technically correct propositions have little or nothing to do with what you really are.

In all it arises from a turning away from the universal, necessary, abstract, per se, to the unique individual, the contingent, the concrete, the de facto.

Jaspers repeatedly insists that freedom is not definable; Sartre establishes the fact of freedom by asking whether you have been in the torture chamber with the ~~Nazi~~ Nazis and made the experiment of freedom by not giving your comrades away; none of them would dream of discussing "man" as what is common to mewling infants, people sound asleep, and the mature man facing a crisis in his life.

Gabriel Marcel: "Plus il s'agit de ce que je suis et non de ce que j'ai, plus questions et réponses perdent toute signification. Quand on me demande, ou quand je me demande, en quoi je crois, je ne puis me contenter d'énumérer un certain nombre de propositions auxquelles je souscris; ces formules, de toute évidence, traduisent une réalité plus profonde, plus intime: le fait d'être en circuit ouvert par rapport à la Réalité transcendante reconnue comme un Tu." Quoted by R. Troisfontaines, De l'existence à l'être, II, 352.

5. This unconcern with propositional truth and this distaste for the per se is de facto connected with an incapacity to provide foundations for either propositional truth or the per se.

It is my firm conviction that, while there is much in existentialism on which we should practise the patristic maxim of despoiling the Egyptians, still we cannot simply take existentialism (even Marcel's) and incorporate it within Scholasticism. Marcel (in a private conversation with ~~V. G. Levenson~~) intimated that he had little or no idea how one could go about proving the existence of God; the statement quoted above, taken in its concrete context, eliminates the possibility of any evolution of dogma or any dogmatic theology in the traditional Catholic sense; in other words, while it fits in with the requirements for a Biblical theology, it has no room for the Councils of Nicaea and Chalcedon, to say nothing of Trent and the Vatican.

virtually
out

6. Existentialism is concerned with the human subject qua conscious, emotionally involved, the ground of his own possibilities, the free realization of those possibilities, the radical orientation within which they ~~emerge~~ emerge into consciousness and are selected, his relationship with civilization, other persons, history, God.

7. G. Marcel is not a systematic thinker; in his preface to R. Troisfontaines' *De l'existence à l'être*, he congratulates the author on having done for him what he could not do for himself.

G. Marcel is a penetrating thinker and an extremely effective writer; he can put a concrete idea, orientation, ~~his~~ criticism of life, across with extraordinary brevity and skill.

He reviews his intellectual history in "Regard en arrière", a paper added to the collection "Existentialisme chrétien: Gabriel Marcel", introd. by E. Gilson, contributors include Delhomme, Troisfontaines, et al. See Bocheński.

I, / His *Journal métaphysique* was published in 1927, the date of *Sein und Zeit*. His background is idealism (including Bradley) and Bergson; Kierkegaard is acknowledged to have influenced him indirectly.

8. K. Jaspers began with abnormal psychology of which he became professor and wrote various technical articles; he has a profound respect for science and is a mordant critic of scientists; forty years ago he was ridiculing the mythology of the brain and the mythology of the unconscious in the psychology of his time.

He is a Kantian with the Critique of Practical ~~Reason~~ Reason brought to life by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.

He is the most broadly cultivated of the existentialists and with the widest range of interests; he writes very intelligibly, explains exactly what he means, strikes one as very balanced and sane.

In his *Philosophie* (1932) he explains that Existenz and Transzendenz correspond roughly to what are named by mythical consciousness the soul and God. *Ephe.*

Since then he has developed the notion of das Umgreifende (which corresponds roughly to the notion of being in insight) and has come to place a great deal more emphasis and reliance on reason (more perhaps to disassociate himself from Sartre and similar tendencies than from assignable grounds) and to speak openly of God (as a necessary philosophic postulate).

9. M. Heidegger is perhaps the most original and profound of the lot; his immediate source is Husserl; from Heidegger by way of a strong dose of French clarity and logic comes Sartre, who figures as the reductio ad absurdum of the movement.

On Being Oneself.

1. Subject is subject of...; a relative term; meaning varies with correlative

Grammatical: function in sentence

Logical: function in proposition

Metaphysical: recipient: matter, form; potency, act; etc.

Psychological: subject of stream of consciousness

2. Consciousness streams in many patterns: dream, biological, aesthetic, intellectual, dramatic, practical, mystical.

Contrast: subject of stream as orientated on knowing, and subject of stream as orientated on choosing.

Of old: speculative and practical reason; now, concrete flow orientated on knowing and orientated on choosing

3. Intellectual pattern is intellectual by its detachment, by non-intervention of alien concerns, by concentration of attention, effort, on observing, understanding, judging

Subject is involved, but as involved he is subordinated to dictates of method, to immanent reality concretion within himself of principles of logic, of scientific aspiration, of absolute criteria; *involvement is to submission to norms*

Subject is headed towards object, universe; he himself enters into picture only within objective field, as a particular case in a broader totality; the data of his consciousness may be a source of information, but they are relevant not qua his

Subject has a responsibility: his judgment is his, and *personne se plaint de son jugement*; still it is a limited responsibility, for he can frame his conclusions as positive or negative, certain or probable, etc.; in brief he is bound to say what he knows and no more than he knows, re object and re mode, but he is not committed to reaching definite results

4. The practical pattern of experience demands the intervention of the subject.

He may choose A or B, A or Not-A; or he may consent to drift, permit himself to be other-directed, where however the consenting and permitting are equivalent to choosing, though an inauthentic equivalent

The choice decision drift are determined neither externally, biologically, psychically, nor intellectually

Even when one knows everything about everything, an operable cannot be demonstrated; it admits no more than rhetorical syllogisms. But in fact I do not know everything about everything; I do not know everything that ultimately is relevant to the choices I have to make; and none the less I already am alive, thinking, acting, under a perpetual necessity of drifting or choosing, choosing A or not A, B or not B,...

Hence, choosing is within an atmosphere of incertitude, and so it involves an acceptance of risk

Choosing not only settles ends and objects; it gives rise to dispositions and habits; it makes me what I am to be; it makes it possible to estimate what I probably would do; it gives me a second nature, an essence that is mine in virtue of my choosing; *still* it does not give me an immutable essence, achievement is always precarious, radical new beginning possible

In choosing I become myself: what settles the issue is not external constraint nor inner determinism nor knowledge but ut quo my will and ut quod myself; in the last analysis the ultimate reason for my choice being what it is, is myself, if left to mere balancing of motives impulses, then I consent to drift; I consent to being other-directed; I implicitly choose as myself the "On" "Man" -- inauthenticity if not left to mere balancing of motives impulses, then I intervene, I knowingly assume risk and responsibility in either case what ultimately is operative is purely individual, unique in the drifter what results is another instance of the average man in a given milieu in the decisive person what results is what he chooses to be.

in the drifter, individuality is blurred; his individuality is his consenting to be like everybody else

in the decisive person there comes to light both his individuality and the total-otherness of other individuals; my choice is what it is because that's what I choose; yours is because that's what you choose; even when what is chosen is the same, still the sources are simply different

Finally, there are limiting situations: the drifter can no longer just drift; and the decisive person is powerless to change things by deciding

general: historical period, social milieu of birth, opportunities, male or female, old or young

particular: death, suffering, struggle, guilt confronted with limiting situations, the drifter may try to forget, but ultimately he cannot succeed; he is totally involved, all of him is involved, and he is totally unprepared

on the other hand, the decisive person can be as decisive as he pleases, but the limiting situation is not thereby removed

5. Oneself is the irreducibly individual element whence spring the choices of the decisive person and the drifting forgetting of the indecisive

What springs from that source is free; for it one is responsible

What results from that source is not only the sequence of activities but also the character of the man, the second nature, quasi-essence, by which precariously one is what one is

Nor does choosing wait upon learning, the acquisition of as much knowledge as might be relevant; it involves risk and incertitude

Finally, in choosing is involved everything that concerns me

6. In brief, the intellectual and the practical patterns of experience are incompatible

In one, free decisive intervention despite risk and with total commitment is essential; in the other, it is barred from the movement towards truth to be attained, though total commitment is demanded from the subject by truth as attained.

→ 6 Being oneself is being the subject of free acts. It is ^{existential} ~~existence~~ In the limit, it is ~~existence~~ implies transcendent, absolute

then merges
a source for another
value; drifts value
needed for it to be
irreducible to
any other in any significant
sense.

6. Within a satisfactory synthesis, there is possible an alternation, a Withdrawal and Return, a mutual complementarity

In the intellectual pattern of experience I am choosing because I choose to submit entirely to the exigences of knowing in order to know; and without that knowing there would be, not merely a residual incertitude and risk to choosing, but a total blindness that makes choice indistinguishable from mere force, instinct, passion.

In the practical pattern of experience, there is an ultimate moment of "being myself," of incertitude and risk, and none the less total commitment; but it is a known ultimate moment, and it is within a context of knowing and with respect to a largely known.

On Being Oneself. Philosophic Significance of the Theme.

1. It provides a ready rationalization for those who do not wish to endure the restraints of knowing. Let's drop philosophy, speculative theology, science.

Love of neighbour, zeal for souls, dialogue, ~~xxx~~ disponibilité, prayer

2. Breaks through positivist science of man.
It denies that there is any ready-made essence or nature with predictable properties

L'homme se définit par une exigence.

Eisenhower: "We have to be men." It implies that we might be less than men, that there is an exigence for us to be men, that that exigence is to be met by a decision.

3. Breaks through pragmatist science of man.

One learns from experience about things, about one's own potentialities.

~~But the process of experiencing oneself is already one's becoming oneself; one has only one life; and the problem is not one of sacrificing oneself to the determination of 1 pragmatically validated knowledge of man, since the real issue is not one of knowledge but of deciding~~

But the issue is not one of knowing whether a priori or a posteriori; given all the knowledge possible, all the human experiments desirable, there still remains the whole issue of deciding which even then would involve incertitude and risk

And meanwhile one already is living, and one has only one life. The decision to risk nuclear warfare is not justifiable pragmatically

4. Breaks though the idealist view of man.

The idealist's absolute or transcendental ego is neither Greek nor barbarian, neither male nor female; it neither dies nor suffers nor struggles nor acknowledges guilt

The idealist's world is world that is pure intelligibility, rational throughout; it is not a world of free choices springing from unique individuals that are totally concerned in the once-for-all of the momentous moment.

5. Sets problems ~~xi~~ for contemporary scholasticism

What meaning is possible for the fact that I become myself.

Ambiguity that comes to light in metaphysical theory of person, subsistence.

Rests on issue: is metaphysics knowledge of things through their causes or through the decem genera entis?

Is the thing just its substance or is the thing a whole that includes both substance and accidents.

H. Müller

b Verum et falsum sunt in mente; bonum et malum sunt in rebus. But in the concrete, there are no abstractions, and so there is no abstract good

If no abstract good, abstract moral precepts do not suffice to reach the good; they can ~~not~~ be no more than pointers to the direction location in which the good lies, or limits indicating where the good does not lie

But there remains for each one to work out concretely what the good really is

There remains an order of the universe, but it is not an order deducible from abstract essences and schematic hierarchies; it is a concrete unfolding in concrete situations; and the concrete situations are the product of individual decisions about the concrete good

There remains the natural law (situations do not change moral precepts) but there arises the significance of kairos, of my situation, my opportunity, my duty; and while these can be illuminated by moralists, by spiritual directors, the ultimate issue is whether or not I am to take a risk and assume a total responsibility and rise to the occasion ~~as~~ I alone see it

There is to the order of the universe the emergence of good from evil, the heightening of evil to a maximum that sets the alternative of conversion or destruction,

where the evil is to be met not by being included as intelligibility within the order but as ~~surd~~ violating the order, as a demand not for justice but for self-sacrifice and charity

The order of the universe is not a mechanistic plan flowing from essences; it may descend to that through sin; but it rises from it inasmuch as the order is a matrix network of personal relations

Situation, ~~surd~~, kairos, charity

c The need of an ancilla that will supply theology with the categories necessary to assimilate the doctrine of the Bible

The possibility of such an ancilla: can existential questions be handled by the Catholic philosopher; do they not suppose knowledge of theology by their very nature.

d Withdrawal and return: not simply the mutual dependence of willing to know and knowing to will

There is the problem of conversion (reorientation, reorganization of mind and life)

K's spheres: aesthetic, ethical, religious A and B.

Upward change is not in virtue of knowledge on lower plane; it is not in virtue of will following knowledge on lower plane.

apparent latent

There has to be the irruption of a power, the possibility of a radical discovery where the discovered has been present all along, the fact of an obnubilation that prevented prior discovery

This sets the radical question in all philosophizing.

It is relevant for scholastics with their innumerable ~~and~~ disputed questions, and no method of solution not only not in sight but not even desired, sought, seriously believed in

In various measures ~~it~~ it is the concern of the thinkers named existentialists;

Proposal: to face our existential question and through ~~it~~ it move towards some understanding of this question for others.

1. Enormous literary remains, mostly in shorthand, preserved at Louvain and being classified and edited under H. L. Van Breda, OFM; there is some parallel institute at Cologne.

Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie. Edited by W. Biemel. Published, Haag, M. Nijhoff, 1954.

Husserl's last work; about the first third published in his life-time; the rest put together from his remains; probably owes something to the stimulus of his most brilliant (and disowned) student Heidegger.

A general idea of this work provides a good introduction to Heidegger and offers the advantage of not involving us in the complexities of the development of Husserl's ideas on Phenomenology, Reduktion, Epoche.

2. It might seem paradoxical to speak of ^a ~~unmistakable~~ crisis in modern science: its achievements are unmistakable; its labors in endless fields continue apace; and what unsolved problems there are will be solved either by the methods of the past or by the discovery of new methods to complement and perfect those of the past.

Still the need of new methods can be discovered only by ~~a~~ a critical survey; and if the need exists at present, then the survey will not only discover the existence of the need but also provide a signpost to point the way towards a solution.

Such a survey demands a ^E ~~crit~~ ^{erion}, and the criterion that can hardly be rejected is an act of recall in which we reenact within ourselves the original intentions of the scientific enterprise.

These intentions had two principal manifestations: fourth century Athens; and the Renaissance.

3. The formulation of the aim of science in 4th century Athens consisted in an Umdeutung (shift in meaning) of popular notions of sophia, aletheia, episteme; this shift took place through the Platonic contrast of episteme and doxa, of dialektike and eristike; it consisted in setting up an ideal of knowledge and truth that involved (1) a sustained effort (2) a methodical procedure (3) a rigor (4) an attainment of evidence (5) a solid immovable basis in certainty, that simply were not contained in the previous customary connotation of such terms as aletheia, episteme; finally ~~it~~ it unfolded in the works of Aristotle, Euclid, Archimedes, the historians, and the medical doctors.

4. The Renaissance brought forth a far more grandiose proposal: it discovered in the ancients

- (1) an ideal of knowledge and truth vs merely traditional opinion
- (2) as a principle of transforming society vs merely traditional power.

In the measure that that ideal and that principle are valid, Western man is the ~~xxx~~ exemplar of mankind, the realization of the meaning of what it is to be a man.

In the measure that that ideal and that principle are not valid, man is just another anthropological classification; he is of concern to us, not because of any intrinsic value or significance, but merely because he is the type or species to which we belong.

5. Hence, if we are to judge modern science by the criterion of its original intentions, we must ask what hope modern science offers

- (1) of the attainment of knowledge and truth
- (2) of a principle that frees man from merely traditional opinion and power and enables him rationally ~~xx~~ and responsibly to place human society on a basis of truth and reason, freedom and responsibility.

6. Judged by this criterion, modern science can be criticized

(a) for its tendency to splinter into specialties: any university catalogue; congresses; "Deus scientiarum Dominus."

(b) for the autonomy of the splinters: what counts effectively within each of the departments, sections, subsections, is what is recognized as "good" in that department, section, subsection.

discussions of knowledge, science, truth are just so many other specialties, and their relevance to other fields is a mere matter of opinion.

(c) for the drift to the criterion of technical competence

Upon a background of traditional norms that are not questioned (Selbstverständlichkeiten), the effective principle of change is technique: what counts ultimately is "getting results," and what counts proximately is the approved technique, how one goes about it, all the wrinkles of observation, experimentation, all the apparatus of bibliography and footnotes.

(d) for the position of the human sciences

Scientific medicine is based on scientific anatomy, physiology, pharmacy, chemistry, physics; folk medicine (recipes, cures) for the individual patient has disappeared; but for human society the only medicine remains folk medicine; endless nostrums are proposed and, scientifically, they are of no value. De facto, techniques are unified by totalitarian state and by mass democracy: unifications of power not reason.

(e) for the impossibility of a reorientation on the present basis
A reorientation demands a general view, and no general view is possible; only a shifting set of best available opinions in more or less unrelated fields.

A general view is the work of a mind, and no mind can master all the techniques, and so no mind can present a scientifically respectable general view. Bodenlosigkeit!

#space

7. If we have found that modern science does not fulfil its original inspiration, intention, aim, we can go further and ask if there has been some radical defect or oversight in its program.

H's diagnosis of the malady is that scientific clarity floats on popular obscurity, scientific evidence on popular Selbstverständlichkeit (Marcel: tout naturel), in brief, the real basis of science has not been explored, examined, evaluated.

(a) For there exist two truths and two worlds.

There is popular truth in the sense of telling the truth in the home, in business, in law-courts, in newspapers and periodicals, in autobiography.

There also is scientific truth in the sense of a validated set of propositions: logic, maths, physics, chemistry, etc.

These two reflect the original duality and bifurcation of doxa and episteme, of setting up a scientific ideal within a context of popular notions (one might compare the Hebraic ideal of "man before God" within the unity of Hebraic tradition)

There is the popular world of poets and men of common sense, of everyday assumption, opinion, activity.

There is the quite different world of the scientist and philosopher: mass instead of weight, temperature instead of heat, dimensions instead of size, elements instead of bodies.

(b) There have occurred a series of ^CUnterschiebungen.

The scientific or philosophic world is shoved under the popular world as the underlying reality, as what really is out there. Popular notions are considered mere ignorance or naivete.

(c) But the fundamental truth and the really basic world is not the scientific or philosophic but the popular.

One has only to take any scientific procedure or conclusion and with a little probing it will come to light that the ultimate evidence lies in the popular world, the Lebenswelt with its Selbstverständlichkeiten.

Science claims to ~~xxxx~~ rest on experience, but what is experienced is not the scientist's "real world" but the "popular world"

Science rests on the testimony of observers, experimenters, etc., and they are operating (1) in the Lebenswelt and (2) after the fashion of the Lebenswelt. E.g., there is not investigation of the psycho-physical parallelism (or whatever you please) that has to be postulated to proceed from the results observed by Michelson and Morley to the conclusions announced by Michelson and Morley. Indeed, scientists may find this objection a mere oddity, but it is an oddity, not from any scientifically established viewpoint, but merely from the viewpoint of the Selbstverständlichkeiten of common sense.

8. If a malady and a diagnosis, then also a remedy, cure.

(1) The priority of the subject: the subject is the source of both truths and both worlds. There is a natürliche Einstellung that yields ~~the~~ popular truth and the popular world. There is a cultivated (Athens, Renaissance, Aufklärung) Einstellung that yields the conceptual worlds of scientists and philosophers.

(b) What the subject is the source of is intentional, namely, what he ~~has~~ means, symbolizes, represents, intends,...

Cf. Cassirer, Essay on Man, Man is the symbolic animal

Cf. Köhler's apes, incapable of free images; man's capacity for free images is also man's capacity for ~~xxx~~ envisaging a world, in fact, many incompatible worlds.

(3) What is needed is a return to Descartes' Cogito.

Let the subject realize that all he thinks, believes, is certain of, whether on popular, scientific, philosophic grounds, is just intentional.

Let him ask how much he can primarily, irreducibly, immutably hold: e.g., "I doubt," "I think thoughts,"...

Let him refuse to leap from Cartesian acceptance of Cogito to Galileo's mathematized world of real bodies

Similarly let him refuse to leap from the intending "I" to Descartes metaphysical substance, the soul.

For both of these leaps are erroneous: they postulate an objective reality that is more than and other than the range of the intentional products of the constructing subject.

And both of these transitions/~~is~~/disastrous: for while everything comes from the subject, still science has a "real world" of protons, electrons, etc., and an utter incapacity for Geisteswissenschaft, and scientific psychology is an absurd attempt to study the subjects (from which everything proceeds) in terms of the outer observable objects

(4) The solution is the identity of Transzendente Phänomenologie, T. Psychologie, T. Philosophie.

Epoche: the immediately evident is the intentional (withdraw from interest in, concern with, commitment to the "really real," the way a man forgets his business to live in the intimacy of his family, or vice versa)

Transcendental Reduction: not the mechanist or behaviorist reduction of the intentional to the "real" but of all intended terms to the intending subject.

Secure science and philosophy an immovable ground: not some flimsy ideal construction within an obscure context of Selbstverständlichkeiten; not the dubious products of some historical cultural process; but seek in the Lebenswelt what is primarily given, really primitive.

N.B. Place Problem - Radical Program (cf. Husserl's return to
pre-Socratic) - Practice Program yet dependent on it -
Basic issue: complete Einstellung - What, and what is truth?

Meaning
Kausal
perception / Abschattung /
Horizont
Einstellung / Objekt
Welt = H

are//

Critique of Husserl's "Krisis"

(a) There is a real problem set by science and especially human science; and its ~~only~~ only solution lies in a philosophy.

Natural science can get along somehow (with a bias towards practical and neglect of basic research) by relying on pragmatic criterion of success; but human science, since the scientist is one of its objects, is involved in philosophic indeed theological issues (Cf problem of synthesis today and in MA

(b) Husserl pursued philosophy "als strenge Wissenschaft", as grounded in necessity and yielding absolute certitude.

This ideal with its Greek and Cartesian antecedents is in need of distinctions

All human judgements rest on virtually unconditioned; they are true as a matter of fact; the pursuit of absolute necessity and absolute certitude is doomed to failure because it seeks more than there is to be had.

(c) The correlations of Abschattung-Horizont and Einstellung-Welt are valuable contributions to cognitional analysis

Still the alleged two worlds are but one set of beings considered from two standpoints: as relevant to human living; as constituted by inner relations of things to one another; "being" is the unifying notion

Again the alleged two truths are simply the result of applying the different criteria relevant and appropriate to the different standpoints.

(d) Science does not rest de facto on evidence and procedures of Lebenswelt.

There has been a failure to attempt the phenomenology of the scientist and phenomenologist: Thales, Archimedes, Newton, Einstein are just odd and strange from common-sense viewpoint

This failure has been buttressed by subsequent exclusive concern with engaged as opposed to contemplative consciousness

One must not expect scientist to be able to detail what he really does. Einstein's advice to epistemologists: don't listen to what scientists say; watch what they do.

(e) Greek, Renaissance, subsequent normative accounts of truth, science, method

are not just artificial ideals floating on popular obscurity, though their non-philosophic or inadequate philosophic statement may be such

they are expressions and clarifications and objectifications of the immanent normativeness of human intellect itself, which is participatio creata lucis increatae

this fact coming to light in Heidegger's Erschlossenheit.

(f) There is a real priority of the subject in knowledge

Human sensitive psyche is not animal: free images; development of imagination

Participatio creata ground of questions, intellectual activity

But this priority is not to be interpreted in Greek and Cartesian fashion with exaggeration of absolute necessity and absolute certitude. Moreover, epoche is involved in confusion of "animal faith" and "rational judgment"; and transcendental reduction properly is to "being" and not to "intending" which also is.

PHENOMENOLOGY: NATURE, SIGNIFICANCE, LIMITATIONS.

I. NATURE

PHENOMENOLOGY IS AN ACCOUNT, DESCRIPTION, PRESENTATION OF THE DATA STRUCTURED BY INSIGHT.

(A) OF DATA, WHAT IS GIVEN, WHAT IS MANIFEST, WHAT APPEARS

NOT JUST EXTERNAL DATA, PHENOMENA BUT ALSO INNER;
HENCE, OPPOSITION TO MECHANISM, BEHAVIOURISM

NOT EXCLUSIVELY INNER DATA: THE INNER INTENTIONAL ACT TERMINATES AT THE OUTER DATUM; AND THE OUTER DATUM IS JUST THE TERM OF AN INNER INTENTIONAL ACT.

NO EXCLUSIONS: NOT PRIMITIVE AS OPPOSED TO DERIVED
NATURAL AS OPPOSED TO CULTURAL, SENSITIVE AS OPPOSED TO
INTELLECTUAL, COGNITIONAL AS OPPOSED TO EMOTIONAL, CON-
TAINING

(B) DATA STRUCTURED BY INSIGHT (MY WAY OF PUTTING IT)

SELECTIVE: NOT EXHAUSTIVE DESCRIPTION OF ALL AND
ANY DATA SIGNIFICANT: SEEKS BASIC UNIVERSAL STRUCTURES;
"EIDETIC" "WESSENSCHAU," ARISTOTLE'S PARTS OF FORM IN
METAPHYS., Z.

TAKES EFFORT, TIME: NOT FIRST BRIGHT IDEA, CALLS FOR
SCRUTINY, PENETRATION, CONTRASTS, TESTS; MAY HAVE TO OVER-
COME SPONTANEOUS TENDENTIOUSNESS, SYSTEMATIC OVERSIGHT,
COMMON OVER-SIMPLIFICATION, PRECONCEPTIONS ARISING FROM
"SCIENTIFIC", "PHILOSOPHIC" OR OTHER SOURCES

(C) NOT INSIGHT AS SUCH

EXTREMELY ELUSIVE

WOULD LEAD IMMEDIATELY TO UNITY (VIEWPOINTS, HIGHER
VIEWPOINTS, THEORY OF JUDGMENT)

THERE IS NO SUCH TENDENCY TOWARDS UNITY IN HUSSERL
(FOREVER DISCOVERING NEW FIELDS TO BE EXPLORED)
AND SIMILARLY THERE IS NO SUCH TENDENCY IN HIS SUCCESSORS

(D) THE DATA AS STRUCTURED BY INSIGHT AND NOT THE SUB-
SEQUENT CONCEPTUALIZATION, DEFINITION, THEORETIC STATE-
MENT OF THE DATA IN THEIR ESSENTIAL FEATURES

PERPETUAL APPEAL TO PREPREDICATIVE MANIFESTATION
BASIC DISTINCTION BETWEEN WHAT IS GIVEN, MANIFEST,
APPEARS, AND THEMATIC TREATMENT OF THE GIVEN BY THE
PHENOMENOLOGIST (PHAINOMENA LAGEIN)

2. SIGNIFICANCE

(A) IT PROVIDES A TECHNIQUE FOR THE EXPLORATION AND PRESENTATION OF THE WHOLE REALMS OF MATTERS OF FACT THAT ARE SIGNIFICANT AND HAVE BEEN NEGLECTED OR TREATED SUPERFICIALLY.

BIAS IN FAVOR OF OUTER DATA, IN FAVOR OF MEASUREABLE, COUNTABLE: "SCIENTIFIC" PSYCHOLOGY; COMPARABLE IN THIS RESPECT TO THE OPENING OF NEW VISTAS AND FIELDS EFFECTED BY FREUD

TRADITIONAL PSYCHOLOGY: EITHER ROUGH AND READY STATEMENTS OF WHAT WAS PRESUMED TO BE OBVIOUS OR, WHEN EFFORT FOR PRECISION ATTEMPTED, BOGGING DOWN IN ACCOUNT OF "INDEFINABLE SOMETHING"

HUSSERL ON PERCEPTION: ABSCHATTUNG AND HORIZONT
F.J.J. BUYTENDIJK. PHENOMENOLOGIE DE LA RENCONTRE (DESCLEE 1952), LA FEMME (DESCLEE 1952 OR EARLIER), PERHAPS WESSEN UND SINN DES SPIELS (BERLIN 1933)

S. STRASSER, DAS GEMUT. FREIBURG I.B., HERDER 1956
LE PROBLEME DE L'ANE. ETUDES SUR L'OBJET RESPECTIF DE LA PSYCHOLOGIE METAPHYSIQUE ET DE LA PSYCHOLOGIE EMPIRIQUE, FRENCH TRANS. BY P. WURTZ. DESCLEE

M. MERLEAU-PONTY, LA STRUCTURE DU COMPORTEMENT, 1942;
LA PHENOMENOLOGIE DE LA PERCEPTION, PARIS, GALLIMARD, 1945.
(BRILLIANT ON SIGNIFICANCE OF ONE'S OWN BODY IN ONE'S PERCEIVING; SENTIENT AND SENSIBLE (SPATIO-TEMPORAL); NEITHER PURELY POUR SOI NOR PURELY EN SOI; NOT GHOST IN MACHINE BUT INCARNATE SUBJECT; NEITHER SUBJECT NOR BODY INTELLIGIBLE WITHOUT THE OTHER)

(B) IT PROVIDES PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY WITH A POWERFUL INSTRUMENT

HUSSERL'S QUEST: LOGISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN; IDEEN ZU EINER REINEN PHENOMENOLOGIE; FORMALE UND TRANSZENDENTALE LOGIK; ERFAHRUNG UND URTEIL.

STRASSER; MERLEAU-PONTY (UNE PHILOSOPHIE DE L'AMBIGUITE

HEIDEGGER: A MAN'S UNDERSTANDING OF HIMSELF AS IMPLICIT IN HIS PROJECTS IS THE INTELLIGIBILITY OF THAT MAN, THE DE FACTO SEIN OF THAT SEINDES; JUST AS PHENOMENOLOGY HAS TO GET BEYOND OBVIOUS AND SUPERFICIAL, SO MUST EACH MAN; HENCE INAUTHENTIC AND AUTHENTIC LIVING, AND PRIORITY OF INAUTHENTIC

L. BINSWANGER (TRAUM UND EXISTENZ) DREAMS OF NIGHT (SOMATIC DETERMINANTS) DREAMS OF MORNING (THE HUMAN SUBJECT BEGINS THE PROJECTION OF A WORLD; INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS IN TERMS OF ITSELF VS INTERPRETATION AS FRAGMENTED WAKING, CONCEPTUALIZATION OF DREAM SYMBOLS)

R. BULTMANN PISTIS IS CHRISTLICHE SEINSVERSTANDNIS; THE REST IS MYTH (OBJECTIVE IS SCIENCE OR MYTH, AND XTIANITY IS NOT SCIENCE

H.W. BARTSCH. KERUCHMA UND MYTHOS. I, II, III, IV, V, AND BEIHEFT TO I-II. HAMBURG 1948-55.

R. MARLE. BULTMANN ET L'INTERPETATION DU NOUVEAU TESTAMENT. PARIS AUBIER 1956. THEOLOGIE 33.

3. LIMITATIONS

AS PHENOMENOLOGY IS ESSENTIALLY PREPREDICATIVE SO ALSO ESSENTIALLY IT IS PRECONCEPTUAL AND PRERATIONAL

IT PROVIDES THE EVIDENCE IN WHICH THE PHENOMENOLOGIST AND HIS READER CAN GRASP THE VIRTUALLY UNCONDITIONED; BUT AS FAR AS I KNOW IT HAS NOT PENETRATED TO THE ANALYSIS OF THAT REFLECTIVE RATIONALITY; AND SO IT FAILS TO GIVE IT DUE WEIGHT IN PSYCHOLOGY AND IN THE CONSEQUENT PHILOSOPHY.

HENCE, ITS CRITERION OF TRUE IS THE MANIFEST, THE EVIDENT; WHAT BECOMES MANIFEST, EVIDENT, WHEN ONE LETS THE PHENOMENA APPEAR, DOES NOT BRUSH THEM ASIDE, IS NOT LIVING THE LIFE OF AN ESCAPIST.

PER CONTRA, AS AFFIRMATION BASED ON MANIFESTNESS OF WHAT IS, SO NEGATION BASED ON MANIFESTNESS OF WHAT IS NOT, OF NOTHING. IN HEIDEGGER AND SARTRE, THE BASIC ROLE GIVEN TO THE ANXIETY CRISIS AS THE MANIFESTNESS OF NOTHING.

HENCE, POSSIBILITY OF HUSSERL'S EPOCHE: WITHDRAW FROM INTEREST IN, CONCERN WITH THE "REALLY REAL"; CONCENTRATE ON INTENDING AND INTENDED

RADICAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DIRECTION AND REDIRECTION OF ATTENTION, AND THE "ALS OB" OF SUSPENSION OF JUDGMENT; POSSIBILITY OF EPOCHE CONNECTED WITH THIS AMBIGUITY.

HENCE, IMPOSSIBILITY OF RETURNING FROM EPOCHE.

IF BY INTENTIONAL ACTS I REGARD THE GIVEN AS JUST WHAT APPEARS (AND I CAN DO SO), THEN BY WHAT SLEIGHT OF HAND CAN ANOTHER INTENTIONAL ACT OF AFFIRMING OR ANYTHING ELSE RESTORE THE "REALLY REAL" H.J. POS

CF. PROBLEMES ACTUELS DE LA PHENOMENOLOGIE. COLLOQUE INTERNATIONALE DE PHENOMENOLOGIE. BRUXELLES, 1951. DESCLEE 1952. H.L. VAN BRED A.

REAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN

- (A) NATURLICHE EINSTELLUNG, SANTAYAN'S "ANIMAL FAITH"
- (B) REACHING ABSOLUTE "IS" THRU GRASP OF VIRTUALLY UNCONDITIONED

HENCE, INCAPACITY OF PHENOMENOLOGY FOR DEALING WITH ISSUES OF SPECULATIVE THOUGHT. A. FINK, LOC. CIT.

"... DAS SEIENDE IST PHANOMEN UND WEITER NICHTS. EINE PRUFUNG DIESER URENTSCHEIDUNG LIEGT GAR NICHT IN BEREICH DER PHANOMENOLOGISCHEN METHODE, WEIL SIE ALLE UND JEDE PRUFUNG GRUNDSATZLICH ALS AUSWEISUNG DAR SELBSTOEBEN PHANOMEN VERSTEHT" P. 72

"DASS DAS AUSWEISBARE ALLEIN IST... KANN NICHT WEIDERUM DURCH AUSWEISUNG DARGETAN WERDEN. DAS ERSCHEINEN DES SEIENDES IST NICHT ETWAS, WAS SELBST ERSCHEINT" P. 70

HENCE, HEIDEGGER BOGGED DOWN IN REMOTE CRITERIA OF TRUTH AND UNTRUTH: "BEING IN THE TRUTH" "BEING IN THE UN-TRUTH"

A. DE WAELEHENS. UNE PHILOSOPHIE DE L'AMBIGUITE. L'EXISTENTIALISME DE M. MERLEAU-PONTY. LOUVAIN 1951.

M. M-P PREPARING A BOOK "L'ORIGINE DE LA VERITE"

A. DE WAELEHENS. PHENOMENOLOGIE ET VERITE, PARIS PUF 1953.

DAS SEIENDES: BRUTE EXISTENCE. SEIN : ITS INTELLIGIBILITY WHICH IS IN MAN AND FROM MAN. HEIDEGGER CONFINED TO ART.

LOTZ. H'S METHOD EXCLUDES THE POSSIBILITY OF HIS PROVING THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

M. Heidegger.

- a) what he has to believe about man
- b) what he thinks about being
- c) what he thinks of himself as philosopher

1. Phenomenology as Method.

Phainomena: whatever is manifested, appears.

not appearance vs underlying reality

not sense vs art culture sentiment

not outer public vs inner private

not immediate but also what takes time attention scrutiny

Legen: read off, let appear, discover, un-veil

Truth: based on evidence of letting phenomenon appear;
what is true is what is manifest, un-covered, un-veiled, re-vealed

2. Transcendental Phenomenology.

Eidetic; concerned with ego as transcendental, as constituted by the characters necessary for any possible "intending."; what has no presuppositions, must be presupposed by every other knowledge (since every knowing is an intending), provides rock on which all philosophy science can be securely founded.

3. Heidegger: phenomenology of conscious living, of stream of consciousness.

Let stream appear, come-to-light, reveal itself

Since no inquiry knowledge can occur except within stream, phenomenology of stream is basic, first, presupposed by all other kn

Since eidetic is universal, necessary, abstract, cannot but omit individual, existential, concrete

Hence phenomenology of conscious living is a fundamental ontology, the sole basis from which one can tackle q. What is being

4. Stream basic: as basis of horizon; but also from viewpoint of a phenomenology.

For stream of consciousness is itself a manifesting, a coming-to-light; it is not just living but conscious living; it is the coming-to-light of a consciousness-in-its-world

If the stream is only a partial-coming-to-light, then phenomenology will discover what remains to come to light

it will distinguish authentic and inauthentic conscious living

The truth of phenomenology will be a discovering what it is to be in the truth, and what it is to be in untruth

It would seem that only by being in the truth can one hope to have a stream of consciousness in which one truly can come to answer the question, what is being.

5. Now if there is a stream of consciousness, the streaming, flowing, direction, postulates a finality, a basic drive, and this as conscious, as the root of consciousness is Sorge, Besorgen, Fursorge. Concern, preoccupation, care for

Because the stream is an organizing of contents, it is an in-der-Welt-sein

in so far as the organizing rests on Besorgen, the organized consists of tools, the referential system of tools linked to one another for the stream is Zuhandenheit, and the total complex of tools constitutes the Umwelt

in so far as the organizing is Fursorge, there is the Mitwelt of persons that also use the tools

Because the stream is self-organizing, there are
Verstehen: a grasp of concrete possibilities of the stream; *presumptive*
Entwurf: project of what is to be done
Rede: articulation of Entwurf, seriation of its elements
Sprache: concretization of articulation

Because when conscious one already is concerned, preoccupied, caring (condition of stream as stream), there is Befindlichkeit: the sentiment abrupt de se trouver-là
Geworfenheit: sentiment of being tossed into world, abandoned

Because the being as a stream is its flowing, it is essentially temporal: Sein und Zeit, Homo Viator.

Because the being of a stream of consciousness is a flow of presentations to one present, it is Da-sein, where the "Da" is pregnant; "there" not the way a stone is present to a stone, not the way things are present to us, but the way we have to be present for things to be present to us

latter emphasis upon Erschlossenheit opens way to "and = essence"
intention = human natural
de Waalhaus seems a bit "better in" - others much more.

6. Inauthentic Dasein

Dependence on world: any possibilities I can realize involve me in a net-work of conditions; plenty of alternative possibilities, but none without involvement in net-work

As Jaspers would put it: technical society
a creates the possibility of the masses 10^9 increment in 150 years and thereby ensures its own necessity
b it defines the set of jobs to be done: there is some optimum use of tools machines &c in total process of extraction transformation distribution; the actual is best approximation possible to this optimum (else obsolescence elimination); and man's work is residual
c it defines the product, creates man's world: what is produced is what can be produced and through advertising techniques sold to the masses, to the average of desire taste
d standards ideals values basic criticism irrelevant: the one question is to keep things going; if that is not your norm standard rule, then uncooperative, trouble maker, unwanted conformist comes to top where his freedom is hazard of making misjudgement of objective possibilities on grand scale significance
e personal worth: skill, experience, character tend to vanishing jobs are standardized, depths of standards; person has to meet average standards as a replaceable interchangeable part
f field of freedom contracts: carrying out ideas rising from my creative imagination, not as mere eccentricity, but as significant contribution

Flight into world: inauthentic Dasein wants things that way; wants to be a realization of "On" "Man" "One"
Wants release from being one's own self, freely and responsibly dis-covering and realizing one's own potentialities with all the risk involved

Finds security, assurance, peace of soul in being like everyone else

Why? Selbstverständlich, evidence journalière, "obvious" in the sense that it does not seem helpful to call it in question, that commonly it is taken for granted, that obviously there are so many other ways of occupying oneself

Gerede, Bavardage q otidien, Talk

Cuts articulation of Verstehen from real; means becomes an end; Mitsein, becomes talking to one another, being preoccupied with the talking

authoritative: things are so because said to be so

all-embracing: only from and against talk can one reach genuine

evident and certain: doubt excites deep indignation, resentment, because Talk hides inauthenticity

curiosity: concerned with new because new; not wanting to understand anything but to be distracted, to escape

ambiguous: talk about everything but really understand nothing; doing all sorts of things yet nothing that is my doing

Verfallenheit: all this without any effort, with talking thought, a spontaneous accomplishment in which we become estranged uprooted from ourselves, the selves that really are ours
a permanent aspect of human existence; new civilization would involve only superficial change; there are only two basic alternatives; this is one, and the other is intolerable

permanence of instability: changes have to keep coming; no device of escapist is effective for any length of time

7. Authentic Dasein

The Critical Experience: Ängst, Anxiety crisis, the collapse of stream of consciousness as organized

Dis-covery of aggregate of brute existents, of existents as stripped of all the meaning significance conferred upon them in stream of consciousness

Dis-covery of Sorge (root of stream, reality of Dasein)
être anticipant déjà jeté dans un monde dans lequel il s'est perdu

summation of anticipations, projects: the ultimate project is dying, quitting the world

Selbst, Selbstheit (opp. Man-selbst) the tension through time of the option between authentic and inauthentic mode of Dasein

Unauthentic re Death: all the ways of hiding it; slip it into generalities; everyone dies

Authentic: Durchsichtigkeit, face it; Erwarten, I am expecting; Freiheit zum Tode, Detachment

Not a matter of stopping living, projecting, doing; but of continuing without being a dupe

Earlier: tragic attitude. Later: emphasis more and more on art, poetry, and finally nature mysticism as conferring an intelligibility on the existent

8. Heidegger's Claims.

Explicit claim to have made only a beginning, a fundamental-ontology.

Explicit rejection as misunderstanding of practically all interpretation.

However, Dasein is fundamental fact; stream of consciousness in its basic formation influences all subsequent philosophic efforts at creating a horizon

Tools solidify into things; Dasein interprets itself as thing; Deus se habet ad naturalia sicut artifex ad artificata

Proclaims philosophy to have taken a wrong turn with the Greeks; have to go back to early nature philosophers

Existent: what's there in anxiety crisis

Sein: intelligibility conferred on existent and on self by Dasein; rather Being in truth of authentic, than being in untruth of inauthentic Dasein; yet negation of value judgment

9. Heidegger's Position in History of Phil.

Descartes: Rational Cogito; Absolute object in Spinoza; switch through Kant to absolute Subject in Fichte, Hegel, Schelling
Material substance as extension; mechanism; empiricist philosophy informing scientific thinking; elimination of man as man in drift of modern civilization.

Late Schelling: from Indifference of Subject-Object to Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation

Post-idealists: Kierkegaard, Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, Dilthey

Heidegger's Dasein is an indifference or rather simultaneity of subject-object in a concrete living; *abstract indifference in Heidegger's "indifference"*

10. Critique of Heidegger.

a H S Sullivan: psychic development occurs along lines of minimum anxiety

b Psychic development in man is liberated above flow of animal consciousness; understanding and free image go hand in hand; basic feature of stream of human consciousness
Not Kant's empirical ego and transcendental ego, but transcendental imagination, creative imagination

c The stream of consciousness defines a horizon; and horizon is a philosophic concept of fundamental importance; nor can the constructed horizons of the philosophers ignore the fundamental horizon of Dasein

Limit: Self Appropriation = Fundamental Logic

d Much of human living is infra-rational tribal consciousness, group feeling, group decision, pragmatic tendency in science and logic (of Trobriand Islanders) modern civilization is drift determined mainly by technical possibilities of production, and organizing human living by social engineering (advertising press escape-literature state-education)

a' Sorge -- Pure desire to know. Limit effective in common-to-many scientific endeavour

b' Truth as "letting appear" -- Truth as Unconditioned.

Proposed note is highly false

c' Being as simply intelligible, God, ens per essentiam; material being: simply intelligible as form; differently intelligible in other, as potency, as act.

d' This is intellectualist: but intellectual pattern of experience sole absolute; it knows and judges others; to do so, it has to differentiate itself and, once it has done so, then bring action and feeling into line.

Discussions of "Horizon" because topic conceived as
"what about existentialism?" rather than "what is existentialism?"

Existentialism is an attempt, carried out in a variety of
manners, to do justice to the facts of human living (freedom,
responsibility, commitment, interpersonal relations, communication,
death, God)

without breaking through the frontiers of knowledge set
by Kant, namely, that

sense alone is not constitutive of human knowing and that
true judgment can be the medium in quo the real is known
only if the real is already known prior to true judgment.

Heidegger, preliminaries to a solution that in thirty
years has not been reached

Sartre, a premature ontology that is sheer negation though
its coherence and penetration light up the insufficiencies of
existentialist thinkers

Jaspers, a full and brilliantly technical exploitation of
the resources at his disposal

Marcel, detached from theoretical issues, reaches true
concrete conclusions about being through the "good"

can't do justice to details of these efforts in time at
our disposal

no great point in attempting to do so, since the brilliance
of the efforts is matched by the failure to break out of the
closed circle

On the other hand, there is a notable point in attending
to significance of existentialism for scholasticism

Scholasticism is a philosophy of being, but it suffers
from a multiplicity of schools, it rests upon a bog of disputed
questions, it is not marked by any conspicuous desire and labor
to eliminate QQ DD,

because of half-hearted acceptance that truth is medium
in quo real is known -- not denied -- but very commonly it is
not really believed

with result of enormously weakened capacity to influence ground
unify the sciences and to be useful to theology

Existentialism invites scholasticism

to move from per se (subject, principles) to actual order

to move from being a philosophy among philosophies to being
a philosophy of philosophies, from non-historical to historical

The Dilemma of the Subject.

1. The major premiss of the dilemma is that either the real-for-me ~~is~~ is defined as the immediately ~~is~~ given or else it is the object known through the true tamquam per medium in quo.

The minor premiss is the psychological fact that, without introspection, the subject is never the object and, even in introspection, the difficulty is not eliminated but merely displaced, since the subject as subject is never the subject as object.

Hence, if the real-for-me is the immediately given, then there follows the existentialist opposition between objective science and, on the other hand, real knowledge of the subject which is non-objective. Hence, exclusion of metaphysics in any traditional sense; invention of new types of metaphysics, for dealing with all that concerns man.

On the other hand, if the real-for-me is what is known through what is true, then I am confined to a universe of objects; the subject is inaccessible to me; and because the subject is inaccessible, I remain the victim of unscrutinized horizons, incapable of taking ~~my~~ a place on the contemporary level of philosophic discussion, capable of complete openness of horizon only per accidens and not philosophically.

2. Subject: many meanings in different contexts.

grammatical s.: a word or phrase fulfilling a specified function in a sentence

logical s.: whatever admits a predicate, has one; red is a colour

scientific s.: subject : habit :: object : act.

psychological s.: the human conscious subject.

3. Conscious: predicated of subjects, acts, processes.

subjects: he was knocked unconscious; dreamless sleep; dreaming waki

acts: growth of beard, metabolism of cells, vs. seeing, suffering

processes: circulation of blood, digestion of food (in no malfunctioning), vs. inquiring to understand, reflecting to judge, deliberating to decide, deciding to enter course of action

4. Object: the motive, product, end of conscious act

motive: color moves sight, illuminated phantasm moves intelligence

product: imagining produces image; understanding produces concept

end: ens, verum, bonum; biological ends

what conscious act centers on, brings about, heads for

5. The ambiguity of awareness, presence.

I see colours, but I do not see seeing, I do not see myself seeing.

In seeing colours, the colours are present (presented) to me, but they are presented not to me as absent but as present.

Inasmuch as colours are presented to someone also present, there is consciousness in the direct act of seeing; I do not see unconsciously, though I may see indeliberately, inadvertently, without noticing what none the less I see

Consciousness is not a matter of reflex activity, of introspection; it is the possibility of reflex activity having something to turn back on, of introspecting having something to introspect.

Consciousness is a property, quality, of acts of a given kinds: sensitive and intellectual, cognitive and appetitive

Consciousness always accompanies waking and even dreaming states. The direction of attention to the conscious component in such states is a secondary phenomenon that would be meaningless aimless where there not the primary phenomenon.

Consciousness of Christ.

Presence, awareness, ambiguity.

Presence of objects to the subject and, concomitantly in a quite different sense, presence of the subject to whom objects are presented.

Object is present as intended

Subject is present as intending

Object is what one is aware of, what one sees, hears, desires, fears, investigates, understands, conceives.

Subject is one who is aware, and one cannot be ~~un~~ aware and be unconscious, just as one cannot see and be unconscious, etc.

But "being aware" is quite different from "being what one is aware of"

Hence in primary stream of consciousness a the subject is never without an object and b the subject is never the object. Between subject and object there is a cleavage, a radical opposition.

In infinite act, subject, act, primary object coincide; in finite act, act and object differ, for act is limited by something, by what it is about; in human act, subject, act, object differ, for not only is ~~subject~~ act finite, but also subject does not know himself by his own essence.

6. Introspection does not eliminate but displaces cleavage.

In an incomplete and elusive fashion the subject can shift his attention from object to act and subject

On this basis he can proceed to classify describe relate explain form hypotheses theories systems devise tests verify judge: subject, capacities, habits, acts, objects.

Apart from its basis in shift of attention, this process is essentially the same as in all human knowledge

Experience:: Understanding conception:: Reflection judgment

Moreover, just as in knowledge of other objects there are known, known unknown, and unknown unknown, so also in knowledge of the subject

The phenomenon of the horizon remains, only here the horizon is more difficult to tackle because of the difficulty of the basic shift of attention.

Throughout this process the cleavage remains

The human subject does not know himself by his essence; he begins from objects, defines acts by objects, habits by ranges of acts, potencies by ranges of habits, essence of soul by sets of potencies

In shift of attention: what is attended to, who attends; what is attended to is subject as object; who attends is subject as subject, so that subject still remains inaccessible except as peculiarly present

What is classified, described, understood, is not the subject classifying, describing, understanding.

Hence, Hume a knowledge he describes b knowledge he uses.

7. The Dilemma.

If real is known through true, then only subject as object known; if only subject as object known, the whole inquiry is conducted within horizon, prejudged by horizon, and no possibility of philosophic attack on radical problem of horizon.

If real is the immediately given in its immediate intelligibility (phenomenology a la Heidegger), if immediate truth is this uncovering, re-vealing, if judgement is just the articulation of what is revealed

Again, if no idea of unconditioned, true, ens (Jaspers, Marcel) then either new type of metaphysics concerned with the reality of the subject as subject or at least Existenzerhellung or Truth as Unverborgenheit d-2487

IX 4

Subject and Horizon.

I. The Notion of Horizon.

1. Human knowledge is in process

Intellect: quo est omnia facere et fieri; but though unlimited in range, it begins from tabula rasa.

Process is raising and answering questions: Quid, Propter quid, An, Utrum. Or, manifestation of process is...

2. Hence at any stage of development, a threefold division.

Known: the range of questions I can raise and answer.

Known unknown: the range of questions I can raise, find significant, worthwhile, know how they might be solved, but de facto cannot answer and know I cannot answer. Docta ignorantia

Unknown unknown: Indocta ignorantia; the range of questions that I do not raise; if raised, I would not understand nor find significant nor judge worthwhile nor know how to go about solving.

3. The horizon is the limit, the boundary between docta and indocta ignorantia.

What is ~~x~~ beyond my horizon consists not merely of answers but also and principally of questions that are beyond me, meaningless-to-me, insignificant-to-me, not worthwhile-to-me, insoluble-to-me. "I haven't got a clue."

As defined, the horizon is a relative term: what is meaningless-to-me may or may not be meaningless absolutely.

By way of contrast, we shall also speak of the field: what is beyond the field is meaningless absolutely, insignificant absolutely, insoluble absolutely.

The field is the universe, but my horizon defines my universe.

Both are relevant to metaphysics: for metaphysics deals with ens, with omnia, with the universe.

The field regards metaphysics as such, but the horizon regards metaphysics as possible-to-me, relevant-to-me.

4. The existence of the horizon comes to light not directly but indirectly.

Not directly: it can be sharply defined only by going beyond it, by reaching a wider horizon in which the old appears as a part. From within any given horizon, its limits are not clear and sharp and in focus, but obscure, hazy, distant: for what is beyond the horizon is what we pay no attention to, and what is at the horizon is what we pay very little attention to

Indirectly: for we can study instances in ~~ix xhm~~ which the recession or contraction of the horizon occurs.

II. The Horizon in Science (or Mathematics).

1. The scientific (or mathematical) horizon recedes if there occur

results,
a a crisis: existing theories, methods, modes of thought cannot handle the facts, ~~is~~ satisfactorily.

b a fundamental revision of concepts, postulates, axioms, methods

c the development of a radically new scientific structure

Copernicus Darwin Freud

e. g., non-Euclidean geometry, calculus, Galois, Einstein, Quanta, ^

2. Recession of the horizon meets with resistance.

Max Planck on what makes a scientific theory accepted: not clarity of observation, exactness of measurement, coherence of hypothesis, rigour of deduction, decisiveness of verification, but retirement of present generation of professors.

3. Eventually the resistance is overcome

Universally: scientific results are equally accessible to all; at any time, roughly, contemporary scientists are abreast

Permanently: the new theory covers all the old facts, and many more; there is no tendency to revert to earlier positions, to revise old views

4. Hence, science is characterized by such universality and permanence, by the contrasting absence of permanent division into opposed schools of thought, ~~by~~ the survival and revival of what to others seems to be definitely superseded.

Resistance to scientific advance is a subjective phenomenon; it is eliminated by a new generation of professors

The old have intellectual habits without the suppleness needed to develop new habits; they have invested their intellectual capital in a point of view, and they are not prepared to declare themselves bankrupt.

5. *After the universality and permanence of scientific achievement has in fact no more than a pragmatic foundation*
Bronislaw Malinowski: no myths, no magic or planetary cycles, tending them, merely Perseus
Science does not conquer mythical consciousness; it finds techniques to broaden the field in which magic and magic and justification were gained any foothold

Hence, scientists cannot give an account of foundations of science; their science is or is not ultimately a superstition by the amount of philosophy the individual they have; human science owes man; scientists in which utter stupidity, silliness once outside their specialty.

III. The Horizon in Human Science, Philosophy, Theology.

1. In these fields there occur recessions of the horizon in the same fashion as in natural science or mathematics.
I.e., crisis, radically new viewpoint, radically new structure

Plato: *aisthnta vonta*; the *vonta* are *ovtwa onta*

Aristotle: the *vontov* is the *aitlov tou eival* immanent

in the material object; extrapolation to immovable movers

Augustine: real is body; real is true.

Aquinas: a transformation of existing theology (Gilaon:

Scotus was the traditionalist, *augustinisme avicennisant*)

Descartes: philosophy as an independent and separate subject; not merely distinction but separation from *theology*.

2. In these fields the recession of the horizon does not result in a straightforward universal and permanent difference.

Not universal: per se, an original philosopher founds a new school; he changes philosophy only *secundum quid*; he gives rise to new topics, new approaches, new techniques, but the basic differences remain -- there is a family resemblance between different realizations of the materialist, idealist, realist tendencies respectively, from 4th century Athens to today

Not permanent: the original thinker founds a new school, but the school splinters

further, there occur periods of decadence, loss of vigor, of influence

as there occur insensible changes with changing times, in which the original message can be lost; devaluation of meanings
so also there occur revivals, second spring, recoveries of vigor and influence

3. The difference between the phenomena of the horizon in maths and natural science, on the one hand, and in human science, phil., theol., on the other is not too difficult to account for.

In the latter case the new horizon on the object involves a new horizon on the subject; for the subject is one of the objects

And a new horizon on the subject involves not merely new concepts, postulates, axioms, methods, techniques, but also a conversion of the subject, *a reorientation, a reorganization*

A new concept of oneself, new principles to guide one's thinking, judging, evaluating, all that concerns oneself, is a conversion.

without the conversion, the new ideas not only are inoperative in one's own living, but also they are insignificant, without real meaning, without any vital expansiveness, in the domain of objects. *for a more ready*

The original thinker founds only a school, because he cannot effect the conversion of ~~all~~ subjects, *he can only promote conversion in*

His school splinters, is subject to periods of decadence and revival, because even his followers can succeed in subjective conversion only up to a point.

IV. The Existential Gap.

1. The existence of philosophical and theological schools, the possibility of decadence and revival within any given school (the words of the master are repeated but his meaning is lost), the fact that human science to be science systematically tends to omit what is human, reveal the fundamental significance and importance of horizon in studies concerned with man, directly or indirectly.

This significance is: The reality of the subject can be beyond the horizon of the subject.

The subject can suffer from an indocta ignorantia with regard to himself.

This indocta ignorantia is not a matter of what the subject might very well be excused from knowing: depth psychology, social conditioning, history, biology, biochemistry

It is a matter of the subject's own intelligence, his own reasonableness, his own freedom and responsibility

On the one hand, he is intelligent, reasonable, free, responsible; he manifests these characteristics in many fashions; he would be insulted if told he was stupid, unreasonable, irresponsible, a victim of catch-words

Yet at the same time in a very true sense his own intelligence, his own reasonableness, his own freedom and responsibility stand beyond his horizon

2. The existential gap is the ~~ix~~ difference, greater or less, between one's horizon on oneself and what really one is.

Again, the existential gap is the gap between what is overt in what one is and what is covert in what one is

what Hume asserted human knowledge to be the knowledge Hume manifestly employed in stating proving his assertion

3. The existential gap is not eliminated by affirming the propositions that are true and denying the propositions that are false.

The decadent school repeats the propositions of the master, but it has collapsed the master's meaning into something less that will fit into a contracted horizon.

The problem of the existential gap is the problem of a conversion that is proportionate to the objective development:

it is not the problem of agreeing with Augustine that the real is the true; it is the problem of meaning as much as did Augustine when he spoke of veritas

4. Hence study of the existential gap is concerned with
immediacy: not a matter of true or false props, but of conversion
obnubilation: movement from covert to overt genuine authentic
norms: there is something normative; conversion should occur;
freedom, responsibility: else norms really meaningless
Transcendent: the norms involve an absolute value; the subject takes his stand by them even against the world, against himself, finds in them a symbol, an indication of God
Existenz: the subject becomes himself in his relation to Transcendent

any delusion
to claim psychology for
psychology - which
is a self-deception

OKIT

intention of it is a
not just awareness of
himself; he is a person
who exists in a world
and who is not just
a thing in the world
but a person who is
a person who is a person

Horizon and Dread.

1. The horizon is grounded in the subject: it is the boundary at which begins his indoctrina ignorantia.

Still this is merely an objective aspect of the horizon: it is defined in terms of what the subject not only does not know but also considers meaningless insignificant insoluble

We have to inquire into the subjective phenomena of horizon: how is it constituted; how is it maintained.

2. To consider single acts involves violent abstraction.

Sensitive acts are involved in a multiple correlation: see: approach, look, focus

Intellectual acts suppose sensitive, operative with respect to sensitive stimulus and manipulation of sensitive flow

Hence, study of consciousness is study, not of isolated acts, but of flow, stream, direction, orientation, interest, concern

3. Study of such streams of consciousness, at a first approximation, is erection of ideal constructs.

Cf. motion of mass in central field of force, Carnot cycle

Hence, patterns of experience:

• biological: beast of prey and quarry

• aesthetic: release from biological interests: free creation

• dramatic: primary aesthetic creation is in oneself and with regard to others; extravert if successful; else introversion one is the hero in one's dreamland - one has to make, create, rescue.

• intellectual: Thales and milkmaid; Newton working on gravitation

• practical: getting things done

4. Limit to patterns of experience: underlying biological manifold has to have higher sensitive integration

A stream of consciousness that runs too freely has the nemesis of compulsions, invasions, neurotic phenomena, anxiety crises.

Anxiety crisis: breakdown of stream, pattern; objects there but meaningless, ie no dynamic significant integration

Anxiety: minor phenomena; development of a type of consciousness takes place along lines of minimum anxiety, *Wittgenstein*.

Abnormality: development has had to avoid anxiety by extreme measures.

5. A world: that lies within a horizon; a totality of potential objects. Not some particular object, but a possibility of some types of objects and not of others.

World, horizon, corresponds to the concrete synthesis that is my conscious living, and that concrete synthesis does not admit change without experience of anxiety, dread; ~~since~~

it is not the reality of my world that is the anchor, the conservative principle; it is the dread I experience and spontaneously I ward off whenever my world is menaced

My concrete synthesis in conscious living is a integration of underlying neural manifold b set of modes of dealing with Mitwelt of persons and Umwelt of tools; or any other combination

To change it, to be converted k to new world, to let my horizon recede is to invite experience of dread and to release a spontaneous, resourceful, manifold, plausible resistance

This dread and release not a function of objective evidence for my world; it is a function of my mode of life, my solution to total range of problems arising in my concrete living

6. Hence, a series of corollaries: (1) Conversion a leap.

on which our lives, a bridge to which we cling; it is part of our nature - all else goes -
To convert someone, to be converted oneself, is not exclusively a matter of proofs arguments evidence: *there is a first*

There is for everyone a problem of integrated conscious living
In childhood: illness, fever, easily moves to delirium, if
I may quote my own experience

The problem is solved only more or less satisfactorily:
whole range of types of unsatisfactory solutions, from psychoses
to neurotic phenomena of minor type

The problem exists because man is capable of free images:
Köhler's apes; literature to develop imagination; to provide
intelligence with a tool that will make possible the movement
of intellect to ens, omnia; and because free images is not
an unlimited, unconditioned freedom.

Conversion, moving to new horizon, entering into new
world, is tampering with a hitherto successful solution to
the problem of conscious living.

If I can get by the initial anxiety, I shall be better
off; just as analysand if he can stand anxiety involved in cure
will be cured.

But not merely a problem of standing the anxiety; it is
also a problem of dealing with the resistance

The would-be convert appeals to his Selbstverständlichkeiten;
he indignantly appeals to what is obvious to everyone with an
ounce of common sense; he moves round in a circle within his
established horizon; and as long as it remains, his brand of
logic and his set of premisses will be unshakable-to-him

Moving to new horizon, conversion, involves a leap: a
leap from Selbstverständlichkeiten, which are mostly misunderstanding
what in some sense is true, but also are props to present position,
to another concrete solution to problem of conscious living.

To experience such dread, seriously suppose that
some philosophy (that is not your own) were true.

Real distinction: not a problem of distinction but a
problem of reality, of what really is, of horizon, of horizon
buttressed by dread, and dread rationalized by Selbstverständlichkeiten

Again, leap of faith = transition from old world of comfort to new

last actual "leap"

worldview?

7. Corollary (2): The Self-constituting Subject.

Freedom of will: rational alternatives and free choice

Prior freedom: the solution that has been the concrete synthesis in my living.

Cooperation of subconscious, ~~intellect~~ imagination, intelligence yielding projects within aesthetic (play), dramatic, practical, intellectual, ~~perhaps~~ patterns of experience

The drama we do not think out and then execute; the drama that spontaneously arises already charged with image emotion appetite

It is a freedom not had by animals.

It is an "ontological" freedom by which the conscious subject is this conscious subject, develops this solution to the problem of concrete living.

It is that by which we become what we are before we are able to think out alternative courses of action and choose between them

It sets the horizon within which occurs our thinking and choosing, so that

while any particular project can be vetoed, yet the veto has to have its grounds within my world, my horizon

and no project can arise unless it is such as to fall within the world that is mine

Still, if we have made ourselves without any awareness of what we were up to, so we later can remake ourselves in the light of better knowledge and with a full responsibility

Nor is the refusal to remake ourselves any escape, for that is just assuming responsibility for whatever we happen inadvertently to have made, in the past

overlook
A

CHIT

Markegaard's Spheres of Subjectivity
Aesthetic ↔ Naturalism, Sensation, Pictorialism, Monumentalism, Imagination
Ethical
Religious, A, B
Dostoevsky's Division of Spheres
Divine
Idealistic
Idealism

Heidegger: ER-spheres

Moral: de l'existence à l'être

8. Corollary (3): The basic function of philosophy.

Philosophy is the attempt to illuminate the effort of intelligent, reasonable, free, fully ~~self-responsible~~ self-constitution.

Hence, philosophy is concerned with good: what is freely and responsibly chosen and effected; what is concrete (verum et falsum in intellectu; bonum et malum in rebus)

Point of comparison with scholasticism is with schol. account of good

bonum particulare: corresponds to particular appetite

bonum ordinis: series of particular goods, series of coordinated activities, habits of apprehension appetition, interpersonal relations (communication in good, congruent with coordination of activities, rising from habits)

bonum per essentiam: the absolute norm; possibility of individual willing good agst world, others, self; transcendent

Concern with good

- a concerned with improving my operating solution, functioning synthesis in concrete living; with transition from freedom of images to freedom of enlightened responsible choice; conversion
- b concerned improvement as mine; not truths but the truth I live by, that is involved in my free self-constitution; not notional but real apprehension and assent
- c concerned with a solution of living: not abstract living but living in a world, with others, in a technical civilization; study critique of personal relations, of technical society
- d concerned with concrete possibility of that living at its highest point; ultimate self-affirmation -constitution in relation with transcendent, as person, Thou (Marcel), with my Existenz as awareness of self as gift given to self (Jaspers)
- per* e concerned with history: as everyone, philosopher responds to problems of age; his specific character is to respond to these com on problems at deepest level, at point of maximum consequence for human welfare or human disaster
Jaspers: primitive cultures; organized civil.; Achenzeit; present as momentous as discovery of fire tools speech; old ways relentlessly being dissolved; masses; one world history
- f the philosopher is open: by definition, going beyond horizon based on dread; philosophers his educators qua obscure, for such obscurity is revelation of my blind spots, my horizon
- g the philosopher has to be genuine; not talking beyond his own horizon, devaluating the currency, collapsing the great into a narrow horizon world
- h philosophy has to be relevant; not analytic propositions; not analytic principles with a per se relevance, that is per se only because fact of horizon overlooked; not relevant to man in general, but to me in my age and those with me
- i philosophy can only illuminate; it looks not to a theoretically compelled assent, but to a free conversion; one cannot be another do his thinking judging deciding living for him

Horizon and History.

1. An enlargement of the significance of the existential gap. Not merely a matter of a difficult and doubtful technique in the study of the totality of philosophies, but a critical issue within the historical process. Existential gap is not merely a call to authenticity of subject in his private existence; it is a call to authenticity in all subjects, an invitation to understanding at a critical moment in human history, a summons to decisiveness, an exploration of the techniques of communication. (Existentialists write novels, plays).

History: as total field of human operations in this life.

2. Begin from notion of dialectic.
Familiar: dialectic of an idea; eg dialectic of rigour: exclude casual insights; axiomatization; paradoxes; new basis.
Unfamiliar: dialectic of a reality, of man, of history.

Still, if dialectic of an idea, there is some dialectic of man, of history

Not of man as what recurs by reproduction; no transmission of acquired characters.

But of man as technical, social, cultural; for in these respects, what man is, results from man's ideas on man.

Man as technical, as using tools: not merely satisfies animal necessities, but creates human environment, the city, the state, as a totality of material products facilities

Man as social, as organizing and organized; institutions such as family, education, economic system, political system, ~~economic~~ systems of alliances and enmities

Man as cultural (culture in anthropological sense): the current effective totality of

immanently produced and symbolically communicated contents of imagination, emotion, sentiment; of inquiry, insight, conception; of reflection, judgment, valuation; of decision, implementation.

In these respects man a presupposes nature but b makes himself by taking thought.

Man as technical social cultural is difference between aggregate of babies born and abandoned in jungle and the aggregate of human beings ~~man~~ operating in a civilization.

3. The Objective Functioning of the Dialectic.

a There is a circuit, a mutual causation, in man's making of man as technical social cultural

The objective situation (technical social cultural) is at once a product of and an occasion for

imagination, sentiment, emotion; inquiry, insight, conception; reflection judgment evaluation; decision policy implementation

b As product, the objective situation ~~reveals what man~~ objectifies, reveals, what ~~xxx~~ man has been feeling thinking deciding about man.

As occasion, the objective situation suggests and motivates changes in what man has been feeling thinking deciding

3 con'd.

c In so far as there is an effective existential gap, an operative limited horizon,

the situation as product will objectify and reveal the existential gap in overemphases and oversights

but the situation as occasion will be powerless to suggest and motivate the correct solutions, remedies, as long as existential gap remains;

hence, situation progressively deteriorates; more and more liberal use of useless solutions, remedies

in the limit, either existential gap is closed, or else the civilization liquidates itself.

4. Resolute and Effective Intervention in the Dialectic.
participates

a Everyone ~~interacts~~: everyone contributes to the production of human situations; everyone has to respond to the human situations in which he finds himself.

Still such ~~interaction~~ participation may be mere drifting: one does not understand what is going on; one has no clue as to what is wrong; one has no idea what one could effectively do about it.

Man as historical, man as making man, ^{is in a dream land} is beyond man's horizon.

b Resolute and effective intervention presupposes subjects in which the existential gap has been closed;

else they will merely increase the confusion and accelerate the doom.

Resolute and effective intervention means that these subjects do not remain within an ivory tower admiring their own deeper profundity, the incomprehension of the mass of men

c Resolute and effective intervention heightens the operation of the dialectic.

The situation objectifies the existential gap; intervention crystallizes the objectification; it is there; it is obscurely evident to everyone; but it is not articulate, it is unexpressed, it is not effectively noticed

The situation suggests and motivates the necessary changes in the subject; intervention clarifies the suggestion and ~~it~~ drives home the motivation; clarifies, by linking old errors with present evils; drives home, to ~~xxx~~ retain errors is to perpetuate evils.

Intervention constitutes the correction by communication:
' what man felt thought decided made things as they are
' different feelings thoughts decisions will make them different
' communication results in different feelings thoughts decisions

5. The Essence of the Dialectic.

a Lies in a conflict between what man is, is to be, and what man feels thinks he is, is to be.

Objectification is of what man thinks; but the objectification is also a revelation of overemphases and oversights, in so far as there is a conflict between man's plans for himself and what man really is

Revelation is motivation for change, in so far as what man has made of himself is in conflict with what man really is

b The dialectic then does not operate within the field of concepts and judgments, terms and propositions; it is not based on a conflict between opposing philosophies.

It is based on a conflict between any defective philosophy (implicit or explicit) and what man really is, is to be.

c The verdict of the dialectic is not a label of approval on a philosophy;

it lies in the facts of the situation, in its tensions, its basic hopefulness, its ultimate desperateness, its stimulus to affirmation or its imposition of nihilism

(nihilism: don't care; what happens to me, to man, could not mean less than it does to me)

Still the facts are significant only to those whose horizon does not preclude knowledge of what it is to be a man

If the facts are not significant, then they are destructive of societies; because the effective horizon continually forces a misinterpretation of the facts.

6. In first lecture, concluded that there exists a valid and important field of inquiry concerned with subject in his immediacy, obnubilation, capacity for change, authenticity, freedom, responsibility.

Now must further conclude that ~~an~~ such a field is also relevant to man as technical social cultural

History is concerned to bring to light ~~the~~ man as he really is; hence to study this generalized existential field is to get to the heart of historical process

Again, study of horizons eliminates the horizon that keeps man as historical beyond one's field of vision.

6.

Situation : \approx Order determined by fixed essences in hierarchy

Kairos : what it is up to us alone to do alone

\approx limit on possible action set by nature/ethics

Charity : love neighbour; not judge higher values in order

order \equiv personal relations

order \equiv

mechanical	Structure
metaphysical	

legal

Tension

CMCT

Horizon as the Problem of Philosophy

1. De facto there exist many horizons; this is also de iure since man makes man (generation, technique, society, culture) and within these limits man makes himself if he chooses or drifts into what he happens to be if he fails to choose.
2. This multiplicity may be considered
as a mere matter of fact: history of culture, thought, opinion
as a problem to be explained: Psychologie der Weltanschauungen
as an issue calling for judgment, decision: philosophic issue
3. The multiplicity of horizons as philosophic issue arises when we ask
 - a Is some horizon the field, or is there no field?
 - b If some horizon is the field, how can it be determined?

To deny that there is a field, is to deny that philosophy has a positive content; still that denial is itself philosophic though perhaps unconsciously so

positivism: let's do science
pragmatism: let's experiment, see what happens
scepticism: let's inquire some more
relativism: there are no definitive answers, just pts of view

To affirm that there is a field, involves one in the second question which is at once ontological and epistemological

It is ontological in its consequent: beyond such and such a limit there is nothing to be known and so no indocta ignorantia; it settles where reality ends, where meaninglessness begins.

It is epistemological in its antecedent: to define the field raises the question of the truth of the definition; and the definition is true in virtue of known evidence; what then is the evidence? This evidence is of some reality; hence ontological also in antecedent

4. The simultaneity of E and O is intrinsic to the positive answer.

Simultaneity: E as antecedent; O as included in antecedent, though not O as formulated in consequent. It is the antecedent ontological evidence or "ontic" evidence that in existentialism gives rise to metaphysics. In detail:

a Any determination, justification, evidence for a horizon, arises within a stream of consciousness and so arises within what already is constituted as a horizon

b The justification of the horizon cannot rest on the consequent ontology, on the realities known ~~ix~~ within the horizon, for then every horizon would automatically be self-justifying; and that is the negative solution.

c It cannot rest on the norms, invariants, principles that de facto characterize, determine, constitute any given horizon; for again on that showing, every horizon would be self-justifying.

d It has to involve a discovery of the evidence, norms, invariants, principles

that naturally, ontically, possess a cogency, inevitability, necessity, normativeness

that thereby constitute a self-justifying horizon, stream of consciousness, and so field

that none the less admits the possibility of other horizons, through the whole gamut of human differences

that accounts for the actual existence of these differences at least in principle

that account for them in such a manner that at the same time it discredits them, reveals them to be, not self-justifying, but self-destructive

that discredits them in such a manner that none the less their actual occurrence remains possible, plausible, convincing

e The prior reality that both grounds horizons and the critique of horizons and the determination of the field is the reality of the subject as subject

It is not any object known objectively and it is not the subject known objectively, for all objects are known within some stream of consciousness and so within a horizon; and it has been contended that such objects cannot justify any horizon without thereby justifying all horizons.

It is the reality of the subject as subject: for the subject as subject is both reality and conscious

the subject as subject is reality in the sense that we live and die, love and hate, rejoice and suffer, desire and fear, wonder and dread, inquire and doubt

it is Descartes' "cogito" transposed to concrete living

it is the subject present to himself, not as presented to himself in any theory or affirmation of consciousness, but as the prior presence (non-absence) prerequisite to any presentation, as a priori condition to any stream of consciousness (including dreams)

The argument is: the prior reality is not object as object or subject as object; there only remains subject as subject; and this s as s is both reality and discoverable through consciousness

The argument does not prove that in the s as s we shall find the evidence norms invariants principles for a critique of horizons; it proves that unless we find it there, we shall not find it at all.

What is meant by "science"?

1. Question arises from problem of integration.

a Not any answer will do: the answer must

- a) account for the Ar concept of science
- b) account for its transformation into a modern concept of science
- c) provide a norm that will make possible a critique both of the ancient and the modern concepts
- d) provide a key for the problem of integration

b no use consulting authorities

- a) anonymous authority of English usage: obviously unequal to the task
- b) genuine authorities, with names and reasons for what they say: La crise de la raison dans la philosophie contemporaine, Desclee 1960, E Barbotin J Trouillard R Verneaux D Duxbury S Breton
- c) in any case we should need reasons for accepting or rejecting what authorities say; best find out what reasons are.

2. Procedure | Answer

- a) experience: what happens when one learns science, makes discoveries = (1) learn something (2) attend not only to what is learnt but to the learning process, the decisive event in learning
- b) formulate the experience (1) descriptively (2) theoretically
- c) objective theoretical context: logic method metaphysics met-psy
- d) subjective theoretical context: subject, acts, structures of action

3. Experience

- a) why is this plane curve perfectly round
- b) Euclidean scandal: not non-Euclidean geom but defective proofs
first problem: equilateral triangle
theorem: external angle greater than interior opposite
- c) why mathematical, symbolic logic
- d) Gödel and parallel theorems: unless trivial, either incomplete or incoherent. J. Ladrière, Les limitations internes des formalismes, Louvain about 1957.

4. Aristotelian-Thomist formulation of experience

a) Appeal to experience exists

Sum theol I 84 7. quilibet in se met ipso experiri potest...
Sum theol I 88 1: secundum Aristotelis sententiam quam
magis experimur .. secundum modum cognitionis
nobis expertum
C Gent II 76 §17: homo enim abstrahit a phantasmatibus et
recipit ~~in~~ mente intelligibilia in actu;
non enim aliter in notitiam harum operationum
venissemus nisi eas in nobis experiremur

b) Hence not analogous but proper knowledge; not as blind man's knowledge of seeing and colour; human knowledge of angelic intellect; we know our own intellects, intellective souls, by their acts.

Sum theol I 88 ² 3m: anima humana^a intelligit se ipsam per suum intelligere, quod est actus proprius eius, perfecte demonstrans virtutem eius et naturam
In III de Anima, lect 9, § 724: Unde et supra Philosophus per ipsum intelligere et id quod intelligitur scrutatus est naturam intellectus possibilis

c) Technique formulated for introspective study

In II de Anima, lect 6, §§305-308 (lect 1 ss, definition of soul; now definition of specifically different souls)
A. Objects. B. Acts. C. Potencies. D. Essence of soul.

Regularly employed by Aquinas: ST I 87; De Ver 10 8; C Gent II 75 III 46 -- TS VIII(1947), 61-73

d) Object defined (1) logically (2) metaphysically

Logically: Post Anal II, 1 ss: 4 qq. ti&dia ti; syllogism
equivalence: what is eclipse; why is sun darkened in this manner

Metaphys Z 17: what is a man, house: dia ti ti estiv. ousia.
physis. protov aitiouv tou eivai.

Difference between knowledge of material and immaterial
Z 17: announced 1041a 7ss; given 1041 b 9s.

Proper object: quidditas sive natura in mat corp existens I 84
Only analogous knowledge of angels, God: Sum theol I 88
Solution to ontological argument I 2 1: we don't know quid sit

e) Aristotelian and Thomist Logic Metaphys Rat-Psych are conceived in functional relation with experience of insight, knowing cause

Ar physics (a) brilliant (b) agst Ar's own principles.