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3 The basic contentions of Hume and Kant make clear what is meant by this transcendence and immanence. Hume ended his study of perception with the conclusion that causality was not given in experience. By experience he meant what has here been termed pure presentation. The pure presentation does not contain causality but only succession. We do not see one man causing the death of another; what we see is the sword in the hand of one going through the body of the other. In reading Hume, Kant was awakened from his dogmatic slumbers; he granted Hume's contention that cause was not presented; more, he felt that substance and other terms did not represent what was presented in the strict sense, what was simply appearances, phenomenon. Then, he went a step further; since these terms did not represent transcendent knowledge, they must be due to the immanent activity of the mind, to the understanding of what was presented, to a grasping of the *ratio intelligibilis* of the thing – a *ratio* that was not presented, that could not conceivably be presented.

4 Hence, the idea of substance has become the trial case, the *experimentum crucis*, between the dogmatic and the critical schools. For if understanding is ultimately apprehensive, then 'substance,' what lies beneath or stands beneath the appearances, must be had by apprehension: this is the Scholastic position. On the critical theory, the substance is known by an immanent activity and so is not apprehended but merely understood to be there; clearly, this corresponds exactly with our knowledge of substance; we do not know what it is – as we would if we had ever apprehended it; all we know is that it is there.

5 Of course, it does not follow that subscription to the main contention of Hume or to the initial moment of Kant's thought implies either Hume's phenomenalism or the lumber of categories and antinomies – invented by Kant but hardly ever believed by anybody. Undoubtedly there are consequences to such subscription or acceptance; but what they are is to be decided not historically but logically. Meanwhile, the evidence in favour of the critical view is not limited to the obscurity of the Scholastics' spiritual apprehension, or to the correspondence between (*men*) the critical theory of our knowledge of substance and (*de*) what we *de facto* know about it. Verification of the hypothesis may be found all over philosophic inquiry. Such verification, and at the same time, a fuller and more detailed account of the hypothesis is our next concern.

## III

First, we may consider an argument from the name. There is a connotation to the word 'understanding,' suggestive that by understanding we know what is not presented. The same connotation may be found in the French 'entendement,' the German 'verstand,' the medieval 'intus-legere,' the Greek 'epistemi.'

The classical illustration of the intellectual act is light. This is very apposite for an immanent act. For as light does not add new features to the presented object but simply makes the features of the object actually visible, so intelligence does not add new features to the sensible presentation, is not a supervening, spiritual apprehension, but only serves to make the sensible features intelligible, or understood, or interpreted. What else can be meant by the traditional phrase 'intellectus agentis est illuminare phantasmata' I have been unable to fathom. *Viderint sapientiores.*

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A different use of the simile of light is found in the words 'clear,' 'evident,' 'luminous,' 'perspicuous,' 'elucidate,' 'illuminating,' etc. This refers to the peculiar experience, the subjective reaction as it were of mind, to the act of understanding. For as understanding is preceded by wonder, as Aristotle noted for all time in the opening lines of his metaphysics, so it is followed by its proper satisfaction. This may be illustrated by the parallel appetite and satisfaction of apprehension. The desire to apprehend we call curiosity. The satisfaction of apprehension, in its intenser forms, we call aesthetic pleasure, when the apprehension wants to prolong itself into contemplation: such was the experience attributed by Keats to Cortez when he describes him as gazing fixedly, eagle-eyed, at the Pacific. Curiosity and wonder are both conspicuous in children who have not only a 'Let-me-see-it' complex but also a passion to know the 'why' and 'what for' and 'how it works' of everything. The intenser forms of the pleasure, the joy, or still less grossly the light, of understanding are found in the student who has traced trains of influence in the drama of history, unraveled the mysteries of mathematics, or in philosophy catches unsuspected relations that link together into a harmony what else was but a bleak and insignificant plurality. Similar to the last are what we call lights in mental prayer. Still more profound is the 'Light that enlighteneth every man coming into this world' and the illumination for which Our Lord blessed St Peter, to whom his divinity was revealed not by flesh and blood but by 'my Father who is in heaven.'

This light or evidence has close relations with truth in the intellectual order. Truth in the order of apprehension simply has normality as its criterion; its evidence is its palpableness, and the opinions of the colour-blind or of the tone-deaf are disregarded because the majority of men look upon this minority as abnormal. But intellectual truth has for its stamp and criterion this evidence. Evidence in itself is subjective; but evidence bears witness to truth, shows that the evident way of understanding is objectively the right way. We accept a theory, a way of understanding, as objectively the right way (i.e., as true) because it explains, illuminates, interprets, synthetizes, all the facts. The emphasis is on the fact of explanation; 'all the facts' are important because, unless all the facts are included, then the evidence of the theory will be destroyed when the incompatible fact receives attention. Then the explanation will not explain.

Hence the definition 'veritas est conformitas intellectus et rei' may be considered unsatisfactory. As applied to truth of presentation, it is probably false; things are not what they seem, but eddies in the ether or whirling electrons. As applied to truth of understanding, it is meaningless for it only asks the understanding to be conformed to itself. However, if it means, as it does not, that in truth the way of understanding is objectively the right way, the way the thing should be understood, then this *conformitas* is acceptable.

We go a step further in our inquiry by discussing the Kantian synthetic judgments a priori. It is no answer to the Kantian position to assert that 'ens contingens habet causam' is an analytic judgment, that the subject implies the predicate. There is no dispute over the point (at least from the point of view of the hypothesis here proposed). What may be disputed is the origin of the implication. An *ens contingens* must indeed have a cause; but why? Because otherwise its existence could not be understood, would have no sufficient reason. There must be a sufficient reason, else we should be utterly unable to understand. We must be able to understand, else reality is not per se intelligible. The dispute over synthetic judgments is whether the decisive element comes

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from the presentation, from the subject transcending itself, or from the immanent activity of the subject, from the subject's demand to understand. It seems obvious that the latter is the case. [Handwritten: I.e., 'ens contingens' the concept implies a cause: granted, but is the concept a compound of presentation – transcendent, and understanding – immanent. If it is such a compound, then the fact of the

implication proves nothing to the point. The Scholastic has to prove a spiritual apprehension; he doesn't and I do not think he can. See also back of page 8. <sup>1</sup>

This introduces the critical problem. What justification is there for the subject's demand to understand? Why may we presuppose that evidence, a subjective experience, the illumination that comes of having things explained, should be an ear-mark of truth, that is, of the way things-in-themselves (so distinct from our minds) should be explained? First, let us state Kant's error. Kant suffered from the obsession that the only possible justification was some sort of spiritual apprehension of the thing-in-itself – a presentation and not a mere understanding of the ratio intelligibilis of the object. Since such a presentation was not to be had and, in fact, may be all but meaningless if carefully examined, Kant decided that there could be no theoretical justification for a demand to understand. Metaphysics had to go by the boards; we have no right to understand; all that we have is a practical need of understanding, so as to be able to carry on the dull business of daily life. We may use our heads for practical purposes since there is a practical justification; we may not use them for theoretical purposes, for a discovery of the eternal verities, since there is no theoretical justification.

[Handwritten: Distinguish (1) understanding that, (2) understanding what or how or why; (1) is a substitute for apprehension, (2) is sui generis, unique. Kant's error seems a confusion of (1) and (2). This is the same error as the scholastics!]

Hegel indicated the germ of the solution by positing an identity of intelligence and reality. His interest in theory made him give the upper hand in this identity to intelligence; for him, the world is the idea gaining consciousness of itself and unfolding itself according to thesis, antithesis, and higher synthesis. This is all very nice for the theoretical side of things, however misty, but what happens to the practical? Feuerbach solved this by turning Hegel's house upside down. He asserted the identity of intelligence and reality but gave the upper hand to reality, in particular to material reality. Hence the Marxian materialist dialectic necessitating communism, also Lenin's unity of theory and practice, the basis of Bolshevism.

Now, though an identity of intelligence and reality is the solution, it does not follow that this identity need be verified in the actual world. A radical and

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<sup>1</sup> [Back of page 8: ens contingens: contingent = not its own explanation, sufficient reason

Ens contingens habet causam = A thing that is not its own sufficient reason must have some other thing as its sufficient reason. Obviously, a direct application of the principle that reality must be intelligible.

Hence the infinite series of causes is no explanation since there has to be an explanation for the series.]

fundamental identity is quite sufficient, the theist as opposed to the monist position. This sets up a pre-established harmony (I do not mean a psycho-physical parallelism) which makes the intellect of man apt to understand in the right way, and so justifies the demand of the subject to understand, gives a sufficient reason for the axiom 'ens et intelligibile convertuntur.' Once such a reason is supplied, the Kantian position against theoretical thought falls to the ground, and as well the acceptance of understanding for practical purposes is rationalized.

Plato's expression of this ultimate identity of intelligence and reality is in the myth of recollection (anamnesis). Socrates is using his heuristic method upon a slave, who first tends merely to guess but under the pressure of Socrates' questions elicits the acts of understanding necessary for grasping the geometrical theorem under discussion. The procedure here, as always in the heuristic method, is simply a recognition of the fact that understanding is an immanent act, that the teacher cannot understand it in public, so to speak, that the best way to get the pupils to understand is by asking them leading questions. The point to note is not that the slave knew geometry in a prenatal state (for which no evidence is given) but that the slave was able to understand geometry, i.e., to know what was not presented, what could not be presented. Strip the imagery off Plato's myth of anamnesis and we are left with an assertion of the ultimate identity of intelligence and reality.

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... concrete is model, exemplar, paradigm, and the like. [Arrow to margin, where the following is handwritten: All art is an idea in the concrete. The art critic deals with notions and always complains that he cannot do justice to the work of art. E.g, Shakespeare.] Since there is no actual understanding but only a reference to it unless something is actually being understood, we have here an explanation of the need of phantasm, of diagrams in geometry, of experiments in physics. Parallel to this is the need of illustration in oratory and exposition, of the importance of similitude, parable, analogy in gaining ideas of things unseen. The last brings us to the most profound example of the idea in the concrete, the Incarnation; in the words of St John, *kai ho logos sarx egeneto*.

It is worth noting what a thoroughgoing application of this principle is the *Spiritual Exercises* of St. Ignatius. And while on the point, one may mention how well the theory of intellection as an immanent act fits in with a philosophy of mysticism; the mystical experience is sui generis because it is an experience, a transcendence, of the soul as soul and not merely as united to the body. The uniqueness of this

experience is the more readily understood, if our theory of ordinary knowledge does not postulate spiritual apprehensions.

Returning to less elevated topics, we may observe that on the one hand the Scholastic theory of abstraction seems to require nothing more than a concentration of attention upon the common features of similar objects. Just what the spiritual apprehension has to do with the matter of concentrating attention is not quite clear.

[Marginal: If one tries to think of the spiritual apprehension as separate one gets the ridiculous Aristotelian interpretation of Plato as holding 'universalia a parte rei.' The very argument Aristotle uses against Plato (tritos anthropos) is used in one of Plato's dialogues by Parmenides against 'young' Socrates, i.e., Socrates gets over that notion in his youth. Cf. *Plato's Theory of Ideas* by Stewart, Oxon.]

Plato, in speaking of the idea as separate or separable (choriston), may very well have been no more than referring to the idea as such, the abstract idea separate and distinct and entirely different from the pure presentation which it informs. His intellectual place (noetos topos) may be no more than a metaphor for what we with other metaphors describe as the intellectual order, the intellectual level, the intellectual plane.

A brief discussion of language is here appended to expedite later discussions in logic and metaphysics. Language is a system of vocal gestures and has as the unit gesture the sentence. This unit, which alone makes complete sense, is composed of words. Words have a triple significance, as follows: (1) Objective reference to experiences, presentations, interpretations, either as members of a class or to the class taken collectively. (2) Word function: what part of speech a word is. (3) Sentence function: the function of the word in the sentence; thus, subject tells what we are speaking about, predicate tells what we wish to say of subject. The relations between these three are somewhat complex; we shall touch upon only a few pertinent points.

In word function, we may note the distinction between noun and adjective, which has close relations to the Scholastic distinction between substance and accident. The noun (common as opposed to collective and concrete as opposed to abstract) denotes an intellectual grouping of phenomena, our understanding them as constituting but a single unit, a thing by itself, a thing in its own right, an *ens per se* (substance plus accidents). The adjective primarily denotes the mere phenomenon, the appearance, whether quality, relation, action, passion, etc. The abstract noun is the adjective fulfilling the normal function of noun, i.e., being subject; e.g., heat is

a vibration. The verb is the adjective fulfilling the sentence function of predicate; commonly, when what is denoted is action or passion, the verb form is historically prior to the analytically fundamental adjective form, e.g., the boy sings. Suffixes are regularly added to adjectives to make them fulfill the function of a noun; to have them fulfill the function of predicating, a special verb is used when the language has not ...

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... *cum fundamento in re. Ens rationis* means noumenon, act of understanding, the laws and principles we apply in arguing about spatial relationships, (in its developed form) a geometry. But the Scholastic cannot get beyond the idea in the concrete to the idea in the abstract; hence he will speak of real and possible and imaginary (ideal) space; these are not the idea of space but the material in which the idea (laws, principles, etc.) are verified. Similarly for time. The idea of time is an act of understanding that unifies into a single succession all the successions and sequences of changing objects; it is the universal applicability to the world of our experience of one simultaneity with its prior and posterior; the Scholastic confuses this idea or law of temporal relationships with the concrete in which the law is verified or symbolized; hence, *tempus est numerus et mensura motus*.

The critical theory does not explain space or time as facts. It will tell you that you have apprehensions or experience of them; it will tell you how you understand these apprehensions or experiences either by distinguishing parts in these continua and relating the parts or by taking the continuum as a whole and relating it with other things (e.g., explaining time as a condition of change or explaining space as the condition of sensible knowledge and mechanical action). It will not explain the continuum as such, but it will tell you why it cannot be explained, viz., because it is a unit, and a unit cannot be explained.

The foregoing part of critical metaphysic is deductive, a deduction from the necessary intelligibility of the objective world. (The discussion of space and time does not strictly belong to this part, since it involves a discussion of specified experiences or presentations.) Insofar as the critical metaphysic is a view or theory of reality, it is more pronouncedly positive and inductive; it takes advantage of all human understanding or science of the objective world and is, in the theoretic order, a science of sciences. The particular sciences begin from the facts of a particular sphere; they discover empirical laws, i.e., actual relationships, concomitances, etc.; they then endeavor to explain, to make intelligible, to give the reason why of the empirical law. Thus, Tycho Brahe tabulated the facts; Kepler

discovered that the orbits of the planets were ellipses by studying Brahe's tables and making hypotheses. That the planets move in ellipses is an empirical law, an objective relation but unexplained; Newton explained why they moved in ellipses by his theory of universal gravitation. Critical metaphysic takes the explanations arrived at in every field of science – physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, history, ethics, etc. – and frames a unified view of reality in its totality.

Let me adumbrate as well as I can what would be its theory of substance.

In the first place, our apprehension of the object is not formal but causal. Geny in his *Critica* discusses the issue and holds to a sort of formal apprehension called *perceptionismus integralis*; he avows, nonetheless, that he would accept the *causaliter* view if he could be certain that it was free from Kantian implications. Having met Kant on his own ground, a critical metaphysician would have no reason, therefore, for rejecting the *causaliter* theory.

The substance, therefore, is not only what unifies the different appearances of the object and makes it an *ens per se*, a thing by itself distinct from other things; it also is the cause of the appearances. In other words, the appearances are the substance manifested to us sensibly. Hence there is no real

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distinction between the substance and the appearances, that is, there is no real distinction between substance and accidents as the Scholastic theory requires. For example, the white of the object is not something objectively different from the object itself; white is what the object appears to be to the eye.

(Thus, in the Holy Eucharist, the species are what the Body and Blood of Our Lord appear to be despite the fact of transubstantiation and in virtue of a miraculous interposition of God.)

Again, not only is the substance the cause of the appearances but also it is the explanation of its action and reaction. Being the cause of the appearances and the explanation of action and reaction are not being two things but one thing. These two are both *intrinseci modi, expressiones conceptus unius eiusdemque realitatis*; they proceed from the understanding. This is a priori and applicable to all interpretations of substance. A posteriori we may remark that being the explanation of action includes being the explanation or cause of sensation (insofar as sensation is caused by the object perceived and not by the subject perceiving).

The action of the substance and its reaction is according to intelligible law; this follows from the principle of the intelligibility of reality; but the human race progresses in understanding and at any particular time it may have to be content with few or many, vague or precise empirical laws. This is the uniformity of nature of the scientist. The principle of intelligibility cannot be shown to be absolute in its application to the actions of things; it is therefore sufficient if the uniformity of nature, when violated, is violated in an intelligible manner (i.e., by a superior cause and for a sufficient reason). Hence the possibility of miracles.

This idea of the law of the object corresponds to but differs from the Scholastic idea of essence, for the notion (classification, methodology) enters into the Scholastic idea of essence.

The law of the object is distinct from the fact that the object exists. This distinctness is due to the nature of our knowledge. For the fact of existence is known by the apprehension; the law of the object is known by understanding. Knowledge consists of a conjunction of presentation and understanding into one whole; the pure presentation of experience and the pure intellection (abstract idea) are the *entia quibus* of knowledge (human). This distinction the Scholastic theory objectifies by a real distinction between essence and existence; it puts the composition, not in the mind, but, in some very obscure way, in the object. Whether the critical metaphysician will assert such a real distinction or not, I shall discuss presently. But if he does, it will not be due to the distinction in the mind but only on the analogy of this distinction and as a theory to explain definite facts.

Substances are of different kinds. Perhaps lowest is the physical unit whose action is only mutual. [The following is marked 'Omit': Aristotle's *nihil movetur nisi ab alio movetur* belongs to this sphere or level of being. It does not stand in that form, however, but rather as Newton's third law of motion, that to every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. Motion is not caused by a mover; it arises from the mutual influences of two physical units. Aristotle's theory is a vicious circle, a progress *in infinitum*, or a postulate of a motionless mover, which does not square with his principle since to move you must move and your moving requires a mover. Moreover, motion is defined not as mere movement but technically as a change of velocity. The states of rest or of motion with an uniform velocity are similar; they are not changes but the negation of change.]

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... reality. In fact, natural religion as it has existed always tends to be an answer to these questions and a solution of these needs; in morality it holds some middle course between naturalism and humanism, which are not its antecedents but its consequents when an age of faith and action has yielded to an age of achievement and doubt. The will of the gods is at once man's naturalistic good (for there is a possibility of retribution) and an expression of the cosmic plan. Such religion may degenerate into a matter of statecraft as in the Sumerian cities and ancient Egypt, into naturalistic excess as in the fertility cults and Dionysiac rites of the peasant peoples, into a crystallization of barbarism in the gods of war, the sky-gods honored by the tamers of horses.

And besides the gods of the poets and of the state, the gods satisfying personal requirements and sanctioning social order, there are the gods of the philosophers or prophets who represent an element in religion that was never absent but by *them* [margin: i.e., the philosophers and prophets] is specialized and brought into distinctness. Such is the religion of the Egyptian who wrote the conversations of a man with his own soul amidst the desolation of the Middle Kingdom's social revolution, of the pastoral Job proclaiming the immortality of the soul, of the prophets of Israel specially inspired by God to bring back the people to the ways of righteousness and truth, of the mystic Socrates and the speculator Plato. In these we have a glimpse or a vision of a religion that transcends the humanism whether of Stoic or of more subtle Buddhist, that foreshadows the *aner pneumatikos*, the new man that is to envelop and assimilate the old, the man born not of blood (the human animal), nor of the will of the flesh (*aner sarkhikos*), nor of the will of man (*aner psychikos*), but of God.

The humanism of Stoic or Buddhist is in itself and if we only consider the life of apprehension and understanding, of assent and consent, a rounded theory. It is the life of a man, were man not also an animal and in a society, were man made to live unto himself and by himself finding his proper activity within himself and not made to live in a lower order while tending to a higher. It is a theory that fits an aspect of the facts, their most intimate aspect, but does not take into account either the material of the activity of man nor the telos of that activity. It would produce a perfect man, a Stoic *sophos*, an enlightened one (Buddhist), were the *aner psychikos* not an unstable and incomplete being. This inadequacy of humanism makes it incredible as a philosophy to the majority of men, while its adherents, when they do not fail in their practice, are cold in their relationships, indifferent to the lot of humanity in the concrete, haughty in their self-sufficient isolation, preachers perhaps but not men of action (cf. the traditional idea of Indian indolence or such figures as Thrasea in the Roman Empire), and ultimately vacuous and