

**[NOTES ON] THE OBJECT OF THE TREATISE ON GRACE
AND THE VIRTUES¹**

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[Introduction]

1. The word ‘grace’ (Boyer, *Tractatus de gratia divina*, 2nd ed. [Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1946] 6-7; *Dictionnaire de la Bible, Supplément*, III, 714-59).

(a) Favor, benevolence: ‘to find favor with someone’;

(b) Gift given out of benevolence;

(c) Recompense to the benefit received: to be grateful; to give thanks;

(d) Appearance, comeliness, beauty: deceptive attractiveness and vain beauty.

2. The thing itself: it is Christ’s life communicated to us gratis. John 6.57-58, 15.1-8; Ephesians 2.1-10.

3. This life of Christ is not only the life of Christ as man but is the life of Christ who is also God.

Because Christ is God he possesses the beatific vision so that he knows himself as God, and charity by which he loves himself as God.

Hence this life of Christ in us is a certain participation in the divine nature.

Charity on earth, the vision in heaven. [*In margin*: operations follows beingl.] See 2 Peter 1.4.

1 [The pages that follow comprise an English translation by Michael G. Shields of the Lonergan archival document LP II-19, A 162 (www.bernardlonergan.com 16200DTL040). Apart from the words in brackets, the title is Lonergan’s own. Next, the page numbers that appear in brackets throughout the text are editorial interpolations indicating the present order of pages of the archival document. Third, Lonergan’s own handwritten additions are indicated either by use of the *Monotype Corsiva* font or by explicit mention. Editorial interpolations occur within brackets. Finally, the section numbers are also an editorial interpolation. The titles and subtitles of the numbered sections are Lonergan’s own.]

4. This life is above our nature, for it is the life of a man not as man but as a man who is also God.

Hence faith is superior to reason, charity is superior to the natural love of God, the meritorious work of eternal life is superior to the natural merits of humans, and the beatific vision is superior to the limbo of the unbaptized infants.

Just as the man Christ Jesus is God through the hypostatic union, so does the Christian share in the theandric life of Christ through sanctifying grace, from which flow faith, charity, and merits.

5. This life is grace, a gift given out of benevolence.

(a) Because we are sinners: Ephesians 2.1-9.

(b) Even if we were not sinners: because grace is above nature, it is not needed by us either constitutively (I am still human without this life) or consecutively (I can function as a human being without this life) or exigently (this life is not owed to mere mortals but to him alone who is not only man but also God).

6. This grace is both healing and elevating. It is healing in that it revives fallen nature by taking away our intellectual darkness, weakness of will, the propensity of the flesh towards sin; it is elevating in that it confers the life of Christ upon us, communicated to us and shared by us.

Distinction: [Boyer, *Tractatus de gratia divine*], pp. 22, 23-72 [chapter 1, 'De necessitate gratiae sanantis'], 72-117 [chapter 2, 'De necessitate gratiae elevantis,' to the end of article IX].

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Since everything that God has conferred upon us is given to us gratis, we make the following distinctions of the term 'grace':

uncreated: God;

created: finite being, contingent (NOT out of nothing of himself or of a substance)

in a broad sense: natural things

in the strict sense: in the order of the beatific vision, charity, merit, faith;

given gratis: for the good of the Church (prophecy, miracles, discernment)

rendering pleasing [to God]: for the sanctification of individuals;

as healing: counteracting the effects of both original and personal sin

as elevating: conferring the life of Christ, participation in divine nature

habitual: sanctifying grace, the root of elevation; the consequences of elevation; the infused virtues; the gifts of the Holy Spirit;

actual: directly regarding human actions;

interior: illumination of the intellect, inspiration of the will

external: preaching, education, etc.

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1 The Importance of this Treatise

From the end of our Society:

Summary of the Constitutions, Rule 2: ‘The end of this Society is not only to devote ourselves to the salvation and perfection of our own souls with God’s grace, but with the same to devote ourselves earnestly to the salvation and perfection of others.’²

² [See *Statuta Congregationis Generalis xxviii: a restituta Societate VIII, 8 Septembris-21 Decembris 1923* (Romae: Apud Curiam Praepositi generalis, 1924) 231.]

One who has the life of Christ is saved; and the more one possesses this life, the greater is one's perfection.

Accordingly, it is in order that you may know the end of your vocation as the salvation and perfection of yourselves and that of others, that this treatise on grace is being presented.

From the principal means:

As above: 'with God's grace', 'with the same.'

Summary of the Constitutions, Rule 16: 'Let all who belong to this Society devote themselves to the pursuit of solid and perfect virtues and spiritual things, and let them consider these to be of greater importance than learning or other natural human gifts; for the former are those interior things from which efficacy must flow to external things for the end proposed to us.'³

From the priesthood which you desire and are preparing for:

A priest, an *alter Christus*, who puts on Christ for his personal sanctification and offers Christ in the name of Christ and of the Church for the living and the dead.

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2 The Analogy in this Treatise

DB 1795, 1796 [DS 3015, 3016; ND 131, 132]

Twofold order of knowing

by principle: natural reason

divine faith

by object: that which natural reason can attain (philosophy)

mysteries hidden in God

Theology:

3 [Ibid. 234.]

principle: reason illumined by faith (seeking earnestly, devoutly, seriously);

object: the intelligible ordering of the mysteries (in response to intelligence)

from their connection with one another;

from their analogy with the natural order.

Natural reason is to its object or philosophy as God is to the mysteries.

This intelligible ordering, therefore, is imperfect. Theology is a science, not simply so called but in a qualified sense.

2.1 *What, then, is the analogy of nature?*

(a) It is religious psychology.

For a science that is about life is psychology; but [theology] is about our life in Christ; therefore it deals with religious psychology.⁴

About the soul in general: the first act of an organic body.

About the soul in particular: about the objects, acts, potencies, and from the diversity among potencies to diverse essences of the soul and diverse perfections of the potencies.

Similarly, about sanctifying grace, the virtues, the gifts, actual graces, illumination of the intellect and inspiration of the will.

(b) There are related questions regarding providence and divine governance.

On the distribution of grace;

On the operation of God in natural operations;

On the relationship between grace and freedom.

4 [It is possible that what Lonergan has in mind by this reference to ‘religious psychology’ in connection with the analogy of nature is the use medieval theologians made of Aristotle’s metaphysical psychology in the theology of grace. The next several lines in this section would support this interpretation. But possibly relevant is A 24, www.bernardlonergan.com, 24000DTEL30, notes on religious psychology that Lonergan wrote either in the 1930s or in the 1940s.]

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3 The Way of Proceeding

1. As in every science, so also in theology there are the two questions that have to be dealt with concerning each individual matter, namely, Is it? and What is it?
2. But since theology is a science unlike the others, since its principle is not natural reason but reason illumined by faith, these questions are answered differently in theology than in the other sciences.
3. In a natural science and in philosophy the question, Is it? is answered either by appealing to the witness of the senses or by reference to principles that are self-explanatory.

In theology, however, the question, Is it? is answered by reference to the documents of the faith.

Take, for example, the question whether we participate in the life of Christ. We do not go to our interior religious experience for an answer. True, one may say with St Paul, 'I live, now not I, but Christ lives in me' [Galations 2.20]; but someone else may say that he never had such an interior experience.

But we address this question from the documents of the faith, that is:

- (a) from the revealed word of God, written or by tradition;
- (b) according to the mind of the Church, which is the guardian and interpreter of the deposit of the faith, from whose authority the Church Fathers and theologians have their authority since they appeal not to their own ideas but to those sources that express the mind of the Church;
- (c) according to how this revealed word of God is understood by the Fathers;
- (d) according to the consensus among theologians.⁵

4. There is a *prior* difficulty concerning the question, What is it?

⁵ [In the archival typescript, Lonergan's original ordering (a), (c), (d) and (b). He indicated by hand that the order should be changed.]

The question, What is it? is twofold. First it is answered by a nominal definition, subsequently by the essential definition. Compare a straight line and a circle. $\sin i = m. \sin r$, and Why?

An essential definition proceeds from an act of understanding. 'To understand' is what is frequently found in bright people but rarely in the slow-witted.

Knowledge is the first act towards understanding. It is the habit whereby one understands promptly, easily, and with delight; it is that which is deficient in a learner, for a learner understands slowly and with difficulty and considerable effort.

Do not confuse knowledge with the object of knowledge (the known, Science) or with the signs of knowledge, such as demonstration, certitude, etc. These signs can be quite deceptive, since they are demonstratons 'that' and not 'because of,' and empirical certitudes derived from the senses or from faith. One can study philosophy, biology, chemistry, physics without understanding anything. One can know about many things but know nothing, and repeat words, like a parrot.

5. In theology is there science in the true sense of the word?

(a) There is some fruitful understanding in it, DB 1796 [DS 3016, ND 132].

One arrives at an intelligible ordering of the revealed truths both from their connection with one another and from the analogy with nature.

This is a most fruitful ordering. It remains throughout life. Scriptural texts, the writings of the Fathers, the councils, the statements of theologians easily slip out of one's memory; but understanding of revealed truth remains; it is a habit, a second nature, as it were. See priests and pastors concerning Sacred Scripture.

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(b) This understanding is not transformative but penetrative.

It is not transformative: see DB 1800 [DS 3020, ND 136].

The reason for this is that [the natural] sciences proceed from sensible data that are first understood in one way and then in another way: Ptolemy, Newton, Einstein. Transformations occur because sensible data as sensible are not things but rather are as the material element of things. Through understanding we come to know forms, and in this way understanding grows.

Theology, on the other hand, proceeds not from experiential data but from truths, from what are already constituted by matter and form or by form alone.

Thus in progressing and increasing, theological understanding does not change the truth itself but penetrates more deeply into the understanding of the truth, its intelligible ordering, and its implications.

(c) This penetration is not perfect and complete but imperfect and incomplete. DB 1796 [DS 3016, ND 132].

The reason is that the principal object of theology is God. If we do not know what God is, what he is in himself, our theological understanding is deficient in respect to its principal and central concern.

To know what God is, of course, is to understand God as he is in himself, and that is the beatific vision.⁶ This vision is not granted to us in this life.

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3.1 *Commentary on Boyer's Tractatus de Gratia Divina, Prooemium*, § 1, I, 3^o.⁷

‘The objective connection of things favors St Thomas’s order [in the *Summa*.]’

One wonders whether the order of exposition matters much.

[Thesis 1]

Theological knowledge is an intellectual habit whereby one understands in first act and therefore can clearly, distinctly, coherently, and in an orderly way expound

⁶ See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 12; 1, q. 2, a. 1 c. at end.

⁷ [See Boyer, *Tractatus de gratia divina* 5-6.]

truths revealed by God, considered both in themselves and in their connection with natural truths.

[Terminology]

habit: a relatively stable quality.

intellectual: existing in a human intellect

Beware of the modern way of speaking of Science with a capital S. A science is something in someone's mind; it is that act by which we can tell the difference between bright and slow-witted people.

in first act: one who knows a science does not always understand his science in second act. He is different, however, from a learner in that he can promptly, easily, and with delight understand in second act, whereas a learner understands in second act slowly, with difficulty and considerable effort.

The eye is to eyesight as the intellect is to science as the understanding. There is this difference, that eyesight is produced naturally while science is obtained from a teacher and principally from the light belonging to the agent intellect.

Just as nature, with the help of a physician, produces health, so the light of the intellect, with the help of a teacher, produces scientific knowledge.⁸

Therefore, one can first speak an inner word and then an outer word, and does so because one understands. I can define and order and judge insofar as I understand; otherwise I am a parrot.

To understand and to speak: it is an illusion to believe that one understands yet cannot speak; it is a deceptive but specious beclouding of the mind, not science.

revealed truths, etc.: an improper expression: for science is defined not through an immanent object (truth) but through a transcendent object (the real).

⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate*, q. 11, aa. 1-4.

To avoid difficulties, namely those that appear when concerning the act of faith, which in some way excludes and in some way admits understanding. See DB 1795, 1796 [DS 3015, 3016; ND 131-132].

The sense is: the purpose of theology is to understand scripture and tradition, i.e., to be able to embrace and view in one intelligible grasp all that is to be found in that twofold source.

All phenomena are to physical sciences as all of revelation is to theology.

Conclusion:

Theology, like any other science, is acquired only by protracted study.

Acquiring it is like going up a circular staircase: attaining it is like being high up, and the intellectual view from there must take in everything in order to correctly understand any part.

Basically, then, it matters little where one begins.

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4 States of human nature⁹

The plan, possible or actual, of divine providence according to which human nature considered concretely is directed to a determined end by determined conditions.

plan, concept, design: possible or actual. Some states, therefore, are merely hypothetical, others actual and historical.

human nature considered concretely: all human beings.

end: that for the sake of which something is or is being done.

end of the operator: apprehended good moves the desire; it is an efficient cause.

⁹ See Boyer, *Tractatus de gratia divina* 14-19. [Lonergan includes another handwritten reference with a name difficult to decipher but which may be 'Garrigou,' and a page 18. Even if it is Garrigou-Lagrange that Lonergan is referring to here, the editors have been unsuccessful in tracking down the text Lonergan is referring to.]

end of the work: a good to which is directed what is or is being done; it is the final cause.

supernatural: that which exceeds the proportion of a nature.

absolutely: that which exceeds the proportion of any finite substance.

relatively: that which exceeds the proportion of a certain substance.

natural: in accordance with the proportion of a nature.

determinate conditions: before sin or after sin; with or without the perfect submission of the sentient part to the rational part.

For a natural end:

of pure nature: nature with all that follow from it;

of integral nature: with the addition of spontaneous submission of the sentient part to the rational part.

For a supernatural end:

of original justice: grace, perfect submission, other gifts;

of fallen nature: sin and the rebellion of sense;

of repaired nature: grace and the rebellion of sense.

We pose the question about the states of nature because grace is defined as a gift unowed to anyone.

Grace: a gift conferred out of benevolence.

grace in the broad sense: a gift absolutely unowed, owed on the supposition of a nature.

*grace in the strict sense: a gift unowed both absolutely and on the supposition of a nature: it does not belong to the constituents, the consequences, or the exigencies of a nature **in the present state of nature**.*¹⁰

grace as elevating: leading to the vision.

grace as healing: counteracting the ills of fallen nature.

10 [What is in bold in the text is underlined in the original typescript.]

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[Thesis 2]

Acts elicited with elevating grace are entitatively supernatural.

supernatural: exceeding the proportion of human nature, even integral nature.

entitatively: not only extrinsically, from circumstances or from the end alone;

nor only in its manner;

but by reason of ontological perfection.

elevating grace: exceeding the proportion of human nature, even integral nature.

That habitual grace is intrinsic is theologically certain.¹¹

This opinion is at least the common opinion, perhaps theologically certain

Proof

(a) From the proportion between cause and effect – *relatively supernatural*.

If the acts were not entitatively supernatural, elevating grace would not be physically, absolutely, and antecedently necessary; but it is; therefore ...

(b) From the same – *absolutely supernatural*.

Meritorious acts are proportionate to eternal life, which consists in the supernatural beatific vision; therefore ...

There is proportion, so that there may be true justice.

(c) Being is divided into act and potency; that is, potency is posited in the same species as that of the corresponding act, and vice versa; [e.g.] eyesight and seeing.

But infused habits are to meritorious acts as potency is to act; therefore since infused habits are entitatively supernatural, so also are acts.

[They are so] *relatively or absolutely, according to the teaching about habits*.¹²

11 See Boyer, *Tractatus de gratia*, Thesis XIII, part 1 [pp. 152-61. The first part of the thesis reads, ‘Gratia habitualis non est merus favor extrinsecus Dei, sed est donum animae inhaerens et in ipsa physice permanens’].

'The supernatural and natural differ by reason of their entitative perfection.' - *To say this is to say nothing and not know that one is saying nothing. Pure verbalism. Being is essence according to its proportion to existence.*¹³

And they are specified by their formal object.

That is, this entitative supernatural perfection is not unknowable but corresponds to the perfection of the formal object *that is knowable per se*.

Just as a sentient act and an intellectual act and a volitional act correspond to their formal object, so also does a supernatural act.

Suárez is quite right on this point.¹⁴

Aristotle, Aquinas: essence is known through potencies, potencies through acts, acts through objects.¹⁵

Proof

1. *To say that they differ by reason of entitative perfection is to utter empty words.*
2. According to Vatican I the analogy of the natural contributes to a fruitful understanding of the mysteries.

If there is an analogy of nature, then acts are specified by their formal object and this is a fruitful understanding.

If an act is not specified by its object, it is unknowable to us; there is no analogy of nature, and absolutely every avenue to any understanding, even minimal, is blocked.

12 [In the archival typescript, the three remarks in *Monotype Corsiva* are inserted in the left margin, next to parts (a), (b), and (c), respectively, of the proof.]

13 [At this point in the archival typescript, this remark is inserted on the right side of a space between '... pariter ad actum' and 'Et specificantur ...']

14 [Boyer quotes Suárez as follows: 'nihil aliud est quam evertere principium illud de distinctione actuum ex obiectis, et totam philosophiam, quae docet motus et omnia, quae habitudinem ad aliud essentialiter includunt, sive praedicamentalem sive transcendentalem, habere speciem et consequenter distinctionem a terminis, vel obiectis, quae respiciunt, nam inde habent aliquo modo suum esse et consequenter etiam distinctionem.' A reference for this text is given at the bottom of p. 88.]

15 [See Lonergan, *Verbum* 4-5, 87-89, 138-40, 150.]

Objection against those who have the right opinion: they do not know what is the formal object in singular acts.

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4.1 Boyer, *Tractatus de gratia divina, Thesis v, pp. 72-82*.¹⁶

elevating grace: a special help, permanent or transitory, by which man is directed to his final supernatural end, and therefore it exceeds the proportion not only of fallen nature but also of pure nature or integral nature.

eternal life: that life about which Christ frequently speaks in the gospels. Elsewhere it is shown to be the beatific vision: DB 530 [DS 1000, ND 2305]; it is supernatural, DB 1786 [DS 3005, ND 114]

meritorious act: a human act by which a man acquires a strict right to a reward.¹⁷

grace is necessary: this opinion is defined, DB 812 [DS 1552, ND 1952]; cf. DB 105, 160 [DS 227, 330; ND 1903].

the necessary grace is elevating grace: this is theologically certain, DB 1516 [DS 2616].

The whole system of Michel Baius [1513-1589] can be deduced from the contradictory of this position, DB 1001-1080 [DS 1901-1980].

A. *The necessity of grace for meriting eternal life.*

We suppose:

(a) that eternal life is a reward for our good works;¹⁸

(b) that what is given as a reward for our works is not directly and immediately

grace: it is either owed out of justice or is a gift. Romans 11.6.

16 [Thesis v (*Tractatus de gratia divina* 75) reads: ‘Actus meritorii vitae aeternae elici non possunt sine gratia elevante.’]

17 See Boyer, *Tractatus de gratia divina*, p. 346, regarding the fact, and p. 344, on the notion of condign merit, which requires some proportion between the work and the reward.

18 Ibid. 346- 348.

We note:

(c) What is given as a reward for our good works, although it is directly comparable to those works, is not grace (see above, b); nevertheless absolutely speaking it can be grace, that is, if those works are done out of grace.

For the cause of a cause is a cause of that which is caused. And whatever causes something to have a certain quality possesses that quality itself and to a greater degree.

Eternal life is the reward for deeds done; but these deeds are meritorious because of grace; hence absolutely speaking eternal life is grace.

We argue:

If eternal life is grace, either this life is given apart from any debt arising from our works, or if it is given because of our works, then those works themselves are from grace.

But eternal life is grace: Romans 6.23; and it is not given apart from any debt arising from our works.¹⁹

Therefore our meritorious works themselves are from grace.

Read Romans 5.12 - 6.23; see John 15.1-8.

We add:

The necessity for grace to perform meritorious works is physical, absolute, and antecedent.

John 15.5; DB 812 [DS 1552, ND 1952].

antecedent: because we cannot;

absolute: because we simply cannot;

physical: because *it is required for each individual act*.²⁰

B. *The supernaturality of the grace by which we perform meritorious acts.*

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ See M. J. Rouët de Journal, *Enchiridion Patristicum* (EP), series 308.

(a) This is strongly suggested in several texts: gift of the Holy Spirit, Romans 5.5; in the flesh and in the Spirit, Romans 8.8-9; sons and heirs, Romans 8.15 ff.; gratuitous call, Romans 9, particularly 9.16; new creation, 2 Corinthians 5.15-17; participation in the divine nature, 2 Peter 1.4; EP series 353, 354-61.

(b) Proof: that in which nature is deficient is a weakness in nature; but concerning meritorious works nature is physically, absolutely, and antecedently deficient; therefore ...

major premise: nature denotes a principle that is proportionate to the performance of a work;

minor premise: from the first part of the addition (above).

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5 How the effects of sanctifying grace are understood.

Κοινωνία της θείας φύσεως, 2 Peter 1.4: 'Participation in the divine nature.'

nature: an intrinsic principle of an act in that in which there is the act.

Participation in the divine nature is *neither* the full possession of the divine nature, so that the participants would be God, *nor* a mere imitation of the divine nature such as is necessarily found in any creature (for possible beings are grounded in the divine essence as externally imitable), *nor* it is some supreme and most perfect imitation that nevertheless, since it does not exceed the formality of a created nature, does not confer participation in the divine nature, *but* it is intermediate between God and the perfection of a creatable substance. What it is must now be considered.

First, then, to know God as he is in himself and to love God as one friend loves another are acts that by nature belong to God alone. For God as he is in himself cannot be known through any created *species*,²¹ and therefore such knowledge cannot pertain to a

21 See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 12

creatable substance in any order. Besides, friendship supposes a certain equality among friends, and no creature by nature possesses any equality with God.

Secondly, in heaven the beatific vision naturally results from the light of glory, and actual charity results from infused charity. Besides, in this life infused charity naturally results from sanctifying grace, and after death, provided one perseveres in charity to the end, so also does the light of glory. There exists, therefore, a natural proportion among sanctifying grace, infused charity, elicited acts of charity, the light of glory, and the beatific vision. Accordingly, since the act of the vision and the act of charity by nature appertain to God alone, sanctifying grace, which is proportionate to these acts, must rightly be said to be a participation in the divine nature.

It is the remote intrinsic principle of those acts that by nature appertain to God alone.

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1. *That the Holy Spirit is given to the just – De fide.*
2. *That the other divine persons are also given - De fide.*
3. *That this gift is produced in us only through a finite effect - common and certain opinion.*
4. *That this created effect is not 'that which is God given to us' but 'that by which God is given to us.'*
Common and certain opinion.
5. *That that 'by which God is given to us' is sanctifying grace.*
6. *That sanctifying grace has its properties from the fact that it is 'that by which God is given to us.'*
Life – mystical body ... participation in the divine nature ... regeneration ... filiation.
7. *That sanctifying grace has its properties from the fact that it is 'that by which the Holy Spirit is given to us.'*
8. *That sanctifying grace is produced by all three persons equally.*
9. *That sanctifying grace is more assimilated [?] and therefore regards rather the Holy Spirit to whom this effect is appropriated.*

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What is contingently predicated of God as he is in himself exceeds the order of what is naturally knowable [by us].

[beatific] vision

hypostatic union

charity

sanctifying grace

This introduces a new metaphysical category, namely, finite actuation by infinite act.²²

either substantially denominating – ‘this man is God’

or accidentally denominating – [a] friend in act [b] vision in act

or relatively and extrinsically denominating - inhabitation.

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6 The Supernatural Order:

1. Supernatural: that which exceeds the proportion of a nature

proportion of a nature: substance is to existence [esse] as accidental potency is to operations.

nature: is constituted through substance;

it is consequent upon existence [esse];

from it flow accidental potencies;

by it are required external conditions under which for the most part operations according to nature are performed.

2. Is that which belongs to nature neither constitutively nor consecutively nor exigently.

3. Is divided into:

²² [See Lonergan’s reference to ‘finite actuation by infinite act’ in ‘Notes on the Grace of Justification and the Indwelling of the Holy Spirit,’ 16000DTE040 (translation) p. 62.]

(a) *uncreated*: God himself as given to us as a gift – e.g., Romans 5.5

It is called ‘supernatural’ because in God there is no real distinction between substance or nature and existence; therefore God, in a way, lies outside of and above nature.

(b) the *created supernatural* is divided into absolutely supernatural and relatively supernatural:

absolutely supernatural (supernatural without qualification): that which exceeds the proportion of any finite substance, created or creatable; supernatural in this sense is necessarily an accident.

relatively supernatural (supernatural in some respect): that which exceeds the proportion of this or that particular nature.

In this way rational operations exceed the proportion of the lower animals; sentient operations exceed the proportion of plant life; and so on.

In this way healing grace exceeds the proportion of fallen human nature, though not of pure or integral human nature.

In this way elevating grace, although it is absolutely supernatural, nevertheless as proven in [Boyer’s] thesis 5 exceeds the proportion of human nature, even integral nature.

In this sense the author [Boyer] in thesis 5 speaks of ‘supernatural as to substance,’ that is, of the supernatural that exceeds the proportion of a human substance.²³

23 [See Boyer, *Tractatus de gratia divina* 73. The author adds a footnote reference to another of his works: ‘Vide definitiones et divisiones supernaturalis in tractatu *De Deo creante et elevante*, p. 238.’ The reference is to the third edition, Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1940. On p. 239, Boyer writes: ‘*Supernaturale quoad substantiam* illud est quod dat *intrinsicam proportionem* ad finem ultra debitum, seu

4 A different division, especially by regarding acts:

(a) *extrinsic supernatural*: that which is in a relative or absolute supernatural order, not by reason of an internal property but by reason of something extrinsic.

Thus, what is materially related to the supernatural order, e.g., human nature itself

Also, what is instrumentally related to the supernatural order, e.g., the word uttered by the human voice in preaching the gospel

Again, circumstances or an end as extrinsically denominating an act

(b) *intrinsic supernatural*: that which is in a supernatural order by reason of an internal property, by reason of an entity by which it is constituted; this is subdivided as follows:

modally supernatural (supernatural in manner): intensity, duration, frequency, ease, enjoyment, etc.

substantially supernatural (supernatural in substance): supernatural in the essence, from the very definition that expresses the essence.

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5. Note:

(a) The extrinsic supernatural is also said to be modally supernatural. The reason is that the manner of any entity is derived from other factors with which an entity is connected in some way.

(b) The substantially supernatural is understood in different ways by different authors. Those who are more thoroughly steeped in a certain Christian positivism hold that the substantially supernatural consists in a certain entitative perfection that is known only through revelation; that is, they acknowledge the fact and therefore use the expressions ‘substantially supernatural,’ ‘entitatively supernatural,’ ‘intrinsically

ad finem qui excedat proportionem naturae. Est igitur supernaturale ratione causae *formalis*.’ (Italics in original.)]

supernatural.’ But they are unwilling to think or understand any further, and in this way avoid all difficulties.

Those, however, who have more thoroughly grasped the principles of sound philosophy reject that factitious entitative perfection that is per se unknowable and assert that the substantially supernatural is substantially supernatural because the substance or essence itself, as known by its definition, is supernatural.

From this position it follows that even the formal object of an act must be supernatural; this gives rise to further problems to be solved, namely, what the supernatural formal object would be in particular cases.

(c) Sometimes (e.g., *Summa theologiae*, 2-2, q. 171, a. 2, ad 3m) ‘supernatural in substance’ refers to the property of the uncreated supernatural, and ‘supernatural in manner’ denotes the created supernatural.

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7 Merit²⁴

The Pelagians exaggerated the notion of merit. They held that either eternal life was dependent upon our merits or, if from grace, then that grace itself was given according to our merits.

This notion was overly minimized by the Protestants. We have, they said, no merits; all we do is sinful; and the teaching of the Catholics weakens the merits of Christ, as if the merits of Christ were insufficient by themselves without our added merits.

Kantian philosophy and the modern mentality is opposed to all notion of requital: it is unworthy of a rational human being to do what is good for the sake of reward and avoid doing wrong from fear of punishment. It is against the dignity of God to be angry at sins and punish sinners.

²⁴ See J. Rivière, ‘*Merite*,’ *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique (DTC)* X (19), 574-785.

Here are some texts from scripture that lend support to the Protestants and the moderns:

Luke 17.10: ‘When you have done all that you have been ordered to do, say, “We are useless slaves.”’ A useless slave deserves nothing.

Romans 11.35: ‘Who has given a gift to him, to receive a gift in return?’ All we can do is to pay our debt to God; to acquire more merit so as to place God in our debt is absurd.

Job 35.7: ‘What does he receive from your hand?’ God gets nothing from us for him to pay us back.

Romans 8.18: ‘The sufferings of this present time are not worth comparing with the glory about to be revealed to us.’ Therefore, at least no condign merit.

Romans 6.23: ‘The wages of sin is death, but the free gift of God is eternal life.’ Therefore at least eternal life is not a wage or merit, but grace.

Jesus constantly condemned the legalism of the Pharisees and their confidence in their own merits. See the parable of the Pharisee and the publican, Luke 18.9-14.

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7.1 *The Notion of Merit*²⁵

1. In the broadest sense, merit is a work worthy of requital.

A work is worthy of requital inasmuch as:

- (a) it proceeds from free will
- (b) it is done either for the benefit (utility, honor) or to the detriment (loss, dishonor) of another.

25 [What follows are three accounts of the notion of merit in which there is considerable amount of repetition, particularly in the first two accounts. The third account (§7.1 [*ter*]) covers points made in §7.1 and §7.1 [*bis*] and adds further points. The repetition suggests several attempts by Lonergan to formulate or arrange much the same material.]

If the first condition is lacking, we cannot speak of recompense; if the second condition is lacking, there is no reason why one should recompense the one who did the work.

Requital can proceed from sensitive principles, such as love, for the sake of the utility or convenience of another, or from anger, hatred, and so on.

But this is not the sole or the principal reason for requital.

Just as a work done for the benefit or the detriment of another proceeds not only from natural principles, metaphysical or physical, but also from free will and free choice, so also the consequences of the work are to be expected not only from natural principles but also from free will and free choice.

For just as the law of causality renders intelligible an ordering of things proceeding from natural principles, so also the law of requital renders intelligible the ordering of things proceeding from free will.

This intellectual law concerning requital reveals itself in the natural law, in the spontaneous inclination to render something good for a good deed and something bad for a bad deed.

Just as the other inclinations can be perverted by sin, so also can requital, which nevertheless remains good and right and reasonable both in itself and most of all when God is the one who judges and requites.

And so are solved the difficulties of the moderns regarding the notion of requital. 2. Still, there remains a special difficulty regarding requital on the part of God, for (a) God receives nothing and is immutable, (b) God has dominion even over free wills and therefore obtains what he wants without offering rewards or making promises and threatening punishment.

Briefly, God, in a way, stands outside the order of merit and requital as to essences. He enters into the concrete, existential, personal order.

This difficulty apparently proceeds from a false conception of God as requiring.

God wills the order of things: this intelligible order of things proceeds from God's infinite intelligence; hence St Thomas teaches that God's justice is truth.²⁶ Therefore God wills that there be reward for good done and punishment for evil, since he wills an intelligible order of reality.

Besides, in God there is entitatively only one act of will. Hence one divine volition is not caused by another divine volition, as if God wills A to exist because he wills B; this one act of the will has many ordered terms, and so God wills A to exist because of B.²⁷

From what we have said, there exist true personal relationships among God the Father, the Son the Redeemer, the Spirit of Love and rational creatures. They are present in the concrete, personal, existential order of doctrine and religious experience. It is not just a cold realization of the abstract order of justice.²⁸

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7.1 [bis] Merit

1. In the broadest sense, merit is 'a work worthy of requital.

(a) A work is worthy of requital inasmuch as:

it proceeds from free will;

it is done for the benefit (utility, honor) or to the detriment (loss, dishonor) of another.

(b) Requital is consonant with reason.

²⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 21, a. 2 c.

²⁷ Ibid. q. 19, a. 5 c., at end.

²⁸ [Johannes] Lindworsky – *Die Vertiefung des Gottesgedanken*. [Johannes Lindworsky (1875-1939) was a Jesuit well known for his writings on experimental psychology. He also wrote on the training of the will and on the psychology of Christian asceticism. Lonergan refers to this author and to this title twice (see note 31 below). The editors, however, have been unsuccessful in tracing this particular piece of writing.]

Just as the work itself proceeds not only from metaphysical and physical causes but also from free will, so consequences of the work are to be expected, not only from the natural effects of the work but also from the free will.

Therefore requital is an intelligible law which is to the ordering of those things that proceed freely from a choice made just as the law of causality is to the ordering of natural things.

Requital, then, is not to be ranked among the relics of a primitive, antiquated, and depraved morality.

Nor does it proceed only from a sensitive impulse or from a purely utilitarian calculus.

But inasmuch as it proceeds from the sensible element, it must be said to pertain to the natural law, such as the jealousy of a husband concerning the love of his wife.

(c) Still, recompense is not to be conceived as a cold realization of an abstract order.

There are certain things that are not completely understood as long as they are considered in the abstract. Such are all that in recent times have attracted special attention under the name of personalism and existentialism.

Concrete persons are involved in the essential meaning of requital. Requital does not mean only some intelligible relationship between the work done and its recompense; it means, rather, the intelligible relationship between a person who freely does some work either to the benefit or the detriment of another and, on the other side, the person who receives the benefit or detriment intended for him and requites the doer accordingly.

(d) Finally, a special difficulty arises when we try to conceive concrete relations between God and creatures. Do not think of a personal God as being another creature existing within the order of equality.

God does not will A because he wills B; rather, he wills A to exist because of B.²⁹ One act of God's will does not cause another, but God's unique volition causes the order of reality and also the order of requital in accordance with the notion of justice as truth.³⁰

And yet there do exist personal, concrete relationships between God and rational creatures, between us and God the Father, the Son the Redeemer, and the Spirit of Love.³¹ But these are understood not so much through abstract analysis as through religious experience, spiritual life.

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7/1 [ter] Merit

1. In the broadest sense, merit is a work worthy of recompense.

A work is worthy of recompense inasmuch as:

(a) it proceeds from the free will, and

(b) is done to the benefit (utility, honor) or the detriment (loss, dishonor) of

another.

The intelligible order of reality calls for such requital. For just as a work done to the benefit or detriment of another proceeds not only from metaphysical or physical principles but specifically from free will, so its consequences are to be expected as proceeding not from metaphysical or physical principles alone but also from free will.

These, therefore, are to be considered: the doer and the one who requites; the will of the doer and the will of the one who requites; the work or deed done and its requital.

Thus merit denotes an intelligible relationship in the moral order of the work freely done to the requital freely made.

²⁹ See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 19, a. 5 c.

³⁰ Ibid. q. 21.

³¹ Lindworsky, *Die Vertiefung des Gottesgedanken*. [See note 28 above.]

2. In a stricter sense, 'merit' means worthy of a reward; a bad merit is called 'demerit'; and henceforth.

3. Merit is further divided into aptitudinal (in first act) and formal (in second act).

Aptitudinal merit is a work considered according to its aptitude for being rewarded, but prescinding from the intention and the acceptance of the rewarded.

Strictly speaking, aptitudinal merit is not merit itself so much as an element or part of merit. That abstraction is illicit which prescinds from those formalities that enter into the very definition and understanding of a thing.³²

Formal merit means a good work received by another that is worthy of reward. This reception can precede or follow performance of the work.

Compare the principle that the value of merchandise derives totally from the estimate of the buyer.

4 Merit (good, formal) is further divided into merit absolutely speaking and merit in a qualified sense.

Merit absolutely speaking is had when the work to be rewarded is not owed to the rewarded on any other title. Such is the case in contracts between free and equal persons.

Merit in a qualified sense is had when the work to be rewarded is owed to the rewarder on another preexisting title. This is the case in works done by a servant for his master, by a son for his father, or by a creature in the service of God.

The formality of merit remains in merit in the latter sense because a person does what he ought to do by his own free will.³³

In this case, the acceptance of the rewarded is contained in foreordaining, or commanding, of the work.

32 Thomas Aquinas, *In Boethium de Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 3 c

33 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1-2, q. 114, a. 1, ad 1m

Where God is involved, do not suppose that God wills A because he wills B; God only wills that A exist because of B, that is, God wills rewards because of good works. God wills merit in that he wills an intelligible moral order.

A meritorious work under another aspect and in another order is rather the payment of a previous debt than a title to a subsequent reward.

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5. Merit (good, formal, qualified) is further divided into condign merit and congruous merit.

(a) Merit is condign when according to a just estimation there exists equality between the work and the reward.

Distinguish quantitative equality (in buying and selling) and equality of proportion (for example, as a son by adoption is to the work, so is God to the reward).

Equality of proportion is sufficient for a reward to be owed out of justice. Still, this debt is not said to be owed out of the full rigor of justice, but according to that by which the estimation of what is just regards not only the work and the reward but also the doer of the work and the rewarder.

Nonetheless, there is required in qualified merit a preordination, a promise, and the reception of the work in order that a reward be owed out of justice.

(b) Congruous merit means that there is no equality between the work and the reward, but that there is some congruity for the work to be recompensed by some reward.

For example, if one has tried to do some good work for the benefit of another but through no fault on his part, through lack of strength or some other reason has not done a condign work, it is congruous that he be recompensed by some reward.³⁴

³⁴ [At the end of this sentence, Lonergan has 'Lennerz' in parentheses. It is possible that he had in mind Henricus Lennerz, *De gratia redemptoris* (Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1940) 295-96.]

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8 The Opinion of the Augustinians and of Fr de Lubac

1. (a)³⁵ The Augustinians [Giovanni Lorenzo] Berti (1696-1766), [Henry] Noris (1631-1704), and others taught that God has to destine man to a supernatural end, not on account of any perfection or exigency on the part of human nature, but because of the fairness³⁶ of the Creator.

(b) This opinion has never been condemned by the Holy See; indeed, those who wanted it condemned seem to have been rebuked by the Holy See.

(c) Fr [Henri] de Lubac has recently defended this opinion in a very learned book,³⁷ very historical but without much theoretical elaboration.

(d) In Fr de Lubac's view, the notion of *natura pura*, 'pure nature,' ought to be utterly rejected: the Church Fathers and earlier theologians knew no such thing as pure nature. There is no exigency on the part of man, for there is nothing in man but what God himself has put there. Hence all talk about an exigency of man with respect to God is ridiculous. A personal God, who is charity and love itself, would never create a rational personal being without at the same time destining that creature to that personal union which consists in the beatific vision.

(e) Fr [Cyril] Vollert, in the June issue of *Theological Studies*,³⁸ doubts that de Lubac has proven his opinion from the Fathers. Fr. [Charles] Boyer³⁹ adduces arguments

35 [There is no 'a' in the typescript. The editors have added it.]

36 [Latin *decentia*: i.e., what is only right and fitting (*decet*) for the Creator to do.]

37 [Henri de Lubac, *Surnaturel: Études historiques* (Paris: Aubier, 1946).]

38 [Cyril Vollert, 'Review of *Surnaturel: Études historiques*,' *Theological Studies* 8 (1947) 288-93.]

39 [Charles Boyer, 'Nature pure et surnaturel dans le "Surnaturel" du Pere de Lubac,' *Gregorianum* 28 (1947) 375-95.]

from the Fathers against de Lubac: the Fathers teach that a creature is by its nature a slave but is made an adopted son through grace.⁴⁰

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8.1 *Is Pure Nature Possible?*⁴¹

1. Pure nature is understood as human nature taken collectively and concretely – the entire race sprung from certain progenitors and developing in simultaneous and successive solidarity (contemporaneous and historical) – as destined to a natural end and, at least for the most part, actually brought to that natural end.

(a) Included in this notion, therefore, are nature itself with all its requirements and consequences, the order of the universe, a natural *concursum*, direction towards its end, religious life that is perhaps more intense than it is at present generally considered to be, and the leading of the greater part of humanity to that natural end.

(b) Excluded are the absolutely supernatural gifts, both habitual and actual, as well as other preternatural or relatively supernatural gifts that really are such, that is, those that are not required in order that the majority of men be brought to their natural end.

(c) Whether pure nature means that which is left to its own natural powers can be gathered from what has been said above.

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2. 'Possible' can be understood in a number of ways.

(a) The negative criterion is the absence of an internal contradiction, that is, the absence of conflict between the elements of a definition or their consequences.

40 [The remainder of p. 21 of the typescript consists of 19 lines which are crossed out.]

41 [Pp. 22-29 of the typescript are numbered 1-8 and are the only pages of the document with numbered pages, suggesting perhaps that they may have been inserted from another document.]

This criterion is required, but is not sufficient. What satisfies the requirement is called ‘negatively possible.’ What is possible only negatively is in fact impossible.

(b) The positive criterion is intelligibility.

Intelligibility is what is known through understanding; to understand is an operation that occurs more frequently in intelligent persons and more rarely in the dull.

Everything that is possible and only what is possible is intelligible, and indeed truly intelligible; for what appears to be intelligible in those who are in error is not intelligible in itself, is erroneously deemed possible, and is in fact impossible.

(c) Possible is divided into logical and real.

The logical possible is that intelligibility that is validly introduced as an instrument for forming concepts. For example, the axes of coordination used in mathematical conceptualization are possible in this sense.

The real possible is that intelligibility that is not only validly conceived but is also affirmed to be possible in reality.

(d) The real possible is divided into abstract and concrete.

The abstract real possible is that which can truly exist in reality, so long as concrete possible conditions are added.

Note: ‘Condition’ here is taken in the broad sense as referring to everything that needs to be added [for something to be able to be]; thus it can include a suitable purpose, God’s will, and so on.

The concrete possible is that which includes all that are required and suffice for it to be able to exist in reality.

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3. The question is whether pure nature is possible not only negatively but also positively, not logically but really, and not abstractly but concretely. In other words, we ask whether God can create a human nature without elevating it to the absolutely supernatural order.

(a) This concrete possibility is not proven from the fact that the element of supernaturalism has to be preserved. For as long as pure nature is logically possible, the formality of supernaturalism is preserved.

We presuppose this logical possibility. It is granted, for example, by Fr de Lubac, in stating that pure nature is a useful concept.⁴²

On the contrary, Fr Boyer wrongly argues to an affirmation of the possibility of pure nature from the necessity of the notion of nature.⁴³ This sort of argument proves only its logical possibility.

(b) This concrete possibility is not proven from the fact that there is an abstract possibility.

Abstract possibility of pure nature can be deduced from the fact that humans actually exist, that human nature exists. For to the extent that pure nature and actually existing human nature coincide, there is an abstract possibility of pure nature. But the question is about the possibility of subtracting from actual human nature those elements that are not in accord with pure nature and the possibility of adding to a nature that has been so deprived those elements that accord with pure nature.

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4. For several centuries the concrete possibility of pure nature has been commonly taught by the majority of theologians. But now doubts have arisen about this possibility, and for three reasons.

(a) The Fathers and the earlier theologians say nothing about pure nature.

42 [‘... il est possible, croyons-nous, de montrer que cette idée de “pure nature,” telle que l’entend la théologie moderne, est une idée systématique, légitime sans doute et peut-être utile, mais récente ...’ de Lubac, *Surnaturel* 103.]

43 [See above, note 39.]

(b) Self-transcendence is something natural to man: just as the other species are said to have evolved from lower to higher forms, so it is clear that within the very nature of man there exists a tendency to rise to a higher and more perfect state.

(c) God is love. It seems impossible that God would create a rational personal being without leading it to mutual supernatural love.

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5. As for the first of these arguments, it must be granted that the Fathers and the theologians in the early Church had not systematically developed a notion of any pure nature. But from this one cannot conclude that pure nature is contrary to Catholic tradition.

After all, there is such a thing as development in theological speculation: such development could not have existed if the further elaboration of doctrine through theological speculation had never been permitted.

Besides, in the Fathers and the earlier theologians there are found certain notions that prepare the way for a systematic elaboration of the notion of pure nature. Such, for example, would be the patristic doctrine that a creature by its very nature is a slave but becomes an adopted son through grace.

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6. The second argument calls for a more thorough consideration. What we have to determine are: what self-transcendence means, in what way is this self-transcendence natural, and how it differs from supernatural elevation.

(a) Man is self-transcendent inasmuch as he has a rational nature.

Through knowledge man in some way apprehends being in its totality: he knows material things through their proper *species* or form, and immaterial beings through a

form not their own, in other words, analogically.⁴⁴ But one who knows all being knows beings that are both inferior and superior to oneself, and to the extent that one does so one transcends the limits of his own nature.

Besides, one who has a knowledge of all being can also contemplate the actual order of the universe and conceive of other possible world orders, both inferior and superior to the present one. But in conceiving of a universe which one judges to be better than this one, one can desire the actualization of this superior universe.

From this you can gather what the human capacity for self-transcendence is: by one's conceptions and desires one can imagine and wish for another world order in which humankind would be raised to the highest possible perfection.

(b) Three points are to be noted here:

Because it is arrived at by knowing and desiring things that are naturally knowable and desirable, from which it is clear that this self-transcendence is natural, this conception of a better world order is hypothetical: it is not grounded upon things themselves but upon their mere possibility. Also, in making judgments about possibilities, a human being, however wise, does not possess certitude; it takes a virtually infinite intelligence to make a certain judgment about a concretely possible world order.

Secondly, because this conception is hypothetical, and also because man ought to obey God's will, the desire for a better order is doubly conditional: firstly, it is conditioned by the fact that man does not know for sure that this better world is a concrete possibility; secondly, it is conditioned by the fact that man knows for certain that he ought not desire those things that God does not will to give him.

Finally, neither a hypothetical conception nor a conditioned desire naturally attain what is absolutely supernatural. For the absolutely supernatural is specified by God as he is in himself and as incapable of being imitated outside of himself. The manner in which

44 See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 88, aa. 1 and 2.

man can attain God as he is in himself and imitate him is a mystery, and human hypotheses and conditioned desires do not deal with mysteries.

Objection: Man naturally desires to see God; this vision is absolutely supernatural; therefore man naturally desires something that is absolutely supernatural.

Reply: Man has a natural desire for as perfect a knowledge as possible of the divine essence. But because this most perfect knowledge is a knowledge of God as he is in himself and as extrinsically inimitable, man does not come by this knowledge naturally. Mysteries are not naturally known; in fact, they appear instead to be impossible.

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(c) The self-transcendence that is proper to man as a rational being consists in conceiving hypothetically and desiring conditionally.

In a vague, unclear, and potential way it extends to supernatural realities: it desires what is best, but man cannot naturally form a concept of what in actual fact is the best, namely, the absolutely supernatural order. If by chance he were to conceive it, he would reject it as a mere dream – for his conceptions and desires are limited to those areas in which God is imitable outside of himself.

That supernatural elevation which comes to man through the grace of God consists not only in conceiving hypothetically but in knowing with the certitude of faith whose assent is supremely firm, not only by desiring conditionally but in willing and loving unrestrictedly. Besides, this elevation not only looks to a better order but in fact places man in this other more excellent order.

Hence the opinion of St Thomas: man has a natural desire to see God, but only by grace can he attain this vision.

To this we add our opinion: insofar as man has a natural desire for this vision, he does not know what he is desiring; it is only in a vague and unclear and rather potential way that he tends to that most excellent knowledge of God.

(d) From this we conclude that the capacity of a rational creature for self-transcendence proves the possibility and the fittingness of some elevation above human nature; but in no way does it prove the possibility of man's ability to attain God as God is externally inimitable.

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7. There remains one final consideration: God is love; if therefore God has created a creature that is rational, personal, and capable of friendship, then most certainly God has raised this creature to friendship with him.

(a) We accept this as an argument of fittingness or appropriateness, but we deny that it is a strict and compelling argument.

(b) True, God is love, as the apostle John has testified [1 John 4.8]. And every agent produces what is in some way like itself. Hence a most loving God makes friends for himself; friendship exists among equals, and therefore in order that rational creatures can be his friends, they are raised to the divine order.

(c) However, God is not only love. No one notion exhausts the divine perfection: God is also *mysterium tremendum*, an awesome mystery, and a most just judge. As Isaiah declares [Isaiah 55.8], God's ways are not our ways, nor are his thoughts our thoughts. Why, then, should God necessarily manifest his love more than his justice or his mystery in some order or other of rational creatures?

(d) If you say that love is the most excellent attribute, I would respond by asking why what is most excellent should necessarily be imitated.

Besides, concerning what is best, two points should be noted. First, that which is best is not any attribute or any aspect of God, but God himself, one and three. Secondly, be careful to avoid Leibniz's erroneous notion that God necessarily created the best possible world. (No world is best: God alone is what is best. The infinite is approached by

means that are infinite, so that no creature can ever be said to be absolutely the best, than which no better creature could be created by God.)

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8.2 *Supernatural and Transcendental*

1. The supernatural is that which exceeds the proportion of a nature.

Man, however, being of a rational nature, in some way transcends himself; this self-transcendence is not supernatural, but natural.

2. By his knowledge man transcends himself in that he knows not only the proportionate object of his intellect, namely, the quiddities of material things, but also, in a way, being in its totality. Material things are known in their own *species* or form, but immaterial things are known analogically.

3. In his willing man transcends himself in wanting all reasonable good. For example, one who judges the order of the universe to be good wants and approves that order; one who judges this order to be deficient in goodness conceives of and wants another order.

You may object that man wants what is good for himself, and therefore wants the order of the universe only insofar as it touches upon him. To this I would reply that man wants what is good for himself, that is to say, the good that is proportionate to his appetite; but that he wants what is good simply for himself, that is, only in a selfish way, I deny.

The reason is that man's good is to be in accordance with his reason. His will is an appetite that follows reason; therefore the will can want and approve whatever reason can judge to be good.

4. Man, therefore, can will to go beyond the bounds of his own nature; that is, he can conceive of an order of the universe in which man is made into more than man, and he can desire this kind of world order.⁴⁵

5. In fact, man has a natural desire for the beatific vision, which vision is absolutely supernatural.

There is in man a natural drive toward knowledge, to know the causes of things, and to know the quiddity of causes. But every scientific question in some way leads to God, who is the center and apex of all knowledge.⁴⁶

6. This natural desire:

(a) is in the intellect prior to any elicited act of the intellect, and all the more is it prior to any elicited act of the will;

(b) is a desire to know the quiddity of God, in other words, a desire for the beatific vision;

(c) is really identical with the power of the agent intellect and possible intellect;

(d) as in the agent intellect, it is ineffective in this sense, that it is incapable of producing the beatific vision, and indeed is capable of obscuring it as a result of humanism (δει ανθρωπινα φρονειν⁴⁷ – ‘the proper study of mankind is man’), and positivism;

(e) as in the possible intellect it is obediential, and as obediential, it is objectively conditioned. And because it is objectively conditioned, a consequent elicited and subjective desire must be conditioned as well.

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45 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, x, vii, 7-8; 1177b 26-35. Augustine: ‘You have made (not remade) us for yourself, O God, and our hearts are not at rest until they rest in you.’ Nietzsche, and moderns generally.

46 See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 12, a. 1 c. and *passim*.

47 [A reference to Euripides, fr. 1040, by Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1177b 33.]

Objections:

(a) This desire is not natural but supernatural.

Reply:

(1) It is called natural not in opposition to supernatural but to elicited.

(2) Nor is it to be called natural as referring to the beatific vision; under this aspect it is not natural but obediential.

(3) The same reality that under one aspect is natural (i.e., as perfectible by a finite agent) under another aspect is obediential (i.e., as perfectible by an infinite agent).

(4) As obediential, it does not determine the proportion of human nature in such a way that the attainment of the beatific vision becomes something natural to man; for what is obediential does not pertain to the measure of a natural proportion but to the measure of an effect which God can produce in a nature that is above that nature.

(b) If there exists a natural desire for the beatific vision, that vision is demanded by human nature.

For nature demands its end; its end is happiness; happiness fulfils all the desires of human nature.

Reply:

(1) A finite nature does not demand that perfect beatitude that is natural to God alone; it does, however, demand a finite beatitude that is proportionate to it.

(2) That perfect beatitude that is natural to God alone fulfils all desire; but a finite beatitude does not fulfill all the desires of a rational nature. For just as the will is not completely satisfied by any created good, so is the human intellect not satisfied by any finite intelligibility.

(3) Our natural desire for the beatific vision demands the possibility of that vision,⁴⁸ but it does not demand that man be actually ordered to that vision. For as a desire for the

48 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 12, a. 1 c.

beatific vision, it does not determine the proportion of nature but rather some possible perfectibility in nature to be actuated according to the good pleasure of an infinite agent.

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9 Thesis 3

God does not deny to an adult grace sufficient to attain salvation.

This section is about the universality of sufficient grace.

The earlier thesis was concerned with the existence of grace. The question of infants dying without baptism is dealt with in the treatise on baptism or on the one God. The issue here is the distribution of grace to those who have the use of reason.

grace: a quality or movement by which a person is brought to possess God as he is in himself.

sufficient: that which on the part of grace is an efficient cause proportionate to performing a free salutary act.

attainment of salvation: that is, on this earth it is achieved through justification and perseverance.

Sufficiency to attain salvation is remotely sufficient or proximately sufficient.

remotely: is sufficient for praying or performing other acts that dispose a person to prepare for justification, or acts by which a person obtains special helps to be able to persevere.

proximately: is justification itself and special helps to be able to persevere.

adult: one who is capable of deserving merit or discredit.

This thesis does not refer to those who do not actually have the use of reason, such as children or the demented, nor does it refer to those who sin as they are dying.

The thesis refers to the living, those actually having the use of reason and not actually sinning. For the latter there is always hope, for not to die is a sign of God's mercy.

division of adults:

the just: those who are in the state of sanctifying grace (even outside the Church).

sinners: those who are not in the state of sanctifying grace.

common sinners: who still have not entirely cast off all fear of God.

blinded: those bereft of divine illumination and perverted in religious and moral judgment.

obdurate: those who because of the appearance of some good cling to evil firmly and stubbornly; threats or promises or punishment do not change them nor do ordinary inspirations.

obstinacy: is complete in the damned, partial in this life ...

unbelievers: who do not have supernatural faith.

positive: those to whom the true faith was sufficiently explained but who either never accepted or at one time accepted and later rejected it.

negative: those to whom the true faith was never sufficiently explained.

Adults are either just or sinners or negative unbelievers; positive unbelievers are considered as sinners.

deny: does not give; refuses.

Yet there are different measures of giving in different cases: the just can avoid all mortal sin; sinners are not continually moved by graces but only at opportune moments or as occasion offers. This thesis does not explain how negative unbelievers are called but only states the fact.

9.1 *Opinions*⁴⁹

The question has its complexity from its connection with the doctrine on the universal but antecedent salvific will of God, on the systematic interpretation of this will; also from the distinction between the offer of sufficient grace through ordinary means and the conferring of grace itself, and still again from the way in which negative unbelievers are called to faith.

9.2 *Predestinationism*

Lucidus the presbyter:⁵⁰ DB 160a, 160b [DS 330-339, 340-342]

Gottschalk [c. 805-c. 868]: DB 316-319 [DS 622-624]

Bradwardine (Thomas [1290-1349], Archbishop of Canterbury) taught an extreme form of Augustinianism, whence Wycliffe and Hus derived their errors.

Protestants (Luther, Zwingli, and especially Calvin) taught a false predestinationism.

Jansenius taught an antecedent salvific will for the angels and for our first parents before the fall, but denied it after the fall.

That is to say, from the *massa damnata* God selects a few for salvation to which he brings them by the irresistible help of grace. If at times through grace he calls others not so predestined, he does so not out of his salvific will but in order to strike fear into good persons; but to the obdurate, no sufficient grace is granted.

Jansenists restricted grace to the faithful alone.

Certain older scholastics (Hervaeus [Hervaeus Natalis or Harvey of Nedellec, 1250/60-1323], [Gabriel] Biel [c. 1425-95], Durandus [Durand de Saint-Pourçain, c. 1275-1332]) hold that concerning the damned God has no salvific will expressing his

49 See DB p. [30], Index system, *Distributio gratiarum (Praedestio. Reprobatio)*, Xg and Xh.

50 [On Lucidus, see É. Amman, 'Lucidus,' *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* ix (17) 1020-1024.]

good pleasure but expresses it as a sign, metaphorically, as God did concerning the sacrifice of Isaac (God, says he, wills to save all but in fact does not intend to do so).

Older Bañezians: as long as God considers individual angels and humans he wills all to be saved; but from the perspective of the beauty of the universe, he no longer wills the salvation of all (this is negative antecedent damnation). So [Diégo] Álvarez [c. 1550-1635], Gonetus [Jean-Baptist Gonet (1660-1681)], and quite a few others.

As for those who are obdurate, God offers sufficient graces, which, however, he does not grant (he offers in general by preparing graces and proposing them; in particular cases he confers them on those by which they are received): thus [Domingo] Bañez [1528-1604], Álvarez, Gonet, [Francisco] Zumel (Çumel) [1540/41-1607], John of St Thomas [John Poincot (1589-1644)], [Pedro] Ledesma [1544-1616], [Tomás] Lemos [1550-1629], [Guillaume de] Contenson [or Contensous (1641-1674)]. More recent Bañezians generally abandon this position; but as to unbelievers, they have the same opinion as the former.

Note

Keeping the commandments not impossible for the just, DB 828, 1092 [DS 1568, 2001; ND 1568, 1989/1].

Christ died not for the elect alone, DB 1096 [DS 2005; ND 1989/5].

Christ died for all, DB 318, see 794, 795, 1096 [DS 623, see 1522, 1523, 2005; see ND 1926, 1927, 1989/5].

Christ died not for the faithful alone, DB 1294 [DS 2304].

Unbelievers receive the grace of Christ: DB 1295, 1096 [DS 2305, 2005].

There exists a true antecedent will different from the consequent will, DB 1362, 1363 [DS 2412, 2413].

[Theological notes:]

As to the just, defined a matter of faith.

As to common sinners, theologically certain.

As to the obdurate and unbelievers, certain.

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As to the just: 1 Corinthians 10.13, DB 828, 1092 [DS 1568, 2001; ND 1968, 1989/1; EP series 344: God does not abandon one unless he is first abandoned.

As to sinners: Luke 15.11-32 (prodigal son), Matthew 11.28 (all who labor and are burdened), 1 Timothy 1.15 (Christ has come into the world to save sinners), 2 Peter 3.9 (not wanting any to perish, but all to come to repentance). EP series 346.

As to unbelievers: 1 Timothy 2.4, 1 John 2.2. EP series 347.

[Page 35. Original of this page is in French.]

10 Theology: too intellectual or not enough?

(a) M. Blum, more of an intellectual than intelligent.⁵¹

(b) Supernatural intelligence

These days it is very important to make use of modern means: mechanical means, new techniques of communication and methods of influencing people; speaking in a

51 [Circumstantial evidence suggests that Lonergan has in mind Léon Blum, the first Socialist premier of France, who presided over the Popular Front coalition government in 1936-1937. The evidence is this: A few lines further on, in (d), Lonergan will mention Herbert Doms and the highly critical discussion of his ideas in *Revue thomiste*. It is likely that Lonergan has in mind a series of articles beginning with the article by Benoît Lavaud mentioned below in note 53. On the last page of that article, Lavaud refers to Blum's book, *Du mariage* (Paris: A. Michel, 1937). Given these clues, it would seem rather too coincidental for Lonergan to have had in mind someone other than Léon Blum. And if this reasoning is on the right track, it seems quite possible that this thirty-fifth page of the archival document has been inserted from elsewhere and perhaps from something Lonergan had written on proper theological procedures, possibly with some connection to the theology of marriage – the theology of marriage was a subject he taught in Montreal in 1941-42 and 1944-45. But even supposing this line of reasoning to be correct, the point or significance of the remark, bereft, we are assuming, of its original context, remains something elusive.]

manner that can be understood. The faith is not propagated in the world by inviting it to return to the middle ages.

But these means are secondary.

What is essential is the same as it has been since Pentecost: the Holy Spirit and witnessing to Jesus Christ.

A witnessing that is totally disinterested, clear, and exact.

Theses: exactness

Protestantism today

La Couture [?]⁵²

(c) Human understanding

Is only a part of theology: sacred scripture, patristics, the councils. A true essential part. Not apologetic, nor jettisoning things

Still, it is a part: DB 1796 [DS 3016; ND 132]

(d) Theological renewal

No severing the roots: Kierkegaard, existentialism, study of the emotions (Max Scheler, [Herbert] Doms); the school at Lyons attacked in the *Revue Thomiste* as anti-scholastic.⁵³

Do not block access to the roots.

Christian positivism: understanding is barren, disputed opinions and nothing more.

52 [It is not clear what Lonergan means by this word here, so it has been left untranslated.]

53 [It is quite possible that Lonergan has in mind the article by Benoît Lavaud, 'Sens et Fin du mariage: La thèse de Doms et la critique,' *Revue thomiste* 44:4 (1938) 735-65. See also H. Doms, 'Amorce d'une conception personnaliste du mariage d'après S. Thomas,' *Revue thomiste* 45:4 (1939) 754-63; M.-J. Gerlaud, 'Note sur les Fins du mariage d'après S. Thomas,' *Revue thomiste* 45:4 (1939) 764-73; Marie-Joseph Nicolas, 'Remarques sur le sens et la fin du mariage,' *Revue thomiste* 45:4 (1939) 774-93.]

Dogmatism of the school: uniformity is aimed at as the greatest glory of its school. No attempt to lead to understanding, demonstrating, explaining. Seeking to dominate and through use of the worldly means of domination, through the spirit of the clique, through the dilemma between uniformity with our idols or indeed exterior darkness.

(e) The basis of renewal is to understand as profoundly as St Thomas understood (prior condition: objective study of history)

This is no small matter. It is more than what commentators have done.

(f) The renewal itself will consist in a prolongation, a transposition, an extension of the act of understanding that St Thomas expressed for the middle ages.

Transposition: the equivalence of metaphysics, epistemology, and methodology

Extension: especially the theory of history; not a philosophical question; the question of grace and sin in the ongoing history of human actions.

Prolongation: vital adaptation, growth, to augment and perfect the old by means of the new.

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11 Critique of Billuart⁵⁴

1. His basic error is the confusion and equivocation concerning the potency for acting.

In one sense, potency for acting is the passive potency for receiving a second act. Thus the habit of knowing is the potency for knowing and is the potency for receiving second act, namely, to know. So also the habit of willing is the potency for willing and is the potency for receiving second act.

54 [Charles-René Billuart (1685-1757). Much of what is presented here in §11 appears again in §13.1.]

In another sense the potency for acting is active potency for producing any effect. Thus, understanding is the active potency for producing an [inner] word, and willing the end is the active potency for producing the willing of the means [to the end].

This distinction is in St Thomas where he distinguishes between ‘principle of an action’ and ‘principle of an effect.’⁵⁵

2 There is another error besides this one.

The indifference of passive potency is not the same as the indifference of active potency.

The indifference of passive potency vanishes when passive potency is perfected through the reception of a second act.

The indifference of active potency vanishes when it receives extrinsic denomination from the effect produced.

This distinction is in St Thomas where he distinguishes between the ‘procession of the operation’ by which the imperfect but perfectible is perfected, and the ‘procession of the product’ by which no new entitative perfection comes to the operator as such.⁵⁶

3 The essence of Bañezianism consists in confusing the above.

The created potency for acting is the potency for receiving a further determination and greater perfection.

This further determination and perfection is received from God as the first and immediate cause in the natural order as well as in the supernatural order.

55 See, for example, Thomas Aquinas, *De potentia*, q. 1, a. 1; also *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 25, a. 1; etc. [For a brief account by Lonergan of the distinction and of the complexities of Thomas’s usage in connection with it, see *The Triune God: Systematics*, trans. from *De Deo Trino: Pars systematica* (1964) Michael G. Shields, vol. 12 in *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007) 538-41.]

56 [For Lonergan’s account of the distinction in Thomas, see *Verbum* 107-110.]

Hence sufficient grace is a less perfect, a less noble, a weaker grace: it confers potency for acting, but without a further efficacious grace it does not produce the action itself; otherwise a creature would be the first cause of its own determination.

Efficacious grace is this further determination. Without it one never arrives at the action itself, and with it a person cannot not arrive at an action, for he is determined to one thing [*determinatus ad unum*].

5 In commenting on Isaiah 5.4, 'What more is there for me to do that I have not done?' they interpret these words according to their own confusion in metaphysics.

6 To the objection concerning free will, they reply as follows:

Freedom does not consist in being able to act or not act, so that a person is the first cause of his own determination

Efficacious grace does not confer the potency for acting but the act itself; furthermore, the act itself does not take away freedom. One who is standing can be sitting, in the divided sense [*in sensu diviso*]; in the same way, one who wills this can not will this, in the divided sense.

This is what freedom consists in: it is the indemonstrability of a deliberation or it is the mode of action produced by God together with the substance of the action.

[The following appears on the back of the thirty-sixth page:]

The antecedent efficacy of a deed is

proper to God – in simultaneity with the free act itself

predicated of grace itself [not intrinsically

but extrinsically]

That grace is efficacious by which, when applied, God unfailingly produces a free salutary act.

Nothing can be demonstrated from _____ and other parts/sources [?]

except [the efficiency of power

the antecedent efficacy of a deed.]

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12 Efficacious Grace

That grace is efficacious which not only can but also does produce a salutary act.

Distinguish:

Efficacy of power: that which truly can produce an act.

Efficacy of a work: ... and also produces that act.

Consequent efficacy of a work: that is, subsequent to the work itself, the salutary act.

Antecedent efficacy of a work: that is, prior to the performance of the work.

The consequent efficacy of a work adds nothing to the efficacy of power besides the mere fact of the work itself; that is to say, a grace is given which truly is the efficient cause and in fact does produce the act.

The antecedent efficacy of a work adds to the efficacy of power and the fact of the work done an infallible nexus that in some way precedes the actual performance of the work.

Note: Those who call 'first act' that which first comes to the mind and 'second act' that which afterwards comes to the mind name the antecedent efficacy of a work 'efficacy in first act.' This is wrong, for both efficacious grace and the salutary act produced by grace are second acts.

The nature of this infallible antecedent nexus is a disputed question.

The Augustinians consider this nexus to be founded upon the relative moral perfection of efficacious grace itself; that grace is efficacious which elicits the pleasure of overcoming, a pleasure that is greater than the contrary worldly desire.

The Bañezians consider this nexus to be founded upon the nature of a physical premotion to a deliberate act; as a physical premotion it produces the 'actually acting,' and as an instrument of God it indefectibly produces its effect. In this theory, physical premotion in the divided sense (considered in itself and prescinding from the concept of

instrument of God) can fail and not produce the salutary work; but in the composite sense (*in sensu composito*) as an instrument of the infinitely perfect and utterly irresistible God, it cannot fail, and indeed it is impossible for it not to produce the salutary act.

Molinists consider this nexus to be founded upon God's foreseeing of futuribles. In this *scientia media*, middle knowledge, God sees how a person would cooperate with certain graces. Hence there is an objectively true nexus, infallibly known by God, and affectively willed by a benevolent God.

If one were to erect a theory upon indications left to us by St Thomas,

- (a) he would deny that anything can be future or futurible to God;
- (b) he would admit that God knows both absolutely and hypothetically actual beings;
- (c) he would deny that knowing hypothetically actual beings contributes anything to solving the problem; for in the hypothetical order, all questions keep coming back just as in the actual order;
- (d) he would deny the existence of physical promotion;
- (e) he would deny that physical promotion, even if it did exist, and even considered in the composite sense, cannot fail;
- (f) he would affirm that God infallibly knows all that is knowable, irresistibly wills all that he wills, and indefectibly produces all that he does;

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(g) he would affirm that this divine efficacy is founded upon the infinite perfection of God and therefore precedes anything that has been effected, willed, or known;

(h) he would affirm that this precedence is not prior to (*in signo praevio*) but simultaneous with (*in signo simultaneo*) whatever is known, willed, or effected;

(i) he would affirm that this precedence in simultaneity imports necessity, not absolute, but hypothetical; and this hypothetical necessity is found together with the contingency and freedom of the effect.

Briefly, according to St Thomas, that grace is efficacious whose effect God produces infallibly.

This efficacy is antecedent: for God as indefectible cause precedes the effect.

This efficacy is not prior: it does not exist in any time before the actual causation of the effect.

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*12.1 [Preliminary consideration]: Conceptual Designations in God*⁵⁷

Let A, B, C, ... be truths arranged in the order they have among themselves, so that

- (a) presuppositions are ranked before what they suppose;
- (b) premises are ranked before conclusions;
- (c) causes are affirmed to exist before their effects, even necessary effects;

When a presupposition is different from premises: that which supposes does not necessarily follow from a presupposed truth; for example, the existence of creation is not deduced from the existence of God or from the principle of contradiction.

When premises are different from causes inasmuch as the conclusions only manifest the reality already affirmed through the premises, but the effects are realities superadded to the reality of the cause.

When this ordering has been completed, every truth is found in relation to every other either in a prior designation or in a simultaneous designation or in a posterior designation.



57 [See §24 of 'God's Knowledge and Will,' in Bernard Lonergan, *Early Latin Theology*, trans. Michael G. Shields, vol. 19 in *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) xx.]

The truth, B, is in a simultaneous designation with the truth, A, if B does not posit an entity besides those posited by A.

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12.2 *Efficacious grace [cont.]: freedom*

Freedom: objectively: many ways to one end.



1. *Grace*: a quality or a motion, conferred by God gratis, towards the possession of God himself.

At issue here is grace as a motion, that is, actual grace.

2. *Efficacious*: indefectibly producing a salutary act. It supposes the formality of efficient causality and adds to it the formality of indefectibility.

3 *Indefectibly*: when posited, the salutary act necessarily follows.

With the positing of efficacious grace there is a necessity for the salutary act to be posited; but the salutary act is free, and freedom is immunity from necessity. Here is the problem.

Objectively: many ways to the one end.

Subjectively: on part of intellect: deliberation urged but not demonstrated

*on the part of specification: deliberation does not determine the will
to one alternative*

on the part of exercise: will moves and determines itself.⁵⁸

4. *Freedom*: immunity from necessity. Freedom from coercion is not sufficient, DB 1094 [DS 2003; ND 1989/3].

Immunity from necessity is had when one can perform or not perform an act that is formally free. This is freedom of contradiction; it imports freedom of specification (to do this act or that act); in the state of our present imperfection it includes freedom of contrariety (to do a good act or an evil act).

5. *Necessary*: that which cannot be otherwise.

Absolutely necessary: what is posited unconditionally. Thus, the necessity of God to exist, of 2 times 2 to equal 4, for all agents to act for a purpose.

Hypothetically necessary: posited of the supposition of itself. Thus it is necessary that Socrates be seated when he is sitting, and for me to choose X if I choose X.

6. Hypothetical necessity is compatible with freedom.

Any free act is subject to the first logical principles of identity and non-contradiction: if there is a free act, there is a free act, and necessarily so with hypothetical necessity.

7. There exists divine effectiveness.

58 [Handwritten insertions with much the same content occur twice on the page, first at the very top of the page under the title, and second at the end of §3.]

Divine effectiveness is the property intrinsic to God according to which he infallibly knows whatever he knows, irresistibly wills whatever he wills, and indefectibly does whatever he does.

This property exists: for it is self-contradictory for an infinitely perfect being either to err in his knowing or be resisted in willing or be frustrated in acting.

This property is intrinsic to God: it is grounded upon the infinite perfection of God and not in the perfection of any creature.

8. God's effectiveness imports some necessity in all created things.

If God infallibly knows this thing to exist, irresistibly wills it to exist, and indefectibly makes it to exist, then this thing does exist and necessarily so.

But all created things and all of their parts are known, willed, and made by God; therefore they all exist necessarily.

9. God's effectiveness imports in all created things no other necessity than the hypothetical.

That necessity is hypothetical which is had from the supposition of the necessity itself; but this sort of necessity is the one mentioned in §8; therefore it is the sort of necessity mentioned in the conclusion of §8.

The major premise of this syllogism is the definition; see above, §5.

As to the minor premise: everything extrinsic to God is predicated of God contingently; everything predicated of God contingently is predicated not entitatively but terminatively; and everything predicated of God terminatively supposes the term.

First, from the fact that God is free regarding what is extrinsic to him; but all that is extrinsic to him is contingent: it can not-be. Therefore they can not-be made by God, willed by God, or known (as actually existing) by God.

Secondly, from the fact that nothing that is entitatively in God is contingent.

Thirdly, because there is no true extrinsic denomination without a real extrinsic denominator.

When, therefore, one says that God infallibly knows that *X* exists, the existence of *X* is presupposed in order that there be a true extrinsic denomination; when one says that God irresistibly wills *X* to exist, the existence of *X* is presupposed in order that there be a true extrinsic denomination; when one says that God indefectibly makes *X* to exist, the existence of *X* is presupposed in order that there be a true extrinsic denomination.

Therefore the consequent, '*X* exists' is contained in the antecedent, 'if God knows, wills, and makes *X* to exist,' and therefore the necessity of the consequent is the necessity on the supposition of itself.

10. God's effectiveness is compatible with human freedom. For effectiveness imposes no necessity other than the hypothetical; and freedom does not exclude hypothetical necessity. See §§9 and 6 above.

11. God's effectiveness precedes the act freely posited. For his effectiveness is grounded upon the divine perfection. It is had even if no free act had ever existed.

12. God's effectiveness is not prior to the freely posited act. For God's effectiveness cannot be affirmed regarding this or that free act without by that very fact affirming the act itself; therefore his effectiveness and the act are simultaneous.

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*Efficacious Grace [cont.]*⁵⁹

[Lennerz, p. 346]

1. *Efficacy of power*: that by which an act can be performed.

Efficacy of a work: that by which an act can be and is performed.

consequent efficacy of a work: affirms only the fact of the performance of a salutary act by grace.

⁵⁹ Lennerz, *De gratia redemptoris* 336-43. [In the archival document, Lonergan had 'Lennerz p. 346.' It seems more likely that he meant p. 336.]

antecedent efficacy of a work: affirms an infallible nexus between grace and the salutary work prior to the performance of the work.

This infallible nexus can be considered in three ways:

objectively: it is objectively true that this grace would produce this work;

cognitively: God knows that this grace would produce this work;

affectively: God wills to give a person a grace that would be productive of a work; this will is a great act of benevolence.

It is not clear whether in this theory the efficacy is also prior to the hypothetically actual performance of the work. If it is, then another prior ‘middle knowledge’ (*scientia media*) is required; if not, it seems that this efficacy is consequent and only prior in that it is foreseen by God.

2. Efficacy adds indefectibility to efficiency. All truly sufficient grace is an efficient cause; efficacious grace is an indefectibly efficient cause.

(a) Neither St Thomas nor the Bañezians say that efficacious grace stands by itself, in the sense that it is divided (*in sensu diviso*) from divine efficacy.

(b) According to the Bañezians, grace is efficacious inasmuch as it is an instrument of divine effectiveness in the composite sense, as combined with divine effectiveness.

But they seem to be wrong in saying that this efficacy is prior to the performance of a free salutary act.

(c) If you wish to construct a Thomistic system on this matter, you will say that grace is efficacious:

(1) not by reason of itself but by reason of divine effectiveness;

(2) not prior to (*in signo praevio*) but simultaneous with (*in signo simultaneo*) the performance of a free act

(3) but within simultaneity, antecedently to the performance of the free act.

Not prior, for if you consider God's knowledge, willing, and action prior to the actual performance of the free act, then God does not yet know, will, or effect this free act; but he does produce its cause, which nevertheless can fail.

Still, it is antecedent within simultaneity: for God is effective, not because he produces an effect but by reason of his infinite perfection which is the cause that precedes all that it effects.

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12.4 [Billuart on] *Efficacious Grace*⁶⁰

'Action and the potency for acting are two distinct things, in the supernatural order as well as in the natural order, the former being nobler and more perfect than the latter.

'From these principles (God as first and immediate cause; man as second cause undetermined to acting or not acting; the distinction between the potency for acting and action), which obtain in every state, Thomists infer that two graces are necessary in the order of salvation, in the state of innocence as in the state of fallen nature. One grace, less perfect and weaker than the other, confers potency only, raises man and confers aptitude for supernatural action; it is called "sufficient grace." The other grace, more perfect and stronger, determines potency and confers action; it is called "efficacious grace." The result is that it never happens that the potency conferred by sufficient grace acts or obtains its principal ultimate effect without the help of efficacious grace; otherwise God would cease to be the first and immediate cause of the action, and a creature, who,

60 See F. Charles-René Billuart, *Summa Sancti Thomae: hodiernis academiarum moribus accommodata*, editio nova (Paris: Victorem Palmé, 1876) tome III, dissertation V, article II, pp. 130-31. [All of p. 43 is a quotation from Billuart. Lonergan quoted from the 1839 edition of this work, correctly citing pp. 385 ff. In the 1876 edition the same quotations are found on pp. 130-31. The texts within parentheses in the quotation are Lonergan's own clarifications. Further, Lonergan uses vertical lines along the left margin to highlight Billuart's remarks beginning with the sentence, 'The other grace ... and ending at '... his own salvation.']

notwithstanding the power and elevation conferred by sufficient grace, remains indifferent, would give to himself a determination that he does not have and would become the cause of his own salvation. Thus through his own fault he would lack the efficacious grace that God is ready to give him and offers in abundance, unless by deliberately sinning he should interrupt the flow of grace and obstruct its efficacy ...

‘It is therefore by reason of God’s most omnipotent will and supreme sovereignty over our wills that this grace has its power and infallible efficacy. This is what is expressed and understood by the phrase, “Grace of itself is efficacious ...”

‘For a clearer understanding of this (that God causes both the substance and the manner of an act), note that the motion or grace that is efficacious for producing an act supposes both the potency for acting and for not acting, confers neither, but only the act: however, the performance of an act does cancel potency for the opposite, just as a man by standing does not lose his potency for sitting; but understand this potency to be antecedent and in a divided sense.’

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13 Physical Predetermination

Principles of the system set forth by Billuart.

According to Fr [Ignatius T.] Eschmann, O.P., Fr Garrigou-Lagrange teaches Billuart and believes that he is teaching St Thomas.⁶¹ Hence the selection of Billuart is justified.

61 [Lonergan gives no indication as to where Eschmann said this, and the editors have been unsuccessful in tracing the remark. For a list of Eschmann’s few publications, see L.K. Shook, ‘Ignatius Eschmann, O.P. 1898-1968,’ *Mediaeval Studies* 30 (1968) viii-ix. Eschmann spend about 26 years at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, beginning in 1942-1943, and also occasionally gave courses at the Institut d’Études Médiévales in Montreal. There are indications in the Lonergan Archive that Lonergan may have attended a course on Aquinas given by Eschmann in Toronto (see L.P. II-4, A100, www.bernardlonergan.com 10000DTEL40), and if he did, it is at least

1. God is the first and immediate cause of all beings, natural and supernatural. *By immediacy of power.*
2. Man is a secondary cause subordinate to the first cause in his actions and is indifferent in himself and indeterminate as to acting or not acting, and moreover in himself, especially as weakened by sin, is incapable of performing any supernatural act meriting salvation. *So that premotion, predetermination, is required.*
3. Action and active potency are two distinct entities in the supernatural order as well as in the natural, of which the first is superior (*nobilius*) to the second.

13.1 Some comments on these principles attributed to St Thomas, upon which Bañezianism is based.⁶²

1. The radical error is the confusion between the two meanings of both action and active potency.

In one sense, active potency is to action as the perfectible to its perfection; in this sense, the habit of knowledge is in active potency to the act of knowing, and the habit of willing is in active potency to the act of willing.

In the other sense, active potency is to action as efficient cause is to its effect. In this sense God is in active potency to creatures, understanding to inner word, and willing the end to willing the means.

In the first sense, action is greater and more perfect than active potency; in the other sense, active potency is greater and more perfect than action itself (whether action be taken as effect *qua* effect or as extrinsic denomination from an effect or as a relation of reason in the agent *qua* agent).

possible that he may be reporting a remark he hears Eschmann make during the course.]

⁶² [Much of what is presented in § 13.1 was also presented in § 11 above.]

Hence St Thomas distinguished between the principle of the action or operation and the principle of the effect.⁶³

2. From this there results another error regarding the concept of indifference.

One sort of indifference is the indifference of passive potency to receiving action (second act). This one remains unless passive potency is perfected by its reception of second act. *Processio operationis* [the emergence of a perfection from (and in) what is perfected].

Another sort of indifference is that of active potency to producing its effect. This indifference ceases by the fact that the effect is produced and the agent is extrinsically denominated from the effect. *Processio operati*⁶⁴ [the emergence of one thing from another].

3. Hence there is a third error regarding the indetermination of an agent.

There is the indetermination of passive potency. One who has the habit of knowledge is able to teach; but before one actually teaches and speaks words, one must first actually understand, not simply have the habit of understanding. This indetermination ceases through the reception of the second act of understanding in one's intellect.

There is a further indetermination of the agent in time: one who produces an effect at a particular time, neither before or after, needs a determination to act at that time. The indetermination ceases in two ways: either on the part of the mover, the efficient cause, which under the requisite circumstances goes from first act to second act; or on the part of the movable which under the requisite circumstances is posited to receive the effect from the agent. This is the physical premotion of Aristotle and St Thomas; the complex of relations regarding all agents is fate, the intention and power of the divine art of governing the world.⁶⁵

63 Thomas Aquinas, *De Potentia*, q. 1, a. 1; *Summa theologiae*, q. 25, a. 1.

64 Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7m.

65 [For more on the understanding of premotion in Aristotle and Thomas, see Bernard Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St Thomas*

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But there is a third indetermination that does not exist but as a result of the confusions described above is believed to exist. For from these confusions it follows that ‘to actually act’ in the sense of ‘to actually produce an effect’ is a new perfection superadded to the agent as such and is not only an extrinsic denomination from the effect produced. This indetermination ceases through the Bañezian physical premotion. This indetermination is discussed in the second principle mentioned above.

13.2 Besides these fundamental confusions there are many failures in honesty and probity in science, not to mention in theology also.

1. If ‘to actually produce an effect’ means a new perfection superadded to the agent as such, it follows that God cannot both create and remain an unmovable mover.

They do not openly admit this, but they do restrict this indetermination and indifference on the part of the agent to created agents. *Implicitly, therefore, they are compelled to acknowledge the two senses of active potency.*

2. It likewise follows that there can be no true active potency in any creature. This they refuse to admit openly.

For a creature either has or does not have a physical premotion. If it has, it does not have active potency but the action itself, the actually acting; if it does not have a physical premotion, it does not have true active potency but merely the potency to receive a physical premotion.

3. Because there cannot be true active potency in this system, there cannot truly be merely sufficient grace.

If there is a physical predetermination for a salutary act, grace is efficacious; if not, a person cannot posit a salutary act.

They do not admit this, yet it is obvious.

Instead of a frank admission, we hear only disingenuous evasions. A man with sufficient grace, they say, does not receive efficacious grace because he does not resist sin; but in their system he cannot resist sin (that is, cannot perform a salutary act) without efficacious grace.

4. An upright and honest theologian does not cling to metaphysical opinions that are contrary to scripture.

Because of their opinions about active potency, Bañezians cannot logically accept Isaiah 5.4, ‘What more was there to do for my vineyard that I have not done in it?’ Obviously, God was able to give that without which there cannot be justice and judgment, that is, a greater and stronger physical pre-motion. *Nor would a theologian who reveres St Thomas attribute to him a teaching that is openly contrary to scripture.*

5. Because there cannot be true active potency, there cannot be true liberty, that is, the ability to act or not act.

Bañez himself admits this, *at least implicitly*. He taught that freedom consists essentially in the subjectively known objective indifference of an act, whatever may take place in the will itself (that is to say, to the extent to which the will is determined to one alternative).

Others, however, with less honesty, do not admit this, but have recourse to futile evasions. The main one of these is the ‘in the divided sense,’ and ‘in the composite sense.’

This distinction is valid in the case of hypothetical necessity. For example, in the divided sense, one who is standing can be sitting – that is, he can sit if he is not standing. But he cannot be standing and sitting at the same time [in the composite sense].

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Again, 'I may choose this, yet I can also not choose this.' In the divided sense, that is true; in the composite sense, that is false; and yet freedom remains, because the necessity here is only hypothetical.

Also, 'if God concurs with this act, I cannot not perform this act.' In the divided sense, that is false; in the composite sense, that is true; and yet freedom remains because real concursus is not adequately distinct from the free act itself. As produced by God, it is a free act.

But the Bañezians say the following: efficacious grace produces (*dat*) the very act itself; therefore it produces the act and not the potency to act; therefore when a physical predetermination is given, a person in the composite sense cannot not act, but in the divided sense can act.

Here the fundamental confusions remain. Efficacious grace is not the salutary act itself but an entity that is prior, fluid, etc.; hence the distinction cannot apply. In fact, in the composite sense one cannot not act (for actually acting and not acting are contradictory) and in the divided sense one cannot act; for being unable to act without a predetermination and yet being able to act without a predetermination are contradictory (in the sense divided from predetermination).

The same distinction is applied in a different way. Efficacious grace is efficacious not as a fluid entity producing an actual act but as an instrument of the irresistible will of God.

In the composite sense, efficacious grace necessitates the act; in the divided sense it does not necessitate the act.

But this divided sense never existed; it is of the essence of grace that it be an instrument of God.

Besides, this very divine irresistibility does not necessitate an act prior in time to the existence of the act itself. The necessity is only hypothetical. But the Bañezians suppose a necessity that is absolute and prior.

Further, they say that God produces not only the substance but also the mode of a free act.

This is most true of God, but not of Bañezianism. The mode of a free act is the fact that a person could both perform and not perform an act. This mode is not found in the Bañezian system in actual reality but only as an assertion.

Unless one says that the mode of a free act consists in the fact that someone says that there is a mode, no other mode is present.

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13.3 Garrigou-Lagrange on Physical Premotion⁶⁶

1. It is a motion received passively from God in a secondary cause.

It is really distinct from the divine action itself which is formally immanent in God and virtually transient.

It is really distinct from the action of the secondary cause, which is effected by the power of this received premotion.

These distinctions are illustrated by the action of fire upon water, the effect on the water from the fire, and the action of the water as it heats other things.⁶⁷

2. It is a premotion.

A divine action that is formally immanent precedes not temporally but conceptually and causally the motion received passively in a secondary cause.

The motion received passively in a secondary cause precedes the action of the secondary cause not temporally but conceptually and causally.⁶⁸

66 See R[eginald] Garrigou-Lagrange, 'Prémotion physique,' DTC 13 (25) 31-77.

67 Ibid. 39-41.

3. It is a physical premotion.

It is said to be physical not as opposed to metaphysical or spiritual but as opposed to moral motion, that is, one by which an object entices or attracts.⁶⁹

4. It is a predeterminating physical premotion.

The following are distinct from one another: formal and causal determination, which is in the divine decrees, non-formal but causal determination in the premotion itself, and non-causal but formal determination in the subsequent action of the secondary cause.

Determination in God precedes determination in the premotion, and the causal determination in the premotion precedes the formal determination in the action of a creature.⁷⁰

5. It is required for every positive act – not, however, for the formal element of formal sin, which is a privation and results from a deficient secondary cause.⁷¹

6. When a premotion is produced, the secondary cause without fail produces the act according to its own mode of being: that is, a necessary act if the cause is a necessary cause, a vital act if the cause is a vital cause, and a free act if the cause is free.⁷²

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13.4 Garrigou-Lagrange on Bañezian Freedom.

Freedom is that sovereign indifference of the will regarding a good proposed to the will by one's reason but one that is not good in all aspects.⁷³

68 Ibid. 41-43.

69 Ibid. 42-43.

70 Ibid. 44-45.

71 Ibid. 47.

72 Ibid. 48-51.

73 Ibid. 69-70. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1-2, q. 10, a. 2 c.

By the very fact that an object is proposed to the will is apprehended as being a finite good, the act of the will cannot be other than free.

In this state of indifference in judging, not even God with his absolute power can make the act of the will to be unfree.

An act of the will tending towards an object is free even when it is actually tending to it, for its sovereign indifference remains.

Still, the will cannot will and not will at the same time; in the divided sense, therefore, it can will otherwise but not in the composite sense.

This freedom alone is found in the eternally unchangeable free divine acts.

Note: Freedom is defined as that sovereign indifference of the will regarding a good proposed to the will by one's reason but such that it is not good in all aspects. That this is true in the sense that the will is truly the mistress of its own act, we grant; but that this means that the will's sovereign freedom is reduced to being an empty title and baseless figment, we deny.

The will is truly the mistress of its own act if (a) it can act or not act, (b) this action is an exercise of efficient causality, and (c) this power to act (*potentia agendi*) is the power to exercise efficient causality *with respect to its own determination*.

The will is not truly mistress of its own act if (a) it can act or not act, (b) this power is the power to receive a physical premotion over which the will has no control, and (c) without fail and without regard to the will, the premotion predetermines the act of the will.

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Garrigou-Lagrange on Physical Premotion and Freedom

Molinist definition: freedom is the ability which, presupposing the presence of all that is required for acting, can still either act or not act.⁷⁴

Two distinctions to be made here:

That this definition holds when all temporally prior presuppositions are present, we grant; also presupposing this efficacious premotion, we distinguish: that the ability to do the opposite remains, we grant; that it can happen that the opposite is actually done, we deny.

‘Under the efficacious divine motion which extends to the free mode of our acts, our will, in effectively positing the act willed by God, retains, by reason of its unlimited scope, specified by the universal good, the real power of positing or not positing the opposite act (*remanet potentia ad oppositum*); but it is not possible, under the efficacious divine motion, for the will in fact *not to do* the act effectively willed by God, or to posit in fact the contrary act.’ He cites Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1-2, q. 10, a. 4, ad 3m.⁷⁵

Distinguish between potential and actual indifference.

(a) Prior to the premotion there is potential indifference: one can act or not act, can do this or do that.

(b) Given the premotion there is only actual indifference: namely that indifference that is had in our actually existing free acts, which is had in God who from eternity has willed whatever he has willed and has done so immutably.

(c) The necessity of potential indifference as belonging to the essence of freedom is denied.

By premotion a free act is infallibly and effectively predetermined without however being necessitated.⁷⁶

74 Garrigou-Lagrange, ‘Prémotion Physique,’ DTC 13 (25) 41-42.

75 Ibid. 42. [Italics in French original.]

76 Ibid. 49-50.

This is asserted in connection with the divine decrees, not, however, so that God may know what a person is going to do, but so that the divine decree be effectively carried out.

Although God moves infallibly and effectively, he does not impose necessity. For 'to be free' is a real mode existing in a free act; this mode of being is caused by God himself.

God moves necessary causes in accordance with their mode and free causes according to the mode of a free being, that is to say, that there be in the act itself that mode of being which is called 'freedom.'

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13.6 Garrigou-Lagrange: physical premotion is proven

1. Proven from God's dominion:

As the existence so also the action of a creature is from God as first cause.

But without physical premotion God's dominion and the subordination of a creature with respect to action cannot be maintained; therefore ...

The major premise is universally admitted.

The minor premise is proven (1) negatively, from the inadequacy of the other theory, and (2) positively from the fact that a secondary cause acts insofar as it is acted upon and applied to its action as an instrument of God.⁷⁷

2. From the insufficiency of creatures:

What a creature cannot give to itself must be sought from God;

But no creature can enable itself to actually act; therefore ...

The major premise is obvious.

⁷⁷ Ibid. 58.

As to the minor premise, any creature, before it acts, has only the potency for acting. This potency for acting is less perfect than actually acting, and from a lesser perfection a greater perfection cannot emerge.

3. From the eternal divine decrees and efficacious grace.

God works in order that we may work: ‘... not from human willing or striving but from a merciful God’ [Romans 9.16]; ‘God has mercy on whomever he chooses and hardens the heart of whomever he chooses’ [v. 18].

Now, according to ‘middle knowledge’ (*scientia media*) grace that is actually given is efficacious because God foresees that a person will consent.

This preserves, in a way, God’s dominion, inasmuch as God chooses that world order in which Judas hangs himself and Peter is saved.

But God’s dominion is not safeguarded through efficacious grace: for in each world order it is not God who prevails but a man who freely consents.

Only predetermining physical premotion can satisfactorily account for what we know about grace from the sources of revelation.⁷⁸

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*13.7 Garrigou-Lagranbe on physical premotion and sin.*⁷⁹

1. God does not cause sin, either directly or indirectly.
2. But God is not bound to impede a sin; and in not impeding it, God lets it occur.
3. This allowance is not a cause of sin but an essential condition for it. If it regards punishment for a previous sin, it is a privation. But of itself it is a simple negation: it is a non-conservation in good.

⁷⁸ Ibid. 64-67.

⁷⁹ Ibid. 71-76.

4. By a predetermining physical premotion God effectively moves a person to the physical entity of a sin – for example, of hanging oneself. But God merely allows the failure of the will, the resistance to sufficient grace.
5. Just as the motion on the part of the object has priority over the motion on the part of the exercise, so the resistance to the predetermination has priority over the physical entity of the sin. God does not predetermine the physical entity of a sin but only the will that does not do what it can and ought to do regarding the motion of the object.
6. If this is so, then efficacious grace is required for the will to actually do what it can and ought to do, and therefore there is no solution. Their reply to this objection is that if only God alone were acting, this objection would be valid; but in the present case both an indefectible cause and a defectible cause concur. A man does not resist because he refused efficacious grace but resists because of his own defectibility.
7. If the examples of the angels or of Adam are adduced, they say that resistance on the part of the material cause has precedence. Contraries have the same nature: in the case of justification, the good movement of the will is a prior material cause, and similarly in the case of the loss of grace. God does not abandon one unless previously abandoned.

As to §6, above: these are not two independent causes.

As to §2: That God is not bound to prevent a sin, we reply: according to truth, we agree, but according to the Bañezian system, we deny.

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14 Actual Grace in the Just

Blasius Beraza, *Tractatus de gratia Christi*, 2nd ed. (Bilbao: El Mensajero del Corazón de Jesús, 1929) 191-98, §§218-23.⁸⁰ Boyer, *Tractatus de gratia divina* 143-46. Lennerz, *De*

⁸⁰ [§218 (p. 191) begins with the thesis: ‘Probabilius videtur, etiam in hominibus iustis, requiri gratiam actualem ad actus salutare eliciendos.’]

gratia redemptoris 324-25. Hermanus Lange, *De gratia: tractatus dogmaticus* (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1929) 403-408, §§ 531-36. Christianus Pesch, *Praelectiones dogmaticae, tomus V: De gratia; de lege divina positiva*, 3rd ed. (Herder: Freiburg im Breisgau, 1908) 60-63 §§109-12; [Lonergan cites an earlier edition, giving ‘pp. 65ss.’ as the page reference].⁸¹ Joseph van der Meersch, *Tractatus de gratia divina*, 2nd ed (Bruges: C. Beyaert, 1924) 306-20, §§338-48.⁸² Ludovicus Billot, *De gratia Christi: commentarius in primam secundae S. Thomae*, 4th ed. (Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1928) 109-12. Robert Bellarmine, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, Opera Omnia, vol. VI (Paris: Apud Ludovicum Vivès, 1873), liber vi, caput xv, p. 143, sent. 13.⁸³ Luis de Molina, *Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis ...* (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1876), q. 14, a. 13, disp. 8, pp. 35-39.⁸⁴ Francisus Suarez, *De gratia*, Opera Omnia, vol. X (Paris: Apud Ludovicum Vivès, 1858) lib. xii, cap. vii, pp. 37-42.⁸⁵ *De auxiliis divinae gratiae*, ibid. vol. XI, lib. iii, cap. 4, num. 6, p 167.⁸⁶ *De gratia*, ibid. vol. IX, lib. x, cap. 2, num. 12, p. 575-76. Salmanticenses, *Cursus theologicus summam theologicam angelici doctoris d. Thomae complectens*, (Paris: Apud Victorem Palmé, 1878), vol. IX, tractatus xiv: *De gratia Dei*, disp. III, dub. x, §2, p. 483.

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⁸¹ [Prop. IX, which immediately precedes §109 (p. 60) reads: ‘Etiam homo habitibus supernaturalibus instructus ad omnem actum salutarem indiget auxilio gratiae actualis.’]

⁸² [§338 (p. 306) begins with the thesis: ‘Non videtur requiri gratia actualis proprie dicta, h. e. speciale auxilium gratiae, seu immediata Spiritus Sancti illuminatio ac inspiratio, ad singulos actus salutare in homine justificato.’]

⁸³ [Sent. 13 reads: ‘Homo justus potest, quando vult, justitiam, tam internam, quam externam, exercere, id est, bona opera facere, ac praecepta divina servare, neque indiget ordinarie nova gratia excitante, sed solum adjuvante.’]

⁸⁴ [Disp. 8: ‘Quibus supernaturalibus subsidiis liberum arbitrium indigeat ad eliciendum credendi actum qualis ad justificationem est necessarius.’]

⁸⁵ [Cap. vii reads: ‘Utrum actus meritorius debeat esse supernaturalis, et ex aliqua actuali gratia profectus?’]

⁸⁶ [Num. 6 reads: ‘Quae sit gratia adjuvans ad actus qui ex habitibus eliciuntur.’]

14.1 Pesch, *Praelectiones dogmaticae, tomus V: De gratia; de lege divina positiva, p. 97, §173.*⁸⁷

‘No human being, not even one who is just, can for a certain length of time avoid venial sins without a special privilege from God.’⁸⁸

venial sin: a sin which because of the lesser importance of its subject matter or because of imperfect advertence or consent does not warrant the loss of friendship with God.

It is divided into deliberate and latent:

deliberate: venial only on account of the lesser importance of its subject matter.

indeliberate: venial on account of the imperfection of the human act (*actus humanus*).

Sin: the violation of a law

material: an unknown and unwilled violation of a law.

formal: a violation that is in some way known and willed.

venial: a sin in some way; an offence against God that does not forfeit his friendship.

mortal: absolute, unqualified sin; an offense that forfeits friendship with God.

deliberate venial sin.

indeliberate venial sin.

privilege: exemption from a general and odious law.

[a] because the law is general and not particular, exceptions can be made;

[b] because it is odious, an exception is good.

⁸⁷ [Lonergan, citing an earlier edition, gives ‘p. 104’ as the reference.]

⁸⁸ [Pesch adds a *note* to this thesis: ‘Hac thesi excluditur illa perfecta impeccantia, quam voluerunt pelagiani inveriri in multis hominibus iustis, et statuitur etiam homines iustos communiter incurrere saltem quaedam venialia peccata.’]

special privilege: one that is rarely granted.

In the case of venial sin, such a privilege, so far as we know, has been granted only to the Blessed Virgin Mary.

for a certain length of time: less than in the thesis about moral impotence regarding mortal sin.

At least for several days.

Cannot: refers to moral, not physical, impotence.

Individual venial sins can be avoided, but not all.

Note: that it cannot be avoided throughout one's lifetime: defined as a matter of faith, DB 833 [DS 1573, ND 706].

Adversaries

Pelagians, who argued from human virtue as extolled by the Stoics and found perfect sinlessness in many men.

Argument from scripture: James 3.2: 'We have all offended in many ways.' This refers to the just as well: 'all.' In the case of the just, it refers to venial sins; not all the just commit many mortal sins. See 1 John 3.6: 'Anyone who lives in God does not sin.'

Matthew 6.12: '... and forgive us our offences' – said about oneself, and truthfully. Therefore everyone commits at least venial sins. See DB 107, 108 [DS 229, 230; ND 1905, 1906].

Fathers of the Church: see Rouët de Journel, *Enchiridion Patristicum*, Series 316.

Theologians: common opinion.

Council of Trent, DB 804 [DS 1537, ND 1938]: 'For although in this mortal life human beings ... fall into those slight and daily sins that are also called venial ...'

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14.2 Actual grace in the just [cont.]

1. Distinguish the following:

(a) the general concursus required for every effect that is actually to be produced; it consists in the totality of conditions;

(b) the principal supernatural second acts of intellect and will that are required for the production of free supernatural acts; this consists in acts received in the intellect and will;

(c) these acts can be

(i) *according to the perfection habitually possessed*: ordinary helps;

(ii) *beyond the perfection habitually possessed*: special helps;

(iii) (truly and merely) sufficient graces: the morally good free act is in fact not done;

(iv) *efficacious graces*: the good free act is actually done.

2. Distinguish the following:

(a) *to be able to operate*: this supposes general concursus;

(b) *to be able to perform a supernatural good work*: this supposes principal supernatural second acts of intellect and will, and general concursus;

(c) *to be able to persevere, proximately or remotely*: this supposes habitual grace, considered both in itself and as a foundation and title for ordinary and special helps to be given at the proper time; add general concursus;

(d) *proximate ability to persevere*: this supposes the granting of habitual grace and special helps; add general concursus;

(e) *actual perseverance*: this includes general concursus and a series of efficacious graces right up to the end; add general concursus.

3. From the diversity of concepts of actual grace there follows a diversity of opinions among theologians concerning these notions.

(a) Bañezians and Molinists consider general concursus and actual grace to be not distinct from each other, or at best inadequately distinct;

(b) Hence Van der Meersch calls general concursus that motion which others call supernatural and grace. Likewise Billot, and more clearly according to the author.

(c) Molina calls general concursus that extrinsic divine assistance which others call actual grace.

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Opinions

There are as many opinions on this matter as there are on the essence of actual grace and on the nature of infused virtue.

Theologians are in general agreement on this point: besides habitual grace and the infused virtues there is required a further transient gratuitous help for each salutary act, not to the extent that there are as many such graces as there are salutary acts, but in the sense that without actual grace received here and now there will be no salutary act.

Adversaries

Molina: he himself has said that the general common concursus is sufficient. Molinists have the same opinion in reality, but speak of a supernatural concursus for supernatural acts. Suarez defends Molina on the grounds that the general or common concursus is not the same as natural concursus.

Bellarmino: He said that in addition to habit awakening grace was not necessary but affirmed the need for assisting grace.

Affirmative opinions are grounded

Bañezians: no created cause can ever cause something without receiving a transient physical pre-motion; but habit is a created cause; therefore there is further required a physical pre-motion, which is actual grace, a motion.

Molinists: distinguish between arousing grace (the indeliberate act) and assisting grace (the deliberate act) and the supernatural concursus with both of these (also called actual grace).

Our opinion: habit is a first act and a passive principle. A salutary act is formally free; it is produced by the subject; it cannot be produced by the subject unless the subject is in supernatural second act both intellectual and volitional. The agent intellect is not sufficient to actuate an intellectual habit, and God alone is the extrinsic mover with respect to the exercise of willing the end.

Molinists: maintain that habit is not sufficient, because one who has a habit is dormant, as it were. Habit of itself is somnolent: it needs to be aroused, and it is not sufficiently aroused by the object.

Note: This opinion is more probable and more common.

In the supposition that habit is a first act and a passive principle, that God moves one to willing the end, that to actuate a supernatural intellectual habit exceeds the proportion of the agent intellect, this opinion is certain.

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[Thesis 4]

Any human being, even equipped with supernatural habits, needs the help of actual grace for every salutary act.

[Terminology]

human being: a rational animal, not theoretical but historical.

grace: uncreated (i.e., God himself, given to us – see e.g., Rom 5:5)

created: in heaven

in this life: in the broad sense, natural gifts

in the strict sense: exterior

interior: charismatic gifts

rendering pleasing (to God)

(sanctifying grace)

quality

motion

sanctifying grace: *Summa theologiae* 1-2, q. 111, a. 1; DB 799-800 [DS 1528-30; ND 1932, 1933]

quality or motion: Ibid. q. 110, a. 2 (see also *ibid.* qq. 11-48, on act, operation, motion, passion, and qq. 49-89, on habit).

habit: a quality of the first species, not easily moved (*ibid.* q. 49, a. 2).

in relation to nature: sanctifying grace, received in the essence

in relation to act: infused virtue, received in a potency.

supernatural: exceeding the proportion of a finite nature

needs: physical power is lacking without this help.

help of actual grace: grace not as gratuitous but as a help.

actual grace: a supernatural motion received in the higher faculties; a transient help that is not owing to nature.

ordinary help: makes one to be in supernatural second act. But it does not make one less liable to the weakness of fallen human nature or better directed to the supernatural end than one habitually is.

special help: not only makes one to be in supernatural second act but also heals one's weakness or more safely directs one to the supernatural end to which he habitually tends.

as elevating: produces supernatural second act

as moving: gives one the ability to effect another supernatural act

as healing: provides assistance against the weakness of nature

as directing: divine wisdom corrects and perfects finite wisdom.

Actual grace in relation to the just

[a] it does not elevate the just to first act, for that is already present;

[b] but it elevates them to second act and moves them to other supernatural acts, at all times;

[c] sometimes it further heals and directs a person more than he is habitually healed or directed.

This thesis deals with the ordinary help of grace. On special help in the matter of perseverance, see DB 832, 804, 806 [DS 1572, 1536, 1541; ND 1972, 1938, 1942].

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There is a variety of opinions among theologians on this matter. This is not surprising, since they all have different opinions about both the nature of an infused habit and the nature of actual grace.

An infused virtue can be considered (a) as a principle that produces second act, and (b) as a principle that receives second act.

Actual grace can be said to be (a) general concursus that posits nothing in the subject, (b) general concursus that posits in the subject something that is prior to second act, (c) second act itself produced immediately by God, or (d) other second acts produced by God through the mediation of the acts immediately produced by God.

And concerning all these it is disputable whether they are properly called gratuitous, since they can be said to be owing to a person as elevated by habits.

Our position: an infused virtue is first act, receptive of second act, rendering second act connatural to the subject; hence that actual grace is formally second act immediately produced by God in the intellect and will, and consequently that there are further second acts produced by God through the mediation of the former and even produced by us.

89 [The very same statement that appears at the top of p. 56 of the archival document appears again at the top of p. 57. It has not been included here.]

We distinguish between actual grace as an ordinary help and as a special help. Ordinary help does not include greater perfection than that which is had through the infused virtues, but brings to second act this perfection already received. Special help includes the greater perfection already possessed through the infused virtues, and therefore not only brings to second act the perfection already received but goes beyond this perfection.

We say that the ordinary help of actual grace is required for each salutary act, and that for perseverance ordinary help does not suffice, but a special help is required.

We say that the special help certainly possesses the formality of grace in the proper sense of the word. It is not owed to nature, nor can it be said to be a mere concursus demanded by habits.

We say that ordinary help is truly grace: it surpasses the proportion of human nature. That which does not surpass the proportion of an infused habit is not to be required. But if one wishes to deny that ordinary help is a true grace, no censure can be placed upon him except that of dullness of mind.

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15 Ability to persevere

*Opinions*⁹⁰

(a) Pelagians, denying practically all grace, denied even this one.

(b) Although the Pelagians argued against Augustine's teaching about actual perseverance, they nevertheless admitted that special help is needed for being able to persevere. They vigorously defended the second part, 'God denies no one this special help.'

90 See Lange, *De gratia*, §172, pp. 107-109.

(c) Augustine: at the beginning he did not pay much attention to this special help; later he clearly taught it; towards the end of his life he laid such emphasis upon the gift of actual perseverance as to obscure the real power of special help.

(d) Theologians during much of the early period said nothing clearly about actual grace.

(e) Baius and Jansenius, DB 1054, 1092 [DS 1954, 2001; ND 1986/54, 1989/1].
Against the second part.

(f) Later theologians are in agreement about this thesis. They dispute, however, about the theological note of the thesis, about the meaning of DB 832 [DS 1572, ND 1972], and about the nature of special help.

Theological note

(a) First part, at least theologically certain.

(b) Second part, defined as a matter of faith, DB 200, 804, 806, 1092 [DS 397, 1536, 1568, 1541, 2001; ND 1922, 1938, 1942, 1968, 1989/1].

On DB 832 [DS 1572, ND 1972]⁹¹

(a) At the very least: it is about final perseverance, about the power of futurity (if a person actually perseveres, this is the result of a special help).

(b) Morally certain: at least about final perseverance and the power of virtue (without special help perseverance is impossible).

(c) More probably it is directly about final perseverance. But the inference is valid: 'therefore that one be able to persevere for a long time, special help is required.' For the corresponding chapter 13 (DB 806 [DS 1541, ND 1942]) argues from temptations, from the difficulty of the struggle against the flesh, the world, and the devil; this struggle, therefore, is incumbent upon all the just over a considerable length of time, and at the last

91 See Lange, *De gratia*, §174, p. 109-11; Beraza, *De gratia Christi*, 228-30, pp. 202-205.

period of life this help is necessary not only for the just. So this struggle is incumbent upon all, for all must pray that they may not enter into temptation.

(d) This special help is not a concursus that is related to supernatural habits as natural concursus is related to nature. The Fathers at Trent refused to accept the amendment in which the words ‘special help’ were not found but only the phrase ‘without God’s grace.’ They had in mind the help for which a person must pray in order to receive it.⁹²

(e) This special help is not to be considered as something quite extraordinary, as something *sui generis*, or as distinct from actual graces that assist a person in the struggle against particular difficulties (Lange states that Suarez is wrongly accused of having denied this).⁹³ We say that this special help is the assistance whereby a person begins to want a good that previously he did not want, or to want a good more strongly than before. Thus Augustine speaks of prevenient and subsequent grace, operative and cooperative grace.

(f) One should not insist upon interior graces to the neglect of exterior graces.

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[Thesis 5]

The just cannot long persevere in the justice they have received without the special help of God, which, however, is denied to no one.⁹⁴

92 See Lange, *De gratia* 110, note.

93 [Lange, *De gratia* 110: ‘Non est auxilium extraordinarium et veluti sui generis, distinctum a summa gratiarum, quibus iustus adversus singulas difficultates iuvatur, ... sed sine causa Suarez impugnatur, quasi oppositum doceat; hic revera nihil aliud exigere videtur quam Tridentinum secundum datam interpretationem.’]

94 Lange, *De gratia*, 106, § 170; similarly in Boyer, *Tractatus de gratia divina*, 147, and Beraza, *Tractatus de gratia Christi*, 205-206, § 231. [In the archival typescript, Lonergan’s reference to Beraza is to ‘§ 231, p. 204.’ This would seem to be incorrect, for § 231 is found on pp. 205-206. Beraza’s thesis, the discussion of which begins with § 231, reads: ‘In statu naturae lapsae homo iustus nequit sine speciali auxilio Dei, in accepta

[Terminology]

Perseverance

(a) a special virtue, an integral part of fortitude, which, as it acts against desolations, so it restrains delights;

(b) an aspect of all the virtues which according to its perfection makes a virtuous person act in accordance with a virtue when the occasion calls for it;

(c) the effective continuation in good (right to the end of one's life); the unbroken series of good acts.

to be able to persevere: to have all that are needed to be effective in this continuation in good.

to actually persevere: this effective continuation in good.

for a long time: for a considerable length of time.

the just: those who enjoy the infused habits; those in the state of sanctifying grace.

in the justice they have received: in the state of sanctifying grace.

God's help: the effect of the divine operation of helping human beings.

special: at least a gratuitous help, a grace, a gift not owing to humans.

In this thesis, it is understood to mean a special help.

(a) grace, an undeserved gift, really distinct from natural gifts;

(b) really distinct from habitual grace and the infused virtues;

(c) beyond the general supernatural concursus which is required for a habit to pass into act;

(d) and therefore a grace by which God further heals the just and directs them towards their end, eternal life;

iustitia diu perseverare. Speciale hoc auxilium distinctum est a gratia sanctificante et a gratiis actualibus quae statui gratiae quasi intrinsece debitae dicuntur. His discussion of the thesis goes from p. 205 to p. 213.]

(e) consists both in external protection and foresight and in special illuminations of the mind and inspirations of the will.

It is not denied to any of the just:

That is to say, habitual grace alone is not sufficient for perseverance even for a considerable time without a special help.

This is not meant in the sense that a just person is deprived of such a help, but to clarify what is required for perseverance.

The meaning is not that a just person, although he has habitual grace, still cannot persevere because he does not have a special help. It means that the just can persevere, not, however, through habitual grace alone (which is included in the notion of justice) but through habitual grace together with a special help (which is not formally included in the notion of justice but through the goodness of God is always added to justice).

The sense of the thesis is found in 1-2, q. 109, a. 9 – not a. 10 on the act of perseverance.

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*Without God's special help the just cannot persevere in the justice they have received.*⁹⁵

Thesis taken from Trent, DB 832 [DS 1572, ND 1972]

Note the following:

(a) DB 804 [DS 1537, ND 1938]: God 'does not desert' those who have once been justified by grace 'unless they desert him first.'

(b) DB 806 [DS 1541, ND 1942]: ... 'all should place their firmest hope in God's help. For unless they themselves are unfaithful to his grace, God who began the good work in them will bring it to completion ...'

95 [In the left margin, Lonergan inserted 'omit' roughly horizontal with 'Thesis sumitur ex Trid.' It is not clear whether he meant it to refer to the entirety of this page of the archival document, thinking perhaps that he was repeating himself, or to a particular text on the page.]

(c) DB 835 [DS 1575, ND 1975]: the just do not sin venially in everything they do, much less do they sin mortally.

(d) DB 833 [DS 1573, ND 706, 1973]: the just can sin mortally.

(e) DB 828 [DS 1568, ND 1968]: it is not impossible for the just to obey the commandments of God.

(f) DB 200 [DS 397, ND 1922]: all the baptized, with Christ's cooperation and help, can and ought to attain salvation.

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Ability to persevere

DB 132 [DS 241, ND 1909]: the baptized need daily help.

DB 183 [DS 380]: those who have been reborn [in baptism] and are holy need always to beg for God's help.

DB 200 [DS 397, ND 1922]: the baptized can and ought to persevere, though with Christ's help and cooperation.

DB 804 [DS 1537, ND 1938]: 'God does not command the impossible, but in commanding he admonishes you to do what you can and ask for what you cannot do, and helps you to do it.'

DB 806 [DS 1541, ND 1942]: '... knowing that they are reborn unto the hope of glory and not yet unto glory, they should be in dread about the battle they still have to wage with the flesh, the world, and the devil, which they cannot win unless with God's grace they obey the Apostle who says ...' [see Romans 8.12].

DB 828 [DS 1568, ND 1968]: the commandments are not impossible to observe.

DB 832 [DS 1572, ND 1972]: perseverance possible with special help of grace.

See the practice of the Church at prayer and of the faithful and the saints.

Is denied to no one

DB 200 [DS 397, ND 1922]: they can and ought to if they are willing to labor faithfully.

DB 804 [DS 1537, ND 1938]: God does not command the impossible.

God does not desert those who have been once justified unless first deserted by them.

DB 806 [DS 1541, ND 1942]: unless they are unfaithful to grace, God, who began the good work, will bring it to completion.

DB 808 [DS 1544, ND 1945]: those who commit mortal sins, which they can avoid with the help of divine grace.

DB 828 [DS 1568, ND 1968]: God's commands are not impossible for the just.

DB 832 [DS 1572, ND 1972]: perseverance possible with God's special help.

DB 835 [DS 1575, ND 1975]: the just do not sin mortally in every deed; indeed, they do not even sin venially (contrary to the Protestant notion of totally corrupt nature).

DB 1092 [DS 2001, ND 1989/1]: impossibility of the just to observe the commandments and the lack of grace for the just are condemned as heretical.

DB 979 [DS 1809, ND 1816]: vow of chastity can be observed by those who pray for it rightly.

DB 1794 [DS 3014, ND 124]: perseverance in faith: God 'does not desert one unless first deserted.'

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Scripture

(a) The just face a difficult battle:

fighting the good fight of faith, 1 Timothy 6.12;

doing battle against demons, Ephesians 6.12;

as well-armed soldiers, Eph 6.11;

as soldiers in general: 2 Timothy 2.3; see 1 Timothy 1.18;

boxing [like a man beating the air]: 1 Corinthians 9.26.

(b) The enemies of salvation:

temptations, James 1.2, 12;
 concupiscence, James 1.14;
 seducers, 2 John 7;
 the devil, 1 Peter 5.8, 2 Corinthians 11.14, Ephesians 6.11;
 spiritual forces of evil, Ephesians 6.12.

(c) Christians are warned:

to put on armor: Ephesians 6.10 ff. 1 Peter 5.9 (resist, strong in faith);
 to beg for help: Matthew 6.13, 26.41.

The just cannot long persevere in the justice they have received without the special help of God if sacred scripture warns them to pray and in many places urges them to pray. But scripture does this in many places; therefore ...

As to the major premise: no one prays for what he already has or certainly rightly expects to have.

As to the minor premise: scripture speaks of a battle, of a very fierce adversary, and teaches to pray always.

Fathers: EP (series 319), 485, 1153, 1956, 2227.

Theologians: there is sufficient agreement among them.

N.B. – on this point the mind of St Thomas developed in accord with the development of the notion of actual grace.⁹⁶

Part 2 expressly deals with this in the thesis on the distribution of graces (19a).⁹⁷

1 Corinthians 10.13; Matthew 11.30 (gentle yoke and light burden), 1 John 5.3.⁹⁸

EP, ser. 318.

⁹⁶ See the texts in Lange, *De gratia*, 114-15, §§ 182-83. Read Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1-2, q. 109, a. 9. [Lange's thesis (p. 106) reads: 'Iustus in accepta diu perseverare non potest sine auxilio Dei speciali, quod tamen nulli denegatur.']

⁹⁷ [See Lange, *De gratia*, 106, § 170].

⁹⁸ Lange, *De gratia*, 113, § 178.

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Objections

1. One who has a right to an end has a right to the means necessary for that end.

But the just have the right to the end (glory is merited, DB 842 [DS 1582, ND 1982]), and perseverance is a necessary means to it; therefore the just have a right to final perseverance, which therefore is not a gift.

Reply: (a) That one who has an unconditioned right has a right to the necessary means, we grant; but that one who has only a conditioned right, we deny.

But the just have a conditioned right, not an unconditioned one, DB 842 [DS 1582, ND 1982].

(b) That the just have a right to the necessary means, that is, to the means that are required and are sufficient, we grant; but to those means that make the attainment of the end necessary, we deny, and contradistinguish the minor premise.

2. There is true friendship between God and the just. But a true friend by the demands of friendship itself keeps his friend from falling; therefore ...

Reply: This friendship is inchoate, not completed. It is completed through those gifts such as are granted in the beatific vision.

That a true completed friendship demands confirmation in grace, we grant. But we assert that a true inchoate friendship calls for the hope of glory, not for glory itself (DB 806 [DS 1541, ND 1942]). It provides special helps that are always sufficient but not always efficacious (DB 806 [DS 1541, ND 1942]).

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[Thesis 6]

Actual perseverance is a great gift of God and a singular benefit.

perseverance: the effective continuation in good right to the end.

actual: that is, perseverance in fact; not just the ability to persevere.

active: the effective continuation in good.

passive: timely intervention of death.

gift: what is conferred gratuitously; what is not condignly merited.

great: of great value, connected with eternal life.

benefit: a good given or done to someone by someone.

singular: not rare, but excellent in comparison to others.

DB 826 [DS 1566, ND 1966] contains this thesis indirectly.

DB 806 [DS 1541, ND 1942] contains it parenthetically.

DB 805 [DS 1540, ND 1941] contains it implicitly: ‘because final perseverance is a gift of God, we cannot know that we shall have this gift.’

DB 132, 183 [DS 241, 380; ND 1909] contain the thesis implicitly.

Theological note:

Bleau: theologically certain.⁹⁹

Beraza: the common and certain opinion of theologians.¹⁰⁰

Boyer: in the magisterium of the Church.¹⁰¹

99 [See Paulin Bleau’s unpublished manuscript, *De gratia actuali*, Montréal, Sept.-Dec., 1943, pp.52-59, in the Lonergan Archive, LP I-A, A67 (www.bernardlonergan.com 67000DTL040). On p. 52, Bleau enunciates a two-part thesis (Thesis 9): ‘Praeter gratiam sanctificantem justus alio speciali auxilio indiget ut perseveret usque in finem (1a pars); ipsa autem perseverantia actualis est magnum Dei donum et singulare beneficium (2a pars).’ On p. 57, in the ‘nota’ on the second part of the thesis, he writes: ‘Quod perseverantia finalis sit magnum Dei donum et singulare beneficium: THEOLOGICE CERTUM ex Dz. 826. Cf. 821, 825 ...’ (Capitals in original typescript.)]

100 [See Beraza, *De gratia Christi*, 242. His thesis reads: ‘Perseverantia mere passiva est magnum Dei donum’ and is followed by the remark, ‘Est communis et certa theologorum sententia.’]

101 [See Boyer, *Tractatus de gratia divina*, 140, Thesis XII: ‘Iusti, praeter auxilium speciale quo perseverare possunt, alio auxilio indigent, seu magno perseverantiae dono, ad hoc ut revera usque in finem perseverent.’ He follows the statement of the thesis with the following remark: ‘Thesis non est explicite et certo definita, cum in conciliis prioribus verba non sint satis clara cumque in concilio Tridentino haec doctrina supponatur, enuntietur, non autem definiatur. At dici potest veritatem de

Adversaries

(a) Semi-Pelagians, against whom Augustine wrote *De Dono Perseverantiae*.

(b) Protestants, preaching the certitude of predestination, DB 805, 826 [DS 1540, 1566; ND 1941, 1966].

Scripture:

Romans 14.4: ... for the Lord is able to make them (the weak in faith) stand; see also DB 806.

Perseverance is a great gift of God if God is one who can make one stand and restore the fallen; but this is so; therefore ...

Philippians 1.6: ... who as begun the good work in you and will bring it to completion by the day of Jesus Christ.

1 Peter 5.10: After you have suffered a little while, God who called you ... will himself restore, strengthen, support, and establish you.

Wisdom 4.11: They were caught up so that evil might not change their understanding or guile deceive their souls.

Fathers: EP, ser. 320

Theological reasons:

Final perseverance is a great gift of God and a singular benefit if it is the greatest gift and depends solely upon God; but this is so; therefore ...

It is a great gift: eternal life is joined to it.

Depends solely upon God:

(a) concerning active perseverance: that helps are efficacious and not just sufficient; that all helps be efficacious, or, if one should fall, that he be effectively called again and that all subsequent helps be efficacious.

necessitate doni gratuiti perseverantiae esse *in magisterio Ecclesiae*, ut iam Augustinus affirmavit.']

(b) The timely intervention of death is an act of divine providence.

Scholion: Although the gift of perseverance cannot be merited, it can be begged for.

See Boyer, *Tractatus de gratia divina* 367, quoting Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae*, c. 6, n. 10.¹⁰²

Beraza, *Tractatus de gratia Christi*, thesis §246, p. 219: It is within the power of the just, if they are willing.¹⁰³

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*Objections*¹⁰⁴

1. If God denies no one this special help, praying seems useless, which is contrary to the first part of the thesis.

But if the necessity of prayer is greatly insisted upon, it would seem that God does not grant a special help to all, which is contrary to the second part.

Reply: That God denies no one, no one who prays as he ought, we grant; but that God denies none of those who do not pray in accordance with the precepts of the Church, we deny. *The special help can be (1) the grace to pray, or (2) the grace to overcome.*

God deserts no one unless he is first deserted. But each one can fear that he will be deserted first: special help does not mean efficacious help. Besides, we all commit venial sins, and venial sins gradually and imperceptibly lead to mortal sins.

‘Do what you can, and ask for what you cannot do.’ DB 804 [DS 1536, ND 1938].

102 [In the archival typescript, Lonergan cites ‘Boyer p. 161,’ which does not seem to be correct. The correct pages would seem to be pp. 366-67, where the question, ‘Utrum homo possit perseverantiam meriri’ is discussed. Boyer refers to Augustine’s *De dono perseverantia*, c. 6, n. 10, on p. 367.]

103 [Beraza’s thesis reads: ‘Quamvis perseverantia finalis magnum sit donum, illud tamen, Deo auxiliante, est in omnium iustorum potestate.’]

104 Objections 2-5 taken from Beraza, *Tractatus de gratia Christi*, §§237-39, pp. 210-13.

That efficacious help is not granted to all, we admit: DB 806,¹⁰⁵ 822 [DS 1541, 1562; ND 1942, 1962]; and when this is not granted, the person deserts God first.

2. Habitual grace, together with a proportionate concursus, is a created participation in the divine nature; but a created participation in the divine nature is a sufficient principle of its own conservation; therefore habitual grace, etc., is a sufficient principle of its own conservation.

Reply: It is not a perfect participation in the divine nature; it is an imperfect participation during this life on earth.

We grant that the divine nature is the sufficient principle of its own conservation; for operation follows being, and perfect operation follows perfect being. A participation in the divine nature is a sufficient principle of its own conservation only insofar as it has the divine nature itself directing, helping, protecting and healing the one who participates in it; for only an infinite nature is the principle of perfect operation, whereas any finite form or habit is only a principle of what belongs to it per se.¹⁰⁶

That habitual grace is a sufficient principle of its own conservation, per se and in general, we agree; but per accidens and at all times, we deny.

3. The just can avoid all mortal sins with proportionate ordinary concursus; therefore they can persevere.

Reply: That they can avoid each individual mortal sin, we grant; all mortal sins, we deny.¹⁰⁷

Note: We are not saying that the just struggle with moral impotence. We are saying that they would be struggling with moral impotence without the special help that is denied to no one. Besides, impotence without habitual grace refers only to the natural law, while the difficulty of the just refers to the law of Christ. Again, the difficulty the

¹⁰⁵ [Lonergan also included a reference to DB 833 here, but that would seem not to be correct.]

¹⁰⁶ See Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate*, q. 27, a. 5, ad 3m.

¹⁰⁷ Thus Beraza, §237, following Suarez

just have stems not from the failure of supernatural habits to do anything, since they do a great deal, but from the fact that the just have them in an imperfect way, and through them are imperfectly victorious, since their combat is with the flesh, the world, and the devil.¹⁰⁸

Also, the unjust sin per se (for one sin leads to another); the just sin per accidens.

4. DB 103 [DS 225, ND 1901]: Grace not only works to remit sin but is also a help to avoid sin.

[*Reply*]

(a) This refers to grace understood comprehensively, without distinguishing between habitual and actual.

(b) If it is understood as habitual grace alone, it is a help against individual sins; against all sins taken together it is a remote but not a proximate principle.

5. It is owed to the just to be able to persevere. But a help that is owed is not something special. Therefore the help to be able to persevere is not something special.

Reply: We deny that such help is owed to the just, but grant that it is owed to grace itself (a grace for grace).

That a help that is owed is not special in every sense we grant, but we deny that it is not special in the sense understood in the thesis.

In the thesis a help is understood in this sense, that it proceeds from a principle that is of greater perfection than a just person is through sanctifying grace and equipped with infused virtues, however great they may be, and moved by a proportionate concursus. The proportionate cause of an operation that is always perfect and never deficient is God.

¹⁰⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1-2, q. 109, a. 9.

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Proof

(a) The sources of revelation speak not about habits alone but *most of all* about operations performed by God.¹⁰⁹

John 15.5 – bear fruit

Philippians 2.13 – to will and to do

2 Corinthians 3.5 – right thinking

1 Corinthians 4.7 – what have you that you have not received?

John 6.44 – come to me

DB 135 [DS 244, ND 1911] holy thoughts, good counsel, every movement of a good will.

(b) The sources of revelation do not determine exactly what a habit does; hence there is a difference of opinion among theologians.

(c) Theologians, at least the majority of them since the Council of Trent, agree on the necessity of actual grace for the just to perform any salutary act.

(d) They have a variety of theories according to the various concepts of habit, vital act, and concursus.

(e) If a faculty endowed with a habit is only a passive principle with respect to second acts, it is obvious that actual grace is necessary for a person to perform a salutary act.

(f) Even if a faculty endowed with a habit is an active principle, the Bañezians still need a further physical premotion, and the Molinists need a further supernatural concursus and awakening grace.

109 *N.B.* The sources do not say that a free salutary act is produced by God immediately by the immediacy of the supposit. [Loneragan inserted the sentence by hand on this page, in a space at the top of the right side of the page, adjacent to the remark made in (a) and obviously intended to clarify that remark.]

The argument:

For every salutary act the just need the help of actual grace if habitual grace itself is not sufficient for eliciting a salutary act;

But since the Council of Trent the majority of theologians agree that habitual grace is not sufficient for eliciting a salutary act.

Hence for every salutary act the just need the help of actual grace.

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Difficulties

1. Actual grace, at least as an ordinary help, is not a gratuitous gift but is owed to the just.

Reply: That actual grace does not exceed the proportion of grace itself, that may be.

That it does not exceed the proportion of any finite nature, we deny.

That it is owed to the just as just, that may be.

That it is owed to a justified person as human, we deny.

2. One who has a habit can operate when he wishes, can operate by himself, etc.

Reply: If certain conditions are fulfilled, that is true, but not if such conditions are unfulfilled.

Actual grace is among the conditions required for a salutary act.

3. When there is a habit, a motion on the part of an object is sufficient.

Reply: The objection would hold if the agent intellect were proportionate to the actuation of a supernatural intellectual habit.

Similarly, the objection would hold if the will could move itself to willing the end.

When an intellectual habit and a habit in the will are already in second act, a motion on the part of an object is sufficient, but not when these habits are only in first act.

Either a physical premotion is required

Or supernatural arousal and supernatural concursus is required

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16 On the notion of sufficiency in relation to sufficient grace

Sufficiency is 'to something' and therefore is a relation.

A relation can be considered (a) on the part of its subject, or (b) on the part of the term, or (c) on the part of the relation itself, or (d) on the part of its foundation.

(a) The subject is a human being in the state of fallen and restored nature.

(b) The term is a free supernatural human act.

This term can be considered in two ways, as possible or as actually existing.

Per se, sufficiency regards its term as possible.

Per accidens, sufficiency also regards its term as actually existing. For by the fact that someone has all that is required to do something, he does not necessarily do it. God is sufficient to create another world, but he does not necessarily create another world.

Hence *per accidens* sufficiency is divided by reason of the term into mere sufficiency and positive sufficiency: the former denies and the latter affirms the term as actually existing.

(c) The relation of sufficiency is the relation of an efficient cause to its effect. For freedom is constituted through efficient causality inasmuch as the one who can either effect or not effect a determination (of his will) is free. *Hence sufficiency for a free act is sufficiency for effecting a free act.*

This relation, therefore, is the same as that of active potency understood in the proper sense: it is that which a *processio operati* but not a *processio operationis* follows. It is that which is the principle of an effect and not the receptive principle of an action.

(d) The foundation of sufficiency can be considered in two ways: completely or partially.

The complete foundation for a free supernatural act is human nature helped by God's grace.

The foundation on the part of grace is the sufficient grace about which we are inquiring.

It is a question, therefore, of the foundation of sufficiency on the part of grace with respect to the production of a free supernatural act. This act is considered both as possible (truly sufficient) and as actually not occurring (merely sufficient).

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[Thesis 7]

There is grace that is truly and merely sufficient.

Terminology

grace: a gift not owed to humans conferred by God and ordered to the possession of God as he is in himself.

sufficient: that which provides all that is required on the part of grace in order that one may be able to posit a free supernatural act.

truly: in reality and not only verbally. This rules out the opinion of those who say that a person with sufficient grace cannot posit a free supernatural act because he still needs another grace.

merely: and nevertheless a person does not posit a supernatural act. This rules out the opinion of those who say that interior grace is never resisted.

Meaning of the thesis

It concerns the true guilt of a sinner

Having conferred sufficient grace, God can ask, 'What more could I do that I have not done?' And God can say, 'Your downfall is your own doing, Israel.'

Adversaries

1. Luther and Calvin, condemned at Trent, DB 797, 814 [DS 1525, 1554; ND 1929, 1954].
2. Propositions of Jansen condemned as heretical, DB 1092, 1093 [DS 2001, 2002; ND 1989/1, 1989/2].
3. Jansenists: DB 1296, 1359 ff.,¹¹⁰ 1521 [DS 2306, 2409 ff., 2621; ND 1992/10 ff.].
- 4 *Augustinians: prevailing delight [sancta delectatio, DB 1521, DS 2621] is given and an act follows, or is not given and covetousness rules.*

Bañezians: their concept of active potency is so confused that according to their metaphysical principles God could not give a truly sufficient grace that a person could truly resist.

[Handwritten insertion by Lonergan in the right margin of the page, next to ‘*potentiam activam.*’]

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{principle of an effect} \\ \textit{principle} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{of an action} \\ \textit{of an operation} \end{array} \right\} \end{array} \right\}$$

Adversaries 1-3 reject sufficient grace, both the reality and the term; those under no. 4 admit the term “sufficient grace” but in reality (and implicitly) deny it.

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Theological note

Bleau, *De gratia actuali*, p. 100: defined as a matter of faith, as to the reality.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ The ‘ff.’ has been left in here, for it is difficult to determine where Lonergan intended the cut-off point to be.]

¹¹¹ [Bleau’s text is unpublished. See, in the Lonergan Archive, LP I-A, A67 www.bernardlonergan.com at 67000DTL040, the page numbered ‘100’ of the document.]

Boyer, *Tractatus de gratia divina*, 239, defined as a matter of faith.¹¹²

Lennerz, *De gratia redemptoris*, p. 337, defined.¹¹³

DB 200 [DS 397, ND 1922]: the baptized can if they are willing.

DB 797 [DS 1525, ND 1929]: can reject (inspiration of Holy Spirit).

DB 814 [DS 1554]: can refuse.

DB 804, 828 [DS 1536, 1568; ND 1938,1968]: the just can keep the commandments.

DB 808, 833 [DS DS 1544, 1573; ND 1945, 706]: and yet can sin.

DB 1092, 1093 [DS 2001, 2002; ND 1989/1, 1989/2]: commandments can be observed;
 grace can be resisted.

DB 1296 [DS 2306]: From sufficient grace, deliver us O Lord! (Jansenist error).

DB 1359 ff. [DS 2639 ff.].¹¹⁴

DB 1521 [DS 2621]: (refers to DB 1092, 1093).

Proof: [See] Bleau, *De gratia actuali*, pp. 100-102.¹¹⁵

Argument from Scripture

If grace that is truly and merely sufficient was given to the house of Israel and to the men of Judah, then this kind of grace exists; but ...; therefore ...

The major premise is evident.

112 [Boyer's thesis XX says: 'In statu naturae lapsae, datur gratia vere et mere sufficiens.' Regarding the thesis, Boyer adds: 'Thesis est *de fide definita* tum in aliis documentis, tum praesertim in damnatione propositionum Iansenii.' In the archival document, Lonergan's reference was to 'p. 272,' which seems to be incorrect.]

113 [Lonergan cites 'p. 337,' in the archival typescript, which would seem to be incorrect. Thesis 18 in *De gratia redemptoris*, the first part of which states: 'In statu naturae lapsae datur et gratia vere et mere sufficiens...', is found on p. 327. Of this part, Lennerz says simply: 'Haec pars est definita.']

114 [Again, 'ff.' has been left in here, for it is difficult to determine where Lonergan intended the cut-off point to be.]

115 [In the Lonergan Archive, LP I-A, A67, www.bernardlonergan.com at 67000DTL040.

The minor premise is proven from various points in Isaiah 5.1-7.

(a) The parable of the chosen vine is explained, vv. 1-6, and applied, v. 7.

(b) The vine is the house of Israel; the people of Judah his delightful plant, v. 7.

The grapes hoped for were justice and righteousness; the wild grapes, iniquity and an outcry; from comparing v. 2 and v. 7.

The excellent field ('on a very fertile hill'), the digging, the removal of stones, the tower, the wine-press are exterior and interior graces conferred upon the Jews.

Included are interior graces, since justice is expected, which can only be had by grace. See the previous theses.

(c) These graces are truly sufficient: 'What is there that I ought to do for my vine that I have not done?' The meaning is, I have done more than what was required.

The Lutherans answer: you have not wielded an inanimate instrument.

The Jansenists answer: you have not given us a prevailing delight.

The Bañezians answer: you have not given us a physical pre-motion so that we might actually act.

But Isaiah understands: you have done all that is required and more.

(d) These graces were merely sufficient: 'I expected justice and got iniquity instead, righteousness and got an outcry.'

Further scriptural passages

Proverbs 1.24: 'I have stretched out my hand, and no one heeded.'

Isaiah 65.1-2: 'I said, "Here I am, here I am" to a people who did not call upon my name. 'I held out my hand all day long towards an unfaithful people.

Matthew 11.21-22: 'Woe to you, Corozain! Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the miracles that have been done in you had been done in Tyre or Sidon, they would have repented in sackcloth and ashes.'

Matthew 23.37: 'Jerusalem, Jerusalem ... how often have I wanted to gather your children as a hen gathers her brood under her wings, and you refused.'

1 Corinthians 10.13: 'God is faithful, who will not allow you to be tested beyond your strength, but with the testing will also provide the way out so that you may be able to endure.'

Romans 2.4: 'Do you not realize that God's kindness is meant to bring you to repentance?'

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Romans 11.22: God's kindness and severity

John 15.22-23: 'If I had not come and spoken to them they would have no sin; but now they have no excuse for their sin ... If I had not done deeds for them that no one else has done, they would have no sin; but now they see and hate me and my Father.'

Acts 7.51: 'You stiff-necked people, uncircumcised in heart and ears, you have always resisted the Holy Spirit, just like your fathers before you.'

1 Thessalonians 5.19: 'Do not quench the Holy Spirit. Do not spurn prophecy. Test all things.'

2 Corinthians 6.1: '... we urge you not to receive the grace of God in vain.'

Revelation 3.20: 'Behold, I stand at the door and knock. If someone hears my voice and opens his door for me, I will enter and dine with him and he with me.'

Church Councils

See above.

Fathers

EP series 332

Theologians

All admit this thesis. But some encounter serious difficulties when they try to reconcile the thesis with their erroneous notions about active potency.

Theological reason

Without sufficient grace, a sinner is not truly free, not truly culpable, and unjustly condemned to eternal punishment and torments. But this is inadmissible.

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17 [A second discussion of] efficacious grace

1. Efficacious grace is that which without fail (indefectibly) produces a salutary act.

Therefore it supposes causal effectiveness in producing a salutary act and adds the formality of indefectibility.

That efficient cause is indefectible which has a nexus of necessity with its effect.

2. Distinguish the following:

(a) *The efficacy of power*: that which can truly produce an effect.

This efficacy of power is the same as true sufficiency.

(b) *The efficacy of operation*: that which not only can produce an effect but also de facto does produce it.

The consequent efficacy of operation: that is, that which is consequent upon the positing of a free act. This consequent efficacy of operation is the same as true positive sufficiency: there is a true efficient and sufficient cause and there is an effect.

The antecedent efficacy of operation – antecedent, that is, to the positing of a free act. This efficacy is an addition to true positive sufficiency; it adds that infallible or necessary nexus such that grace without fail produces a salutary act.

3. There is an apparent conflict between the notion of efficacious grace and the element of freedom from necessity.

Freedom from necessity resides in the fact that there is no truth from which the necessity of a free act can be deduced except those (truths) which already include in themselves the existence of the said free act. This is proven: for in every other deduction there would be, not hypothetical necessity, but absolute necessity.

On the other hand, this efficacy of grace is the efficacy of operation antecedent to the positing of a free act; it is an efficacy that is such that indefectibly or infallibly the act is free.

Hence the problem: either a grace is efficacious and then there is no freedom, or else freedom remains and then the grace is not efficacious.

4. In this thesis we prove that both are true:

[Thesis 8]

Grace is efficacious, and the human person is truly free.

A later thesis will deal with the various explanations proposed by theologians.

5. *Adversaries*

(a) Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians.

Catholics who in defending human freedom have not sufficiently preserved the thesis. These are some Fathers, especially among the Greeks, the adversaries of Gottschalk (Rabanus, Hincmar), and the early scholastics (St Anselm).

St Augustine, the Augustinians, the Infralapsarians (Jansenists, some Calvinists, and a few Thomists such as Contenson and Gonet, for whom the thesis holds only from after the sin of Adam, not before; nor in the case of the angels.

Theologians at the Sorbonne deny efficacious grace in first act for easier actions and especially for praying.

On these, see Lange, *De gratia*, pp. 427-28, §556.

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(b) Lutherans, Calvinists, Baianists, Jansenists deny freedom from necessity.

Theological note

The efficaciousness of grace: in the state of fallen nature, and for more difficult actions, the thesis is *theologically certain* (see on final perseverance).

The efficaciousness of grace: in the state of nature before the fall, and for even easier actions, *proven with certainty*.

Freedom from necessity, defined as being a matter of faith, DB 814, 1093-1095 [DS 1554, 2002-2004; ND 1954, 1989/2, 1989/4].

Proof

Efficacious grace exists if God gives not only the power to act but also, according to his good pleasure, the salutary act itself; but this is so, therefore ...

Major premise:

If God grants the power to act, grace is an efficient cause; if God, according to his good pleasure, grants the salutary act itself, grace possesses the antecedent efficacy of operation, for what God does *according to his good pleasure* precedes the consent of the person.

Minor premise:

Ezekiel 11.19: 'I will give a heart of flesh that they may walk in my precepts.'

Matthew 22.14: Many are called but few are chosen.¹¹⁶

called: that is, called to faith (refers to the kingdom on this earth, for some will be chosen), but through sufficient grace, with respect to many who will not come.

chosen: that is, chosen to embrace the faith, and indeed thanks to antecedent divine grace: it is God who chooses.

Thus the apostles in speaking of the efficacious call to faith very frequently use the words *εκλεγεσθαι*, *εκλογη*, *εκλεκτοι*: Romans 11.5, 7; 1 Corinthians 1.27, Ephesians 1.4, 1 Thessalonians 1.4, James 2.5, 1 Peter 1.1, 2.9, 2 Peter 1.10.

¹¹⁶ See Lange, *De gratia*, p. 430, §559.

Romans 9 deals with saving grace. Why the Gentiles have attained justice, but not the sons of Abraham, Romans 9.30.

Merely sufficient grace is acknowledged: Romans 10.16, 18, 21; 9.31.

The perversity of the human will is acknowledged: 9.22-24, 10.16-21.

Efficacious grace is acknowledged: unmerited choice and efficacious call, 9.11-13; does not depend on the will or effort, 9.15-16.

Romans 8.28-33: *κατα προθεσιν κλητοι*, 'called according to his purpose.'

Ephesians 2.10: created in Christ Jesus to perform good works which God prepared beforehand ...

Philippians 1.6: God began and will complete.

Philippians 2.13: God who works in you to will and do for his good pleasure.

Fathers

EP, series 333

Councils

DB 133 [DS 242], DB 134 [DS 243, ND 1910], DB 139 [DS 246, ND 1913], DB 141 [DS 248, ND 1914], DB 176 [DS 373, ND 1915], DB 178 [DS 375, ND 1917], DB 179 [DS 376, ND 1918], DB 182 [DS 379], DB 193 [DS 390], DB 200 [DS 397, ND 1922] (see canons 12, 17, 20, 25) [DB 822, 827, 830, 835; DS 1562, 1567, 1570, 1575; ND 1962, 1967, 1970, 1975).

DB 809, 810 [DS 1545-1549, ND 1946-1949] repeats that our merits are God's gifts. Supposed by Paul v.¹¹⁷

Theologians

Agree regarding the matter of the thesis.¹¹⁸

117 [In the archival document, Lonergan has 'vide Pesch 583,' but this seems not to be correct, for in the book by Pesch previously cited by Lonergan there is no § 583 or p. 583.]

118 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1-2, q. 112, a. 3; 2-2, q. 24, a. 11.

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17.1 Efficacious grace does not take away freedom from necessity.

DB 797, 814, 1093 [DS 1525, 1554, 2002; ND 1929, 1954, 1989/2].

Scripture:

Commandments of God, counsels, exhortations, warnings, promises with which scripture is replete make no sense if a person is necessitated to good; but all these do make sense; therefore ...

Sirach [Ecclesiasticus] 15.14-16: God created humankind in the beginning and left them in the power of their own free choice.

Sirach [Ecclesiasticus] 31.10: who had the power to transgress and did not transgress.

Deuteronomy 30.19: 'I set before you life and death ... therefore, choose life.'

Revelation 3.20: 'if one hears my voice and opens the door to me ...'

Fathers:

EP, series 334.

Theologians agree with respect to the assertion.¹¹⁹

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17.2 Human freedom and efficacious grace

1. Freedom consists in a certain immunity.

External freedom is immunity from coercion. Thus, one's action¹²⁰ can be voluntary, that is, elicited in the will, and yet interiorly necessary (it cannot be avoided).

Freedom from coercion does not suffice. DB 1094 [DS 2003, ND 1989/3].

119 [See] Thomas Aquinas, *De malo*, q. 6, a. 1.

120 In the autograph, *actus hominis*. But it is clear that Lonergan meant simply any act done by a human being, not an *actus hominis* in the technical sense of the word, as opposed to *actus humanus*. See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1-2, q. 1 c. and ad 2m.]

Internal freedom is immunity from necessity. The necessity excluded here is not hypothetical necessity (if something is, it is), but absolute necessity. Hence there is no truth from which a free act can by necessity be deduced except those truths which include in themselves the existence of a free act.

2. Freedom is divided into freedom of contradiction¹²¹ (to do or not do an action), freedom of specification (to do this action or that), and freedom of contrariety (to do a good action or a bad one).

The second of these follows from the first. The third does not imply an imperfection in our freedom but the imperfection of our state and of our finite nature.

3. Requirements for freedom:

(a) objectively: many ways to attain a single end;

(b) subjectively on the part of the intellect: a decision that is not demonstrable but suasive;

(c) subjectively on the part of the specification of the will: the decision of the intellect does not determine the will to one particular choice;

(d) subjectively on the part of the exercise of the act of the will: the will moves itself and so determines itself to one choice.

The prior conditions are those that are necessary for freedom; the last constitutes the essence of freedom.

For the essence of internal freedom does not consist in the objective variety of means to one end: there can be many ways, and yet one of them is imposed by necessity, as happens in non-rational animals.

Moreover, freedom belongs to the subject.

121 [In the autograph, *contractionis*, an obvious slip.]

The essence of freedom does not consist in the fact that a decision is not demonstrable, in the fact that the intellect is not determined to one decision; this is nothing but objective freedom known subjectively.

Again, the indetermination of the intellect does not suffice. The fact that the intellect is not determined to one decision follows by necessity from objective indifference, and is a prerequisite for the contingency of the act of the will; but this does not explain where the free determination of the will comes from.

The essence of freedom does not consist in the fact that the decision of the intellect does not determine the will to one choice, for this is merely negative.

The essence of freedom lies in this, that the will is capable of choosing between contradictories or contraries, and moves itself to choose this particular one.

For essence is that by which, when posited, the reality itself is present with all its properties.

The reality itself is present: for an efficient cause that is not determined to one choice and positively determines what effect it should produce possesses interior control over its act.

These are the consequent properties: the will is not determined by the decision, but its self-determination makes this decision to be the last step to take. The intellect is not determined to its decision from the end, otherwise by equal necessity the willing of the means would be determined by the willing of the end. There exist objectively different ways, for otherwise the intellect would err in contingently arriving at its decision.

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The efficacy of grace is to be explained neither by Bañezian predetermination nor by that prevailing delight described by many Augustinians, but by the fact that God gives to

the human person such grace as he knows to be congruous to that person's free consent.¹²²

17.2.1 Physical predetermination

Sufficient grace is one thing (a physical premotion to an indeliberate act) which gives one the power to act (in the sense in which one cannot actually act).

Efficacious grace is something else (physical premotion to a deliberate act) which produces the actual action.

This grace, as being in itself a finite entity, can fail to produce its effect; and therefore in the divided sense it is a contingent cause.

But the same grace, as an instrument of God, cannot fail to produce its effect, and therefore in the composite sense it is a necessitating cause.

Further, it is intrinsic to this efficacious grace that it be an instrument of God, and therefore this grace is intrinsically or in itself efficacious

Besides, it is efficacious in another way also: for it produces the actual action, and it is contradictory to say that actual action is produced and yet is not had.

This system is inadmissible

(a) because it does away with truly sufficient grace.

Isaiah 5: 'What is it that I ought to have done for my vineyard that I have not done?'

Give predetermination, O God.

(b) because it does away with freedom from necessity

Physical predetermination is an entity antecedent to a free act from which a free act necessarily follows.

¹²² On the efficacy of grace, see above.

If it follows by absolute necessity, there is no freedom from necessity; if it follows by hypothetical necessity, there is no antecedent entity and the system is abandoned; if it follows by no necessity, grace has no efficacy.

(c) All this makes nonsense of the fundamental concepts of the whole of metaphysics, and calumniates St Thomas, a Doctor of the Church.

17.2.2 Prevailing delight

A person acts either out of prevailing charity or prevailing covetousness.

Grace entices one through the moral virtues so that if it is relatively strong, charity begins to prevail, but if it is relatively weak (even if strong, absolutely speaking), worldly covetousness prevails.

Hence there is a dilemma: can a prevailing delight fail? If it can, it is not efficacious; if it cannot fail, it is a necessitating cause, indeed absolutely so. Therefore it destroys freedom from necessity or destroys efficacious grace. Besides, there are further difficulties concerning sufficient grace: for without this prevailing delight, either one cannot perform a good act and then there is no truly and merely sufficient grace, or one can and then of what use is this prevailing delight?

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17.3 *The Bañezian system is inadmissible.*

1. Because it is based upon conclusions concerning the potency to act and action, the indifference of passive potency, and the indifference of active potency.
2. Because it calumniates Saint Thomas in implying that he had confused these things.
3. Because it does away with truly sufficient grace.

‘What more is there that I ought to have done and have not done?’ They reply, ‘Physical predetermination.’

Nor is there any reason why the texts of scripture should be interpreted according to the confusions, even the metaphysical ones, of the Bañezians.

4. Because it does away with the human freedom of the will

A person either accepts physical predetermination for a salutary act or not; if he accepts it, it is self-contradictory that he actually acts and does not act; if he does not accept it, it is self-contradictory that he does not actually act, yet acts. Whether, therefore, he accepts or does not accept a predetermination, he does not have control over his own act.

Nor are basic confusions in metaphysics excused by the additions of new confusions.

(a) They say: freedom cannot consist in the fact that one is the first cause of one's own determination.

We willingly grant this. But it does not follow (unless one supposes the Bañezian confusions) that a human person is incapable of acting or not acting.

(b) They say: efficacious grace does not do away with freedom.

Just as one who is standing up is capable of sitting, that is, by antecedent potency in the divided sense, likewise efficacious grace does not produce the potency to act but the act itself, and the positing of the act does not do away with freedom; for in choosing this I can, in the divided sense, choose that.

Either efficacious grace is the salutary act itself, and then there is no predetermination and grace has no antecedent efficacy, or efficacious grace is not the salutary act itself but some prior entity, and then there is no solution. An act is necessitated prior to its existence.

(c) They say: freedom consists essentially in the fact that a decision is not demonstrated.

We grant that freedom supposes the contingency of the decision; that it essentially is its contingency, we deny.

(d) They say: grace is efficacious not by reason of its own perfection but by reason of divine efficacy, that is, as an instrument of God.

We reply that not even divine effectiveness exists prior to the free act itself; otherwise the free act would be necessitated.

5. Because it makes God the principal author of sin

God either grants efficacious grace and a person necessarily performs a morally good act, or God does not grant efficacious grace and a person has only the potency to receive a further determination which he does not accept.

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18 Congruism and Molinism

1. These theories agree regarding efficacious grace.

They differ concerning the order of the conceptual designations (*signa rationis*) of the divine mind. Some hold that God first wills an end and subsequently wills the means; hence they assert that predestination to glory, understood precisely, is prior to foreseen merits and therefore has the formal predefinitions of merits. Others hold that willing the means precedes when the end that is willed is conditioned, that the glory of a person, understood precisely, is an end that is willed conditionally and therefore predestination, taken precisely, is subsequent to foreseen merits, and the predefinitions of merits are virtual.

On this difference, see the treatise *De Deo Uno*.

2. EP, series 1573: the patristic basis of congruism.

God gives to a person such grace as he knows is congruous with that person's free consent.

3. The meaning of God, human person, grace, freedom, and consent is by now sufficiently clear.

Three kinds of knowledge:

(a) KNOWLEDGE OF SIMPLE UNDERSTANDING:

object: possibles, ideas

means: the divine essence, Word.

(b) MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE:

object: conditioned futures (hypothetically actual beings); scripture demonstrates the existence of middle knowledge.

means: divine concursus conferred conditionally considered terminatively.¹²³

In other words, God knows how he would concur with a person if that person were placed in such or such circumstances.

This hypothetical concursus is not fully distinguished from the free act itself; it is the free act as produced by God; and the total act is produced by God.

Hence middle knowledge is not a kind of experimental knowledge, as if God were performing hypothetical experiments in order to find out through observation of the results how a person would freely act. In this way God would be acted upon.¹²⁴

Hence the concursus cannot be indifferent, as if God were the cause of the entity and the creature were the cause of the determination. In this case, God could not know the free act in his concursus as the means of his knowing.

Hence, middle knowledge is distinct from knowledge of simple understanding. The latter is about possibles; but middle knowledge adds hypothetical existence. Besides, knowledge of simple understanding precedes every act of the will, while middle knowledge follows the hypothetical decrees of the will.

123 *Henricus Lennerz, De Deo Uno (Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana) 232-33, §§329-30.*

[In the archival document, Lonergan has ‘p. 223 f,’ but it seems he inadvertently inverted the last two digits for §§ 329-30 appear on pp. 232-33 of Lennerz’s book.]

124 [At this point Lonergan has written in the left margin what appears to be ‘cf. *Bleau, oppositum p. 522,*’ though the ‘5’ could perhaps be a ‘1.’ Paulin Bleau seems to be the writer Lonergan has in mind, but beyond that the editors have been unsuccessful in identifying to what exactly Lonergan is referring.]

(c) VISION KNOWLEDGE:

object: absolute futures (absolute actual beings)

means: middle knowledge together with an absolute divine decree.

Molinism: (Lessius) God gives a grace that is efficacious; the person acts morally and deservedly accepts the reward.

Congruism: God gives a grace because it was; if it were not efficacious, he would have chosen another grace that would be efficacious. For before any foreseen merits, God predestined this person to glory.

*Thus Bellarmine, Suarez.*¹²⁵

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(a) congruous: that is, apt, suitable, proportioned with the consent to be obtained.

Two kinds of congruity: intrinsic and extrinsic.

Intrinsic congruity is the aptitude and proportion of the grace itself to effect consent in this concrete set of circumstances.

This intrinsic congruity provides no more than a great degree of probability, moral certitude at most.

Intrinsically congruent grace is not sufficient to explain the efficacy of grace. For this grace can fail; indeed, since it is impious to attribute to God gifts of grace that are incongruous, this intrinsic congruity is found also in every sufficient grace.

(b) Extrinsically congruent grace is that which is infallibly connected with free consent.

This nexus is founded, proximately, on middle knowledge, and remotely on the indefectibility of divine concursus.

By middle knowledge God truly knows what a person would do in certain circumstances, natural and supernatural; and one who truly knows the nexus, knows the objective nexus.

125 [Handwritten insertion by Lonergan at the bottom of p. 78.]

The objectivity of this nexus is had from the indefectibility of divine concursus: for it is absolutely contrary to God's infinite perfection that any action of his would be frustrated.

(c) Hence efficacious grace is that grace by whose use God indefectibly produces a free salutary act.

It has the efficacy of power: for grace gives physical and moral strength.

It has efficacy of operation: for the salutary act itself takes place.

It has an antecedent nexus: for middle knowledge precedes every free act; and the indefectibility of divine concursus precedes the effect of the concursus, for it is grounded in God's infinite perfection.

(d) Human freedom is safeguarded.

Neither middle knowledge nor divine concursus is prior to the futurity (actual or hypothetical actuality) of a free act.

Middle knowledge is not, because it is grounded on concursus.

Concursus is not, because considered in its term it is not adequately distinct from the free act itself.

If I have a concursus I also have the act, not as a consequence but by identity. Just as the act of consenting is not prior to the consent itself, so neither is the concursus considered in its term.

(e) There is no intrinsic efficacy.

This is not demonstrated from scripture.

Nor is it possible. For grace cannot have any efficacy antecedently to divine effectiveness itself; but divine effectiveness is simultaneous with the consent itself; therefore grace is also.

Whatever is predicated contingently of God is predicated by extrinsic denomination; thus are predicated God's knowing, willing, and acting concerning actual beings.

Whatever is truly predicated by extrinsic denomination supposes the actuality of an extrinsic denominator, and therefore it cannot be prior to this actuality.