

The Triune God

Notice

These notes are not an unabridged presentation of the treatise on the triune God but contain only those propositions that are more positive in nature. A more speculative account of this material is set forth at length in Bernard Lonergan's *Divinarum Personarum Conceptionem Analogicam* (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1957).¹

Introduction

Summary

Given the importance of the question of dogmatic development, there is presented here a complete introductory exposition consisting of the following six points:

- 1 A linguistic factor: development in the symbolic way of speaking about the Holy Trinity.
- 2 A crisis in this development: some general points concerning the Arian controversy.
- 3 A second linguistic factor: the development in the way of speaking about God, in which there is detected (a) a transition from the way of speaking proper to a particular culture to that of a different culture (transcultural transition); (b) the unique character of dogmatic development, which is not *merely* transcultural.
- 4 To explain these factors, recourse is had to the parallels between scientific and commonsense knowing.

1 See Bernard Lonergan, *De Deo trino: Pars systematica* (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964; *The Triune God: Systematics*, vol. 12 in *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009).

5 These parallels are applied analogously to our human knowledge of God.

6 A particular application is made to the Trinitarian crisis in the fourth century.

At the end of the introduction, there is offered an answer to a relativistic objection.

1 The linguistic factor: development in the way of speaking about the Trinity in the creeds.

The Trinitarian dogma can be expressed in fourteen short non-technical propositions:

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|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1 The Father is God | 4 God is the Father |
| 2 The Son is God | 5 God is the Son |
| 3 The Holy Spirit is God | 6 God is the Holy Spirit |
| ***** | |
| 7 The Father is not the Son | 11 The Son is not the Holy Spirit |
| 8 The Son is not the Father | 12 The Holy Spirit is not the Son |
| 9 The Father is not the Holy Spirit | 13 God is one |
| 10 The Holy Spirit is not the Father | 14 God is not a quarternity |

(4th Lateran Council, 1215, DB 432)

Propositions 1-6 are convertible; cf. Council of Rheims, 1148, DB 390.²

In these propositions the nouns ‘substance,’ ‘nature,’ and ‘person’ are not used. Such words belong to theological reflection rather than to a simple statement of the dogma. In accordance with the degree to which this theological elaboration is developed, the doctrine of the Trinity is conceived and expressed in different ways at different times, as can be seen in comparing four fundamental documents which testify to the faith of the church, namely, the *Quicumque* or Athanasian Creed, the Apostles’ Creed, the Nicene Creed, and the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed.

2 ‘Cum de tribus personis loquimur, Patre, Filio et Spiritu Sancto, ipsas unum Deum, unam divinam substantiam esse fatemur. Et e converso cum de uno Deo, una divina substantia loquimur, ipsum unum Deum, unam divinam substantiam esse tres personas confitemur.’

The Quicumque Creed (DB 39). Despite its name, it is certainly not from St Athanasius. It belongs rather to the Latin tradition. It is disputed whether its *origin* is Antipriscilian and Spanish, or is from St Ambrose or Fulgentius of Ruspe. However, its dogmatic *value* does not derive from its author but from its use and acceptance in the church and its use in both the Eastern and Western liturgies. Hence it is a true expression of Catholic faith, and its theological note can be said to be ‘of divine and catholic faith.’

In this creed, we already find the technical expressions ‘substance’ and ‘person,’ the former being reserved for God and the latter for the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. In the West, this distinction had been accepted from the time of Tertullian, while in the East there were bitter disputes about it even after the Arian crisis.

The words ‘with no confusion of persons’ reflect our six negative propositions (7-12) and what will be expressed later in a Scholastic manner as ‘a real distinction’ of persons.

The words ‘no separation of the substance’ exclude any affirmation of three substances, i.e., of three Gods. See the term *homoousion* in the Nicene Creed, 325 [DB 54].

Thus were settled the other seven positive propositions (1-6, 13).

After these affirmations, the language becomes concrete and less technical, once again about the unity of substance but also about three divine attributes: *uncreated*, as to origin, *immensity*, as to space, and *eternity*, as to time. Similarly with respect to three other divine titles: *omnipotent, God, Lord*.

Next came a more explicit distinction between the persons: if the Father is not the Son and the Son is not the Spirit and the Father is not the Spirit, something must be truly said of the Father but not of the Son, etc. This has to do with *the properties of the persons* (see the Preface of the Holy Trinity), which constitute the objective basis for the distinction of the persons. These affirmations can be expressed as follows:

‘The Father is not made, not created, not generated’;

‘The Son is not made, not created, but generated’;

‘The Spirit is not made, not created, not generated, but proceeds.’

Thereupon were denied the sharing of properties among the persons, and priority and posteriority as well as greater and lesser within the Trinity. Coeternity and coequality among the persons were affirmed, and oneness in the Trinity and threeness in the Unity.

In this creed, Trinitarian terminology is different from the manner of speaking in the East especially in this, that here ‘God’ is not a name proper to the Father but is common to all three persons. On the contrary, *ho theos* in both the Old Testament and the New is regularly said of God the Father. Only in a very few texts is it said of the Son, and only once of the Holy Spirit. Only gradually, down through the various councils, did the word ‘God’ become extended to the other persons, first among the Latin Fathers, then among the Greeks.

This progress among the Greeks can be seen by comparing the Apostles’ Creed, the Nicene Creed, and the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed.

The Apostles’ Creed (DB 2), second century, apparently. The word *theos* is said only of the Father. The titles given to Jesus are *Son* and *Lord*. No particular title is given to the Holy Spirit, but only a simple affirmation of faith. The same is found in the creed in daily use today.

The Nicene Creed (DB 54), Council of Nicea, 325. It was composed against the Arians. Here the Son is also called God, and, on account of the Arian controversies, all loopholes were blocked by declaring him to be (a) born of the Father, not made, (b) only begotten, (c) of the substance of the Father (i.e., not out of nothing, as a creature), (d) one in substance with the Father (*homoousion tō Patri*), and (e) through whom all things were made.

In contrast, this creed adds nothing about the Holy Spirit beyond what is found in the Apostles’ Creed.

The Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed (DB 86), First Council of Constantinople, 381. Its text differs from that of the Nicene Creed only with reference to what it says about the Holy Spirit. At issue was the teaching of the Macedonians and others concerning the divinity of the Holy Spirit. Considering the numerous difficulties raised against the explicit definition of the divinity of the Son and his consubstantiality with the Father, the Council Fathers argued in different ways. While stating nothing explicitly about the Spirit’s consubstantiality and the

nature of his procession, as was done in the Nicene Creed concerning the Son in the words ‘true God *from* true God, etc.,’ they simply extended implicitly to the Spirit what was said about the Father and the Son, namely the title ‘Lord’ and those attributes that always, from the Old Testament onwards have been held to be proper to God alone, such as ‘life-giving,’ ‘adoration,’ ‘conglorification.’ Thus it is implicitly asserted that the Holy Spirit is God.

By comparing these creeds, one can discern the ongoing process of clarifying the dogma of the Trinity. From a more or less general formulation which, in order to be complete, had to include those fourteen propositions mentioned above, a perfect enunciation was arrived at in the fifth or sixth century (*Quicumque*). Accordingly, thanks to the Arian heresy, there was development in Trinitarian doctrine similar to that in the teaching on grace as a result of the Pelagian heresy, with help from St Augustine. This indeed is one advantage of heresies: to force the church to render a more accurate expression of the deposit of revelation entrusted to it.

But regarding Trinitarian doctrine, this development was easier in the West (partly because Tertullian coined new terms). In the East, progress was slower and much more tumultuous, as we shall now briefly explain.

2 The crisis in this development: general observations on the Arian controversy.

The Arian controversy, from about 310 to 380, arose out of confusion between two issues, the first of which had the catholics opposing the ‘rationalists’ while the second was a dispute among the catholics themselves.

Is the Son truly God or just a creature? The question is asked against the Arians, who claimed to find in sacred scripture only a *likeness* between the Father and the Son.

Is it legitimate to use words not found in scripture in a positive formulation of the catholic faith? Here the issue is the word *homoousion* used to express the oneness in being of the Father and the Son. This question was also directed against the Arians but it was especially a question among the catholics: if the creedal formula contains only scriptural words, then the

Arians can recite the creed just as they did before with no external factors distinguishing them from true Christians. Some word, therefore, has to be thought up and introduced in order to eliminate any such loophole.

But is it legitimate to do this in a profession of faith? This led to innumerable disputes in the church, and was the reason why many Catholics, however orthodox in their belief, impugned the Council of Nicea.

On this occasion, in fact, there occurred a fundamental doctrinal development resulting from the ongoing course of history but guided by divine providence.

But to better understand this progression, we shall have to take some further steps in our investigation.

3 A second linguistic factor: development in the way of speaking about God, in which there is revealed

(A) the transition from the way of speaking proper to one culture to that of another culture (transcultural transition);

(B) the unique nature of dogmatic development, which is not a ‘merely’ transcultural transition.

Development in the notion of God (a transition from what is known to us, concrete, to what is true in itself, abstract.)

As we have seen in comparing the creeds, there are differences in the way of speaking and thinking about the Trinity in going from sacred scripture to the creeds and the documents of the magisterium. These differences are found not only in discussing the Trinity but also in speaking about God – and indeed, with utmost generality, about any object of human knowing. A consideration of such development is of utmost importance in order to understand *why* and *how* we posit the first theses in our treatise on the existence of the Trinity.

(A) Transcultural transition

Let us look now at the linguistic factors in this development in the way of speaking about God. An explanation will be given later.

The language of the [First] Vatican Council (see, for example, DB 1782) about God the creator of all things is obviously totally different from the language of scripture. The Council has many technical expressions that are not found explicitly in the bible, all of which presuppose the development of Scholastic philosophy and theology. Thus, in order to understand the words of the Council, one requires some training in philosophy and theology, because of the fact that its description of God *per se* and *propter se* is organized using highly abstract concepts. In scripture, on the contrary (see, e.g., Exodus 6.2ff., a very dissimilar text), God is presented to the Jews in a historical and personalist manner. God is described not through essential and abstract concepts but by recounting what he has done, is doing, and will be doing. God comes to be known through his actions and by his promises. That way of thinking was necessary at that time and always *must* remain, since many people never learn how to think abstractly, and because those who can so think often need the help of the concrete in their thinking and daily living. We find the same way of speaking in the New Testament.

Thus, revelation is made concretely, since abstract ideas, characteristic of educated persons, are not only of no use to the uneducated but could even lead them into deception. For concerning things that are remote from ordinary experience, the popular imagination spontaneously creates myths that are taken to be factual, but whose field does not extend to the concrete realities of everyday experience.

Thus it is in *Luke 1.46-52* (Magnificat). This text is typical of the New Testament in its allusions to the Old Testament. Mary begins with relating *her own* intimate experience of God, and then goes on to describe God's deeds.

Thus too in *Luke 1.68-79* (Benedictus). We certainly do not have here the systematic concepts of the Vatican Council, where there are no historical reminiscences. Rather, in scripture the historical connection belongs to the very notion of this God who reveals himself. (For a

further account of God as described in scripture, see the notes by Fr Alfaro, *De Deo Uno*, 1956, pp. 58-62.)³

In rightly grasping this difference between documents, we understand the order to be followed in our proof: first, to demonstrate the divinity of the Son in the New Testament, then the divinity of the Holy Spirit in the New Testament; here we have our starting point, for the dogma of the Holy Trinity is revealed in the New Testament.

Next, we must show that the ante-Nicene and the post-Nicene Fathers held the same doctrine, albeit with a development in language.

It was important to have grasped *why* such a proof is necessary in order to understand its nature. It was necessary to have grasped the differences between the language of magisterial documents such as those of the Vatican I and the language of the scriptures. If everything that is said in Vatican I can be proven by scriptural texts, still everything that the Council says in one word is equivalently expressed in scripture using many words. The language of the Council is most systematic, and thus comprehensive. A single expression in the Council supposes a multitude of references to many scriptural texts. In explaining its teaching to the people, one will have to have recourse to those many different passages in the scriptures.

The nature of this equivalence needs to be examined more closely.

If we compare the various words that Paul uses concerning God, we can see that there is already some development in them. We notice, for example, that very different language is used in speaking to the Gentiles and the Jews. For example,

Acts 13.16-47: Speaking to the Jews in the synagogue in Pisidian Antioch, Paul speaks of the many blessings of God bestowed upon his Jewish people, that is, he uses a historical concept of God proper to a Semitic people. (See also Stephen's speech in Acts 7.)

Acts 14.15-17: Speaking to the pagans in Lycaonia who wanted to worship him and Barnabas, Paul speaks of God as creator and provident conserver of all things, according to

³ Juan Alfaro, *De Deo uno* (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1956).

relative divine attributes – not relative to one particular people but to the whole of creation both material and human. This way of speaking is not determined by a particular historical context but is more abstract.

Acts 17.22-31: Paul speaks about God to the Athenians in the same universalist way in accord with attributes relative to the whole of humanity.

A *transcultural* movement is immediately evident in these texts. There is a transition from a particular culture, the Judaic, to an expression that is more general, more abstract and intellectual. Paul adapts his preaching of the gospel to the people he is addressing. This movement was especially necessary after the destruction of Jerusalem, for the center of the influence of Palestinian culture was taken away. The movement continued when the Apologists but especially Clement of Alexandria and Origen had to speak about God to cultured Greeks, who themselves had to be saved. That transcultural movement continues through the entire history of the councils, from Nicea to the Vatican [1].

But our concern here is not directly about this transcultural shift but rather about the *dogmatic* movement.

(B) The dogmatic movement is not a merely transcultural transition.

Dogmatic development should not be conceived as an exclusively transcultural phenomenon. For if another movement did not accompany this transcultural movement, in later stages positions formerly admitted as true could easily be abandoned. This in fact happened in the case of Mosaic rites but not in dogmatics. From this we have the first indication that dogmatic development cannot be reduced to a mere transcultural movement.

Besides, the meaning of dogmas is not something connected with the mentality of a particular culture. The church has never said, ‘If one does not have a Hellenistic mentality, let him be anathema.’ For in addition to the elements of a given culture, there are present in the definitions systematic, universal, catholic elements, whence we can claim that the *relativism* of

the modernists and liberal Protestants is false. For them a novel way of expression necessarily carries a new affirmation. On the other hand, if the definitions were totally new, one could legitimately admit the *archaism* of the Protestants (*sola scriptura*), the Jansenists (*solus Augustinus*), and the Irenicists mentioned in the encyclical *Humani Generis* (1950), who proclaim we must return to the early church and call Jesus Christ *Lord*, adding nothing that might explain how this title is to be understood.

But in fact, although there was a transition from the Judaeo-Palestinian mentality to the Judaeo-Alexandrian, to the Syriac, to the Hellenistic, to the medieval and modern . . . , revealed dogmas do not stand in a relativistic flux. In fact, we are able to determine the very meaning of development. For God, although he has historically couched revelation in the categories of the Semitic mentality, founded a church that was not Judaic, or Syriac, or Hellenistic, or medieval or modern but *catholic*.

Hence the fundamental problem is the antithesis between form and ‘content.’ What relation is there between a *particular* form, such as is ‘incarnate’ in a determinate historical ‘setting,’ and the *universal* truth which it contains? Hence the two aspects of theological studies: *knowledge of the form* under which revelation has been given, requiring thorough and diverse studies in order to determine what is contained in scripture; and *an understanding of the data of revelation* as meant for every people, place, time and culture. God was aware of this problem and provided a solution. He himself presides over the movement whereby from elements that are proper to a particular culture revelation always becomes more universal.

Let us see how this process unfolds.

As we said above, there are two movements in the development of dogma.

(1) Above all, people intend *transcultural adaptations*. This is admitted by all and is readily understood. Hence there arise the many particular difficulties in communicating dogmas in various cultures.

(2) Still, the movement is never only transcultural: there is always something more. Even in the minor variations in expression, the universal meaning of dogmas remains independent of

particular circumstances and is attained by divine, not human, intention. For example, the introduction of the word *homoousion* in the fourth-century Nicene Creed was fundamental. This word is not found in scripture, and so the controversies went on for fifty years. In the Council of Nicea, the church clearly and consciously took a progressive step in the abstract systematic order despite the opposition of many catholics. Yet this step proceeded from human beings and from God in different ways. St Athanasius, the stout defender of *homoousion*, never even thought about or intended arriving at a universal expression of the doctrine. It was not a matter of finding a better formulation but of coming up with the only alternative possible that would exclude the Arian heresy. Even Athanasius admitted that it would be better to express the faith using only the words of scripture, but he defended *homoousion* as a necessary exception. God, however, used what was done by way of exception against the will of many to introduce something into the church by way of principle.

The same thing happened in the following century at the Council of Chalcedon where in defining the [one] person of Christ in two natures, the word ‘nature’ was used in a new sense. Hence Severus of Antioch, still thinking in a conservative way about nature as concrete and subsistent, accused the Council of Nestorianism. Even at Chalcedon there was introduced, albeit unconsciously, not only something borrowed from the scriptural and patristic mentality but also something systematic and universal.

Likewise, in the Middle Ages a fundamental step was taken in the development of dogma in the controversies between the Augustinians and the Aristotelians. Actually, not many have understood what the issue was. But in fact, medieval theology, in transposing dogmas into Aristotelian categories, obtained definitive systematic acquisitions for the church.

Hence, this dogmatic development towards a systematic and universal meaning happened apart from any human intention. The human persons who carried it out were not thinking about dogmatic development, attending only to the transcultural movement; but God used them to provide teaching that was catholic and universal. For when the love of intelligence, wisdom, and knowledge thrives in the church, the necessary condition for doctrinal development is there. If it

should happen that this love grows cold, there are heretics who will force the church to make progress simply by the reaction they stir up. But God always and infallibly obtains his ends. What is said here about movement in theology ought to be kept before one's eyes when proving any theological thesis from sacred scripture.

But what is the difference between expressions that are universal, catholic, systematic, and permanent and those that belong to particular cultures? To understand this, we shall begin a comparison between two ways that are proper to human thought, and from this comparison light will come to illumine our quest.

4 A parallelism between scientific and commonsense knowledge will help to explain these facts.

(A) Human commonsense knowledge

(a) Commonsense knowledge is governed by practical concerns, and is itself practical. If a question has no practical importance, it provokes little interest. The finality of such knowledge is essentially egoistic, 'interested'; its slogan is 'live first, then philosophize.' So it is greatly concerned about other things besides knowledge that are part of ordinary life.

(b) Hence it considers things according to their relations to us. For this sort of knowledge, to consider things in themselves seems rather odd and mysterious, indeed quite useless.

(c) It distinguishes various aspects of things but limits itself to their differences in relation to us. It is not the whole object, then, that is known. But regarding those aspects to which it does attend, it sometimes makes quite subtle and exact observations.

(d) These different aspects are connected to one another in a merely empirical manner. The conjunction most often used is 'and ... and ... and' – one particular thing taken by itself known through its many manifestations.

(e) It makes no use of definitions⁴ or deductions, which in fact greatly annoy it, because it considers itself to be the best equipped to know the definitions of everything. It is against scientific knowledge just as the Athenians were against Socrates. To one whose life is lived in ordinary knowledge alone, speculative people are looked upon as being in some way not only useless but even dangerous because they are continually asking questions about things that seem most certain.

(B) Scientific knowledge

(a) It begins from love of understanding and of intelligible truth. It is knowledge that is ‘disinterested,’ or rather its ‘interest’ is universal, not particular and egoistic. It attends almost entirely to knowledge and wants to subordinate everything to it.

(b) It considers things as they are in themselves, not according to their relation to us.

(c) It considers all aspects of things, even the invisible and inaudible, etc. For this reason it makes use of the very best machines.

(d) The connection between these aspects is causal: things are known through their causes, and so the most frequent connective is ‘because’ and not ‘and ... and ...’ Thus many things are known in their unity.

(e) It is greatly taken up with defining things and in making deductions, while rarely concerned with the concrete aspects of reality.

5 This parallelism is analogously applied to human knowledge of God.

(A) Knowledge of God in sacred scripture (an analogy with commonsense knowledge)

⁴ The Latin text has ‘defensionibus.’ An editorial change has been made to ‘definitionibus.’

(a) God is defined not in terms of what he is but by what he does and says. The synthetic concept directing revelation is a *soteriological* concept, and hence it is most practical. Soteriology is awaited in the Old Testament; it is realized in the New.

(b) God is described by what he says and does to us, first to the patriarchs and then to the people of Israel, hence according to attributes that are relative and almost always particular.

(c) An immense amount of research has to be done to form an adequate notion of God, who is as it were an historical concept.

(d) There is almost never given a definition of God. The One who is God is known by a multitude of things. This knowledge has always remained and ever will remain in the church, especially for pastoral reasons. The church is not and must never be a school of philosophers.

(B) The notion of God, e.g., in the First Vatican Council (an analogy with scientific human knowledge)

(a) God is defined as he is in himself, according to what he is, at least insofar as this can be known by us.

(b) God is described in terms of his attributes, either absolute or universal relatives.

(c) From those things that are prior to us, *quoad nos*, we proceed to that one reality which is prior in itself, *quoad se*.

(d) From what are prior in themselves, everything else that can be said about God is deduced. From this, many assertions that are made about God in revelation are known through that one reality that is God.

This application is not restricted solely to the notion of God, but could be followed anywhere in theology. For theology is simply the understanding, expressed in technical terms introduced according to church tradition, of whatever is to be found in the sources of revelation.

Besides the analogy outlined above, however, there are *fundamental differences between scientific and theological knowledge*.

1 Scientific progress is the work of human beings and carried out in accordance with their aims. Advances in dogma, in the other hand, are not achieved by human intention but by God's, who often, by allowing heresies to emerge, gradually brings Catholic thought around to what is prior in itself.

2 The natural sciences begin from and are grounded on sensible data, by which their value is established. But the dogmatic process begins from truths which God reveals about himself. Whence arise huge differences!

(a) Natural scientists by understanding sensible data arrive at theories that are more or less probable; through approximations they advance indefinitely to what is simply true. (At least this is what scientists say, but science sometimes does seem to arrive at some truth – in chemistry, for example, where it would certainly be hard to conceive a wholesale revision of the periodic table). Better and better scientific theories are constantly coming up. (N.B. We are not speaking of philosophy here!)

(b) Theologians on the other hand begin from truths that are believed. Their understanding of these truths continually grows, yet they must always cling to the truth from which they started. No revolution is possible in theological development, for its starting point is not sensible data. Whoever does anything different is not a genuine theologian, whose function it is to seek an understanding of revealed truth. Through the theological process there *is* growth in understanding, but the understanding is of the same truth (see DB 1800); but it is the same truth that remains known throughout the whole process, whereas in scientific progress a truth as such is almost never known.

3 New scientific theories often fundamentally overturn the older ones. It is in this way that there is always further growth in understanding sensible data. It is otherwise in theology, where understanding the same truth truly grows in such a way that the starting point of the process, the revealed datum, is always being better understood without ever being denied.

Here are four examples of progress in understanding sacred scripture:

1 *First step*: One who duly reads scripture has first an understanding of individual texts, which is not yet sufficient even about each one taken separately because they are approached separately. See, for example, the commentaries of Origen or Augustine.

2 *Second step*: In prescindning from accidentals, from metaphors, etc., and attending to essentials, one arrives at an understanding of the meaning of each text. By noting that the same thing is being said in several texts and comparing those texts, one forms a concept of the essence of one and the same thing expressed in diverse texts and finds technical terms to express it. The essence that is thus found and expressed is not found explicitly in any particular scriptural text; it is rather the fruit of an abstraction by which is expressed the same doctrine as that contained in scripture, though in different concepts. By arranging these concepts in order there is produced a systematic series of concepts about the nucleus of the teaching of the scripture. This knowledge is a new and more comprehensive understanding of the same truth. This is the first systematic exegesis. (See Peter Lombard, *Liber Sententiarum*).

3 *Third step*: If you compare those fundamental concepts derived from an understanding of the nucleus of the scripture, you immediately discover huge problems and difficulties. You see what is said about God, who is both one and three; about Christ, both human and divine; about grace, that it is hard to see how it is compatible with free will. Thus begins the second systematic exegesis: the same truth is known more comprehensively, because the relations among its various aspects are determined. Thus is born systematic theology. (See, for example, the theological systematization of the thirteenth century.)

4 *Fourth step*: It is noticed that the accidentals from which one prescindns in the second step are not superfluous but very important for a deeper understanding of the ever-unchanged truth. A more concrete and at the same time more synthetic way of understanding is sought. Positive investigations are multiplied, and attention is paid to the smallest archeological, liturgical, linguistic, ascetical, historical etc., details. This is the step toward which twentieth-century theology is heading.

5 *The fourth step is not the last.* The time will come when theology will be more comprehensive and synthetic and at the same time more concrete, resulting from the historical syntheses of the fourth step. But let us not call for that synthesis before it is possible; there is not yet any method sufficiently developed that is capable of that sort of investigation. What our times need most of all is patience; otherwise we shall easily err – as did St Anselm who, endowed as he was with great intelligence and being engrossed in all the most difficult questions, wanted to solve them at a time that still lacked the conceptual foundations necessary for doing so. Merely seventy-five years later, Peter Lombard arrived on the scene, collecting the documents needed for the new requirements of systematics. And the same can be said of Abelard's premature doctrines. The positions of those authors are almost completely abandoned today, because they were developed too prematurely. Their importance, however, lies in their influence on contemporary authors to develop methods better adapted to the new demands of human thinking and by which the same truth can be understood in an ever more comprehensive way.

So the same thing can be said about theological knowledge as is said about angelic knowledge. What is true of the angels hierarchically, namely, that the higher angels understand the same truth through fewer *species* and have a more comprehensive knowledge than their fellows, is happening here below in the ongoing course of history.

Dogmatic development: Conclusion

We believe that we have demonstrated what we asserted above, that there are two historical movements concerning dogmas. One is *transcultural*, which continually from the first Council of Jerusalem has had to go forward – and this is why there are schools of missiology and always new missionary adaptations. The other is *theological*, always opposed by many because it seems to corrupt – as they say – the true meaning of the gospel. But when only the transcultural movement is asserted, we fall into the dogmatic relativism condemned in the encyclical *Humani*

Generis (1950). Dogmatic development, as we have seen, implies not only a transition from what is first with respect to certain persons to something else that is first to other persons, other times, places, cultures, etc., *but also* to something that is first in itself, previously not known or less known by us. This is proper theological progress.

Regarding this theological progress the following should be noted:

1 It is necessary by reason of the very nature of the Catholic Church. What is first in itself is not dependent on any prior culture. Hence a transition had to be made to a more universal and more abstract expression, lest the Christian should be obliged to become Oriental.

2 It is made not by human intention but by God's. For true doctrinal development is known only after it has occurred. The infallibility of this progress is evident here as the work of the Holy Spirit.

3 The necessity for this did not exist only in the early church but is always present. And in fact this progress is always going on in the church, as can be seen from the fact that on all five continents amid so many disparate cultures the same truth is believed and proclaimed in the same way.

4 Although theological progress is in keeping with the very structure of human knowing, it is profoundly different from advancement in the natural sciences.

5 This theological knowledge of dogmas can equip us with that understanding and wisdom of the mysteries of the faith called for by Vatican I (DB 1796).

6 Application of the above to the Trinitarian crisis in the fourth century

The basic reason for the Arian crisis that shook the whole church in the fourth century was that the progress toward what is prior in itself regarding Christ was not equal to that regarding God. This progress was quicker in the case of God but slower regarding Christ.

The concept of God evolved because of the transition from a notion of God according to attributes relative to a particular notion (canticles in the New Testament, for example) to a notion

regarding attributes relative to all people, universal attributes (Paul). The problem about God was given more careful consideration because pagans, especially philosophers, ridiculed the anthropomorphisms of the Old Testament. The Apologists and the early Fathers, influenced by Greek and Hellenistic philosophy, worked hard at purifying such notions by approaching the definition of God according to either absolute attributes or universal relative attributes.

Yet there was also progress regarding the notion of Christ.

In the beginning Christ was an individual known to the apostles, the crowds, the scribes and Jewish teachers (synoptic gospels). Next he was a man who rose from the dead, savior, judge of the living and the dead, seated at the right hand of God: *kyrios*, Lord, a name that is special to God in the Old Testament (Paul, Apostles' Creed). Then there were speculations about the *logos* (John), especially among the Apologists. He was said to be God, but it was not clearly thought out in what sense he was God, how what was said about Christ was to be understood. So far this was commonsense human knowing. In fact, in many authors such as Justin and Origen there are some elements of subordinationism. Finally, at the Council of Nicea there was made that one affirmation that was first in itself, *homoousion*, by means of which many statements were made about the Son that could be understood exactly.

Still, developments in thinking about the notion of God and of Christ were unequal, and so there arose in the fourth century the question about Christ, whether he himself was God. For since the notion of God was worked out according to absolute attributes, it seemed difficult to admit that God has sons, so this was considered to be rather a vestige of pagan mythology. Thus for the first time an opening was given for rationalism to impugn the divinity of Christ and subsequently that of the Holy Spirit. These fourth-century rationalists were the Arians, the Eunomians, etc.

But besides the rationalist movement, the *traditionalist* faction in the fourth century also contributed to causing the crisis. To be able to show in the fourth century that Christ was God, one would have to use the fourth-century concepts in speaking about Christ that were used by those who opposed the divinity of the Son. Nor could it be enough to use only words that are

found in scripture, which were not questioned by the Arians. It was now no longer possible to stay with an earlier understanding of the words [that had to be used]:⁵ a greater and more comprehensive understanding was needed. For this reason Athanasius proposed to introduce the word *homoousion* into the creed by way of exception.

For since the crisis arose out of an unequal development in the two sets of concepts [about God and about Christ], the solution had to be found not in a return to the past but in speeding up development regarding Christ. Thus, a new systematic word was added to the creed.

At that point the opposition of the traditionalists erupted on the part of many who in no way doubted the divinity of Christ yet refused to accept as a matter of faith a word not found in scripture. This opposition to Nicea was much stronger and more widespread than the Arian opposition, all the more so as this opinion was embraced by a larger number of good Catholics, even saints and bishops. From this there arose interminable disputes between the Arians and Semiarians; many of the latter, however, were never Arians but only conservative traditionalists. For 60 years numerous disputes went on concerning the divinity of Christ, numerous councils, numerous creedal formulas; yet the reason for that uncertainty was not a rationalism suddenly scattered about the church but the very serious problem about development in dogma: the refusal to introduce technical terms into the creed.

The complexity of this question and of matters of dogmatic development in general ought to be borne in mind when we begin to prove theological theses from scripture; for the same errors, namely rationalism and traditionalism, are still being repeated today.

For others (anachronistic traditionalists), ignoring so many questions, think that there can be a direct and technically deductive syllogistic transition from the New Testament to the Nicene Creed, and in general from the language of scripture to that of the councils, as if the Evangelists

⁵ The Latin text has ‘in prima intelligentia illarum virum.’ The change to ‘in prima intelligentia illorum verborum’ is editorial.

had been able to speak to their listeners just as the Fathers had to address the faithful three centuries later.

Actually, it is not a matter of deducing the consubstantiality of the Son from the New Testament by a strictly syllogistic technical process; for in a syllogism there is no term in the conclusion that is not in the premises. Nowhere in the New Testament is *homoousion* to be found. In both the New Testament and the council the same meaning is expressed, not absolutely but in different ways in each source, according to a different ‘prior.’ For the same divinity of Christ is affirmed in the New Testament in the commonsense way of knowing as is expressed in the council in a speculative way of knowing.

Hence what has to be proven is whether the concept of Christ in the New Testament is proportionate to the scriptural concept of God in the same way that Nicea’s concept of Christ is proportionate to the fourth-century concept of God.

Others, on the other hand (rationalists, modernists, liberals), on the grounds that the aforementioned technical deduction is impossible, maintain that at Nicea something extra was illegitimately added to scripture. We, however, in proving the consubstantiality of the Son from scripture, do not repeat the same thing in different words; rather, we make a transition from what is prior to us to what is prior in itself, from the many things which always mean the same one thing to that one thing which means many things.

Those who are too ready to find the terminology of the councils in the scriptures lead others to deny the legitimacy and validity of the process. The opposite errors of both rationalism and traditionalism have a common root; the catholic doctrine alone is truly progressive!

Objection: Given the importance of the cultural context of revelation, this may be said: if the Incarnation had taken place in another culture, there would be a different revelation, hence a different dogma.

Reply: that there would be a *substantially* different true revelation, I deny; an *accidentally* different revelation, I grant. For cultural differences involve accidental differences.

That the same truth would have been revealed in a different way I grant, but with this reservation: some preparation by God would have to be supposed (in the case of Israel it went on for twenty centuries) that would have influenced the culture of the chosen people. The announcement of and preparation for the Incarnation would be done differently.

The consequences, however, do not affect the dogmas, which are prior in themselves, because the differences would affect only what is, or would be, prior to us.

Explanation:

1 *Difference between natural sciences and history:* The natural sciences are the same now on all five continents. For despite cultural differences, all think in the same way about mathematics, physics, chemistry, etc. The same things are understood, thought, concluded ...

Histories of countries are different by reason of their authors, because each one writes with the particular “interest” of their readers in mind. Moreover, history is about the concrete: abstract concepts and propositions that are evident *per se* are of less importance, therefore, than sentiments, images, illustrations, etc., all of which are part of cultural relativity. Compare the difficulty and impossibility of translating into Latin, for instance, metaphors that are proper to our national languages.

2 *The factual reason:* this diversity between the natural sciences and history comes from the fact that the natural sciences tend to what is prior in themselves: not to what is sensed – for instance, in determining mass, temperature, etc. – but to what is. Abstracting from what is prior to us, they attain something that is not changed by a change in sensations or a cultural change.

The same sort of approach to the prior in itself is something that the historian partly cannot, partly dare not, attempt. For in speaking about concrete things one must make use of the senses in order to know them. Historians do not posit abstract preconceptions but adapt themselves to their readers. Also, there is a certain relativity here since in dealing with concrete things it is very difficult to express what is prior in itself. To do this, historians would have to solve all the philosophical questions about history before writing history, or they would never write at all. So while philosophers discuss among themselves, historians write, though with a

certain sceptico-relativistic element in what they write. Practically speaking, this is often better, for experience has amply shown that historians who have wanted to follow a certain philosophy in writing history have not done as well as others. In history, therefore, it is not so easy to understand how the prior in itself ought to be approached – which still has to be done, in so far as possible.

3 Application to our concern: Since the nineteenth century, scriptural exegesis has been done in the light of history. As a result there have arisen a host of very divergent interpretations. Biblical schools have multiplied so that now there are almost as many opinions as there are exegetes. And since under history there are latent philosophies, to bring philosophy into exegesis is even more absurd. Philosophical schemes have been imposed upon sacred scripture. This happened with Hegel, and today with Bultmann who wants to demythologize Christianity. As a well-known Anglican author has remarked, this endeavor makes Christ a follower of Martin Heidegger!

The theologico-dogmatic movement, however, will escape from cultural relativity by seeking that which is first in itself and starting from a truth that is already more or less sufficiently known. The questions that arise in this transition are questions about being or non-being (the historical existence of Jesus), about finite or infinite existence (the divinity of Christ), about the same or different (personal distinction of the Son from the Father). All other elements of everyday living are left aside, even though they contribute greatly to a vital acceptance of revelation; these, however, are more suitable to evangelization than to theology. Thus relativism is avoided, and we arrive at something that is prior in itself, something catholic, so that nothing further is taken from that culture in which revelation took place.

This, then, is our reply to the objection: even if in some other culture the Incarnation and Revelation had occurred, the same dogmas would be ours today.

On the Divinity of the Holy Spirit

That the Holy Spirit is a divine person distinct from the Father and the Son is drawn from the synoptic gospels, the Acts of the Apostles, and the letters of St Paul. (Boyer, 1949, pp. 19-28)⁶

General outline

1 'Spirit' in the Old Testament: *ruah, pneuma*

in the New Testament: *pneuma*

2 The Holy Spirit in the New Testament in general

3 A particular gospel text, Matthew 28.19

4 General argument from the New Testament on the divinity of the Holy Spirit. Objections

5 *Pneuma* in Paul

6 'Life in the Spirit' in Paul (analysis of 1 Corinthians 12)

7 Proof of the divinity of the Spirit from letters of St Paul. Objections

1 The Word 'Spirit'

a In the Old Testament - ruah

Non-religious usage: (1) wind, air, breath, movement; (2) vital principle, especially of sensitive living beings; see Psalm 104.29; (3) human soul (like a variable wind), various movements,

⁶ Lonergan refers often to Charles Boyer, *Synopsis Praelectionum de Sanctissima Trinitate* (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1949).

one's spirit as the seat of the emotions. (See Zorell, Hebrew Lexicon⁷). It is doubtful whether it sometimes suggests a spiritual substance.

Religious usage: Spirit of YHWH

Anthropomorphically it means breath, God's breathing, since for the Jews Yahweh is always alive and hence always breathing. See, e.g., Exodus 15.8, 'blast of your nostrils'; 2 Samuel 22.16, Psalm 18.16.

Functions of the spirit of Yahweh:

1 Cosmological function:

to give life to things: Genesis 1:2: 'The spirit of Yahweh hovered over the waters' (this interpretation is disputed);

seems in a special way to concern human life: the breath/spirit of Yahweh passes through the nostrils of human beings giving them life. Genesis 2.7, 6.3, 6.17, 7.15; thus it is virtually the cause of life.

2 The divine power producing extraordinary feelings or emotions:

transient: acts of bravery, prowess, prophetic exaltation

bravery: e.g., Judges 14.6: 'The spirit of the Lord came mightily upon [Samson], and he tore the lion asunder as one tears a kid; and he had nothing in his hand.'

prowess: e.g., 1 Samuel 11.6-7: 'And the Spirit of God came mightily upon Saul when he heard these words, and his anger was greatly kindled. He took a yoke of oxen, and cut them in pieces ...'

prophetic exaltation (even false): e.g., 1 Kings 22:20-22. ... and the Lord said, 'Who will entice Ahab, the king of Israel?' ... Then a spirit came forward and stood before the Lord, saying, 'I will entice him.' And the Lord said to him, 'By what means?' And he said, 'I will go forth, and will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets. And the Lord said, 'You will

⁷ Franz Zorell, *Lexicon Hebraicum et Aramaicum Veteris Testamenti* (Rome: Pontificium Institutum Biblicum, 1947-1964).

entice him, and you shall succeed; go forth and do so.’ (Here it is not about the spirit of Yahweh but of a spirit indirectly dependent on Yahweh.)

permanent: the Spirit gives to individuals some supernatural power which is manifested in various ways:

Thus Joseph interprets dreams because the Spirit of God is in him; Genesis 41.38: ‘Can we find such a man as this, in whom is the Spirit of God?’

Thus with regard to Joshua; Numbers 27.18: ‘The Lord said to Moses, “Take Joshua the son of Nun, a man in whom is the spirit ...”’

Thus with regard to David and with regard to Elijah and Elisha. 1 Samuel 16.13, 2 Kings 2.9-15.

But it was especially during the time of the prophets that this concept was clearly manifest in the prophetic books. Micah 3.8: ‘But as for me, I am filled ... with the Spirit of the Lord.’ The spirit of Yahweh is generally connected with prophecy: see Isaiah 30.1, Zechariah 7.12, Nehemiah 9.30. In Jeremiah, however, there is no mention of the Spirit, but this can be explained by the fact that false prophets at that time used to claim that they had the spirit of the Lord.

3 There is often mention of some future work by the spirit of the Lord.

the Messiah:

Isaiah 11.2: ‘The spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and fear of the Lord.’

Thus the Servant of Yahweh will receive the spirit of Yahweh to rightly fulfil his divine mission: ‘I have put my spirit upon him; he will bring forth justice to the nations’ (Isaiah 42.1). Cf. Matthew 12.18.

Isaiah 61.1-2: ‘The Spirit of the Lord God is upon me, because the Lord has anointed me to bring good tidings to the afflicted; he has sent me to bind up the brokenhearted, to proclaim liberty to the captives, and the opening of the prison to those who are bound; to proclaim the year of the Lord’s favor, and the day of vengeance of our God.’ Cf. Luke 4.18.

the entire messianic community:

Joel 2.28: ‘And it shall come to pass afterward, that I will pour out my spirit on all flesh; your sons and your daughters shall prophesy, your old men shall dream dreams, your young men shall see visions. Even upon the menservants and mainservants I will pour out my spirit.’ Cf. Acts 2.17.

Zechariah 12.10, Ezekiel 36.26-27: ‘A new heart I will give you, and a new spirit I will put within you; and I will take out of your flesh the heart of stone and give you a heart of flesh. And I will put my spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes and be careful to observe my ordinances.’ Ezekiel 37: The vision of the revival of the dry bones by the power of the spirit of the Lord. (It is not clear whether this text refers to the future messianic community.) Ezekiel 39.29: ‘and I will not hide my face any more from them, when I pour out my Spirit upon the house of Israel, says the Lord God.’

b *In the Old Testament – pneuma in the book of Wisdom (2-1 century BC)*

1 Basic meaning of *pneuma*: air, wind, or human soul.

2 Meaning of the word among the Stoics: hot air, very subtle, like fire, found especially in the topmost sphere but penetrating all things and constituting the soul in living beings. Its relation to the elements is disputed; but it is said to be capable of thought and is called ‘fiery artificer’ containing within it all the seminal elements (*rationes seminales*), the universal spirit, the world-soul.

This materialistic Stoic doctrine has some connection with what is said about *pneuma* in the book of Wisdom. On this question, see J. Lebreton, *Histoire du dogme de la Trinite I* (1927) 85-99; also G. Verbeke, *L’evolution de la doctrine du pneuma du Stoicisme a St. Augustin*. Paris, Louvain, 1945.

3 Meaning of the word in the Book of Wisdom:

At least once, human soul, life-giving spirit, 15.11;

Gift:

on the part of God, 9.17: ‘... unless you had given Wisdom and sent your holy spirit from on high.

See also the prayer to God, 7.7: ‘Therefore I prayed, and prudence was given to me; I pleaded, and the spirit of wisdom came to me.’

1.5: ‘The holy spirit of discipline flees deceit ...’

7.17: The source of natural knowledge: For he gave me sound knowledge of existing things’ – and of the moral virtues, 8.7 ff.: ‘she teaches self-control and prudence, justice and courage; nothing in life is more profitable for mortals than these.’

9.11: ‘For she knows and understands all things and will guide me discreetly in my affairs and safeguard me by her glory.’

7.27: ‘... she produces friends of God and prophets.’ (Compare the distinction between *gratia gratis data* and *gratia gratum faciens*.)

A quasi-divine being:

filling the entire world, 1.7: ‘For the spirit of the Lord has filled the whole world, and that which contains all things knows its voice.’ The expression ‘that which contains all things’ is a Stoic expression here explaining the role of the spirit in the cohesion of the universe. ‘Knows its voice’ = understands those things that are spoken by human beings.

‘all-powerful, all-seeing and pervading’ This is described in a lengthy enumeration about wisdom (7.22 ff.), in which it is said, ‘There is in her a spirit that is intelligent, holy, unique, manifold, subtle, mobile, clear, unpolluted, distinct, invulnerable, loving the good, keen, irresistible, beneficent, humane, steadfast, sure, free from anxiety, all-powerful, overseeing all, and penetrating through all spirits that are intelligent, pure, and altogether subtle.’

universal, 8.1: ‘She reaches mightily from one end of the earth to the other.’ This is said of wisdom which was shown above (7.22 ff.) to be so closely connected with *pneuma (noeron)* as to be virtually identical with it. See the *Bible de Jerusalem*, note at 7.22.

good and sweet, 12.1: ‘O how good and sweet is your spirit, O Lord, in all things!’ (Note that the Vulgate does not accurately translate the Greek which adds *aphthartos*, incorruptible: ‘Your incorruptible spirit is in all things.’)

emanating from God himself, 7.25: Wisdom is ‘a breath of the power of God and a pure emanation of the glory of the Almighty.’

choosing the works of God, 8.4: ‘for she is an initiate in the knowledge of God, the selector of his works.’

Still, even though wisdom is said to be the universal spirit and the spirit of the Lord, it seems that the intention of the author is to express some symbol of divine governance and activity that touches immediately upon all things in the universe. For according to mentality of the author, God directly creates and governs the world, 1.14, 9.1-9, 11.18, 11.24, 15.1, 16.24; and acts in a special way immediately upon people, 2.23, 6.7. Thus, God is well known from the world, 1.1-2, 13.1-10. And the spirit is not a mediator between man and God, something separating God from creatures: for sin alone separates human beings from God: 1.3.

To describe the spirit, the Book of Wisdom uses some expressions derived from the materialistic thought of the Stoics. Regarding this, note the following.

Since our concepts are abstracted from what is sensed, the signs or words by which we express them are generally taken from material things. When it is a question, therefore, of concepts that are most remote from sensible things, as is the case in speaking about God, it is necessary to develop a terminology that is exact and abstract, purified from all contamination.

This happens most of all when, as in our case, in order to express a notion that cannot be reduced to other notions, we use a terminology which is already in use in another cultural context of that time.

Hence, concerning *pneuma* in the Book of Wisdom we must say:

either it is a mere symbol of divine governance and activity and divine wisdom

or in it we already have a certain foreshadowing of those elements that come to appear more clearly in the NT. (See the note to 8.22 in the *Bible de Jerusalem*.)

c pneuma in the New Testament

Six uses of the noun *pneuma* in NT: in the synoptic gospels, Acts, and catholic epistles.

Note: We will treat the question of the Spirit in John's gospel, especially in the sermon at the Last Supper, when discussing the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son and the nature of the Holy Spirit.

'Spirit' means:

1 *Demons* – either without an adjective but known as evil from the context,
or with some typical modifier, such as 'unclean,' 'evil.'

2 *Soul, principle of life, either as separable or as separated*

James 2.26: 'the body without the spirit is dead'; John 19.30: 'he gave up his spirit'; Acts 7.59: 'Lord Jesus, receive my spirit'; Luke 8.55: 'Her spirit returned, and she got up at once'; 1 Peter 3.19: 'he went and made a proclamation to the spirits in prison'; Luke 24.37: 'they thought they were seeing a spirit'; Acts 23.8: 'The Sadducees say that there is no ... spirit'

3 *Inner principle of knowing, joy, emotions, moral life*

Mark 2.8: 'At once Jesus perceived in his spirit'; Mark 8.12: 'And he sighed deeply in his spirit'; Luke 1.47: 'and my spirit rejoices'; John 11.33: 'he was greatly disturbed in spirit'; John 13.21: 'Jesus was trouble in spirit'; Matthew 5.3: 'Blessed are the poor in spirit'; Matthew 26.41: 'the spirit indeed in willing'; Acts 18.25: 'fervent in spirit'; Acts 17.16: 'his spirit was deeply disturbed within him'

4 *External principle – that must be discerned*

Luke 9.55: 'you do not know what spirit you are of'; 1 John 4.1: 'do not believe every spirit, but test the spirits to see whether they are from God';

external principle – gift of God

Luke 11.13: 'how much more will the heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to those who ask him'; John 3.34: 'he gives the Spirit without measure'

5 *Other usages, especially antithetic uses in John's gospel*

wind, John 3.8: ‘the wind blows where it chooses’; breath, as a symbol of another reality, John 20.22: ‘he breathed on them, and he said to them, “Receive the Holy Spirit”’; antithesis between the spirit and the flesh, the spirit and the letter, John 3.6: ‘What is born of the flesh is flesh, and what is born of the Spirit is spirit’; John 4.23: ‘they will worship the Father in spirit and truth’; John 6.63: ‘It is the spirit that gives life; the flesh is useless’

6 To signify the Holy Spirit

General impression: besides these five usages, the early Christians knew of the existence of a holy spirit who had a most important function in the church. So the word was not invented to explain certain effects, but a reality distinct from human beings, demons, the Father, the Son, yet not distinct from God. In a general way, then, we will look at what is found in the NT, apart from John, concerning this Spirit.

2 The Holy Spirit in the New Testament in General

Knowing this context will be useful for understanding the use of the noun ‘Spirit’ and the particular passages in which it occurs in order to determine who this one is who is mentioned in the text that we rely upon to prove our thesis.

The Holy Spirit is revealed to be the one who:

1 has spoken through the prophets: in general, through all the prophets, 2 Peter 1.21: ‘... men impelled by the Holy Spirit have spoken under God’s influence’; in particular: concerning David, Mt 22.43: ‘David by the Spirit calls him Lord, saying ...’; Mark 12.36: ‘David himself, by the Holy Spirit, declared ...’; Acts 1.16: ‘the scripture had to be fulfilled, which the Holy Spirit through David foretold concerning Judas’; Acts 4.25: ‘it is you who said by the Holy Spirit through our ancestor David, your servant’; concerning Isaiah, 28.25: ‘The Holy Spirit was right in saying to your ancestors through the prophet Isaiah ...’; concerning Elizabeth, Luke 1.41: ‘she was filled with the Holy Spirit’; concerning Zechariah, Luke 1.67: ‘he was filled with the Holy Spirit and spoke this prophecy’; concerning Simeon, Luke 2.25-27: ‘and

the Holy Spirit rested on him. It had been revealed to him by the Holy Spirit ... Guided by the Spirit he came ...'; *concerning John the Baptist*, Lk 115. 'he will be filled with the Holy Spirit'; Luke 1.80: 'the child grew and became strong in spirit; note: it is not clear that all these texts are speaking in an absolute way about the Holy Spirit; still, in general there can be found in them an allusion to the prophetic work as something from the Holy Spirit;

2 intervenes often in the life of Jesus: at his conception: Luke 1.35: 'The Holy Spirit will come upon you'; Mt 1.18: 'she was found to be with child by the Holy Spirit'; 1.20: 'the child conceived in her is from the Holy Spirit'; *at his baptism*: Luke 3.22: 'and the Holy Spirit descended upon him in bodily form like a dove'; see also Matthew 3.16, Mark 1.10, John 1.32-33; the Spirit *led him* into the desert, and brought him back to Galilee: Luke 4.1: 'and was led by the Spirit in the wilderness'; see also Matthew 4.1 and Romans 8.14; Luke 4.14: 'then Jesus, filled with the power of the Spirit, returned to Galilee'; the Spirit *inspires* Jesus' preaching, Luke 4.18: 'The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me to bring good news to the poor'; and the prophecy of Isaiah, 61.1 ff., 58.6, which Jesus declares to have been fulfilled; Matthew 12.18: 'I will put my Spirit upon him'; the prophecy from Isaiah 42.1-4; Jesus *exults* in (by) the Spirit, Lk 10.21: 'Jesus rejoiced in the Holy Spirit'; the Spirit is connected with Jesus' *miraculous power*, for to say that Jesus performs miracles through Beelzebul is to blaspheme the Holy Spirit; see Mark 3.21-22 and Matthew 12.24-32; Luke 11.15-22, 8.19-21; see also the words of Peter in the presence of Cornelius, Acts 10.38: 'how God anointed Jesus of Nazareth with the Holy Spirit and with power';

3 is promised to the Apostles and others and is given to them: promise to the Apostles, Matthew 10.20: 'for it is not you who speak, but the Spirit of your Father speaking through you'; see also Mark 13.11, Luke 12.12; Acts 1:5: 'for John baptized with water, but you will be baptized with the Holy Spirit not many days from now'; 1.8: 'you will receive power when the Holy Spirit has come upon you'; *promise to all believers*, John 7.37-38, at the festival of booths: 'Let anyone who is thirsty come to me, and let the one who believes in me drink. As the scripture has said, "Out of the believer's heart shall flow rivers of living water." Now he said this about

the Spirit, which believers in him were to receive; for as yet there was no Spirit [the Spirit had not been given], because Jesus was not yet glorified'; note that the interpretation of this text is not easy; *coming of the Spirit*, Acts 2.2-4: 'And suddenly from heaven there came a sound like the rush of a violent wind, and it filled the entire house where they were sitting. Divided tongues, as of fire, appeared among them, and a tongue rested on each of them. All of them were filled with the Holy Spirit and began to speak in other languages, as the Spirit gave them ability'; 2.14-21: the coming of the Holy Spirit is explicitly connected, in Peter's sermon, v. 17, with the prophecy of Joel 3.1-5: 'I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh'; 2.33: 'Being therefore exalted at the right hand of God, and having received from the Father the promise of the Holy Spirit, (Jesus) has poured out this that you both see and hear'; note the realism with which Peter speaks about the Holy Spirit;

4 directs the apostles and, in a sense, governs the church - the Acts of the Apostles can be said to be the Gospel of the Holy Spirit; *directs the apostles*, Acts 4.8: 'Then Peter, filled with the Holy Spirit, said to them ...'; 8.29: 'Then the Spirit said to Philip ...'; 8.39: 'the Spirit of the Lord snatched Philip away'; 10.19: 'While Peter was still thinking about the vision, the Spirit said to him ...'; 11.12: 'The Spirit told me (Peter) to go with them and not to hesitate'; 13.9: 'Paul, filled with the Holy Spirit ...'; *governs the church: chooses ministers*, 13.2: 'the Holy Spirit said (to the leaders of the church at Antioch), "Set apart for me Barnabas and Saul for the work to which I have called them"'; *sends them*, 13.4: 'being sent out by the Holy Spirit, they went down to Seleucia; and from there they sailed to Cyprus'; *renders judgment at the Council of Jerusalem*, 15.28: 'for it has seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us'; *determines places in which to preach*, 16.6-7: 'They went through the region of Phrygia and Galatia, having been forbidden by the Holy Spirit to speak the word in Asia. When they had come opposite Mysia, they attempted to go into Bithynia, but the Spirit of Jesus did not allow them'; 19.21: 'Paul resolved in the Spirit to go through Macedonia and Achaia, and then to go on to Jerusalem'; *predicts the future to the apostles, and Christians regard this as an ordinary event*, 20.22-23: 'And now, bound by the Spirit, I am on my way to Jerusalem, not knowing what will happen to

me there, except that the Holy Spirit testifies to me in every city that imprisonment and persecutions are waiting for me'; 21.4: 'Through the Spirit they told Paul not to go on to Jerusalem'; 21.11: '[Agabus] came to us and took Paul's belt, bound his own feet and hands with it, and said, "Thus says the Holy Spirit, This is the way the Jews in Jerusalem will bind the man who owns this belt and will hand him over to the Gentiles'; *appoints leaders (episkopous)* to shepherd the flock, 20.28: 'Keep watch over yourselves and over all the flock, of which the Holy Spirit has made you overseers, to shepherd the church of God that he obtained with the blood of his own Son';

5 who is given to others also: given to others also in a general way: in baptism, Acts 2.38: 'Repent and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ so that your sins may be forgiven; and you will receive the gift of the Holy Spirit'; *in confirmation*, 8.15: '... prayed for them that they might receive the Holy Spirit'; 8.17: '... laid their hands on them, and they received the Holy Spirit'; 8.19: 'so that anyone on whom I lay my hands may receive the Holy Spirit'; 9.17: 'that you may regain your sight and be filled with the Holy Spirit'; 11.16: 'but you will be baptized with the Holy Spirit'; 19.2: 'Did you receive the Holy Spirit when you became believers?'; 19.6: 'When Paul had laid his hands on them, the Holy Spirit came upon them'; *given to certain persons in particular: to the Jews*, 4.31: 'When they had prayed, the place in which they were gathered together was shaken; and they were all filled with the Holy Spirit'; 6.3, in the choice of deacons: 'Therefore, brothers, select from among yourselves seven men of good standing, full of the Spirit'; *to Stephen*, 6.5: 'a man full of faith and the Holy Spirit'; 7.55: 'filled with the Holy Spirit'; *to Paul*, 9.17: '[Ananias] said, "Brother Saul, the Lord Jesus, who appeared to you on your way here, has sent me so that you may regain your sight and be filled with the Holy Spirit'; *to the Gentiles*, 10.44-47: 'While Peter was still speaking, the Holy spirit fell upon all who heard the word. The circumcised believers who had come with Peter were astounded that the gift of the Holy Spirit had been poured out even on the Gentiles ... "who have received the Holy Spirit just as we have?"' (this fact was the greatest confirmation of the mission to the gentiles); 11.15: 'And as I began to speak, the Holy Spirit fell upon them just as it had

upon us at the beginning’; *to Barnabas*, 11.24: ‘for he was a good man, full of the Holy Spirit’; *to Agabus*, 11.28: ‘predicted by the Spirit’; *at the Council of Jerusalem*, 15.8: ‘And God, who knows the human heart, testified to them by giving them the Holy Spirit, just as he did to us’; *to the people of Ephesus*, 19.6: ‘the Holy Spirit came upon them’;

6 is intimately involved in all apostolic activity; see paragraph 4 above [*directs the Apostles ...*]; here we are dealing with something more general; Acts 5.3: ‘“Ananias,” Peter asked, “why has Satan filled your heart to lie to the Holy Spirit?”’; 5.4: ‘You did not lie to us but to God!’; 5.9: ‘How is it that you have agreed together to put the Spirit of the Lord to the test?’ (implicitly there is affirmed equality between the Holy Spirit and God); *the Holy Spirit is a witness together with the apostles*, 5.32: ‘And we are witnesses to these things, and so is the Holy Spirit whom God has given to those who obey him’; *argues together with Stephen against some people from the synagogue*, 6.10: ‘arguing with Stephen they could not withstand the wisdom and the Spirit with which he spoke’; *resisted by the chief priests*, 7.51: ‘You stiff-necked people, uncircumcised in heart and ears, you are forever opposing the Holy Spirit, just as your ancestors used to do’; *fills the church with consolation*, 9.31: ‘Meanwhile the church throughout Judea, Galilee, and Samaria had peace and was built up. Living in the fear of the Lord and in the comfort of the Holy Spirit, it increased in numbers’; 13.52: ‘And the disciples were filled with joy and with the Holy Spirit’; *intimately involved in the administration of the sacraments, especially baptism and confirmation*: see the texts mentioned above in paragraph 5.

3 Special Text, Mt 28-19: ‘Go forth and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.’

Authenticity of this text: For objections, see Boyer, 1949, 22-25. A longer explanation will be found in Lebreton, *Histoire du dogme de la Trinite*, 559-610. *Note these two points: (1) this text is found in all codices; there is no doubt about its canonicity and inspiration; (2) the positive ground for the objection is that in his earlier writings, i.e., before 325, Eusebius of Caesarea*

apparently quotes the text as follows: ‘... teach all nations in my name ...’ The three divine persons are not mentioned; see Conybeare, ‘The Eusebian Form of the Text Mt 28:19,’ in *Zeitschrift für Neutestamentlich Wissenschaft* (1901) 275-88.

We reply as follows: had there been at that time any doubt about the validity of this text, both the Arians and the church Fathers would have been aware of it, and so it would have been of no use to Fathers such as Athanasius and Hilary and others, who used it frequently in their arguments against the Arians.

Exegesis of the text

1 Meaning of the expression eis to onoma = ‘in the name of’:

In the New Testament the word onoma, ‘name,’ sometimes stands for the thing or person itself. Acts 1.15: ‘together the crowd numbered about one hundred twenty persons (Greek = onomatōn)’; Revelation 3.4: ‘Yet you have still a few persons (nomina) in Sardis’; 11.13: ‘seven thousand people (nomina) were killed in the earthquake’; but this usage is not close to ours.

Onoma is governed by several prepositions: epi, eis, en, dia, or simply by itself in the dative case, onomati. The use of prepositions in the NT is rather free.

By comparison with similar expressions, there are three possible senses for the word: it regards either the power of a person in whose name someone is acting, or the motive or purpose of an action, or the relation of ownership by way of consecration or submission.

a power, Acts 3.6, Peter’s healing of the beggar: ‘in the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, stand up and walk’; Acts 3.12-16 interprets the meaning of the expression: it is not ‘by our own power or piety’ that he has been healed but ‘faith in [the name of the author of life] has made tis man strong, whom you see and know’; Mark 9.38: ‘Teacher, we saw someone casting out demons in your name ... no one who does a deed of power in my name will be able soon afterward to speak evil of me’;

b motive, Mark 9.37: “Whoever welcomes on such child in my name welcomes me”; Mark 9.41: ‘whoever gives you a cup of water to drink because you bear the name of Christ will by no means lose the reward’; Matthew 10.41: ‘Whoever welcomes a prophet in the name of a prophet ... whoever welcomes a righteous person in the name of a righteous person ... whoever gives even a cup of cold water ... in the name of a disciple’; glorification as motive is specified in Colossians 3.17: ‘And whatever you do, in word or deed, do everything in the name of the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to God the Father through him.’ The text is explained through 1 Corinthians 10.31: ‘do everything for the glory of God.’

c Relationship of ownership (dedication, consecration, submission), 1 Corinthians 1.12-15: ‘What I mean is that each of you says, “I belong to Paul,” or “I belong to Apollos,” or “I belong to Cephas,” or “I belong to Christ.” Has Christ been divided? Was Paul crucified for you? Or were you baptized in the name of Paul? I thank God that I baptized none of you except Crispus and Gaius, so that no one can say that you were baptized in my name’; Acts 19.3: ‘“Into what then were you baptized? They answered, “Into John’s baptism.” Paul said, “John baptized with the baptism of repentance, telling the people to believe in the one who was to come after him, that is, in Jesus.” On hearing this, they were baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus’; the meaning seems to be, in whose honor was your consecration through baptism made? As to baptism, the fundamental sacrament, three significations can be simultaneously distinguished: the efficient cause of grace is the Trinity; the final cause (motive) is the glory of the Trinity; the relationship on the part of God is ownership, on our part it is consecration; hence, in the above text, Mt 28:19, ‘to baptize in the name’ first states the efficient cause: the baptized receives grace from the Trinity; next it expresses the final cause: baptism for the glory of the Trinity; lastly it expresses the relationship of consecration to the Trinity confirmed through the renunciation of Satan.

2 The form under which there is the allusion to the three persons.

Note the repetition of the article tou, 'of the,' and the conjunction kai, 'and.' Use of the article in Greek: when there are two different names and the article is repeated for each, two different subjects or persons are indicated; if the article is not repeated, two names of the same subject are signified. See 1Thessalonians 3.11, Acts 26,30; 1 Corinthians 1.3, 3.8; John 20.17. In the above text, the article is thrice repeated, hence, according to Greek use, as well as in the NT, three distinct persons are indicated.

4 General Argument from the New Testament on the Divinity of the Holy Spirit

Argument

Aim of the argument: to prove that the Holy Spirit is the third person of the Trinity, it will be necessary to prove that he is real, divine, distinct from the Father and the Son, and a person.

Method of the proof: We are taking Mt 28.19 not as being a special and unique text but because and insofar as it provides us with the best focal point to which the many assertions in the synoptics and in Acts about the Holy Spirit can be brought together.

The Father and the Son are divine persons, mutually equal and yet distinct; but in the above baptismal formula the Holy Spirit is simultaneously and distinctly numbered with them; therefore the Holy Spirit also is a divine person as are the Father and the Son and at the same time distinct from the Father and from the Son.

The divinity and personhood of the Father is proven in the treatise on God as one, De Deo Uno.

The divinity and personhood of the Son is proven in the treatise on the incarnate Word, De Verbo Incarnato.

The importance of the above text does not derive only from numbering the Holy Spirit with the other two persons but also from the fact that these other persons are distinct and yet are of the one same substance or being. Still, our argument by itself alone is not absolutely cogent unless it is understood in light of the congeries of statements made about the Spirit in the rest of

the New Testament. Hence further knowledge is required about the Spirit from the many other texts which, in fact, our text synthetically recapitulates. The force of the argument, then, rests upon the baptismal formula in Matthew 28.19, understood in light of the New Testament as a whole. Therefore, we must examine all that is said in the New Testament about these four steps which constitute the object of our proof and which this Matthean text already intimates.

The Holy Spirit is real, is a reality. For this it is sufficient to note the general impression among the first Christians, especially as expressed in the Acts of the Apostles.

The Holy Spirit is divine:

from his name: he is very frequently called the Spirit of God, or the Spirit of the Father or of the Son, and so is ranked in the order of divinity as belonging to God. See 1 Corinthians 2.11, 'No one knows the things of God except the Spirit of God,' which is therefore something most intimate to God just as the spirit of a human person is to that person. For if something is the spirit of a thing, it is part of the reality of that thing. Besides, the Holy Spirit is commonly mentioned together with the Father and the Son;

from his work: prophecy: according to the New Testament, prophets in the Old Testament were created by the Holy Spirit; but prophecy is a divine work, and therefore that by whom it was established must also be divine; intervention in the life of Jesus: at his conception, baptism, deeds, preaching, miracles, and interior life; but Christ is God, hence also the one who intervenes in such ways must be God; formation of the apostles: directing, governing, strengthening both the church as a whole and individual apostles; the apostles had the largest part in the new divine economy of salvation; all these facts taken together point to some transhistorical function that cannot belong to a mere creature but to God alone;

from particular passages: Acts 5.3, 4.9: to lie to Peter is to lie to the Holy Spirit and to God; implicitly, therefore, the Holy Spirit is called God; Mt 12:22-28, 31-32: anyone who tries to attribute the miracles of Jesus to the intervention of Beelzebub blasphemes against the Holy

Spirit; the force of the argument is that it is more serious to sin against the Holy Spirit than against the Son of God, who is God; therefore the Holy Spirit is God; this argument is even weightier from the fact that in the Son there is also a human nature that is not God, and therefore Christ is not a totally unmixed manifestation of God inasmuch as he possesses something finite; the Holy Spirit on the other hand is a most pure manifestation of divinity. We prescind from the exegetical question concerning the explanation of parallel passages because we are taking this text from Matthew as the inspired word of God.

The Holy Spirit is distinct from the Father and the Son:

from enumeration: in the baptismal formula, since what are not distinguished are not numbered; at Christ's baptism: Matthew 3.16-17: 'And when Jesus had been baptized, just as he came up from the water, suddenly the heavens were opened to him and he saw the Spirit of God descending like a dove and alighting on him. And a voice from heaven said, "This is my Son, the Beloved, with whom I am well pleased.' Here the Father speaks, the Son is the one spoken about, and the Holy Spirit appears in the form of a dove and hovers over the Son;

from the structure of revelation: in the Old Testament, where the one who in the Old Testament is called 'God' is called 'God the Father' in the New Testament; this revelation continues in the New Testament where the Son very frequently speaks about the Father; the gospels directly speak of Our Lord Jesus Christ as the Son of God; thus they continue the revelation of the Son;

from the Acts of the Apostles tells about the Holy Spirit as the promised Spirit of God who is given to and works in the church, governing, directing and fostering her, further revealing the Holy Spirit;

from particular texts: Matthew 10.19-20: 'The Spirit of your Father will be speaking in you'; Acts 2:33: 'Exalted at the Father's right hand, he first received the promised Holy Spirit from the Father, then poured out this Spirit upon us'; Peter, speaking of the outpouring of the Spirit, considers Jesus and God and says that Jesus received the promise of the Spirit from the

Father and then poured out the Spirit; the above texts clearly indicate a real distinction among the three persons.

The Holy Spirit is a person: the Holy Spirit manifests the essential properties of a person and therefore he is not a metaphysical attribute or a divine force or power; although we do not have a technical definition of the Holy Spirit as person, nevertheless he performs functions that can only be attributed to a person; he speaks through the prophets and inspires them: 2 Peter 1.21; he speaks to unbelievers; he gives the apostles the gift of speech, Acts 2.4; the Holy Spirit himself speaks, Acts 10.19, 11.12, 13.2, 21.11; he sends apostles forth on their mission, Acts 13.4; he judges and decides, Acts 15.28; he prevents something, Acts 16.6-7; he appoints bishops, Acts 20.28; he testifies with the Apostles, Acts 5.32.

The Holy Spirit, then, is not an ens quo but an ens quod and a person.

Conclusion

This formula at the end of Matthew's gospel is truly a focal point to which all that is said in the gospels and in Acts come together. The expression, 'in the name' tells us that the Holy Spirit exists and is distinct (the three articles), is a person (one to whom the baptized are dedicated), and is divine (one to whose glory the baptismal dedication is made). Also, the entire Trinity is represented here.

Objections

1 I John 5.7-8: '... and there are three who give testimony on earth, the Spirit and the water and the blood – and these three are one.'

We reply: this objection would be excellent if our proof rested only on the fact of the two conjunctions in Matthew 28.19. But we know from other texts and have proven that the Holy Spirit is a distinct person, and so it is in light of all the other texts that this text also must be

understood. For whenever two are found together one cannot immediately conclude that they are one in nature. But we have concluded to this identity not only from the baptismal formula but from all the other texts understood in this formula.

2 Jn 3.5. See Boyer, p. 24.

3 The apostles did baptize in the name of Christ; therefore, the command in Matthew 28.19 was not all that explicit. There are several New Testament texts that support this objection: Acts 2.38, 8.16, 10.48, 19.5; Romans 6.1 ff.; 1 Corinthians 1.13; Galatians 3.27. See also Denzinger, 47, 94, 335.

We reply: There is a distinction between the name of the person to whose power one is dedicated or to whose glory one is baptized and the formula of baptism itself.

The formula of baptism, conferred only in the name of Christ, was held to be valid (see D 335) in the opinion of St Ambrose and St Basil as well as of a number of Scholastics such as Hugh of St Victor and Peter Lombard. Yet even according to them the invocation of Christ implies a profession of the whole Trinity, just as by the name of the anointed alone both the anointer and the anointing is implied. St Bonaventure and St Thomas Aquinas admitted this practice, but only for the early church.

The words of Christ in this mandate look to the meaning of the sacrament of baptism rather than to the words of the baptismal rite; yet there has never been a valid baptism that would exclude belief in the Trinity.

To sum up: That the apostles in baptizing excluded the Trinity, we deny (see Acts 19:1 ff.); that they did not always mention it explicitly, possibly.

4 Against the argumentation from the three conjunctions and the Greek article it is argued that the Greek text is not the original, and since the Aramaic original is lost, this argument is invalid.

We reply: The Greek translation is either true or it is not. If it is true, then the meaning is fully determined and so our argument is valid. If it is not true, then we should have to say that

that God has inspired a text that is totally corrupt and its translation false. But this is inadmissible.

Note, moreover, that our argumentation does not rely solely on this one text.

5 – To the objections against the authenticity of Mt 28.19 our answer is that any text is authentic if it is found in all the codices and there is no argument against it. This is actually the case here. Besides, in order that the objection against this text be made in accordance with the norms of internal criticism (from the impossibility of their being such a clear statement at that time, immediately after the resurrection), the same reply would hold as against objection 3, above, if authenticity is to be rejected. See the note in the Bible de Jerusalem at Matthew 28.19.

5 Ppneuma in Paul

There are six kinds of meaning besides signifying the Holy Spirit.

1 Breath: 2 Thes 2:8: The Lord Jesus will destroy the wicked may ‘... by the breath of his mouth.’

2 Interior principle of a human person: (a) in a general way, Romans 1.9: Paul serves God with his ‘spirit’; 1 Corinthians 16.18: the spirit of Paul and of the Corinthians is refreshed; thus too the spirit of Titus in 2 Corinthians 7.13; Galatians 6.18: ‘May the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with your spirit, brothers and sisters, Amen’; Ephesians 4.23: ‘renewed in the spirit of your mind’; 1 Corinthians 5.5: ‘so that his spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord’; (b) where the meaning is determined insofar as the spirit is opposed, to nous, mind: 1 Corinthians 14.13 ff.: one should pray with tongue and spirit and mind; to soma, body, 1 Corinthians 7.34: the virgin is anxious about the affairs of the Lord, so that she may be holy in body and spirit; to sarx, flesh, 2 Corinthians 7.1: we must cleanse ourselves ‘from every defilement of body [flesh] and of spirit, making holiness perfect in the fear of God’; Galatians 3.3: the one who began with the spirit should not end with the flesh; see the same meaning in Galatians 4.29; Philippians 3.3: ‘For it is we who are the circumcision, who serve God with the

spirit and boast in Christ Jesus, having no confidence in the flesh’; 1 Corinthians 3.3: Paul is speaking to the Corinthians as to people of the flesh, not of the spirit; (c) regarding certain operations connected with the spirit, Romans 12.11: ‘Do not lag in zeal, be ardent in spirit’; 2 Corinthians 4.13: ‘Just as we have the same spirit of faith’; Philippians 1.27: ‘that you are standing firm in one spirit’; Philippians 3:3: Christians serve God in the spirit.

3 Metaphorical use: (a) spirit of the world: 1 Corinthians. 2.12: ‘Now we have received not the spirit of the world’; Ephesians 2.2: ‘the spirit that is now at work in those who are disobedient’; (b) spirit of compunction (better, stupor, torpor: katanyxis): Romans 11.8: ‘God gave them sluggish spirit’; (c) spirit of servitude, slavery, Romans 8.15: ‘you did not receive a spirit of slavery to fall back into fear’; (d) spirit of meekness, gentleness, 1 Corinthians 4.21: ‘or with love in a spirit of gentleness’; Galatians 6.1: ‘restore such a one in a spirit of gentleness’; (e) spirit of error: 1 Timothy 4.1: ‘paying attention to deceitful spirits and teachings of demons’; (f) spirit of fear: 2 Timothy 1.7: ‘for God did not give us a spirit of cowardice, but rather a spirit of power and of love and of self-discipline’; (g) the sword of the spirit (i.e., the word of God): Ephesians 6.17: where there is talk of the armor of the Christian.

4 The spirit something indeterminate and hypothetical, 2 Corinthians 11.4: For if someone comes and proclaims another Jesus than the one we proclaimed, or if you receive a different spirit from the one you received ...’

5 Spirit as signifying charisms or spiritual gifts, 1 Corinthians 14.32: ‘and the spirits of prophets are subject to the prophets.’

6 Spirit as lifegiving, 1 Corinthians 15.45: ‘The first man, Adam, became a living being; the last Adam became a life-giving spirit.’

Besides these meanings in Paul, the word pneuma clearly points to a being that is real, personal, divine, really distinct from the Father and the Son. Among the various places where Paul speaks of the Holy Spirit, we will select one as a centerpiece to be illuminated by other texts so that we may be able to grasp the fullness of meaning and present a certain proof through understanding Paul, not in the light of our concepts, but in the light of Paul himself.

6 Life 'in the Spirit' according to Paul (Analysis of 1 Corinthians 12.1-13)

Context: from chapter 12 to chapter 14, St Paul gives a lengthy instruction on spiritual things to the Corinthians; presupposition: Paul writes to the Christians presupposing their knowledge of the Holy Spirit; see Acts 19.1 ff.; division of the text: 12.1-3: Paul's intention to talk about spiritual things; 12.4-11: distinction between the Holy Spirit and his charisms; 12.12-31: a basic analogy of the body and its members about the one Spirit and many gifts, which is set forth (vv. 12-13), expounded (vv. 14-26), and applied (vv.27-31); chapters 13 and 14, comparison among the gifts (charisms): praise of charity as the greatest and best gift, chapter 13; contrast between prophecy and glossolalia: prophecy is to be preferred.

*Text: Verse 1: refers to *tois pneumatikois* (spiritual gifts). Adjectives ending in *-ikos* generally signify a cause.*

Verse 2: refers to the (spiritual) state from which the Gentiles came to the faith, which is also found in Romans 1.18, 3.20, and Ephesians 2.1-13.

Verse 3: announces the fundamental law for the recognizing a true spirit, since already in the primitive church experience taught the necessity of discerning spirits. The same criterion is mentioned in 1 John 4.1-4: 'This is how you can recognize God's spirit: every spirit that acknowledges Jesus Christ come in the flesh belongs to God, while every spirit that fails to acknowledge him does not belong to God.' See Philippians 2.11: 'Jesus is Lord.' The Vulgate, however, is less exact; 1 John 4.15). And no one can say, Jesus is Lord, except in the Holy spirit.

The need of grace and of the Holy Spirit is affirmed in order to confess that Jesus is Lord, just as in other words, but along the same lines, see John 6.44 and 14.6. Thus in 1 Corinthians 12.3 the criterion for recognizing the spirits is affirmed to be the acknowledgement that Jesus is Lord.

Verses 4-6, clear expression of the Holy Trinity: 'There are different gifts but the same Spirit, there are different ministries but the same Lord, there are different works but the same God who works in all.' It is one and the same Spirit who produces all these gifts, distributing

them to each as he wills (v. 11). In Paul we often find texts in which the Trinity is clearly evident, e.g., Galatians 4.4-6: 'God sent his Son, born of a woman, born under the law, in order to redeem those who were under the law, so that we might receive adoption as children. And because you are children, God has sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, "Abba! Father!"' So also Romans 15.30: 'I appeal to you, brother and sisters, by our Lord Jesus Christ and by the love of the Spirit, to join me in earnest prayer to God on my behalf ...' See 2 Corinthians 13.13: 'The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ and the love of God and the communion (koinonia) of the Holy Spirit be with you all.' Ephesians 4.4: 'One body and one spirit ... one Lord ... one God and Father of all.'

Verses 7-11: distinctions between the various gifts, manifestations of the Spirit, and the one Spirit who gives them to different persons. The words 'as he wills' indicate personhood. V. 8: 'the utterance of wisdom. 1 Corinthians 2:1-16: the conditions for announcing the gospel; Ephesians 1.17: 'that God ... may give you a spirit of wisdom and revelation as you come to know him'; Ephesians 3.10: 'so that ... the wisdom of God in its rich variety might now be made known to the rulers and authorities in the heavenly places'; 1 Corinthians 2.16: 'But we have the mind of Christ'; 'the word of knowledge' (Ephesians 3.14-19). Verse 9: 'faith'; see Romans and Galatians passim. Gift of healing: see Acts 14.8, 16.18, 19.13 ff., 20.7 ff., 28.4 sq., where there is mention of the miracles performed by Paul. Verse 10: 'Miraculous powers': the preaching of the gospel does not depend on human means but is a manifestation of the power of God. See 1 Corinthians 2.5, 4.19-20; Romans 15.18, 1 Thessalonians 1.5. Paul calls his apostolate the 'ministry of the Spirit,' 2 Corinthians 3.8; see also 1 Corinthians 3.9.

Verses 12-13: the work that has been produced through faith and baptism is the Mystical Body of Christ, in which there is unity between the members and Christ and among the members themselves in one body through baptism in the one Spirit. Verse 13: 'For in the one Spirit we were all baptized into one body – Jews or Greeks, slaves or free – and we were all made to drink of one Spirit.'

Let us see what 'baptism in the one Spirit' means.

Entry into this one body takes place through a baptism that from the Synoptics was distinguished from John's baptism as being baptism in the Holy Spirit (Matthew 3.11, Mark 1.8, Luke 3.16, John 1.33, Acts 1.5, 11.16, 19.2 f.). In the letters of Paul we have a clear teaching on baptism; see Titus 3.4 ff.: 'But when the goodness and loving kindness of God our Savior appeared, he saved us, not because of any works of righteousness that we had done, but according to his mercy, through the water of rebirth and renewal by the Holy Spirit. This Spirit he poured out on us richly through Jesus Christ our Savior, so that, having been justified by his grace, we might become heirs according to the hope of eternal life.' (There is the same connection between baptism and the Holy Spirit, the source of the bath of rebirth and renewal.)

The consequence of baptism in one Spirit is life in the unity of the body by which we all have access to the Father. There is a connection between one Spirit and one body. See Ephesians 4:4-6: 'There is one body and one Spirit, just as you were called to the one hope of your calling, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, who is above all and through all and in all.' Religious life means access to the Father through the Son in the one Spirit: see Eph 2.18, 'for through him both of us have access in one Spirit to the Father.'

This life consists in a transformation from a former state to a state that is now washed, sanctified, justified. As to that prior state, see Romans 1.18 – 3.20 and 1 Corinthians 6.9-11: 'Do you not know that wrongdoers will not inherit the kingdom of God? Do not be deceived! Fornicators, idolaters, adulterers, male prostitutes, sodomites, thieves, the greedy, drunkards, revilers, robbers – none of these will inherit the kingdom of God. And this is what some of you used to be. But you were washed, you were sanctified, you were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and in the Spirit of our God.'

The author of this dynamic change, one that is a genuine and permanent religious conversion, is the Spirit. See 2 Corinthians 3.2-3: 'You are our letter, written on our hearts, to be known and read by all; and you show that you are a letter of Christ, prepared by us, written not with ink but with the Spirit of the living God, not on tablets of stone but on tablets of human hearts.'

This transformation is not only something mysterious and ontological but is also an illumination of the mind and an inner freedom: this is clear from the contrast with the state in which the Jews remain. See 2 Corinthians 3.14-18: 'Indeed, to this very day, when they hear the reading of the old covenant, that same veil is still there, since only in Christ is it set aside. Indeed, to this very day whenever Moses is read, a veil lies over their minds. But when one turns to the Lord, the veil is removed. Now the Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom. And all of us, with unveiled faces, seeing the glory of the Lord as though reflected in a mirror, are being transformed into the same image from one degree of glory to another; for this comes from the Lord, the Spirit.' Here the 'glory of the Lord' means resurrection, sitting at the right hand of God, Messianic glorification; but the transformation of Christians belongs to the Spirit of the Lord.

Especially freedom from the law of sin. Galatians 1.4-5: 'to rescue us from the present evil age'; 5.1: 'For freedom Christ has set us free. Stand firm, therefore, and do not submit again to a yoke of slavery'; 5.13: 'For you were called to freedom, brothers and sisters'; Romans 6.18: 'you, having been set free from sin, have become slaves of righteousness'; 6.22: 'But now that you have been freed from sin and enslaved to God, the advantage you get is sanctification. The end is eternal life'; 8.2: 'For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has set me free from the law of sin and of death'; Romans 7.24: 'Who will rescue me from this body of death? Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord.' This freedom, therefore, comes from Christ and is received through the love of the Holy Spirit.

True life in the Spirit is opposed to life according to the flesh, as we read in John's gospel, 3.5-6: 'No one can enter the kingdom of God without being born of water and Spirit. What is born of the flesh is flesh, and what is born of the Spirit is spirit.' This is more clearly developed in Rom 8:5-17 in a lengthy contrast between life in the flesh and life in the Spirit. The opposite of life in the flesh is life in the Spirit, which is the goal of the transformation through baptism and justification into life, peace, ability to please God, all of which Paul calls 'being in the spirit,' described in terms of the Spirit's 'dwelling in' Christians. This indwelling is the

terminus ad quem of that transformation, which is not understood statically, for the children of God are moved by the Spirit of God. This inhabitation abolishes the infinite gulf between God and humans because they have received the 'Spirit of adoption.' And we know this by the Spirit's testimony to our spirits.

This transformation is most concretely understood by Paul in terms of the dynamic working of the Spirit in the life of a Christian. There are numerous instances of this transformation in the Acts of the Apostles, in the work of the apostles in establishing and directing the church. 'Being in the Spirit' is also illustrated in those passages which portray its opposition to 'being in the flesh': Galatians 5.16-25, Ephesians 4.17-24, Romans 6.12-23, 8.5-11. St Paul describes this inhabitation of the Holy Spirit in many different ways. It is the result of baptism, Titus 3.6: 'he poured on us richly'; see also the words of Peter in Acts 2, especially v. 38; it comes from the hearing of faith: Galatians 3.2: 'Did you receive the Spirit by doing the world of the law or by believing what you heard?'; it is like being in a temple, 1 Corinthians 3.16-17: 'Do you not know that you are God's temple and that God's Spirit dwells in you? If anyone destroy's God's temple, God will destroy that person. For God's temple is holy, and you are that temple'; as possessing a person: 1 Corinthians 6.19: 'Or do you not know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit within you, which you have from God, and that you are not your own? For you were bought with a price'; of importance here is the distinction between God and the Holy Spirit, and yet the equality between them is evident from comparison with 1 Corinthians 3.16-17; as a mover, Romans 8.14: 'For all who are led by the Spirit of God are children of God'; as the cause of adoptive filiation: Romans 8.15: 'you have received a spirit of adoption, in which we cry "Abba, Father"'; as the proof of this filiation, Galatians 4.6: 'And because you are children, God has sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, "Abba! Father!"; as testifying to this filiation, Romans 8.16: 'It is that very Spirit bearing witness with our spirit that we are children of God'; as helping us in our weakness and as interceding on our behalf, since we do not know how to pray, Romans 8.26-27: 'Likewise the Spirit helps us in our weakness; for we do not know how to pray as we ought, but that very Spirit intercedes with sighs

too deep for words. And God, who searches the heart, knows what is the mind of the Spirit, because the Spirit intercedes for the saints according to the will of God'; who can be saddened by us, Ephesians 4.30: 'And so do not grieve the Holy Spirit of God, with which you were marked with a seal for the day of redemption'; and can be stifled, quenched, 1 Thessalonians 5.19: 'Do not quench the Spirit'; is the first fruits of eternal life in us, as Christ is the first fruits of those who have fallen asleep, Romans 8.23: 'ourselves, who have the first fruits of the Spirit'; 2 Corinthians 1.22: 'by putting his seal on us and giving us his Spirit in our hearts'; and the pledge of our inheritance, 2 Corinthians 5.5: 'He who has prepared us for this very thing is God, who has given us the Spirit as a guarantee'; Ephesians 1.13-14: 'In him you also, when you had heard the word of truth, the gospel of our salvation, and had believed in him, were marked with the seal of the promised Holy Spirit; this is the pledge of our inheritance toward redemption as God's own people, to the praise of his glory'; cause of our resurrection, Romans 8.11: 'If the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, he who raised Christ from the dead will give life to your mortal bodies also through his Spirit that dwells in you.'

The Spirit is the cause of union not only between individual baptized persons and God but among those Christians themselves. In Acts, Christians are described as 'of one heart and one mind.' Acts 4.32, 5.12-16. In Romans 5.5, the cause of this union is explained as 'the love of God poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us.' See also 1 Corinthians 13, the hymn to love. In 2 Corinthians 13.13 mention is made of koinōnia, communication of the Holy Spirit. Note the mention of the Trinity in the doxology. This means a special participation in the very life of God through sanctifying grace and the uncreated gift in the economy of the incarnation and redemption, all of which is ordered to the vision of God. Koinōnia is the fruit of the indwelling, action, and testimony of the Holy Spirit in the everyday life of Christians, as in Philippians 2.1-5: 'If then there is any encouragement in Christ, any consolation from love, any sharing in the Spirit (ei tis koinōnia pneumatōs), any compassion and sympathy, make my joy complete: be of the same mind, having the same love, being in full accord and of one mind. Do nothing from selfish ambition or conceit, but in humility regard others as

better than yourselves. Let each of you look not to your own interests, but to the interests of others. Let the same mind be in you that was in Christ Jesus.'

7 Proof of the Divinity of the Holy Spirit from the Letters of St Paul

We will make use of 1 Corinthians 12.1-13 as a central text to which all other places where Paul speaks of the Holy Spirit can be related.

Concentration on this text is necessary due to the difficulty of proving this thesis in the absence of a Pauline vocabulary enabling us to immediately determine among the seven ways in which Paul uses the word pneuma which meaning expresses the reality of a divine person distinct from the Father and from the Son. We must therefore compose such a vocabulary, for otherwise the meaning of words that can be found in only one text would remain totally enigmatic and our argumentation would prove nothing.

In the Pauline letters the Holy Spirit is presented as a personal divine reality distinct from the Father and from the Son.

A reality: 1 Corinthians 12.7-11. In this passage are listed real effects (word of wisdom, of knowledge, faith, healing graces, works of power) that were very well known among the early Christians and in addition to which there existed a reality that was the cause of these effects: one Spirit.

Personal: It is not a matter of some impersonal force or power, but rather of a reality pertaining to the personal order, the order of those that subsist in an intellectual nature. For the Spirit (a) wills, 1 Corinthians 12.11, and (b) chooses different gifts for different persons, 1 Corinthians 2.12; willing and choosing imply understanding; (c) understands, knows, 1 Cor 2.10-11: 'these things God has revealed to us through the Spirit; for the Spirit searches everything, even the depths of God. For what human being knows what is truly human except the human spirit that is within? So also no one comprehends what is truly God's except the Spirit of

God'; if this text is about the Holy Spirit, it clearly proves its intellectual nature; but because of the comparison with the spirit of a human person, it could be said to refer to God's spirituality and then would be an argument for God's intellectuality; however, there are indications favorable to the interpretation in terms of the Holy Spirit, for this text is about the Spirit of God through whom revelation has been made, and it is the Holy Spirit who has spoken through the prophets; also, there is a hint of a certain opposition between God and his Spirit, so the argument is not altogether clear, and some caviling is possible; this text demonstrates both the nature and the difficulty of our proof: each text expresses only one aspect of the Spirit, hence they are not apodictic; in literary matters mathematical proofs are of no use: (d) the Holy Spirit also prays, intercedes, cries out, testifies, teaches all truth; see Romans 8.16, 8.26-27; Galatians 4.6.

*Divine: this is proven (a) from the very name 'Spirit of God' and (b) from his operation (1 Corinthians 12) as the source and author of the entire supernatural life of the church beginning with baptism; see Ephesians 4.4; this operation is (a) effected through baptism in the remission of sins; (b) a transformation of a person into Christ by means of baptism, a transition from death to life; (c) an indwelling of the Spirit in one who thus belongs to God (1 Corinthians 3.16 ff.); (d) adoption of one as a child of God (Romans 8,15, Galatians 4.6 ff.); but this filiation is to be distinguished from the real relation of filiation in the Trinity; still, it pertains to that order (see the treatise *De gratia*), because we are introduced into intimacy with the divine person of the Father; (e) an outpouring of the love of God into our hearts (Romans 5.5), by which we attain divine life inchoately here on earth and fully in heaven; this Christian operation, therefore, whether in its origin or in its action or in its ultimate end is such that it demands a divine author, for its effect belongs to the supernatural order.*

Distinct: (a) from its created effects, 1 Corinthians 12.4-11; for the Spirit is the causal agent, the effects are its products; the Spirit is active, its effects are passive; the Spirit is one, its effects are many; (b) from the Father and the Son, 1 Corinthians 12.4-6; note that generally for St Paul Kyrios is the word for the Son, Theos for the Father; the Spirit, Pneuma, is numbered

with the Father and with the Son; these persons are distinct and referred to separately, intimating the Spirit's distinction; there is a better proof of this from other Pauline texts; the clearest text is Galatians 4.4-6: 'But when the fullness of time had come, 'God sent his Son, born of a woman, born under the law, in order to redeem those who were under the law, so that we might receive adoption as children. And because you are children, God has sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, "Abba! Father!"'; in this the Father is the sender, and the sending of the Son is different from the sending of the Spirit; the first sending is for adoptive sonship, the second presupposes this sonship; also, the name of the Son in the second sending is in the genitive case, so it is not he who is the person sent; therefore the Spirit is distinguished both from the Father, the sender, and from the Son, whose Spirit he is; further probative Pauline texts are, for example, 2 Corinthians 13.13, Ephesians 4.4-6, Romans 15.30, etc. See Prat, La Theologie de St Paul, vol. 2, p. 518, note F.

Objections

1 The Spirit is God, not as equal to the Father but subordinately. This was the cardinal objection of the Arians. See 1 Corinthians 8.4-6, where the Father is that from (ex) whom, the Son is through (dia) whom; (elsewhere, e.g., 1 Corinthians 12.3) the Spirit is that in (en)whom. Therefore there is not equality here, but a descending order.

Reply, ad hominem: The use of prepositions in Paul and in the New Testament in general is so variable that no cogent argument can be based upon it. In some places the same things are said of the Father, who cannot be inferior to himself: see Romans 11.36 (from, through, in), Ephesians 4.6 (above, through, in), 1 Corinthians 1.9 (through). Elsewhere the same things are predicated of the Holy Spirit as of the Father and the Son. See Ephesians 4.16, through (ex) the Son, Romans 8.11, through (en) the Spirit, Romans 5.5, through (dia) the Holy Spirit, Colossians 1.14, in (en) the Son, and 1 Thessalonians 1.1, in (en) God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ. But surely the Father and the Son and the Spirit are not three gods. See Deuteronomy 6.4.

2 In Paul, the Spirit is a worker of miracles, for he can be stifled or extinguished (1 Thessalonians 5.19), and all have been given to drink of him (1 Corinthians 12.13). Therefore, the Spirit is not a person.

Reply: Paul uses the word pneuma in different senses, so we cannot say that he is referring to the Holy Spirit in all instances. Commonly in Paul, even concerning the Holy Spirit, there is a transition to a metaphorical or figurative meaning – for example, from cause to effect and vice versa, or from donor to the gift and vice versa. The same can be found in connection with Christ: for example, in Romans 13.14 we read, ‘put on the Lord Jesus Christ,’ from which we surely cannot conclude that Jesus is not a person but a garment. For the expressions means ‘imitate the virtues of Christ, receive the grace of Christ, fulfill his commands. It is a metaphorical expression. The literary author was not concerned so to write that from his words we could always prove the meaning of an expression. He was not acting polemically but only wished to communicate his understanding about something. Regarding the Spirit, then, we can distinguish a variety of meanings.

3 The Spirit is not distinct from Christ, for (a) Paul frequently identifies being in the Spirit with being in Christ.

Reply: This objection is not contrary to our position, for even if the Spirit and Christ are two hypostases, there is nevertheless one substance, one being, for the Spirit and the Son and the Father, and therefore one operation, so that the effects of one will be the effects of the others. We all uphold consubstantiality. Life in Christ is the same as life in the Spirit because life in Christ is given to us through the Spirit, just as the sanctification of the Lord is given through the Holy Spirit. Operations ad extra are common to all three persons.

(b) 2 Corinthians 3.17: ‘The Lord is the Spirit.’ ... ho de kyrios to pneuma estin.

Reply: This text is difficult to interpret, since it seems to directly identify Christ and the Spirit. There are two opinions regarding this text.

First opinion: In this text, Lord, kyrios, is the subject, and it is said of Christ, and spirit, pneuma, is the predicate, taken in a transferred sense; see vv. 6-8 and v. 15. The meaning would then be that the veil signifies the blindness of the minds of the Jews preventing them from seeing that the kingdom of Christ is spiritual inasmuch as their understanding was tied to the letter of the Law, not enjoying the freedom of the spirit. See Prat, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 522-29, note T.

*Second opinion: kyrios would not be Jesus, but the Spirit would be the Holy Spirit. For in this text there is something remarkable in Greek: the subject and the predicate each has its own article. In the case of a true predication, there would be an article before the subject but not before the predicate. Here, then, is the explanation: just as we place quotation marks around a word that we are citing, so did the Greeks place the definite article before that word. Therefore ho kyrios would refer back to kyrion in the preceding sentence in which there is a reference to Exodus 34.34. Here, then, Paul would explain this text as follows: that Kyrios, Lord, whom Moses spoke about is the Holy Spirit. Hence there is no identity here between Christ and the Spirit. See C.H. Dodd, *The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel*. Cambridge, 1953.*

(c) 1 Corinthians 15.45. On the resurrection of the body, Paul writes, 'The first man, Adam, became a living being, the last Adam became a life-giving spirit.' Hence the life-giving spirit is none other than Christ, who rose again and is glorified. See 2 Corinthians 5.18.

Reply: We must attend to the parallelism not only between the first and second Adam but also between what they became. Adam became a living soul (Gen. 2), a being alive with the life of a soul (anima, psyche), but not a separate soul. Thus, the life-giving spirit which Christ became is a being alive with the life of a spirit (pneumatous), in fact, a being who brings others to be alive with the life of the Spirit, doing so either by his own power or by sending them the Holy Spirit. This text, then, is perfectly coherent with the rest of St Paul's doctrine. See Prat, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 205.

4 From the parallelism between the spirit of a person and the Spirit of God in 1 Corinthians 2.11. Just as the spirit in a person is not distinct from that person, so the Spirit of God is not distinct from the Father.

Reply: (a) The comparison necessarily limps. We simultaneously must predicate likeness and unlikeness of God. See DB 422. (b) Infinite being is necessarily simple. (c) The scriptural comparison should not be extended to other things (ens quo, a 'being-by-which') not found in the text. Here we simply assert that the Spirit of God knows the things of God, and this is the point of the comparison. Comparisons between dissimilar beings should not be extended. Further on this text, see what we have said in our proof of the personhood of the Holy Spirit.

Thesis 1 – The Holy Spirit is Truly and Perfectly Divine, One in Being with the Father and the Son, yet Really Distinct from the Father and the Son

This thesis is proven by two arguments, the first of which is based upon the concept of the Holy Spirit according to the synoptic gospels and the Acts of the Apostles; the second draws upon the concept of the Holy Spirit in the Pauline letters. We will deal with the concept of the Holy Spirit in John in the thesis on the procession of the Holy Spirit.

'Spirit' (ruah, pneuma) in the Old Testament indicates (1) psychic life, human soul; (2) the life-principle in the world; (3) divine power (a) producing extraordinary effects in human beings, (b) active at the time of Moses, and (c) a gift of God; (4) a being that is in some way divine, emanating from God, yet rather as a symbol of God's governance. All of these can be considered as but vestiges of that reality known to us clearly only after the revelation in the New Testament of the mystery of the Trinity.

'Pneuma' in the New Testament can indicate a human soul, life, demon, the principle of knowledge and of moral life, or a gift of God. More often, however, it clearly refers to the Holy Spirit, i.e., a divine person distinct from the Father and the Son. This is what we have to prove.

Proof: In the synoptic gospels and the Acts of the Apostles the Holy Spirit is described as:

real: especially in the Acts of the Apostles, the Spirit is something (1) given to the apostles, (2) which is active in them, (3) governs the church by making choices, deciding, preaching, (4) is given to others (descending, filling, pouring himself out upon them), (5) testifying and arguing in support of the apostles, yet (6) which can be resisted;

divine: (1) the Spirit is often called the 'Spirit of God,' i.e., something belonging to God; (2) the Spirit performs the works of God: (a) he speaks as the voice of God to the prophets, (b) he intervenes in the life of Christ who is God, (c) he determines the divine economy by transforming and strengthening the apostles, guiding the church and guiding individuals; (3) to lie to the Spirit is to lie to God, while (4) to credit Beelzebub with Christ's miracles is to blaspheme against the Spirit;

a person: actions are predicated of the Holy Spirit that can only be attributed to a person: speaking, inspiring, rendering eloquent, sending apostles, judges, forbidding, appointing authorities, testifying.

distinct from the Father and the Son: (1) the Spirit is referred to as 'the Spirit of the Father,' thus distinct from the Father; (2) the Spirit is said to have been poured out upon the Son as promised by the Father, and therefore is distinct from both Father and Son; (3) the principal text clearly indicating that the Holy Spirit is a person distinct from the Father and the Son is Matthew 28.19, the baptismal formula; a second text to consider is Matthew 3.6, Christ's baptism; the faithful are said to be baptized 'in the name of the (tou) Father and of the (kai tou) Son and of the (kai tou) Holy Spirit'; the repetition of the definite article clearly indicates a diversity of subjects mentioned by name; for their names would not be listed together if their subjects were not distinct; the Holy Spirit, therefore, is divine, because numbered along with the Father and the Son who are divine persons, distinct, because ranked with two persons who are distinct, and a person, because baptism is conferred in his name, that is, through his power, for his glory, and as dedication to him; all these affirmations would make no sense were the Spirit not a person; yhis text, Matthew 28.19, since it comprises and sums up all that has been said

hitherto about the Holy Spirit, has a central position in this entire argumentation; its probative force appears more clearly in the entire preceding context.

*An argument from St Paul: Although *pneuma* often means breath or one's interior principle or what is characteristic of some reality (e.g., spirit of the world) or a life-giving element, nevertheless it sometimes certainly denotes the Holy Spirit as a divine person as distinct from the Father and the Son.*

In proving this, the principal text will be 1 Corinthians 12:1-13. Still, this passage ought to be complemented by the full teaching of Paul on the Spirit that is found in his other letters.

Proof: The Holy Spirit is described by St Paul as

real: because it produces real effects that are charisms: vv. 7-11 and elsewhere;

divine: because his works are the source of supernatural life; these are: (1) baptism: v. 13, which includes (as drawn from other letters) the remission of sins, unity in one body, transition from a prior sinful way of life, enlightenment of the mind, freedom from the law of sin, life opposite to the life of the flesh; all these are divine effects; (b) indwelling of the Spirit: 1 Corinthians 3.16 ff., which (as drawn from other letters) implies ownership of a person by God, divine adoptive sonship, certainty of this sonship, help for one's life, heavenly inheritance, resurrection; all these operations and effects, since they are of the divine order, demand a divine author;

a person: because he wills (v. 11), chooses (vv. 7-11), understands, both implicitly in the whole passage and explicitly in 1 Corinthians 2.10, prays, intercedes, cries out, etc. – all taken from other letters;

a person distinct from the Father and the Son: for the Spirit is numbered along with the Lord and with God, who are distinct divine persons (vv. 4, 6); in Pauline usage, 'Lord' refers to the Son and 'God' refers to the Father; if, therefore, the Spirit is listed along with distinct divine persons, he himself is a person and distinct from the other two; this distinction among the persons of the Trinity occurs frequently in other Pauline texts.

Thesis 2: The Tradition of the Apostolic Fathers and Other Ante-Nicene Fathers Is Consonant with Catholic Doctrine

See Boyer, 1949, 29-51.

The Question

We are asking whether catholic tradition from the very beginning of the church is in agreement with what is said in the New Testament concerning the dogma of the Holy Trinity. Our inquiry will be done in three stages, distinguishing a certain progression from (a) the conduct and teaching of the early church as seen in its liturgy, prayers, and the writings of the apostolic Fathers to (b) the way of speaking of the Apologists (thesis 2), the post-Nicene Fathers, especially the Cappadocians (thesis 3). With the Apologists in the middle of the second century, the church began to speculate about the procession of the Word and the difference between the Father and the Son. Such theological speculation was at this point not yet very accurate, so that there was some obscurity about what we have seen to be the New Testament teaching on the Trinity. This lack of clarity provided the grounds for the rationalistic objection that the doctrine of the Trinity was a fourth-century invention. We shall find plenty of contrary evidence to dispel this doubt.

The thesis has three parts: 1 Evidence for the Trinity in the liturgy of the early church; 2 Witness of the apostolic Fathers, first and second centuries; 3 Witness of the Apologists, Popes, Christian authors in the third century.

N.B: At this point it might be necessary to repeat what we have said about the scriptural way of speaking and the progressive transition from an ordinary way of knowing to expressions more abstract, more general and universal. This is a lengthy process. Before clear and distinct formulations are devised, many attempts have to be made which are not without obscurity. This will not surprise anyone who knows something about the slow evolution of the human mind. This happens, for example, in determining the vocabulary of many languages: the same idea which at

first glance seems quite simple, for example 'two,' is expressed in very different concrete ways among primitive peoples according to the subject matter – animals, inanimate objects, human beings. For example: 'I have bought 5 yoke of oxen' = '10 oxen. Only gradually is the idea 'two' arrived at which is valid in all cases. See also the 'dual' number in some primitive languages.

This also depends on the fact that human thinking begins in a very concrete mode.

Clarifications that now seem obvious have often taken a long time to be made. Thus, before the Council of Nicea Christians repeated what was in the New Testament concerning the Trinity. But when they began to give explanations, it took a while before they arrived at a clear formulation, e.g., 'three persons in one nature' (the creed Quicumque). This was a new way of expressing a truth that had been known for three centuries. This should be kept in mind in looking for the true solution to any difficulty.

Adversaries

Rationalists: The dogma of the Trinity was set forth at the Council of Nicea (325) and the First Council of Constantinople (381). Prior to that, Monarchists were active in the western church, teaching that God is one and there is no personal distinction between the Father and the Son. See, for example, Ignatius of Antioch, Zephyrinus, Praxeas, and the Sabellian heresy at the end of the second century, all of whom conflated the divine persons. In the east the main heresy was subordinationism, or ditheism or tritheism, which divided the divine being on the grounds that in order to distinguish the persons, three different names were required as well as some order among them. Regarding the opinion of some Catholic authors, such as Petavius, on this matter, see Boyer, pp. 30 and 39-40.

Proof

1 Affirmation of the Holy Trinity in the Liturgy of the Early Church

Trinitarian faith was attested (a) in the baptismal formula and rite, and (b) in the lex orandi, the 'norm of praying' as being a 'norm of believing.'

(a) Baptism: The very early Christian work known as the Didache, 'The Teaching of the Twelve Apostles,' prescribes in section VII the procedure for administering baptism according to the formula, '... in the name of the Father and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit' (RJ 4). This formula together with the triple pouring of water on the head constitute a marvelous proof of Trinitarian faith. This text has the same probative force as Matthew 28 above in Thesis 1, and it is drawn from tradition.

Similar formulas are found in Justin (RJ 126), Irenaeus (RJ 219) and Tertullian (RJ 67), indicating that the same rite was in use from the year 150 to the beginning of the third century.

In the triple questions and answers (see Irenaeus and Tertullian) we find an element that coincides with the New Testament data, although the affirmation of the divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit is not more explicit here.

What is more explicit is the testimony of Hippolytus (ca. 200). (Hippolytus' canons were edited in the fifth or sixth century, but older fragments were found in a Berlin palimpsest dated to the third century.)

Thus, it is quite clear that the doctrine of the Trinity existed from the beginning, albeit not explicitly asserted.

(b) Lex orandi: This 'law' reveals the same faith: that the Son and not only the Father is petitioned and worshiped.

Testimonies

Pliny the Younger, in his report to the emperor Trajan (ca. 110), says that the Christians used to sing hymns to Christ as to a god.

The Christian Smyrneans, in referring to the martyrdom of Polycarp, made a distinction between the worship of Christ – ‘we adore him as the Son of God’ – and the cult of the martyrs – ‘we pray to the martyrs as disciples and imitators of the Lord.’

The martyr Polycarp: In the above report, he is said to have prayed, when already tied to the stake, and two things are noteworthy in this prayer: (a) ‘Father of your beloved and blest (eulogetos) son Jesus Christ’ – the word ‘benedictus’ may be an allusion, as is the custom of the Jws, to that name in place of YHWH; see Mark 14.61). (b) Also, at the end of the prayer, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are glorified together: ‘I praise you, I bless you, I glorify you ... through Jesus Christ, through whom to you, with him and the Holy Spirit, be glory ... (See John 5.23). We see here an indication of the religious attitude of the early church which gives through the Son glory to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

Ignatius of Antioch similarly explicitly affirms the divinity of the Son when speaking about ‘the passion of my God.’

Prayers

In the Didache, the Son is honored as God: Hosanna to the God of David.’

In a Greek evening hymn (RJ 108) Christ is invoked as the light of the Father; note the following: (a) possibly an allusion to the exordium of the Letter to the Hebrews: ‘the splendor of his glory’; (b) in praising the Trinity, ‘we praise the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit’; (c) glory is given to the Son in a special way: ‘You are worthy to be celebrated in hymns and holy acclamations, Son of God, who give life; for this the world glorifies you.’

In a Sunday prayer: ‘May the Holy Spirit come upon us ...’

In celebrating the Eucharist: ‘We beg you, send us the Holy Spirit...’

In doxologies: What was expressed later in the councils [Constantinople] was already done in practice: ‘... the Holy Spirit ... who with the Father and the Son is adored and glorified ...’

Conclusion: The early Christians dealt with the Trinity in the same way as today, just as explicitly although less technically. This argument has a more than ordinary probative force from the fact that liturgy is very conservative.

2 Testimony of the Apostolic Fathers

1 Clement of Rome: his references regarding our doctrine are contained under six headings.

a His letter to the Corinthians has the same context as in Paul's letter to the Philippians, 2.5-11, where explicit mention is made of the divinity of Christ. Both texts mention the intimate connection between Jesus and the Father. Hence the greatest dignity and most outstanding example or humility for all Christians: 'For if the Lord so humbled himself ...'

*b Note also the words, '... who, being the effulgence of the majesty of God, is as superior to the angels as the name he has inherited' (RJ 18) and compare them with Hebrews 1.3-4 in which Christ's divinity is affirmed. The literary and cultural contexts of these passages is the same. See the textual analysis of Hebrews in the treatise *De Verbo incarnato*.*

c Attributed to Christ are the words of Wisdom, 'Come to me, children, and I will teach you the fear of the Lord' (Palms 34.12), which supposes that Clement held the identity between Christ and the Wisdom of God. So also Paul, 1 Corinthians 1.24, 1.30 (RJ 23).

d Supreme worship is accorded to Christ in the same manner as to the Father: 'majesty and glory.'

e An Old Testament oath made in the words 'as the Lord lives' is now made naming the Son with the Father and the Holy Spirit. So the Son and the Spirit are in the order of divinity (RJ 28).

f Mention is made of the function of the Holy Spirit as inspiring all salutary thoughts as well as the prophets and scripture.

2 Ignatius of Antioch is so explicit about the divinity of Christ that liberals take that to prove the opposite thesis: 'Ignatius identified the Father and the Son.' See Boyer, 36-37. But in fact his words suppose a distinction:

a 'The church of Ephesus chosen by the will of the Father and Jesus Christ, our God.'

b Christ who 'came forth from one Father and has been with him and to him has returned.' Sometimes Christ is called 'our God' (six times), not that he is another God but that he was incarnated, died, etc. ... for us.

c 'God ... our Lord Jesus Christ was carried in Mary's womb, in accordance with the dispensation of God, of the seed of David, by the Holy Spirit.' RJ 42)

3 Letter of Barnabas (ca. 130): The author takes the Son to be coeternal with the Father; for he interprets Genesis 1.26, 'Let us make man ...,' as indicating a conversation between the persons of the Trinity (RJ 31).

4 Second Letter of Clement of Rome (ca. 140, author unknown): He calls upon Christians to have the same religious relationship to the Son as to the Father; hence the Son is God. Also, the Son is said to be the author of our incorruptibility, which implies a divine attribute (cf. Wisdom 12.1) (RJ 101). On the other hand, he speaks of the sending of the Son by the Father to save us, indicating a distinction between their persons.

5 The Shepherd of Hermas (middle of the second century) raises more difficulties than it gives light. It deals with the Trinity only indirectly, so that it is hard to determine clearly what it teaches on this point. In particular, what it says about the Son and the Holy Spirit smacks of a certain adoptionism: the Son of God would be the Spirit of God residing in the man Jesus (RJ 89). The reason for this uncertainty would seem to be that his Trinitarian doctrine is found only incidentally in certain similitudes that he uses for his moral and ascetical teachings, to which the

dogmatic aspect is secondary. The obscurity in this work is not usual in tradition; in fact it contradicts it.

3 Testimony of the Apologists, the Roman Pontiffs, and Ecclesiastical Authors of the Third Century

A Testimony of the Apologists

How can one explain the position of non-Catholics on these writers when they assert that there is no evidence of Trinitarian teaching in them and accordingly that Trinitarian faith was unknown in the second-century church?

- 1 -

First fundamental distinction: The faith of the Apologists is one thing, their speculative attempt to understand the faith is another.

We can obtain the criterion for separating what aspects in their works pertain to faith from what are attributable to personal speculation by going to what we in our day know from the Magisterium as pertaining to the faith. From this, texts are selected, as witnesses to Tradition, expressing orthodox faith; in those, however, that can in no way accord with the faith, we acknowledge private speculation about the faith, and this is the method which apologetics occasionally uses, presupposing the infallible magisterium of the church.

For us, however, proceeding more historically, we will apply the distinction to the texts that was made by those authors themselves, insofar as this is possible. Such a process is most important if we wish to reach the mind of these authors.

Now then, three later writers, Origen, Tertullian, and Clement of Alexandria, have explicitly made this distinction:

Origen, seeking the gnosis [knowledge] of revealed truths, clearly distinguished those that are certain according to the preaching of the church and universally admitted (the existence

and spiritual nature of God, three divine hypostases, etc.) from his own explanations and research in matters where this unanimity was not yet clear. (For example, whether the Holy Spirit was born and generated as the Son was. Cf. RJ 443-445 ff.)

Clement of Alexandria: same as Origen.

Others also, although more confusedly, made that distinction. For example, Tertullian, in De Praescriptione haereticorum, secure in the immutability of the rule of faith to which he acknowledged freedom to satisfy in whatever way he wished his 'lust for curiosity' on more obscure points wherever investigations can be made.

Even some Apologists made that distinction sufficiently, although less developed. Thus:

Justin, when wanting to prove the existence of Christ prior to his birth from the Virgin Mary, drew a clear distinction between his own explanation and the truth he was inquiring into that was universally admitted (RJ 136).

Athenagoras (in his apology) at first professed faith in God the Father and in the Son. Later, in order to satisfy the curiosity of the emperor, he tried to explain in what sense the expression 'Son of God' is to be accepted and understood (RJ 164).

Irenaeus had already come to this meaning: he distinguished faith that does not become more or less according to number of words used to express it (RJ 194, 231, etc.) and questions in the solution of which it is better to be silent than to err. (He said this in writing against the Gnostics who indulged in a multitude of speculations.) For example: How was the invisible God made visible to the prophets? Why was the Word made flesh only at the end times? How is the Son generated by the Father? RJ 202-204, etc.

Therefore, that distinction, although applied in different ways by different authors, when found in them is truly historical.

- 2 -

There is a further fundamental distinction to be made regarding this question: in judging the attempt these second- and third-century authors made to understand the faith, one must avoid anachronism, which consists in defending or criticizing the speculations in one era according to

principles and distinctions that were only found to be true later. For example, we hold that there would be no real distinction among the divine persons unless there were processions; but for several centuries this was not yet clearly held by theologians.

With these two distinctions, we are in a position to understand the Apologists: their speculation is not to be taken as their faith; that speculation should not be examined in the light of what came to be known only later on. Even the Fathers who came after them knew that they had not been correct in what they had said about the Trinity. Augustine, for example, in arguing against the Pelagians who made use of statements by Chrysostom, distinguished between the earlier way of speaking, when cautions were lacking that subsequently were required, and that of a later time after the rise of Pelagianism, appealing to the way of speaking of the Trinity both before and after the Arian heresy (RJ 1228).

3

The principal sources of difficulties found among the Apologists

1 The generation of the Son

*After rejecting the mythical way of generation in the genealogies of the pagan gods, and in arguing against the more sophisticated pagans who derided so many divine generations, in order to explain the meaning of our 'Son of God,' they appealed to the Stoic distinction between *verbum insitum*, 'inner word,' and *verbum prolatum*, 'uttered word.'*

*The Stoics distinguished *lalia*, inarticulate vocal sound, *phone*, articulated sound not necessarily making sense, and *logos*, sound of a series of words signifying something. Clearly, there has to be some *logos* in the mind, *insitum*, before one can utter a *logos prolatum*.*

The Fathers used this distinction to explain generation in God. From this it is clear that they were engaged in pure speculation: why the Word is Son.

*Jesus is called *Logos* by John; hence, they said, the eternal Word with God is an inner Word inseparable from God, and that at the moment of creation it became an uttered Word through whom God created. For it was through the Word that all has been created (John 1.3).*

This 'uttering' of the inner word they called 'generation' in God; hence, it was at the moment of creation, not from eternity but at the beginning of time that the Word became Son.

Thus there is here a real error; for the Son as Word is eternal, and so it must be said that some Fathers erred in their speculations about the way in which the Word is Son, placing the Son as later than the eternal Word.

Further, there is another error in this first example. For since in God there is a real distinction only inasmuch as there are processions, the Trinity would have begun only at the moment of creation! But to impute this error, a practical denial of the Trinity, to the Apologists is precisely to fall into the error of anachronism mentioned above. This conclusion follows logically, but from a principle that has been admitted universally and explicitly only since the Council of Florence (1438-45). Historically, however, it is not clear that the Apologists denied any other basis for distinction in God besides to the processions.

2 Subordinationism

In sacred scripture there are in fact many statements about the relations among the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit – e.g., 'The Father is greater than I,' John 14.28 – which if accepted immediately as they sound can lead to errors about the Trinity, and this in fact has happened. For a clear and sufficient understanding of these texts, much intense speculative theological study over three centuries was done requiring some systematic notions such as nature, person, generation, procession, which we find fully developed only in the Quicumque creed.

The authors in the second and third centuries are to be found at the beginning of this drive to understand the scriptures. It is no wonder, then, that in them (especially in Origen) there is lacking that precision and caution in speaking about the Trinity that the church has learned only as a result of so many heresies.

General assertion: The Apologists are good witnesses to the common belief in the Trinity, even though their individual attempts to understand the faith led them into error on some points which, at that time, the church had not yet fully and authoritatively defined. Therefore, we cannot refer to one or other of their texts to prove our thesis without answering the difficulties arising from other texts.

In particular:

Justin (ca. 165) certainly considered Christ or the Son to be God, distinct from the Father. This is clear from (a) the second part of his *Apologia I* (cc. 30-53), where he takes his proof from the Old Testament prophets (RJ 113-129); (b) in the *Dialogue with Trypho*, where he wants to prove from some Old Testament texts that there is a true God who is not the Father. For while the Father does *not appear*, there is a God who *does appear*, to the patriarchs in the Old Testament and then later in the New Testament, the one who is always the Son and who truly is God.

Prescinding from the validity and the nature of the argumentation, there is no doubt that Justin held the true divinity of the Son.

Difficulties

1 *Concerning the generation of the Son* (see Boyer, p. 42): briefly and only here does Justin touch upon the generation of the Son, asserting that the Word became the Son at the time of creation. Fr Boyer refers the word *genitus* (born) not to what follows but to the preceding words in this passage, as follows: ‘The Word, prior to creation, was both one with the Father and was *generated* [*genitus erat*], when through him he [the Father] made all things ...’

But according to the principles mentioned above, we can admit that there is an error here, but one that regards speculation only. Hence the interpretation of a particular text matters little: Tatian, a disciple of Justin, and Theophilus make the same error. It is a blemish on the thought of that time, which, although it contains within itself the dangers posed by serious errors, still does not weaken the faith for which Justin Martyr gave his life.

2 *From the opposition* which Justin seems to place between the nature of God the Father, *invisible*, and that of the Son, *visible*, as a manifestation of divinity. From this one would have to conclude that the Father and the Son do not have the same nature, substance, or essence, since God would be either visible or invisible but not both at the same time; see Boyer, p. 43. Hence the Father and the Son would not be the same God, and this is *subordinationism*.

Reply: Subordinationism is actually latent in the basis of Justin's argument, but in fact his distinction has a basis in scripture. See John 1.18, 'no one has ever seen God'; 'it is God's only Son ever at the Father's side, who has revealed him'; Hebrews 1.3, 'the splendor of his glory and the very stamp of his being'; Colossians 1.15, 'the image of the invisible God.'

There was no systematic theology at that time nor any dogmatic formulation of Trinitarian doctrine. Through reasoning on the texts of Scripture, Justin thought he had found an argument to prove what *through faith he had come to know as true*, namely the divinity of the Son. This argument, inasmuch as it supposes a difference in nature between the Father and the Son, is erroneous, but that conclusion was arrived at only after considerable time. In his time, therefore, Justin was doing the best he could in the absence of a notion of nature, person, etc., as clear and distinct as what we have today.

Justin is not to be faulted on this account. We are simply saying that progress in understanding a doctrine depends on the cultural state and context. Justin spoke quite well on those matters that were well known in his time, less well on what still remained to be known. Hence for us who have clear concepts of the one nature of God's being, that distinction can in no way be made between Father and Son. If anyone, however, uses only biblical categories, as the Apologists did, it is not so easy to apply notions or make the deductions that we make. Therefore, subordinationism is only *virtually* present in Justin's thought.

3 In the *Dialogue with Trypho*, 61,1, Justin speaks about the Son as being 'generated from the Father by will.' More subordinationism! (See Boyer, 43; RJ 137)

Reply: This statement was made only indirectly, parenthetically. Still, it is the conclusion of an imperfect theology, for in fact the Son proceeds from the Father by necessity, not by will.

Let our conclusion, then, be this, that Justin faithfully transmits what has been revealed as true. He has less understanding of some particular points that he deals with. He remains, therefore, a witness of the same faith as we have. (See what he says on baptism, RJ 126).

Irenaeus (died ca. 200): Six points are to be noted (texts in Boyer, pp. 43-44): (1) He clearly states the elements of the dogma of the Trinity; he affirms the divinity and the distinction of the Father and the Son. (2) He explicitly rejected the Stoic distinction between the inner word and the uttered word when he detected its dangerous implications. The Word is eternally with the Father, distinct from the Father. Thus he avoids all error regarding the generation of the Son (RJ 204, 231). (3) Because the Son is said to be ‘the measure of the Father’ and the Father is necessarily infinite, the Father and Son together must be such that their identity in nature follows. (4) He notices the danger of speaking as Justin did about the invisibility of the Father and visibility of the Son, and asserts that the Son has the same invisible nature but became visible in order to reveal the Father. (5) *However*, in his way of speaking there are suggestions of subordinationism (see Boyer, p. 44) to remove which would require a systematic rule for study of the Trinity, a rule against which all expressions would be judged, to which all would be reduced, and without which some inexact statement might easily go unnoticed by everyone. This rule was introduced only later on in the clear affirmation of one nature and three persons in God. Hence the same general assessment can be made: in Irenaeus also there is the distinction between faith and speculation about the faith. (6) He is very good in what he says about the Holy Spirit (Boyer, p. 44).

Tatian, a disciple of Justin who later became an Encratite, witnesses to the divinity of the Son and his distinction from the Father. He presents the same difficulties as Justin and their solution is the same (RJ 153).

Theophilus of Antioch, who flourished between 160 and 170, had a Hellenistic education and only as an adult became a Christian. He also used the distinction between the inner word and the uttered word to explain the generation of the Son in his three books *Ad Autolyicum* (RJ 182). See Boyer p. 45.

Athenagoras (160-180) expresses Trinitarian faith more clearly than Tatian and Theophilus (RJ 164 f.). See Boyer, p. 45.

B *Testimony of the Roman Pontiffs of the Third Century*

Victor (ca 189-98). We do not know whether he wrote in Latin or in Greek. He condemned the monarchianism of Theodotus ('only the Father is God') which led to adoptionism regarding Christ: Jesus was a mere man and so the adoptive son of God as we are, but God was present in him in a special way.

Zephyrinus (ca. 198-217) and *Callistus* (217-22) whose position we know from the work *Philosophoumena* of *Hippolytus of Rome* (237), who was an antipope under three popes but subsequently was reconciled in the persecution of Maximinus Tracius and is venerated as a martyr on the same day as Pope Pontian (230-35). The difficulty of faithfully representing the position of these authors arises from the doubtful value of the historical sources that have come down to us. Hippolytus asserted the distinction between the Father and the Son such that it led to subordinationism through his theory of *logos*. For this he was condemned by Zephyrinus, who at that time had Callistus as a councillor. Hippolytus (DB 42a, 3036) accused two popes of denying all distinction between the Father and the Son, which nevertheless was false, for we know that they had formally condemned Sabellianism.

Dionysius of Rome (259-69) is the clearest witness to our position (DB 48-51). Concerning his connection with *Dionysius of Alexandria*, note the following: there was an accusation against Dionysius of Alexandria made to the pope to the effect that he affirmed three gods, exaggerating the distinction among the three divine persons in his defence of the faith against Sabellianism. Possibly a linguistic error was committed in understanding his work; for ever since Tertullian the church had accurate Latin terminology for speaking about the Trinity: 'one *substantia*, three *personae*.' The Greeks, on the other hand, used the word *ousia* ['being'] for substance, but had no precise word to designate 'person.' Clement of Alexandria and Origen chose *hypostasis* for 'person,' while etymologically *hypo-stasis* = *sub-stantia*, meaning the

reality, the being, of a thing. So also at the Council of Nicea, where *hypostasis* is synonymous with *ousia*. Thus there is much that lacks precision in Dionysius of Alexandria. Note also that Dionysius of Rome speaks of ‘monarchy’ in God in asserting the unity in God; whereas the Sabellians, who are also called ‘Monarchianists,’ exaggerated divine unity to the point of denying the trinity of persons. Hence Dionysius of Rome only rejected three separate hypostases, and therefore tritheism, and affirmed belief in three but at the same time in the oneness of God.

C Testimony of Third-Century Christian Writers

In the case of Tertullian and Origen, the general distinctions that we have given provide the solution to questions arising from their works. Their faith is not to be confused with their private speculation.

Tertullian (ca.157-226) is the clearest witness to tradition (RJ 371-79), having marvelous precision, especially in his *Adversus Praxean* where we find the first use of the word ‘Trinity’ (c. 3). His great merit is that he introduced the use of technical terms (person, substance), c.12. With the help of this terminology, the Western church was spared the disputes that vexed the Eastern church, and furnished them, more speculative though they were, with a way to a correct understanding of the faith. However, some of his other distinctions were too rhetorical. *Oeconomia*, for example, is used not in the sense of divine providence directing the world toward salvation but to indicate intratrinitarian relations. Also, his thought concerning the generation of the Son is less fortunate: he goes back to the explanation given by the Apologists (the Word becomes Son at the moment of creation), already rejected by Irenaeus. See Boyer, p. 49. At that time this subject was not yet a matter of faith, *de fide*, but was treated as a purely speculative question. That anachronism is to be avoided which imputes to him conclusions logically deduced through our concepts from his way of speaking.

Origen (died 253-254) makes many clear statements about traditional faith (Boyer, pp. 94-50). There is a particular difficulty about his exact “mind”, because his treatise *Peri archon*, *On Principles* (ca. 230), (the first dogmatic manual according to Altaner), is known to us only in

a translation by Rufinus (345-410) who did what he could to correct errors. Certain expressions in the translation are much better understood if the influence of the progressive movements in the fourth century is recognized, especially that of the Cappadocians, particularly regarding the properties of the persons in the Trinity. These are too developed for Origen's time. Origen taught the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son, using the word *homoousion* (RJ 540). Being generated from eternity, the Son is of the same nature as the Father. In a word, he provided elements which later were adopted by the Council of Nicea and which in fact could be misunderstood, as for example by the Arians.

However, some clear expressions of subordinationism can be found in him – for example, where he takes literally the words, 'The Father is greater than I.' (See Boyer, p. 50). This must be said: Origen is in the first historical stage of exegesis, in which sacred scripture is still not thoroughly explored.

Not knowing, therefore, the conclusions that could logically be drawn from his statements, still there is much that cannot logically be reconciled with sound faith, which he had. This is easily explained in an author who took his first theological steps almost in every camp, so to speak.

Moreover, his thought included neo-Platonic elements (he was a pupil of Ammonius Saccas); in the matter of the relation between the Father and the other persons, for example, he speaks too 'emanistically': the Father alone is pure, so the Son would be 'one among many.' If this question can legitimately be asked, still Origen's expressions in fact cannot be reconciled with Trinitarian dogma.

Thesis 3 – The fourth-century Fathers explicitly believed in the perfect equality and real consubstantiality of the Son with the Father

(Boyer, pp. 51-71)

Historical introduction: Even in summary fashion and quite incompletely we ought to look at the major thrust of the positions taken on the Trinitarian question in that century. Three points are to be considered: errors both before and after Arianism; the decree of the Council of Nicea; opposition to the Council.

1 *Errors in General*

Before Arianism we find in the church these heretical tendencies:

1 Monarchianism (Noetus, Praxeas). *Monos arche*, one principle; Sabellianism (Sabellius); modalism (disciples of Sabellius). God is one but reveals himself under three distinct modalities: either as a lawgiver in the Old Testament (Father) or as Redeemer in the New Testament (Son) or as sanctifier (Holy Spirit). These constitute the one tendency to speak of God as being so one and unique that there is no real distinction between the Father and the Son, but the Son is *numerically the same person* as the Father. And similarly for the Holy Spirit. There are three names but the persons are joined into one.

2 Adoptionism. Christ would have been, like us, an adopted son of God. It is rather an error in Christology but with the consequent error concerning the Trinity that there is no more than one person in God. Its principal proponents were *Theodotus*, condemned by Pope Victor in 190, and *Paul of Samosata*, Bishop of Antioch, condemned by the Council of Antioch, ca. 268. It was at this council that the word *homoousios* appeared for the first time; it was condemned, but with a different meaning from that of Nicea, i.e., as indicating a real identity of the *persons* of the Father and Son just as of their *substance (ousia)*. Also the *priest Lucian*, who died as a martyr in the persecution of Maximinus in 313. He had considerable intellectual influence, and many of his friends, who later became bishops, espoused Arianism. He seems to have completely denied Christ's divinity.

3 Arianism. Its doctrine is clearly set forth in the anathemas of Nicea. Arius had three errors (DB 54, at end):

(A) The Word is not eternal: ‘Time was when he was not,’ or in the preferred Greek formula, ‘there was a moment of time I which the Word did not exist.’ The moment when he began to exist was when he was generated: ‘Before he was born he did not exist.’ This refers to his temporal birth.

(B) The Word is a creature like all others, created out of nothing: ‘he was made out of nothing,’ or at least he was not made out of the substance of the first being: ‘... or out of another substance or essence.’

(C) And so the Word is not unchangeable, but “convertible or mutable.”

He argued:

(a) *from scripture*: there are many statements referring either to the humanity of Christ or speaking of his divinity in such a way as to suggest that the Son is less than the Father. His conclusion: The Son is simply less than the Father;

(b) *from Origen’s commentaries* on the scriptures, which tended sometimes toward subordinationism, at least in his way of speaking and in his too literal interpretations of scripture;

(c) *from reason*: there is a rationalistic element in all of them, though not to the same degree as in Eunomius. In full-blown rationalism, God knows himself in the same way as we know ourselves. Even more, as a result of confusion regarding certain Greek words: *agennetos*, from *gennaō*, means ‘ungenerated,’ predicated properly only of the Father; *agenetos*, from *gignomai*, means ‘not made,’ ‘not created,’ which can be predicated of the Son and the Spirit as well as of the Father. Prior to the Arians, both words were used indiscriminately about the Son with the same meaning: the Son as God is *a se*, from himself, but as generated he is *ab alio*, from another. The difference in meaning went unnoticed, and the Arians took advantage of this verbal confusion.

Three things should be noted: what is being defined, how the word *homoousios* is understood, and the meaning given to the word *hypostasis*.

What is being defined: It was clearly defined that the Son is ‘... from the substance of the Father, God from God, light from light, true God from true God, born, not made...’ DB 54. That is: the Son is truly God, eternal, and is not a creature. The ambiguity about the words *agenetos*, ‘not generated (born)’ and *agenetos*, ‘not made,’ was cleared up.

How the word *homoousios* is understood: *Homoousios* = having the same substance (*ousia*, being) as the Father because born of the very substance of the Father. ‘... of the same substance as the Father, which is *homoousios* in Greek; (DB 54). *Homos* = same, *ousia* = essence, being, substance, hence *homo-ousios* = having the same substance.

However, its meaning as derived from the words themselves needs to be further determined from the historical context.

1 As derived from the words themselves, nothing is indicated as to the numerical identity of nature of the Father and the Son. This is clear from the Council of Chalcedon (see DB 148), where it is said that Christ is ‘consubstantial with the Father according to his divinity and consubstantial with us according to his humanity.’ But no one holds that there is numerically one human substance common to us and Christ. Hence in terms of the words themselves it is not determined whether the Son is the same God as the Father is or some other God.

2 But in order to determine the mind of the Council using these words, we must look at the *historical context*. If Christians acknowledge *one* God, the Council of Nicea understands this as numerical identity; but if they admit a plurality of gods, the meaning of the word as understood in DB 148 can be retained. However, the monotheism of Christians is beyond doubt, whether one looks at the Old Testament or the New Testament or the tradition of the church. Dionysius of Rome (ca. 260) clearly affirmed that there were not three gods (DB 48). Moreover, in its argument against Arius, it was not to be determined by the Council of Nicea ‘how many gods there are,’ but ‘whether the Son is truly God,’ the one God whom all acknowledge. Thus there is no doubt about the meaning of *homoousios* in this Council.

The meaning given to the word *hypostasis*: at the end of the fourth century the Greeks recognized three *hypostaseis* and understood by it ‘three persons.’ But that word was not always used with that meaning. For example, in the anathemas at the end of the Nicene Creed (DB 54) there are the words ‘*hypostaseis e ousias*,’ two terms used with the same meaning, namely ‘substance.’

3 Opposition to the Council of Nicea

Since at that time the question was vague, even with us the obscurity remains about how the various parties and factions that emerged after the Council were opposed to one another. This opposition lasted from 325 until the Council of Constantinople in 381. During this interval of over fifty years there were numerous other councils and disputes.

Opposition, however, did not clearly emerge right away but did so especially between 341 and 381. During that time there arose four opinions, according to the possible relations of the Son to the Father.

1 The Son is *unlike (anomoios)* the Father. The adherents of this opinion were called *Anomoians*. They were pure Arians. Such were Aetius, Eunomius, and others, the ‘left wing’ of the Arians.

2 The Son is *similar, homoios*, to the Father, but similar in a diminished sense. They were called *Homoians*; Acacius was one. We do not know in what this diminution of likeness consisted.

3 The Son is *similar* to the Father in all respects, even as to substance, *homoousios*. These were called Homoiousians, today Semiarians. They were the closest to being orthodox. Their leader was Basil of Ancyra. They were the right wing.’

4 Finally, the orthodox position, *consubstantiality*: the Homousians, whose principal proponent was Athanasius.

Note: There were some who, like those in (c) above, although they maintained that the Son was like the Father in all respects, nevertheless rejected the term *homoousios*.

Reasons for this uproar and confusion: why were there four factions and not just two?

1 *The complexity of the matter.* In fact there were not one but two questions: (1) whether the Son was God, and (2) whether the word *homoousion*, which is not in the scriptures but only mentioned in the Council, should be inserted in a creedal formula, so that anyone who rejects it must be considered a heretic and liable to eternal punishment. What was at issue here was the development of dogma.

Both questions were difficult, even taken separately, but it was more difficult to distinguish them, since they arose from the same decree of Nicea.

Regarding the first question: first, there was an exegetical problem. To prove the divinity of Christ from the New Testament texts is not easy; for what is required is a selection of texts and a good explanation of them, but this is not done systematically in one day. Besides, the speculative difficulty was greater at that time than today. Two affirmations concerning Christ must be held, which seem to be opposed to his divine simplicity: (1) he is really *a se*, of himself, since he is God, and (2) he is really *ab alio*, from another, i.e., he really depends on another, since he *genitus*, begotten. At that time there was no clear distinction between person and substance, nor any term suitable for designating a person as conceptually distinct from substance. Hence their terminology remained confused, as is evident from the Council of Alexandria, 362, convoked by Athanasius. Some Fathers held that there were three ‘hypostases,’ others that there was only one, in God. Athanasius realized that this was a question of terminology, even long after Nicea. So the problem then was also terminological.

Regarding the second question, on the legitimacy of introducing into the creed a term not found in the text of the New Testament.

The difficulty arose from a discussion about the first ecumenical council in 325. If even today, after so many such councils, the development of doctrine is still being disputed, it was disputed all the more at that time, when the question was not even known as a problem.

Athanasius favored the use of the term *homoousios* in the creed by way of exception, for he felt that only scriptural words should be used. But it was the only way to counter the error of the Arians.

2 Other elements, historical rather than doctrinal, complicated the issue.

(a) *Imperial interference* in theological questions. Until the time of Constantine the emperors were pagans and hostile to the church and did not meddle with its internal matters. Constantine, in a way, convoked and presided over the Council of Nicea. His successors were more Arian; and Constantius, who was the first real ‘Caesaro-papist,’ fully supported the Arian doctrine, convoked the council, and penalized the orthodox. As a result of this interference in ecclesiastical matters, there was little progress in the church. Ecclesiastical ‘diplomacy’ began at this time, there was strife among the factions in many ways, battles against Athanasius were frequent (five times he was forced to leave his episcopal chair and lived in exile for 17 years), and against other orthodox bishops, not for doctrinal but for temporal reasons.

(b) *Organization of the church*. The authority of the local bishops was very helpful in the time of the persecutions. All the churches in one region were members of a community (*koinonia*), so that there was a direct union among all the bishops of that region and only as a unified group did they interact with the Roman See. Today, on the contrary, bishops are united among themselves inasmuch as they have a direct link with Rome. The difference was not in the nature of church organization but in the concrete way in which things were done in those days. In a time of persecution and of difficulty in communication the union of regional bishops is more effective, and only through the mediation of these bishops was union among them all made possible. Such organization made it difficult to get a quick unanimous decision in any controversy. All the bishops had to be gathered together for an ecumenical council. After a dogmatic decision was made, there was the further difficulty in communicating it.

(c) Unlike today, the special *importance of conciliar decrees* could not have been clear, or why some council was ecumenical and others provincial: the specific difference had not yet been defined. Their importance comes from tradition: it is easier to see after twenty ecumenical

councils than immediately after the first. Indeed, the word ‘council’ was not in use for the 300 bishops at Nicea.

Reasons for this Thesis

Rationalists and liberals object that in the fourth century it was not *numerical* consubstantiality that was affirmed but only *specific*. The Fathers then would be ‘ditheists.’ This objection, like all objections, was not without grounds. The fourth-century Fathers were not that different from the Apologists, for Trinitarian doctrine had not yet fully developed, and so some things could have been said that logically led to ditheism. We will investigate the matter further.

1 There are some differences in mentality between the Western and the Eastern Fathers. The *Western* Fathers laid greater stress on the *unity* of God than in clearly distinguishing the *Three*. As a result, there was a danger of falling into Monarchianism, Sabellianism or modalism. The *Eastern* Fathers had the opposite tendency. They made a clear distinction between the ‘three persons,’ and their particular danger was ‘subordinationism,’ Arianism. Note that these differences were not about what was affirmed and believed as true, but about what was *more often* affirmed and stated. Thus, the Western and Eastern Fathers easily suspected each other of heresy.

2 *The Cappadocians* acknowledged that given the distinction of persons in God, each person must have something *proper to himself*. So they rightly distinguished between what was *common* and *proper*. But in what does what is common and what is proper consist? To answer this requires a metaphysical inquiry. But the Cappadocians did not yet have a sufficiently well-developed ontology and so were not yet able to take the further steps called for by Trinitarian thought. Instead of engaging in speculation based on principles that *later* we have recognized to be truer and more sound, and still dabbling in Platonism, they attempted to solve the difficulties regarding the distinction of persons in God according to less solid principles. Thus, for example, Gregory of Nyssa: Man is *one* (= human nature, a Platonic idea of man) and all men are but

participations in this one which is the unique and sole true Man. By the same token, *three persons* in God present no obstacle to the *unity* in God. So rationalists today conclude that Gregory of Nyssa, who posits this parity among the persons, affirmed the *specific* unity in God, not the *numerical*, and indeed implicitly asserted a numerical trinity of Gods. Here we find the same difficulty as previously found among the Apologists, and the answer is the same: it is one thing to affirm the belief, and another to understand and explain it in some way. (See the first difficulty at the end of this thesis.)

Note on the change in meaning in the word *hypostasis*: *Hypostasis* is taken in general as equivalent to *ousia*, ‘being,’ ‘essence,’ ‘nature,’ ‘substance.’ See the anathema at the end of the Nicene Creed, DB 54, the Synodical Council of Sardica (343), the Council of Rome under Pope Damasus (382), as well as Athanasius, Epiphanius, Cyril of Jerusalem, Cyril of Alexandria (DB 115), and, among the Latins, Jerome.

Although Athanasius was aware that others used this word to mean ‘person’ and did not disapprove, he himself did not use it in this sense. A change was made in the second half of the fourth century by the Cappadocians (Basil, Gregory of Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa), who used this word to mean ‘person.’ For they needed some word to indicate the distinctive element in God. Hence this word is found with this meaning in the Synodical Council of Constantinople I (Kirch, 652), in the Council of Chalcedon (*prosopon, personam*, DB 148), in Constantinople II (DB 213), etc. Note, however, that in the fifth century there was no consistency in the use of this word, as can be seen in Cyril of Alexandria and John Chrysostom.

Argument

The argument for this thesis consists in showing that the Fathers of the church in the fourth century opposed the heresies of both the Monarchianists and the Arians. The thesis is historically and theologically certain.

1 Against monarchianism, the Fathers affirmed the Son's real and eternal distinction from the Father.

a *Dionysius of Alexandria*: writing first against Samosatans, he so distinguished the persons as to seemingly separate their substance, but then wrote his *Apologia* in which he preserved both the unity of essence and the distinction of persons. This *Apologia* has not come down to us, but it is often quoted in Athanasius's work *De Sententia Dionysii*, in which he wished to defend the orthodoxy of his predecessor. For example:

'There was never a time when God was not Father ... For with the ever-shining light of eternity, it is obvious that its radiance also always existed; for by the same token the light is understood as that which shines, and it cannot be that light would not shine ... Since, then, the Father is eternal, the Son is also eternal, light from light. For if there is the begetter there is also the begotten Son; but if the Son does not exist, how could there be a begetter, and of whom? But both exist, and always exist.' (*De Sent. Dion.*, 15; Boyer, p. 63.)

This quotation most clearly affirms the eternity of the Son. The argument is drawn from Hebrews 1.3: the Son is 'the reflection of the Father's glory.' No light without radiance, no Father without Son.

'For just as our mind utters a word from itself, as the prophet says: "My heart has uttered a good word": and each one is from the other, having his own place distinct from the other's, one abiding and moving in the heart and the other on the tongue and in the mouth. Yet there is no distance between them, nor is each aloof from the other. The mind is not without the word nor the word without the mind: the mind makes the word and appears in it, and the word reveals the mind in which it was made. And the mind is, as it were, an inner word, and the word is as the mind leaping forth. The mind passes into the word, and the word inserts the mind into the hearers, and in this way the mind is placed in the souls of the hearers by the word, entering them together with the word. And the mind is, so to speak, like a father to the word, existing in itself; and indeed, the word is like the offspring of the mind, not, of course, before the mind but neither can it be made outside the mind; it exists with the mind and is productive by it. In the very same

way the Great Father and universal Mind before all else has the Son, the Word, its interpreter and messenger. (Athanasius, Part I of *De Sent. Dion.*, n. 23; Boyer, p. 63)

The above affirms the distinction of persons. Likewise, the word as expressed cannot be separated from the word in the heart, for otherwise the spoken word would lack all meaning.

Here we have a twofold testimony, that of Dionysius and that of Athanasius himself.

b *The Case of Marcellus of Ancyra*: an obscure case.

One of Marcellus's disciples was *Photinus*, who was certainly a heretic. In the east, Marcellus himself was under suspicion. However, he appealed to Rome, and Pope Julius I accepted his profession of faith, in which were the words 'undivided power of God ... reigning with God, whose kingdom, as the Apostle declares, will have no end.' (Letter of Julius I, in Epiphanius, *Haer.* 72, 2-3. Boyer, p. 64)

Photinus was condemned in 345 along with those who asserted a distinction between an inner Word, an utterance of God and not distinct from God himself, and a created Word, Christ, the Son of God, neither eternal nor uncreated; and he said that the reign of Christ would end after the end of the world and the last judgment. This condemnation renewed suspicion of Marcellus also, who was said to have easily accepted Nicea's *homoousion* because it did not acknowledge the distinction of persons in God. The whole question was an occasion for Eastern and Western to assert the *distinction of persons*.

2 *Against the Arian heresy*, there is taught the *consubstantiality* of the Father and Son.

Consubstantiality: verbally there is no argument: for it can mean the same nature specifically but not numerically; historically, however, the matter is easily solved. (See what we said about Dionysius of Rome and Dionysius of Alexandria in Thesis 2. Note also that neither the OT nor the NT speak of three gods. All Christians acknowledge one God only.) Here are some explicit texts.

(1) In the Council of Nicea itself

a Athanasius: The Council Fathers chose the word *homoousion* ‘to mean that the Son is from the Father not only as similar, but even as the same as the Father by similitude’ (*De decretis Nic. Syn.* 20; see Boyer, p. 65). ‘When the bishops noticed their [the Arians’] insincerity in this matter and that there was deceit in their hearts as they were thinking evil things, they were compelled to go back to scripture again and express in clearer terms what they had said earlier, and finally to write that the Son is consubstantial with the Father, so as to signify that the Son is not only similar to the Father but is the same as the Father by similitude from the Father.’ The word “consubstantial” was inserted because of the impossibility of refuting the Arians by the words of scripture alone. How the Arians were able to pervert scripture is set forth by Athanasius: ‘Since the generation of the Son from the Father is obviously quite different from human nature, the Son is not only similar to the substance of the Father but cannot be divided from it, since he and the Father are one, as he himself said (John 10.30); and the Word is always in the Father and the Father in the word (John 10.38), just as radiance is to light, for that is what this statement means. Therefore, the synod, after careful consideration, rightly wrote that he is consubstantial, in order both to counteract the perversity of the heretics and to show the true nature of the Word’ (ibid. 20. RJ 755).

Athanasius here uses two arguments: (a) From reason: persons related by the generation of one from the other resemble each other. A father, however, is different from his son because they have matter which is the principle of individuation and division. But God is a pure spirit, and in spiritual and divine beings generation cannot take place through division of a substance that is invisible and spiritual. This argumentation leaves no doubt about the mind of Athanasius. (b) From John 10.30, ‘The Father and I are one,’ and 10.38, ‘The Father is in me and I in the Father’ (with reference to Heb. 1.3).

According to Athanasius, then, the mind of the council was that the word ‘consubstantial’ signified numerical consubstantiality between Father and Son.

Moreover, it rejected the position that the Son was from another substance or from nothing – that is, a creature. ‘To those who say that the Son of God comes from nothing or from

something else that exists, or that the Son is created or mutable or made or from another substance, the holy catholic church declares an anathema.’ With these words it openly declares that by the words ‘out of the substance’ and ‘consubstantial’ it banishes the impious statements that the Son is something created, produced, made and mutable, and that before he was generated he did not exist’ (*De decretis Nic. Syn.* 20; see Boyer, p. 66).

The conclusion is: The Son is of the substance of the Father, and since the substance of the Father is indivisible, the substance of the Son is the very substance of the Father, hence the Son is said to be *homoousios*.

b *The Council of Sardica, 343*: ‘We believe that there is one *hypostasis*, which the heretics call *ousia*, common to the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. And if they ask what the *hypostasis* of the Son is, we profess that it is that sole *hypostasis* that belongs to the Father’ (Theodoret, *Hist. Eccl.* 2, 6; Boyer, p. 66). Note that the meaning of *hypostasis* here is ‘essence.’

2 *After the Council of Nicea*: Let us look at the works of Athanasius and the Cappadocian Fathers. We shall find that scholastic speculation did not begin in the Middle Ages.

a Athanasius, *Oratio III contra Arianos*: ‘The Son is in the Father, so far as we can understand, because *all that the Son is is proper to the nature of the Father*, just as radiance is from a light or a stream from a source ... For since *the form and divinity of the Father is the very one that is in the Son*, it follows that the Son is in the Father and the Father is in the Son. Therefore, when it was said, ‘I and the Father are one,’ this rightly means, ‘I am in the Father and the Father is in me,’ that is, it is taught that the same divinity and the one nature are in both’ (RJ 768). In this passage Athanasius focuses especially on what is common to the Father and the Son, their equality, and through this equality he understands the words of scripture, ‘I and the Father are one,’ and ‘I am in the Father and the Father is in me.’ Whatever is proposed as a matter of faith is proposed not because it is understood but because it is believed. (The Cappadocians will see the need to distinguish between what is *common* and what is *proper* in the Trinity.)

‘They are one, not one divided into two parts which are nothing but one, nor because this one has two names, so that the same one is sometimes Father and sometimes becomes his Son; this was the opinion of Sabellius, condemned as a heretic. But indeed there are two, because the Father is father and is not the Son, and likewise the Son is son and is not the Father... Hence the Son is not another God, for he was not produced extrinsically; otherwise there would be several gods, if divinity is thought of as something extrinsic apart from the divinity of the Father ... The divinity of the Son is also that of the Father and for this reason is undivided and therefore God is one: and God was the Word’ (ibid. Boyer, p. 67).

Divinity, a spiritual substance, admits no division. The generation of the Son does not imply division. The same one is not named in two ways, the Father and then the Son. But the two are truly one: there is one, and yet there is a distinction. Therefore, the persons are not confused but nonetheless the substance is not distinguished.

The Son is neither created nor made, but generated. This gives rise to his relation to the Father although he is of the one same substance. Had he been made, he would have been a different substance, ‘produced extrinsically.’ Otherwise there would be two gods and two divinities. Therefore there is a real distinction, yet the divinity of the Son is the very divinity of the Father. One God, therefore, one essence. Therefore, what is taught is consubstantiality, not only *specific*, as between two men, but *numerical*. Hence it is clear that Athanasius’s doctrine is the same as ours, and it is false to say that he did not acknowledge the mysteriousness of Trinitarian dogma.

b *The Cappadocian Fathers*

Gregory Nazianzen, *Orat. Theol.* 5, 9: ‘From the fact that there is an ungenerated and a generated and one that proceeds, there results one who is called Father, another called the Son, and another the Holy Spirit; thus an unconfused distinction among three persons in one divine nature and dignity is maintained. Nor is the Son Father, for there is one who is Father; but he is that which the Father is. Nor is the Spirit Son because he is from God, for there is but one who is

the only-begotten, and that is what the Son is. *These three are one as to divinity, and this one is three if one considers the property of each.* Thus neither the one favors Sabellius nor do the three contribute to the present detestable schism. What then? The Holy Spirit is God? Certainly. Consubstantial, then? Of course, since he is God' (RJ 996).

Gregory lived in the second half of the fourth century. There was already some progress since Athanasius's time (295-373). While teaching here only that the Father is Father because father and that the Son is Son because son, Gregory found three distinctive elements in that the Father is ungenerated, the Son is generated, and the Holy Spirit proceeds. Besides, the Son is the only-begotten. The Spirit, then, is not generated, is not the Son. And so there was progress in understanding the dogma and the reason for distinguishing the persons. Still, the Son is *that which the Father is*, and the Spirit is *that which the Son is*, where by the words 'that which is' divinity is clearly understood. The three are one in respect to *divinity* and that one three in respect to their *properties*, i.e., what are added to Athanasius: being ungenerated, generated, and proceeding. Moreover, from his arguments against Sabellius and tritheism it is evident that Gregory was teaching numerical consubstantiality.

Basil, Epist. 189 (Boyer, pp. 67-68): 'Whoever has said there are three gods is anathematized by us, and is judged to be not even a Christian ...' Sacred scripture does not admit of many gods.

Gregory of Nyssa, *Orat. Catech*, c. 3 (Boyer, p. 68): The Catholic notion of the Trinity lies between the doctrine of the Jews who deny any multiplicity of divine persons and the pagan Greeks, who admitted a multitude of gods.

The Cappadocian Fathers, therefore, recognized that the distinction of persons was based on their personal properties. They understood the ontological basis for the properties as being attributes added to their divinity. This was not well thought out. But it is not right to go from the difficulties in their explanations to denying their teaching on the Trinity, as is done by rationalists and liberal Protestants.

Augustine went further and so did Thomas; still, the mystery remains. But concerning the Trinity there is but one faith.

Let us conclude, then, once again: we must accept what the Fathers believed, not what they understood, which can be inaccurate.

Difficulties

1 Basil: ‘There is the same difference between essence and hypostasis as between common and singular, between an animal and this man.’ (RJ 926). Therefore the Cappadocians held not numerical unity in the divinity but only specific unity.

What Basil says here is true in a way and in another way false. It is true that divinity is common to the three persons. Still, what is common, as common, is in creatures only an abstraction, while in the divinity it is something concrete, the one numerically same divinity.

Therefore, if Basil understands the matter as setting up a totally perfect analogy between what is common in the divinity and what is common in humanity, he would surely be wrong, for that would result in a divinity with only specific consubstantiality.

But that Basil did not at all doubt the unicity of God is evident from what he said against Eunomius (see Boyer, p. 69): ‘What we discern in the Father and the Son is not a sharing of divinity but unity.’

Reply to the above

Indirectly. (a) If ‘common’ and ‘proper’ are to be understood in the same sense concerning the Father and the Son as for Peter and Paul and James ..., Basil would surely have spoken otherwise. For although the Cappadocians, although they acknowledged three persons, never admitted three gods, as Peter, Paul and James are three men.

Note, however, that this reply is not beyond all exception, for these Fathers recognized the difference between Peter, Paul, and James; still, they understood it in a Platonic way, that is,

they did not clearly perceive that the humanity of Peter and of Paul and of James were different humanities.

(b) Probative argument: The Cappadocians held the Trinity to be a great mystery, whereas they saw no mystery in predicating humanity of Peter and Paul and James et al. Therefore they surely did not intend to predicate what is common to the divine persons and to human beings in the same way, but in a totally imperfect analogous way. These days, however, when we speak about analogy, a sufficiently advanced development in theological method is needed which did not yet exist in the fourth century.

Directly. (Boyer, p. 69) Basil presents this comparison not as applied universally and in all details but as a help to understanding that in the divine persons there is something that is common to all three and something that is proper to each. He goes on: 'For if we do not consider the particular properties of each person, paternity, filiation, and sanctification, but profess God in terms of his common essence, it is impossible to give a sound reason for our faith. We must then profess our faith by adding what is proper to the common element: a common deity, proper paternity...' But among human beings it is not by paternity alone that a father is different from his son.

2 The Cappadocians deny numerical consubstantiality: 'We profess one God not numerically but in nature.' Evagrius Ponticus, *In Ps. Basil., epist. 8, 2*. Boyer, p. 69.

Reply: Any inference from a Platonic mentality to ours is false. Evagrius denies numerical unity in God inasmuch as in the Platonic mentality number belongs to material things. Hence he does not deny what we call numerical consubstantiality but what we should in Aristotelian terms call predicamental unity. There is one God according to one intelligible nature with no admixture of matter. Therefore there is no question about 'number' with regard to God.

3 Where there is identity there can be no similitude. But the post-Nicene Fathers support the proposition that the Son is *similar* to the Father.

Reply: Where there is identity there is no similitude that excludes identity, granted; ... that there is no similitude that extends to identity, not proven. The Fathers extend similitude to identity. Therefore they rejected the genuine opinion of the Homoiousians.

4 Immediately after the Council of Nicea it was said that there was one hypostasis for the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Later there was admitted a single formula, ‘one substance, three hypostases.’

Reply: Formerly hypostasis meant ‘substance.’ Later it came to refer to ‘person.’ A change in the meaning of a word does not mean a change in doctrine.

5 The Council of Constantinople I eliminated the phrase ‘from (*ek*) the substance of the Father’ from the Nicene Creed.

Reply: It is not certain why this phrase was omitted. According to some, it was omitted because the meaning was already expressed in the word *homoousion*, which was kept.

6 In Constantinople I the Holy Spirit is not said to be God.

Reply: But there was said something that had not been said previously, namely, ‘... who with the Father and the Son is adored and glorified.’ This signifies that the Holy Spirit is a third person consubstantial with the Father and Son, that is, God. After Nicea there was some issue about the way of speaking in a non-scriptural way, and so in this Council the nontechnical term was preferred.

Thesis 4 – The Existence of Three Persons in God, Even when Known through Divine Revelation, Cannot Be Sufficiently Proven By the Natural Light of Reason.

(See Boyer, pp. 72-87)

The Nature of Mystery: See Vatican Council I, sess. III, cap. 4, ‘De Fide et Ratione,’ (DB 1955 ff.) and the corresponding canons (DB 1816 ff.)

Definition of Mystery: In the strict sense, it is what cannot be known naturally even as to its existence. Broadly speaking, it is any object not naturally knowable by reason of the lack of a correct proposition.

The Twofold Order of Knowledge: DB 1795. Mystery in the strict sense presupposes a systematic distinction between nature and supernature. To this distinction there corresponds a twofold order of knowledge: (1) on the part of the principle, because there are two principles from which knowledge proceeds, natural human reason and divine faith; (2) on the part of the object, because besides natural objects there are mysteries hidden in God that cannot come to be known unless they are revealed.

Understanding the Mysteries: DB 1796. Reason, when illuminated by faith, can know something about the revealed mysteries with an imperfect understanding, and that in two ways: (1) by analogy with what are known naturally, and (2) from the connection between the mysteries among themselves and with the ultimate end. Mysteries, however, can never be understood as a proper object of the human intellect, which is the intelligible in what is perceived by the senses. Thus their necessarily imperfect knowability is not based upon some individual or historical accident – as if in the course of time or by ongoing theological investigation a mystery would become clearer. This notion is ruled out by the words *suapte natura*, ‘by their very nature exceed any created intellect.’ No further inquiry or development will ever be able to dispel its obscurity to our intellect.

Relation between Faith and Reason: DB 1797. There can never be a contradiction between faith and reason, since it is the same God from which both have issued.

Immutability of Dogmas: DB 1800. The meaning of a dogma once declared by the church is to be perpetually maintained; and if there should be some further understanding, knowledge, and wisdom concerning it, this takes place in the same dogma, the same meaning, and the same

understanding, with the dogma remaining unchangeable and fixed. There is, however, development in the understanding of the mysteries.

Under Anathema: DB 1816. Vatican I condemned the possibility of understanding mysteries strictly so called – in other words, that by reason alone all the mysteries could be understood and demonstrated. This against Hermes, Frohschammer, Gunther.

The Imperfect Understanding of the Mysteries

The intellect can naturally understand its proper and adequate object, namely being; but it does so in different ways:

In God: the divine essence is perfectly known and in it all beings; its proper object is identical with its adequate object.

In an angel: its proper object is its essence in which, as in a perfect image, God is known and all other things are known through species infused by God.

In humans: by abstraction from phantasms the form is attained in the quiddity of a sensible thing as in its proper object, that is, its proper object is the nature in sensible things.

How concepts are formed: in conceptualism, the act of understanding is not first but what is formed first in a mechanical and nonconscious way is the concept; in Aquinas, the act of understanding results from the verified existence of an analytic proposition (if *A*, then *B*) so that there is a transition from the analytic proposition to a judgment, unless the proposition is verified in an existent (but *A*, therefore *B*). A demonstration from the simultaneous (*a simultaneo*) is invalid, because an existential judgement is required for an analytic proposition to be valid. So besides the act of understanding, wisdom is needed for selecting the analytic principles and applying them to what exists. (See *Summa theologiae*, 1-2, q. 66, a. 5, ad 4m.)

By such knowledge there are demonstrated about God: (1) God's existence, as the first principle and last end; (2) those attributes consequent upon God precisely as Being, i.e., the

series of transcendental attributes: Truth, Goodness, Beauty; (3) those attributes consequent upon God as a certain nature, i.e., knowledge, life, will, love, power, etc. (See I, qq. 3-6.)

Besides what we can demonstrate about God, there are many truths about God which we cannot know. For analogical knowledge consists in a partial likeness. By the very fact that there is analogy – analogues being simply diverse, and in some respects the same – there is *both likeness and unlikeness*. And since likeness is a cause of what we know, unlikeness or diversity indicates that there is also present some particulars that we cannot know. Whether these perfections are imitable *ad extra* or not we cannot state a priori.

Reason can state the very *fact* of revelation and determine what the positive elements in it are: this is positive dogmatic theology. We can go further and advance to a certain understanding of the mysteries, but by way of *some* analogy come to know what are in some way dissimilar by proceeding from what are *imperfectly* similar. For example, from the way by which in us one act proceeds from another, we can suspect something about the way by which in God one person proceeds from another. Thus there arises a ‘spectrum’, so to speak, of similars and dissimilars in which some similars diminish and some dissimilars increase, so that finally we arrive at what are completely dissimilar, and understanding ends.

But since concepts are not formed in a mechanical and nonconscious manner, in order to eliminate contradictions in a further analysis of the mysteries there is required some understanding even of dissimilars. Attention must always be given to the *diversity* in the concepts themselves so as to understand the way of proceeding.

Without some understanding of the mysteries there can be no such thing as speculative theological knowledge. But if only names are understood (one, three), we have nominalistic concepts and no concept of the thing. Thus, for example, St Thomas in *Contra Gentes* IV, after speaking about the existence of the Son of God (cc. 1-9), introduces in c.10 objections or reasons against divine generation which he will solve only when in c. 14 he has accurately presented

some understanding of the generation of the Son (cc. 11-13). The faith is not defended without understanding it.

That imperfect understanding, those concepts, those relations of the mysteries are not of the same nature as an understanding of the *proper* object of our intelligence, namely the intelligible in the sensible. When *imperfect* analogies are brought in, the concepts are by their nature *imperfect*, insofar as it is from created things that we are able to come to know *something* about the mysteries of God's life.

Proof of the first part: The existence of three persons in God cannot be sufficiently demonstrated by the light of natural reason. (Boyer, pp. 72-79)

Theological note: proxima fidei, from Vatican I, as shown above. For the Trinity has always been considered the deepest of the mysteries.

Proof from sacred scripture: Not as elaborate here as in the Vatican Council, but sufficient items are adduced to duly support that elaboration.

A text directly bearing on this point: Matthew 11.27, 'No one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and anyone to whom the Son chooses to reveal him.'

Further texts: 1 Corinthians 2.11, 'No one comprehends what is truly God's except the Spirit of God.' This implies the divine mysteries in general. John 1.18, 'No one has ever seen God. It is the only-begotten Son, who is close to the Father's heart, who has made him known.' Here any vision of God to human beings is denied without specifying the nature of such a vision; but it seems to refer to immediate knowledge, because it asserts that the Son has performed this revelation, while for mediated knowledge such a revelation is not necessary, and indeed we know from elsewhere that it can be given to us.

Proof from the Fathers of the Church (See quotations in Boyer, p. 70)

The Synod of Antioch, 268. Approximately 70 bishops, in condemning Paul of Samosata, a Monarchist and Adoptionist, affirmed that we do not have a lofty knowledge of God, but through the revelation of the Son we have what is sufficient for us.

St Hilary says that we ought to know about the Father only what the Son tells us, who is the only reliable witness.

St Ambrose: It is impossible to know the secret of generation. When the mind is powerless, the voice is silent.'

St Jerome: 'As to the mystery of the Trinity, the right confession is to know nothing.'

Proof from reason: The argument by Fr Boyer on God's manner of acting (pp. 78-79) relies upon the fact that whatever is done by God is done in accordance with his divine nature, and therefore there can be no created effect that would be more proper to individual persons in the Trinity from which we might rise to knowing the persons. But this procedure evidently does not sufficiently distinguish between a natural agent and what God does through his nature. A natural agent is different from an agent acting through intellect. A natural agent – fire, for example – always acts in accordance with its nature and produces only what are like its own nature; but an agent acting through intellect, such as an artist, produces what he or she has conceived in the mind, in fact through an intrinsic form, but one that is intentional. The three divine persons act *ad extra*, externally, insofar as they have the same divine essence, omnipotence, etc., and not according to their properties; and so it is true that God acts *ad extra* according to his nature. The divine nature, however, is intellectual and therefore does whatever it does through his intellect, together with the will. But since God perfectly knows his own Trinity, he can also produce similarities to the Trinity. Inasmuch, then, as we consider only the divine way of acting, there is no proof that God cannot produce some effect from which we might proceed to some knowledge of the Trinity.

Therefore the impossibility of naturally knowing the Trinity is the result of *our inability*.

Our knowledge of God is analogical, hence the similarities and dissimilarities between us and God are its object. As to similarity, we know the *fact*, and moreover have the *means* for

determining some corresponding positive aspect of God and in this way we develop a positive natural theology. As to dissimilarity, however, we know *only the fact* without being able to know what aspects are dissimilar, that is, those positive aspects in God that correspond to these dissimilarities. This is because the *medium* of knowing, in analogical knowledge, can be derived only from aspects that are similar. This procedure belongs rather to negative natural theology.

Accordingly, our question is this: Can the Trinity be known analogously so that from what is similar to it in creation we can arrive at knowing it? In other words, is the Trinity found in a known similar or in a dissimilar? The answer to this first question must be negative: the Trinity is found in knowing a dissimilar. From similars we conclude that God is One and Simple, hence his Personhood, greater than it is in us, is verifiable in only one subject. On the other hand, we know from revelation that God's simplicity does not exclude a trinity of persons. For although the Trinity does not contradict Theodicy, it is so different from what we know naturally that it is to be numbered among the dissimilars. By reason alone, therefore, God is known as analogous to us in his oneness, but as a trinity he is utterly unknown.

In humanity there is one nature with many persons; but human nature is composite, having a material principle whereby there are many individuals within the one species. In God, on the contrary, there is no such composition and therefore no multiplication within the species; and yet in the numerically one same nature there are divine persons. Things that are different are so either because they have a different nature or intelligibility (angels) or because even though they have the same nature or intelligibility, they also have a non-intelligible principle, matter, by which individuals are multiplied. But God consists of one utterly simple intelligence. If, therefore, there are in him several persons, this would have to be because his nature is composite; but this is contrary to his simplicity. If, however, there is a plurality of persons because of the different intelligibility of each one, we ask which one might be infinite; if there is only one, then the others are identical with it; if none is, then these are angels, not God.

God's nature, then, is so different from ours as to be quite unlike ours. In fact, however, some remote analogies can be found, though not such as to lead to demonstration. Considered in

himself, *quoad se*, God is necessarily Three, yet we are not able to grasp the reason for this necessity. For example, in God there is the generation of the Son who is nevertheless the same God as the Father. We are so far from seeing the necessary connection between these two that we can scarcely think of both at the same time. This is the source of the apparent contradictions throughout our treatise, whose task it is precisely to reconcile in some way the various elements of the mystery. This clearly demonstrates that we have no natural knowledge of the necessity of their connection, between God as one and the Triune God, so that it is right for Trinitarian theology to be quite separate from natural theology.

The reason, therefore, why we are unable to understand the mystery of the Trinity is that this sort of mystery belongs to that part of our analogical knowledge of God in which God is more unlike his creatures than like them. But what rightly pertains to that unlikeness is proven from the fact that the only way possible for an analogy would be from *intellectual emanation*. Yet this emanation cannot be proven to be a pure perfection, and therefore to be present in God in a higher degree – *as will become clear in the theses that follow*.

Objections

1 Many Fathers of the church say that some pagan philosophers have already come to know the mystery of the Trinity. (Boyer, pp. 63-76)

Reply: (1) Regarding the object: these Fathers have said that there is in pagan philosophy a certain anticipation of and preparation for the Gospel, but not that those philosophers themselves had any clear knowledge of this mystery.

(2) Regarding the source of such knowledge: they did not state that this preparation took place without some special divine light but from either a direct or indirect revelation or one going back to Moses.

2 Rationalists refer to Plato, the Stoics, Philo, and Plotinus as sources of what are found in Christianity. (Almost no one holds this today)

Reply: In *Plato* there are subsistent Ideas, with the Idea of the Good predominant; but according to their description they are apparently distinct in nature. Thus they have no likeness to the Trinity.

The *Stoics* do speak about the Logos but as principle immanent in the world: in individual things, inasmuch as they act according to their nature, in humans as acting according to reason, and in the world, insofar as it is conceived as one living order. This immanentism is worlds away from catholic doctrine.

For *Philo*, the Logos is something intermediate between God and creatures, or is identified with the divine mind and then appears to be the notion of an artefact in the mind of the artisan, described anthropomorphically and not as a second divine person. Nor can it be said that *Philo's* teaching is totally independent upon what is revealed in the OT concerning wisdom, etc.

Plotinus does speak about three Hypostases, the One, the Intellect, and the Soul, but these are clearly three substances, not persons, and there is a descending order among them. There are some points, it is true, that smack of Christianity, but this can be explained by the influence upon him of his mentor Ammonius Saccas, a Christian at one point, and therefore it is not clear whether these notions were based on reason alone.

3 The word *Logos* comes from Greek philosophy.

Reply: Whether or not this word has been borrowed from Greek philosophy, the meaning certainly was not borrowed from the Greeks, for there it lacks the richness of the meaning that it has in Christianity.

Logos: its meanings: (1) An uttered word, spoken orally (*logos prophorikos*); (2) a word said interiorly (*logos endiathetos*), rationality; thus for the Greeks man is *zōon logikon*, animal logicum seu rationale; (3) a cosmic principle immanent in the world, ordering all things, (4) a transcendent cosmic principle as (a) instrument of God, (b) divine mind, (c) a being intermediate between these two (*Philo*), (5) a person distinct from the Father, generated, true God transcendent from true God, consubstantial with the Father; not a cosmic principle even though

having a cosmic function; this is the *Logos* about whom John and catholic tradition speak and about which there is not the least whisper outside of revelation.

Proof of the Second Part: Even when known by revelation, the existence of three persons in God cannot be sufficiently demonstrated through reason.

(Boyer, pp. 80-87)

Semirationalists: As opposed to the rationalists who deny the very possibility of mysteries and consider them as mere myths, semirationalists are said to be those authors who concede that mysteries do exist, but maintain that we can prove them by reason after they are known by revelation.

Some others in the twelfth century: They inculpably erred because of the lack of a systematic distinction between two orders, the natural and the supernatural, between faith and reason, and between charity and human good will. (This distinction was made in the following century.) At that time only the systematic distinction between theology and philosophy had been clearly drawn.

Anselm: often seems to speak like a semirationalist, but did not at all intend to demonstrate the mysteries by reason;

Abelard: argued to a Trinity of persons in God from God's wisdom, God's power, and God's goodness;

Richard of St Victor: bases his argument on God's need for a company of love, for which one or only two persons would not suffice;

Raymond Lull: since goodness diffuses itself, it follows that in God there is such a diffusion in that the Father communicates himself to the Son and the Father and Son to their Holy Spirit.

Others are from the nineteenth century: Since faith is not defended without an understanding of it, for faith is reasonable, these wanted to reduce theology to a science in the strict sense of the term, in which there would be no mystery that properly informed reason could not demonstrate. (DB 1708, 1709, 1799)

Georges Hermes (+1831): followed Kantian principles. A doubt (positive?) must be had as the basis for all theological inquiry. Reason is the only means by which human beings can acquire knowledge of supernatural truths (DB 1618-1621.) See Edgar Hocedez, 'Histoire de la Theologie au XIX siècle,' I (Paris, 1949) 177-215.

Antonius Günther (+1863): followed Helgelian principles. Dogmatic definitions are valid for the time in which they were made, but are perfected when further progress is made. From the principle that personality is in one's self-consciousness, he concluded that in God there are three self-consciousnesses and three substances linked only by their relation of origin. God the Father is the subject, and in order to know himself he must experience himself as an object, and this is the Son; and this knowledge in which the subject is related to the object is the Holy Spirit. This destroys the notion of divine unity which is no longer simple, but organic, from the fact that the three persons would suppose three consciousnesses and so three individual natures. Günther himself, however, retracted his position (DB 1655-68). E. Hocedez, op. cit., II (Paris, 1952) 39-59. Ladislaus Orban, 'Theologia guentheriana et Concilium Vaticanum,' *Analecta Gregoriana* 28 (Romae, 1950).

Antonio Rosmini (+1855): according to the tenets of his system, which somewhat resembles rationalism, a trinitarian notion is verified in God because of the distinctions between real, ideal, and moral. (D1891-1930). Hocedez, *ibid.*, 140-157. F. Bruno, 'Le dimostrazioni trinitario di Antonio Rosmini,' *Divus Thomas* (Piac.), vol. 29, 1952, 166-195. See especially propositions 25 and 26 in Boyer, p. 84.

Maurice Blondel: adduces only reasons of fittingness (*convenientiae*).

Generic proof: If prior to revelation there was no proof of the mystery, neither can there be afterwards; for it is a matter of the native power of the same human reason both before and after revelation. It is not that as a result of revelation some deductions can be made – with this all agree – but that, given revelation, reason can perfectly and on its own understand the mysteries and prove them. But *the fact of revelation does not lead to essential differences:* mysteries by their very nature exceed any created intellect, which is unequal before them both before and after revelation, which surely does not change human nature (DB 1796). Hence the theological note is: this thesis is *theologically certain* (from the Vatican Council, DB 1795, 1816).

Particular replies

Abelard: That God's wisdom, power, and goodness are really distinct, we deny; that they are three divine attributes which are identical in the utterly simple, unique, and infinite divine spiritual act, we grant. Therefore this is no demonstration of the Trinity.

Richard of St Victor: From a necessary society of love there results some fittingness for and imperfect understanding of a trinity. But this is no true demonstration either of a beginning or of a limit to the multiplication of persons. For it is said that God would not be perfect if he were solitary, since God is love. In fact we know this to be true from revelation, but when we affirm this by the light of reason alone, we immediately ask whether we are stating anything more than a pure anthropomorphism: a solitary human, no doubt, is not perfect, but what can we say about a solitary God? To do this we should have to have perfect knowledge of infinite perfection according to its proper mode of being, whereas our knowledge is only about negatives and derived from things that are finite.

Raymond Lull: From the principle of the (free) diffusion of good we cannot conclude to anything having to do with God's interior operations since we are totally ignorant of how such a diffusion would proceed.

The 19th Century semirationalists: Our disagreement with these authors is rooted in cognitional theory, namely in the question whether knowledge is essentially a matter of identity or of duality.

More or less according to Platonism, the order of reality lies in ideas that are intelligible but not intelligent. There is knowledge in God who understands and contemplates the ideas. This gives rise to the theory according to which all knowledge is rooted in duality. Knowledge cannot be simple, hence it is found not in the first but in the second. If there is sight there must be something seen, so if there is knowledge there must be a known. Knowledge cannot even be thought of without this distinction. From this principle the Scotists posit their ‘formal distinctions on the side of the thing.’ Thus in *Plotinus*, the First is the One, beyond being, beyond understanding, and only in second place comes Intellect, which involves some composition and which knows the One; from this duality flows the Soul. Thus in *Sartre*, who asserts that the very notion of God is contradictory since any being cannot at the same time be simple (*en soi*) and not simple (knowing, *pour soi*). Assuming this gnoseological basis that what is one and simple cannot be a knower, there is required a process from some first in order to have knowledge. *Günther* posits a transition from subject to object, and this is knowledge itself; in *Rosmini*,₂ from subjectivity to ideality, which is sanctity.

But according to Aristotelian principles, knowing is not a duality. The intelligible in act is the intellect in act; that which understands and what is understood are one and the same; knowing is essentially an identity. The object of knowledge, then, is only distinct from the knower when both are in potency, that is, when understanding is the act of those things that are not without matter; but in those which are without matter – God is pure Act without any potency – the understander is the same as the understood. Therefore the First is both most simple and most intelligent. Hence it is in no way proven that God cannot know himself unless he utters the Word.

Semirationalists therefore are refuted on the basis of their philosophical fundamentals. But one who does not know which of these two fundamental principles is correct cannot proceed until obtaining certitude. Günther, moreover, is refuted by the fact that if there were three consciousnesses in God there would also be three divine natures and three Gods.

Thesis 5 – The Son is generated in the proper sense by the Father and is so by way of intellect; the Holy Spirit does not proceed as the Son does but proceeds by way of will. (See Boyer, 1949, pp. 89-115)

Hitherto we have proven (1) the existence of the mystery of the Trinity from scripture, from the magisterium, and from Tradition; (2) that the Trinity is a mystery in the strict sense. *Now* we begin that part of our treatise in which we will try to say something about the *nature* of the Holy Trinity, by way of an imperfect analogy to human cognition, as according to the First Vatican Council (DB 1796).

The synthetic and speculative way upon which we shall embark in the following thesis will begin from the question of the processions in God, for reasons that will become clear. But even before we inquire into the question about *what the divine processions are and how they are to be conceived by us*, we must by the positive and analytic way determine *whether there are* processions in God. This is what we intend to prove in this thesis, in which, of course, we do not yet suppose the systematic development on this topic to be found in subsequent theses, but only some prescientific (without causes) knowledge of the fact (whereas in every science there is certain knowledge of a thing through its causes), in which therefore there is here not an *understanding* of the fact but only *certitude* of it, to the extent that we are able to derive something positive from the sources of revelation and the magisterium of the church.

The terms, even those that can seem to be technical ('procession', 'generation' ...) are not used according to their systematic formulation as found in theology but in their ordinary everyday meaning understood by all and used in scripture and in documents of the church.

The thesis has two parts:

Part One: The Procession of the Son. A. It is generation the proper sense. B. It is by way of intellect.

Part Two: The Procession of the Holy Spirit. A. It is not generation. B. It is by way of will.

Part One

A The Son is generated from the Father in the proper sense of the word

Terminology:

Generation: Broadly speaking, it is the origination of a material substance. Strictly or properly speaking: defined in the following thesis. Without giving a technical definition, we understand that we are dealing with a being who is the proper Son of his Father in the true sense, not a son by adoption or metaphorically. We shall see that it is implicitly asserted in scripture that the Son is so by *natural filiation*, which is what ‘proper generation’ means.

Procession: The origin of one thing from another.

Divine procession: This will be explained in the next thesis by analogy to intellectual emanation, where it will be even clearer what ‘generation by way of intellect’ and ‘procession by way of will’ mean. Since now we are in the analytic way, the way of certitude, let the prescientific knowledge of these notions suffice.

Opinions (Boyer, pp. 101 ff.)

1 Argument from the magisterium:

(A) Creed *Quicumque* (DB 39): The Son is from the Father alone, not made or created but generated.

(B) Fourth Lateran Council (432): The Father by generating the Son ...

(C) The Constitution *Auctorem Fidei* of Pius VI against the Pistoians (D1597)

Note that in the creeds and councils it is repeatedly stated that the Son is a true son in the proper sense of the word.

Therefore the theological note for the generation of the Son is ‘of divine and catholic faith.’

2 Argument from reason:

Christ is said in the New Testament to be Son. But this can be understood either naturally or by adoption (by juridical title) or as a metaphor.

But he is son neither by adoption nor as a metaphor.

Therefore he is a natural Son, that is, by generation from the Father.

Not by adoption: adoptionism is a heresy, incompatible with divinity.

Nor as a metaphor: the more so, since this would implicitly deny the Son’s divinity. See the treatise on the incarnate Word.

3 Argument from scripture: The issue is whether the sources of scripture add any intelligibility to the name ‘Son’ such that from them we may be able to state that it is a matter of generation in the strict sense, or that at least we could exclude all other ‘filiations.’

John 1.18: ‘No one has ever seen God. It is the only Son, who is close to the Father’s heart, who has made him known. See 3.16, 1 John 4.9. Regarding the word *monogenes*, ‘only-begotten,’ it is necessary to distinguish (a) the way in which it is understood in tradition and the church in interpreting scripture – for example in the *Quicumque* the Son is said to be *genitus*, born, generated, and the Spirit is *nec genitus*, not generated (this means, then, that the Son is an only son, only-begotten, *unigenitus*, which was how the Vulgate had translated *monogenes* and how the Fathers had understood it in their dispute with the Arians); (b) the word itself: it does not necessarily mean generation, or a unique generation. From the Greek root *genos*, the word means

only *something unique in any genus*. But, as in all languages, one cannot determine the particular meaning of words from their etymology.

Hebrews 1.5: ‘For to which of the angels did Gd ever say, “You are my Son; today I have begotten you?” Or again, “I will be his Father, and he will be my Son?”’ (See Pssalm 2.7, 2 Samuel 7.14, Acts 13.33, Hebrews 5.5.) This text has been very influential in forming the notion of the generation of the Son. But it is understood in a different sense in an Old Testament or New Testament context. In the Old Testament, ‘generation by the king’ signifies the *solemn designation of his successor*; hence the messianic prophecy means today I have made you the Messiah.’ In that case, there is nothing in this text about an eternal generation, but only about a messianic enthronement. In Hebrews, although the New Testament context suggests some indication of an eternal generation in the name ‘Son of God,’ this text cannot be considered as strictly probative.

Romans 8.32: ‘He who did not withhold *his own* Son, but gave him up for all of us, will he not with him also give us everything else?’ 1 John 5.20: “And we know that the Son of God has come has given us understanding so that we may know the true God and be in his true Son. This is the true God and eternal life.’ These texts are certainly unexceptionable in supporting the divinity of Christ and also his origin from God. But the question is *whether they are about his generation properly so called*. The New Testament does not sufficiently support that, for it does not deal with it, but there is required a further explicitation of what is actually found in the New Testament, namely, the distinction and opposition between the Son and adoptive sons through grace whose generation, even if generated by God, is a totally different generation whose ultimate purpose is their incorporation in the natural Son of God. See Titus 3.4-7: we become children through baptism.

Conclusion: In the sources themselves we find neither the technical definition of the Son's generation as generation in the strict sense nor the basis for a technical definition. Still, we do find a basis for excluding other possible generations, such as adoptive and metaphorical sonship.

From the Fathers of the church: This matter is clear from the Fathers, especially in the Arian controversies. The point of the dispute was precisely whether the Son was 'born' from the substance of the Father or rather was made or created.

B ... *and is generated by way of intellect.* Our aim at this point is only to find in scripture and tradition what has given rise to the opinions of various theologians, without choosing one or the other. We are content, therefore, to maintain that the generation of the Son had some relationship with the divine intellect. Understood in this way, our thesis has a solid foundation in the New Testament as well as in the entire tradition of the Fathers and theologians. Hence its theological note is at least 'certain' (perhaps 'theologically certain').

Opinions (Boyer, p. 101)

1 The argument from theological reason:

a from the nature of God: (a very general argument): God is intellectual by nature. The Son is generated by the Father naturally, by his nature. Therefore the generation of the Son is by way of intellect. (That procession by way of intellect is called generation and that there can be only one generation in God, see B. Lonergan, *Divinarum Personarum* 69-79).

To the major premise: God understands himself perfectly, but a divine act of understanding does not imply any duality in God (it is not a 'taking a look'). All that God understands about himself is God, and there can be no distinction between divine understanding and what is understood about God. God, therefore, is not conceived as other than an act of understanding, and so includes all things, even what we do not know, because he understands them in understanding himself.

To the minor premise: Generation is a communication of a nature. It must then occur in accordance with the nature in which it takes place. Hence there is no opposition between generation according to intellect and that according to nature, as Durandus stated.

b from the name ho Logos, Verbum, Word: The Son is totally simple. Therefore altogether the same is meant when one says ‘Son’ or ‘Word.’ But the Word proceeds by way of intellect, therefore the Son does also.

To the major premise: The Son is God, in whom there can be no real composition.

To the first conclusion: what is really signified by these two words is one and the same. See Augustine, *De Trinitate* 1, 7, c.2: ‘To say “Word” is to say “Son.”’ (DB 1597). This is of divine and catholic faith: DB 66, 111a, 114, 148, 480, 710, etc.

To the minor premise: That ‘Word’ implies intellect is not because of the word itself but comes from the constant interpretation of tradition about John’s Gospel (disregarding later determinations). Therefore ‘Son’ also has to do with intellect. But a ‘son’ as such is so called because he is generated. Therefore the Son’s generation is intellectual.

Some difficulties with the meaning of “Word” in the Prologue of John’s Gospel

1 According to some more recent commentators, this name is but an extrinsic designation of the Son indicating the fulfilment of his function of preaching the gospel with no suggestion about his nature. For in the New Testament this name would have (a) a general sense, i.e., its meaning in ordinary Greek usage, and (b) a special sense in the gospel: ‘preach the Word,’ ‘hear the Word,’ etc., especially in Acts. Therefore there would be no reason to make an exception and invoke some new extraspecial meaning for a few Johannine uses (John 1.1-2; 1 John 1.1; Revelation 19.14). That constant tradition, then, which had held that this name reveals the nature of the second person of the Trinity is completely groundless.

Reply to this opinion: Although we cannot here endlessly investigate this matter, it will help to consider the following points.

(a) In ordinary Greek usage, the word *logos* has five meanings. See above. Now surely in the Prologue *ho Theos*, ‘the Word,’ indicates at least a transcendent principle of the world: ‘... all things were made by him, and without him was made nothing that was made ... he was the true light who enlightens everyone ...’ Therefore it must be admitted that in the Prologue there is a very special meaning besides the two that are mentioned by the objectors.

(b) From the parallelism between the way in which John’s Gospel and the Old Testament prophecies begin. (See Origen, *Commentarium in IV Joannis*, 1, 2; C. H. Dodd, *The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel* (Cambridge, 1953). In the Prologue the Word is *en*, ‘was’; in the Prophets, the Word of God *egeneto*, comes, is spoken. In the Prologue, the Word is God; in the Prophets, the Word of God. In the Prologue the Word is with God; in the Prophets, the Word is with any human being. These seem sufficient to show that the meaning of ‘Word’ in John is to be distinguished from all other meanings of it in scripture, and therefore the common interpretation in catholic tradition should not be abandoned.

2 – St John does not seem to have been a metaphysician; but the traditional explanations of his Gospel are all metaphysical.

Reply: It is not a matter of metaphysics but of a psychological analogy. In order to determine whether John was a metaphysician or not depends upon the objector’s concept of metaphysics. For in every person there is an implicit metaphysics that is present in every human affirmation. Finally, the distinction between the spoken word and the word as uttered inwardly (rationality) is not something recent but rather very ancient, however diverse may be its technical expression. Cf. DBS, Logos.

Part Two

A: *The Holy Spirit does not proceed in the same way as the Son (his procession is not generation).*

Opinions: See Boyer, p. 110.

Argument from the magisterium of the church: From the *Quicumque*: ‘The Spirit (is) from the Father and the Son, not made or created nor generated but proceeding’ (DB 39; cf. DB 432). Hence the theological note is by divine and catholic faith.

From scripture: From the word *monogenes*, only-begotten (John 1.18, 3.16; 1 John 4.9). Even if in earlier documents this word was not used as meaning ‘only-begotten’ but only as ‘unique,’ we already have what we want: namely, if the Son is unique, there are not two sons, and therefore the Spirit is not a son and does not proceed like the Son.

From the Fathers: they opposed the Arians and Eunomius who asserted that if the Spirit were God, he would be another Son. See Athanasius, Basil, and Augustine.

From theological reason: in God there is no multiplicity as there is in material things; hence there cannot be two Sons, and therefore the Spirit is not another Son.

B: *The Holy Spirit proceeds by way of will.*

As we have done in treating the generation of the Word, so also here we prescind from all further determinations and only posit some relationship between the procession of the Spirit and the divine will. This part of the thesis is *common* and *theologically certain*.

Opinions: cf. Boyer, p. 110.

1 *General argument: Genesis 1.27*: ‘And God created man in his own image and likeness ...’

There is no argument from this text considered in itself but as it is in constant catholic tradition.

From the time of St Augustine this text has been the basis of a psychological analogy, that is, between the triune God and the human soul. Now, however, since in our souls there are only

intellect and will, and the Son proceeds by way of intellect, it remains that the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of will.

2 From the titles of the Holy Spirit:

(a) *Spirit* is not a proper name like ‘Father’ and ‘Son,’ generating and generated: for there is a true and proper generation in God, although generation in natural things is different. In itself the name ‘Spirit’ is applied to God (John 4.24). So it is not a name that is proper to the third person. But what is specific to the Spirit is holiness; see, for example, Matthew 1.15, 28.19, Luke 3.16. Holiness is in the will, not the intellect; the procession of love is in holiness, just as the procession of the Word is in truth, because there is a rational consciousness that is *obliged* to perform an act on account of the goodness of the object. Therefore, the procession from which one becomes *holy* is a procession by way of the will.

(b) Romans 5.5: ‘The love of God has been poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us.’ Hence the Spirit is a *gift* (so also Hilary, Augustine, and other Fathers). A gift is the handing over of something out of *benevolence*: thus love is the very first gift, because it is the basis of all other gifts. The Spirit proceeds, therefore, in accordance with God’s good will.

(c) The Spirit is called *pneuma* in the New Testament (air in motion, energy, movement). All external action, however, depends upon the will.

Thesis 6 – The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son together as from one principle and by a single spiration.

(Boyer, pp. 177-195)

We assert that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and Son not as from two different principles but from one, and by a single spiration.

Terms:

Spiration: (a) Inasmuch as it means a procession, it is the origin of the Spirit from the Father and the Son by the power of love; (b) inasmuch as it means a relation, actively it is the relation of the spirator to the spirated, and passively it is the relation of the spirated to the spirator.

History of the Question

This comes up because of the controversy with the eastern churches concerning the addition of *Filioque* to the creed by the Latin church.

4th century: In Constantinople I (381) the Holy Spirit is said to proceed from the Father (DB 86).

5th century: In the West, the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son is clearly found in the writings of the doctors. In the East, however, Theodore of Mopsuestia and Theodoret deny that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.

7th century: This question was disputed at the Lateran Council (649) but went unsolved. In Spain the expression *Filioque* was added; from Spain it made its way to Gaul and Germany.

9th century: Greek monks protested against the Latin monks in Bethlehem because they heard them singing the creed with this addition. Disturbed by this dispute, Pope Leo III *approved the doctrine* of the *Filioque* but *not its addition* to the creed. Among the reasons for the schism, Photius placed the argument against the Latins concerning this teaching about the *Filioque*, as if by it they were stating two principles of the Holy Spirit and so had defected from the faith. Later, Michael Cerularius repeated the accusation, adding that it amounted to a violation of the most ancient creeds since the Council of Ephesus had decreed that no additions were to be made to the creed. Afterwards, at an eastern synod it was stated that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, but this addition soon disappeared.

10th-11th century: Even in Rome the custom of singing the creed with the *Filioque* was in use, an addition that was approved by the Popes.

13th century: Second Council of Lyons, 1274, expressly approved the *Filioque* (DB460).

15th century: Council of Florence, 1439, in the ‘Decree for the Greeks’ clarified the doctrine as follows: ‘... we define ... that the Holy Spirit is eternally from the Father and the Son and that he has his essence and subsistent being *as* from one principle and in a single spiration’ (DB 691)

Note the following:

(a) The word ‘as’ here does not mean ‘as if he were’ but indicates only the way in which the procession really is.

(b) By using the word ‘principle’ (which is defined as ‘that which is first in some order’) the Latin bishops were excluding causality, as appears from the conciliar definition itself when the Fathers were explaining the phrase ‘from the Father *through* the Son.’ The Council interpreted it as follows: according to the Greeks, the Son is a *cause*, while for the Latins the Son is a *principle* of the Holy Spirit. For the Greek word *aitia*, cause, has a broader meaning than the Latin *causa* (*aitios* can mean ‘responsible’) and so can include the notion of intelligible emanation. Historically, however, it is not definite that the Greeks knew about emanation.

(c) ‘... proceeds from the Father through the Son.’ The mediating preposition ‘through’ indicates the order of the subjects. If it is a question of two subjects in an order, the Father as an unoriginated principle and the Son as an originated principle, then we do not have two absolute principles but only one, as expressed by the phrase ‘from both eternally as by one principle and in a single spiration.’ If, on the contrary, there were two absolute principles, they would either be two Gods or God and a creature.

The Council’s Argument: To prove this thesis, the Council argued as follows: the Son has all that belongs to the Father, except paternity; but the Father is a spirator, therefore the Son also is a spirator. Hence the word *Filioque* was licitly and reasonably added to the creed for the sake of clarifying the truth and out of urgent need. This addition to the creed was not imposed upon the Greeks. (See Boyer, p. 180)

It is clear from all the above that this whole thesis is *de fide definita*, defined as a matter of faith, in the Second Council of Lyons (1274) and the Council of Florence (1439). There had already been some discussion of this doctrine at the Fourth Lateran Council, 1215 (DB 428).

Part one: The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.

A Scripture: The arguments in the scriptures do not prove directly, but our conclusion necessarily follows from theological reflection whose function is to clarify the mind of the inspired writer in accordance with the understanding of tradition. *From John 16.13-15* two distinct arguments can be drawn from the text itself and from the added premise. These premises, although resulting from theological reflection, are so firmly grounded in the scriptures that the procession of the Spirit from the Son may be said to be formally implicit in the assertions of scripture.

First argument: This text presupposes the simplicity of the Holy Spirit. It affirms that the Holy Spirit really depends on the Son, for he does not speak by himself but receives from the Son what he should say. Therefore the Spirit is not the first principle of the message but the Son tells him what to say. The issue is not only about the sole dependence of the effect, namely the teaching that the Spirit imparts and is received in the minds of the disciples, but also about the dependence of the Holy Spirit, the teacher, upon the Son. In insisting that the Spirit does not speak on his own, Christ himself greatly clarifies the Holy Spirit's real dependence upon the Son, to the exclusion of any metaphorical interpretation.

Hence the probative argument: Whatever is true with qualification about a perfectly simple being is true of that being without qualification, since in a perfectly simple being there is no basis for distinction. (See *De Deo Uno*.)

But concerning the perfectly simple Holy Spirit, it is true that he depends upon the Son as the principle of speech.

Therefore it is true that he depends upon the Son simply, without qualification; this dependence is nothing other than procession.

Objection: In the above text there are no grounds for an eternal procession, since it says that the Holy Spirit will receive what to speak and announce, i.e., within time.

Reply: In this text, John does not speak directly about procession but about the sending of the Holy Spirit, which is within time. But if there is to be dependence not only on the part of the disciples but also of the Spirit, this dependence could not be real unless the Holy Spirit himself

were within time. But this is impossible, since the Spirit is God, in whom there is no ‘in this respect’ and ‘in that respect,’ and also since he has no parts, not even any part of time. Therefore the dependence of the Spirit upon the Son is either outside time or is not real. The simplicity of a divine person is such that a complete disjunction is demanded by contradictories.

Second argument: John 16.15: ‘All that the Father has are mine. That is why I said that what he will announce to you, he will have received from me.’

Presupposition: that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father. This is proved in John 15.26, where it is explicitly stated, ‘... the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father.’ Therefore the Father is a spirator (active spiration).

Affirmed: that the Son has all that the Father has except paternity (a property).

Hence, the proof:

The Son has all that the Father has (except paternity).

But the Father has the function of spirator.

Therefore the Son also has the function of spirator. This was the argument of the Council of Florence, DB 691.

From Other Texts: all are reducible to the first proof.

(a) It is argued from the fact that often in John the Son is said to send the Holy Spirit (John 15.26, 16.7, ...). Note that this sending of the Spirit by the Son is no mere metaphor but is real, and therefore that the dependence of the Spirit on the Son, implied in this sending, is not metaphorical but real. Then, from the fact that the Holy Spirit is a perfectly simple being, we conclude to total dependence. See thesis on the divine missions.

That the sending of the Spirit is not metaphorical can be shown also from its similarity to the sending of the Son by the Father, the reality of which is the foundation and basis of the whole

order of the New Covenant, and also from the similarity of Christ's sending of the apostles, the real foundation of the entire church. The similarity of missions implies a similar dependence.

(b) Another argument is taken from Galatians 4.4-6: 'God has sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts.' The same verb *exapeteilen* is used for the sending of the Son and that of the Spirit. The genitive case indicates possession or ownership, hence relationship, and therefore if the genitive has to be understood in the real sense, there is stated a real relation of dependence in the deity. But in the deity there can be no real relation except the relation of origin. Therefore the genitive posits the relation of dependence in the origin of the Holy Spirit from the Son. As to the minor premise: in the deity there cannot be any relations of quantity or measurement because of the lack of corporeality, nor can there be relations regarding action and passion in the strict sense of the term, because the Spirit is neither made nor created.

B *Proof from the Fathers*

The Latin Fathers clearly and explicitly unanimously assert the procession of the Holy Spirit not only from the Father but simultaneously from the Son.

Tertullian: 'I reckon that the Spirit is from none other than the Father through the Son.' See the declaration of the Council of Florence on the expression 'from the Father through the Son,' whose meaning is given by Tertullian himself when he says, 'The third is the Spirit from God and from the Son.'

Hilary (who already has the argument of the Council of Florence), Marius Victorinus, Ambrose, Paulinus, Augustine, Leo the Great, etc., affirm the same. Pope Leo III prohibited the singing of *Filioque* only because it was not necessary to insert all the articles of faith into the creed. (Boyer, pp. 182 f.)

Some Greek Fathers held the same doctrine but with a different way of speaking, and this for historical reasons: they rejected the expression 'from the Son' because it had been used by

Eunomius to mean that the Holy Spirit was a creature of the Son. For this reason they preferred the wording ‘from the Father through the Son.’

Cyril of Alexandria uses both formulas, ‘from the Father through the Son’ and ‘from both.’

Basil: ‘... but if the Spirit is united to the Son and the Son is united to the Father, clearly the Spirit also is united to the Father.’ Clearly here is acknowledged here the procession of the Son.

Cyril of Jerusalem opts for procession from both because the Son has all things from the Father and the Spirit has all things from the Son, by reason of the Son’s mediation between the Father and the Spirit.

Some Fathers seem to assert the procession of the Spirit from the Son in the expression ‘the Spirit is the image of the Son.’ Thus Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, ... By this expression they affirm a procession only if image is taken in the strict sense, i.e., not as any likeness at all but as a likeness resulting from the origin of one from the other. It is not certain whether the Greek Fathers always understood this in the strict sense, for they did not yet have an exact systematic terminology.

Other Greek Fathers state that the Spirit proceeds from both; so also, as we have seen, Cyril of Alexandria, Epiphanius, Didymus of Alexandria, Ephraem.

John Damascene is reluctant to say that the Spirit proceeds ‘from the Son,’ but prefers ‘from the Father through the Son.’ His mind is as follows: he does not want to acknowledge more than one principle in the Trinity, and so he refuses to say that the Spirit is from the Son, for then the Son would be a first unoriginated principle. There is something to be said for this opinion, for a principle is that which is first in some order. When there is a first and a second, the second is not first. Here Damascene is speaking with strict logic in mind but not in accord with reality: for the Son is *homoousion*, consubstantial with the Father, and has from the Father what a principle is, since there is no real distinction between the Father and the Son in constituting the principle of the Spirit. Diversity is therefore systematic only in the way of speaking and in the

meaning of the notion of *archē*, principle; but in terms of reality, Damascene seems to be in agreement with us. See Boyer, pp. 183-86.

C From Theological Reason

This proof is based on the fact that if the Spirit did not proceed from the Son he would be identical with the Son.

Probative argument:

In God there is a real distinction only where there are real mutually opposed relations; therefore between the Father and the Holy Spirit and between the Son and the Holy Spirit there must be mutually opposed relations, which can only be relations of origin, that is, processions.

The above antecedent is expressed in the Council of Florence, in the decree for the Jacobites (DB 703). Still, this is the truth that was known in the church since the time of St Augustine. The Cappadocians held that the three divine persons were really distinct; but inasmuch as they are consubstantial, there must be in them some property as a basis for their real distinction. But any true property of a divine person can only be a *relative* property.

An absolute posits some reason which either is or is not. A relative, on the other hand, posits nothing, but *refers* what is posited; and as what is posited is referred, there is something whose total reality is not found in a simple positing or not positing, but something generically different. For an absolute contains within its reality its entire reason – thus, e.g., man is a rational animal. A relative, however, does not contain its entire reason within its reality: its property is to refer to something else.

The properties which distinguish the divine persons cannot be anything absolute, for otherwise the Father would have a perfection that the Son does not have, ... and this would destroy the consubstantiality and infinite simplicity of the one and only divine absolute to which nothing can be added. It remains, then, that the properties are relative.

If the properties are really and truly relative, they are distinguished inasmuch as they are mutually opposed. For relations are mutually opposed inasmuch as each one terminates at the

other. If, however, the one and the other are really the same, then each is a relation of the same to the same, which is only an *ens rationis*, a thing of the mind. But if they are not really the same, then they are really mutually distinct. Hence real and mutually opposed relations are really distinct from each other.

Consequently, then, we have the words of the Council of Florence that if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, there would be no relation opposite to the Son by which it would be distinct from Him. And if passive spiration were not really distinguished from sonship, the Son and the Spirit would be the same person. Hence sonship must necessarily be the same as active spiration.

Part two: The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from a single principle.

Opinions: Durandus and Gregorius Ariminensis hold that the unity of the spirating principle is improperly stated and base it solely on the unity of the term of the procession. But there are exceptions: other Catholic doctors teach unity here in the proper sense.

This point must be clearly understood, that opposite relations in God multiply suppositis but not principles. Suppositis are multiplied: For real relations are multiplied, and in God a relation is a real being-which, not a being-by-which. For in God a being-which and a being-by-which are identical. Thus paternity and sonship posit two suppositis in God.

Principles are not multiplied: Principles, primarily and per se, indicate something absolute, and an absolute is not multiplied through the real opposite relations which it has. For although a principle, or origin, connotes a principled, an originated, primarily and per se it indicates something absolute, that from which a principled, an originated, follows.

Objection: In God, mutually opposed relations multiply suppositis. But a suppositis is a principle-which; therefore mutual opposite relations multiply principles-which, and the thesis falls.

Reply: A distinction must be made in the notion of suppositis, and there must be a development in the terminology that we have been used to in considering a suppositis as a

principle-which. We would be doing this legitimately if we did not know the dogma of the Trinity. A supposit in God, although it refers to a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature, nevertheless does not mean something absolute but *relative*, precisely because it is through the opposition of relations that the three divine persons are really distinguished, and they are three supposits, three beings-which. Accordingly, since in God supposits are relative – for although God subsists, he does not subsist as a fourth something distinct from the three persons – the multiplication of supposits does not multiply a principle-which, which remains really the same (DB 704, Decree for the Jacobites).

The Father and the Son, therefore, are the one principle of the Holy Spirit, and there is no point in asking whether they are a principle-by-which or a principle-which. For in God there is no real distinction between that by which something is and that which is.

Translated by Michael G. Shields

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