

- 268 Historians content to write history not questioning nature of hist. knowl. which is reached by adaptation of human underst. based on spontaneous special^{ized} ization of common sense (c.s. underst. and judg. Insight 173-81, 280-99).
- 269 Some historians have articulated what they do when doing history; this involves dialectic between their actual practice and their ~~more or less adequate grasp~~ ^{implied cog. theory in their accounts} ~~of cog. theory~~ ^{of that practice}. This very instructive in showing positions-counterpos. on his knowl.
1. Three Handbooks on method of hist. knowl. from late 19th cent. illustrate how hist. facts became separated from their intell. interconnections (Zusammenhang) in an empiricist fashion.
- A. Droysen's Historik. Vorlesungen ueber die Enzyklopaedie u. Methodologie der Gesch. 270 (1882) divided historian's task into Heuristic, Criticism, Interpretation, Presentation. Criticism limited to text, i.e., reliability of data uncovered in Heuristic. Hist. facts are known only in the interpretative unity which reveals the fulness 271 of their conditions and process of emergence. Facts and interconnections together constitute the hist. reality towards which Interpretation (forschend Verstehen) ~~stands~~ by grasping series of events (1) in their interconn. (2) in their dependence on situation (3) on character and psychol. of agents (3) as a realization of purposes and ideas.
- B. Berheim's Lehrbuch der hist. Methode und der Geschichtsphil. (1905) has similar 272 fourfold division of historian's task but seems to put hist. facts before the work of interpretation inasmuch as he distinguishes outer criticism (are single 273 sources reliable?) and inner criticism (what is factuality of events witnessed by several sources?). Yet this latter determination of factuality of events not independent of hist. apprehension of interconnections.
- B. Langlois and Seignobos' Intre. aux etudes historiques (1898) separates facts and 273 their interconn. Books I (preliminaries) II (analysis: what author meant, whether he believed it, if his belief justifiable; isolate "object." data from context) 274 III (synthesis: put pieces together, subject to aberrations). Here emerges clear-cut separation of determination of hist. facts and determination of interconn. Separation had ground in notion of nat. sc. in 19th cent. positivist circles. But there further ques. bound to arise: Why add to facts? Is not addition merely subjective? Let facts speak for themselves.

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2. Data and Facts: clarification, data are one thing and facts another

275 Data of sense and of consciousness. Both are merely given if not attended to, invest, underst, conceived, involved as evidence in judg. But if they are invest they enter into combination with other components of human knowing.

276 Hist. facts never merely given but are known events. Process from data to facts has three levels: (1) concreteness of object of extern or intern exper. (2) precision of object of underst. (3) stubbornness of what is grasped as (approx the) virt. uncond. and so as something (probably) independent of knowing historian. (Insight on data, T3 f, on facts 331,347,366,411ff). Facts emerge, not before ~~was~~ data are underst, but only after they are understood satisfactorily and thoroughly.

276-7 There are two distinct, yet interdependent, processes:

(1) Critical process moves from data as perceptible monuments, remains, account through investigations to series of statements which yield more or less reliable inform, on past. This inform. not hist. knowledge but only hist. experience of many agents; not over-all view but fragments. The facts obtained from this process are, not hist. facts, but only data for the discovery of hist. facts.

277 (2) Interpretative process pieces together critically evaluated fragments of inform gained in crit process. Only this interpret reconstruction yields proper hist. facts.

3. Three Historians illustrate above clarifications in their critiques of 19th cent. separation of hist. facts and hist. reconstructions.

A. Becker: notion that historians "present all facts and let them speak for themselves" is preposterous, for (1) impossible to present all facts, (2) even so they wouldn't say anything. In Atlantic Monthly (1910) he described well process from results of hist. criticism to apprehension of hist. events:

read pp. 278-279 quote 203 f

279 While not offering a coherent theory of genesis of hist. knowl. Becker here describes what I would call gradual accumulation of insights, each qualifying & correcting preceding, until stream of questions dried up and the historians information on past hist. experience becomes hist. knowledge.

B. Collingwood saw that scissors-&-paste (empty head) on wane since Vice. A

280 Copernican revolution in hist. study saw that it was not only critical but constructive (interpretative). Historians start out from statements found in sources; attempts ~~at~~ imaginatively respresent, their meanings gives rise to

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281 questions leading to further statements in sources; thus emerges imaginative reconstructions wove about fixed points supplied by source statements; yet these are fixed only relatively, to fruits of earlier hist. inquiry.

282: E.g. Thucydides (hist. knowl. permits historian go beyond marks on paper to Greek alphabet to Attic dialect meanings to authenticity of passages to judgments on truth of meanings attributed to Thucydides)

- Authority not in sources but in historian engaged in self-correcting process of hist. knowing.

- Correct cog. theory removes idealist context of Collingwood's description of historian's performance

C. Marrou in his De la connaissance historique offers balanced synopsis of historians conclusions on nature of their work; shows relations of fact and theory, anal. & synthesis, crit. and construction; calls for sympathy and underst. instead of neg. critical approach of positivists looking for independent facts; historian's task not limited to eliminating errors.

285 Hist. knowl. advances spirally. As knowl of events increases, new light throw on character of documents, original ques are recast, new relevant documents acknowledged, new facts come to light. So historian gradually masters area under investigation, acquires confidence in his grasp of meaning, scope, worth of his documents, and to apprehend the course of events that the documents once concealed and now reveal.

4. Verstehen

(p. 286) . Already I have mentioned Droysen's notion of historical investigation as forschend verstehen, and Raymond Aron's introduction of German historical reflection into the French milieu. To that reflection we have now to revert, for it was empirical without being empiricist. It was empirical because associated with the work of the German historical school whose charter was its protest against Hegel's ~~and~~ a priori construction of the meaning of history. It was not empiricist because it knew that historical knowledge involved not taking a look but understanding.

This need to understand appeared in two manners. First there was the hermeneutical circle....For instance, one grasps the meaning of a sentence by understanding the words, but one understands the words properly only in the light of the sentence as a whole. Sentences stand in similar relationship to paragraphs, etc. There is required here the self-correcting process of learning in which preconceptual insights accumulate to correct one another.

(p.287) Secondly, the need for understanding appeared again in the irrelevance of the universal or general. The more creative the artist, the greater the genius the less his achievement can be subsumed under universal principles. If anything he is the source of new rules...Now this high degree of individuality found in artists, thinkers, etc., though beyond the reach of general rules ... is within easy reach of understanding. For what in the first instance is understood is what is given to sense or consciousness or what is represented in images, words, etc. What is so grasped is the intelligibility of the individual. There is but one Hamlet...

(p. 288) The scope of understanding, the range of its significance, was gradually extended. To the grammatical interpretation of texts, Schleiermacher added a psychological interpretation that aimed at understanding persons and especially at divining the basic moment in a creative writer's inspiration. August Boeckh extended the scope of understanding to the whole range of the philological sciences...What Boeckh did for philology, Droysen would do for history. He moved ~~from~~ the notion of understanding from a context of aesthetics and psychology to the broader context of history by (1) assigning expression as the object of understanding and (2) noting that not only individuals but also such groups as families, peoples, states, religions express themselves.

With Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) there is a further broadening of the horizon. He discovered that the German historical school, while it appealed to historical fact against a priori idealist construction, none the less in its actual procedures was far closer to idealist than to empiricist ideas and norms. Dilthey saw that the success of the historical school, like the earlier one of natural science, constituted a new datum for cognitional theory.. Dilthey set himself the question of the possibility of historical knowledge and, more generally, of the human sciences conceived as Geisteswissenschaften.

(289) Dilthey's basic step may be conceived as a transposition of Hegelian thought from idealist Geist to human Leben. Hegel's objective spirit returns, but now it is just the integral of the objectification effected in concrete human living. Living expresses itself. The objectifications of living are living's own interpretation of itself. Das Leben selbst legt sich aus.

In the concrete physical, chemical, vital reality of human living, then, there also is meaning. It is at once inward and outward, a manifestation of need and satisfaction, a response to values, an ordering of means to end. It constitutes social system and transforms environing nature.

The many expressions of individual living are linked together by an intelligible web. To reach that intelligible connectedness is not just a matter

(p.290)

Verstehen (cont.)

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(p. 290)

of assembling all the expressions of a lifetime. Rather there is a developing whole that is present in the parts, articulating under each new set of circumstances the values it prizes and the goals it pursues, and thereby achieving its own individuality and distinctiveness.

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As there is intelligibility in the life of the individual, so too there is intelligibility in the common meanings, common values, common purposes, common and complementary activities of groups. As these can be complementary so too they can differ, be opposed, conflict. Therewith, in principle, the possibility of historical understanding is reached.

Moreover, just as the historian can narrate an intelligible course of events, so too human scientists can proceed to the analysis of recurring or developing structures and processes in individual and group living. So far from being opposed, history and the human sciences will be interdependent.

(p. 291)

Dilthey did much to meet his specific problem. He decisively drew the distinction between natural science and human studies and conceived the possibility of historical knowledge that conformed neither to the a priori constructions of idealism nor to the procedures of natural science. He did not resolve the more basic problem of getting beyond both empiricist and idealist suppositions. His Lebensphilosophie has empiricist leanings and his history and human science based on Verstehen cannot be assimilated by an empiricist.

(p. 292)

Two advances on Dilthey's position should be noted. First, Husserl by his painstaking analysis of intentionality made it evident that human thinking and judging are not just psychological events but always and intrinsically intend, refer to, mean objects distinct from themselves. Secondly, where Dilthey conceived expression as manifestation of life, Martin Heidegger conceives all human projects to be products of understanding; in this fashion Verstehen is Dasein in so far as the latter is man's ability to be. There follows the universality of hermeneutic structure: just as interpretation proceeds from the understanding of an expression, so this expression itself proceeds from an understanding of what it can be to be a man.

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A few comments: Our use of the term insight, understanding is more precise and has a broader range than the connotation and denotation of Verstehen. Insight occurs in all human knowledge... It occurs in response to inquiry and consists in a grasp of intelligible unity or relation in the data or image or symbol. It is the active ground of conception, etc. Finally, the simple and clear-cut proof of the preconceptual character of insight is had from the modern reformulation of Euclidean geometry. The example from Euclid,

Secondly, experience and understanding taken together yield not knowledge but only thought. There must be the grasp of the virtually unconditioned. There is an insufficient awareness of this ~~third~~ third level in the authors just discussed and a resultant failure to break away cleanly and coherently from both empiricism and idealism.

coherently

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Thirdly, the break from both empiricism and idealism involves the elimination of cognitional myth. ~~They~~ ^{These} are notions of knowledge and reality formed in childhood which have provided the foundations of materialism, sensism, etc. and which are the notions idealists know to be nonsense.

5. Perspectivism

- (294) A. Karl Heussi, Die Krisis des Historismus (1932). Reviewed various meanings of "Historismus"; out of these var. meanings Heussi selected ^{the} "Hist." in crisis the views on history among historians ca. 1900. These views involved 4 elements: (1) determinate, but simple-minded stand on nature of objectivity; (2) interconnectedness of all historical objects; (3) a universal process of development; (4) confinement of historical concern to world of exper^l occasioned
- (295) 1. Acc. to Heussi, it was first of these which ~~determined~~ the crisis:
- a. Ca 1900 historians, emphasizing dangers of subj. bias, assumed the obj. of history was stably given & unequivocally structured.
 - b. But Heussi held structures only in mind, similar structures when investigation from same standpt, & historical reality not unequivocally structured but was rather an incentive to ever fresh^h historical interpretation.
1. H's statement has idealist implications, but H added: there are many constants in human living & unequivoc. structs. not rare. Problem is their insertion into larger wholes. Where contexts are fewer & narrower, less likely subsequent developments will involve revision of earlier history. But where diff. wrld views & values, there agreemnt on single incidents & complexes; disagree^{ment} on larger issues.
 2. More fundmentl qualification: H's main pt: hist. reality is too complicated for complete descript-e.g. Battle of Leip: 16-19 Oct 1813.
 - a. Inevitably histor^{ian}/selects: selction goes forward to some extent spontaneously in virtue of some myst. capacity that can determine what is to be expected, tht grps & constricts, tht posses tact to eval. & refine, tht proceeds as tht some governing & contrling law of perspective^{so} tht, grantd the historian's standpt, etc., there mst result the structs & emphases & selection tht do result.
 1. Result is not mere rehandling of old materials; is smthing new. By selcting ~~from~~ wht frm a given standpt is significant or imp, it does prprt to mean & prtry historical reality in sm incomplete & approx fashion.
 - a. Incompl. & approx charctr of hist. narrativ explains why hist is rewritten for ea new gener. Historical exper. is promotd to hist knowldg only if historian is asking quests. Quests asked only by introducing ling. cats. Such cats carry w them their host of presups & implics. They are colored by retinue of concerns, etc. Inevit. historian operates under influ of his langu, ed, milieu--& these change in time. Thus excell. hist bks of end of 19th cent lost all appeal by 1930's.
- B. Reason why the hist cannot escape his time & pl is ^{my} develop. of hist. und ~~cannot~~ deos not admit syst objectificat.
1. Mathemtcians: rigor of formalization; scntists: define terms systemtically, formul. hypoth, wrk out supps & implic of hyp, & carry out elabor. verifications.; philosophers: Transc. Meth. But historian: by developng und. like day-to-day und.
 2. Hist's strtnng pt not set of posts or gen acctpd theory, but all he already knows & believes. Thus more intell, cultivated, etc. the gaeater his capacity to disc^{over} past.
- c. ~~In saying tht the hist.~~
- (296)
- (297)
- (298)

2. In saying the hist. cannot escape his bkgnd, I am not suggesting tht he cannot overcome ind, grp, or gen. bias (Insight, 218-242), or tht he cannot undergo intell, mor, or rel convers. Not retracting "egstatic" char. of developing hist. insight, hist's ability to move out of vwpt of his pl & tim & come to und & apprec the meth^{val} & vals of another p. & t. The pt I have been endeavoring to mk is what is called "perspectivism."

-- Relativism: lost hope of truth; perspect. stress the complexity of what historian is writing & its diff. from math, sc., & phil. Persp. does not lock up historians. Pts^{cv} tht hist. w. diff bkgnd will rid themselves of biases, undergo conv, und. diff mentalities of other places & tims, & come to und one another, ea in his distinctive fash.

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May investig. same area, but quests are diff. Where wuests similar, the implic^t, defining contexts of supps. & implics are not ident.: Some tk for granted, others labor. Discovs can be equiv, yet approached frm diff sets of quest, in diff. terms, & so leading to diff. sequences of further q^uests. Where results same, still reports for diff. readers. Such is perspectivism.

a. Senses:

1. Broad: In a broad sens the term may be ~~sude~~^{used} to refer to any case in which different historians treat the same matter differently.

2. Its proper & specific meaning:

a. It~~d~~ does not refer to diff. from human fallibility, etc. It does not refer to diff. arising from personal inadequacy. It does not refer to ~~diffxxxx~~ history as ongoing process.

b. Prop. & spec. meaning: perspect. results from 3 factors:

1. Historian is finite in information, und, & jdgmt. If not, no selection or perspectivism. Hist. reality wld be known in fixity & unequiv. structs.
2. Historian selects. Proc. of selecting's main element in com. sense. Not subject to objectified controls in itself or initial conditions.
3. We can expect processes of select & their init. conds. to be variable. Hist. process itself, & person. develop of the hist, give rise to series of diff. stndpts. Diff stndpts to diff selective processes. Diff sel. proceses to diff. histories that are (1) not contradict; (2) not complete infor. & explan; but (3) incompl & approx portray^{als} of an enormously complex reality.

3. Is then hist not a sc but an art?

a. Collingwood (Idea, p. 246): 3 difference between hist. narr. & literary fiction:

1. Hist. nar: events in sp. & time; fict: places & time may & largely are fictious.
2. All hist. narrs. must be compatible w. one another.
3. Hist. nar: justified by evid; fict: no appeal to evid, or ~~xxxx~~ appeal is part of fict.

b. On the other hand, hist diff. from nat. sc.: its obj. partially constituted by mean. & val. Diff. from nat. sc. & human sciences: its is part, their results aim at univ. validity.

-- Hist. is sc. in sense tht it is guided by meth, tht tht meth yields univ. answers for ~~xxx~~ ident. quests, tht results of history are ~~xxxxxxx~~ cumulative.

1. All discovery is cumulation of insights. But there are diff. between history & sc. in expression, checking, advance, & aims.

4. Let us revert to the view of history held at beginning of cent.:

5. Perspectivism (contd)

Error not precisely where Heussi placed it. Past is fixed & its intelligible structures are unequivocal. But historians only knew such a past incompletely and approximately

5. Read final paragraph on p. 303

6. Horizons.

- 304 A) Sir Lewis Namier has described a historical sense as "an intuitive understanding of how things do not happen." He was referring, of course, to the case in which such intuitive understanding is the fruit of historical study, but our present concern with horizons directs our attention to the prior understanding that the historian's derives not from historical study, but from other sources.
- B) On this matter Carl Becker wrote. His topic was Bernheim's rule that a fact can be established by the testimony of at least two independent witnesses not self-deceived... Do historians consider witnesses to be self-deceived simply because of their view on what is possible and impossible. Becker's answer was affirmative.... Historians have their preconceptions.
- v305 C) The open acknowledgment that historians have preconceived ideas is in accord not only with Becker but also with what we have said about horizons and meaning. Each of us lives in a world mediated by meaning and a world of basic options.
- 306 D) The historian is engaged in extending his world mediated by meaning. His questions regard not only detail but also principle, issues, options. Can miracles happen? If for the historian miracles are impossible what does he do with witnesses testifying to miracles as matters of fact? He must either reconstruct his world on new lines or find the witnesses either incompetent or dishonest or at least self-deceived.
- E) Becker in "Detachment and the Writing of History" was aware that historians were not detached from the dominant ideas of their age. Hume's argument did not really prove that no miracles had ever occurred. Its real thrust was that the historian cannot deal intelligibly with the past when the past is permitted to be unintelligible to him. Miracles are excluded because they are contrary to the laws of nature regarded as established in his generation.
- 307 F) What holds for questions of fact also holds for questions of interpretation. Religion remains in the twentieth century, but it is no longer explains medieval asceticism, e.g. St. Simeon Stylites.
- 308 G) Becker's contention that historians operate in the light of preconceived ideas implies a rejection of the Enlightenment and Romantic ideal of presuppositionless history. To say that the historian should operate without presuppositions is to assent to the principle of the empty head and to strip him of historicity.
- H) It was Newman who remarked a propos of Descartes methodic doubt that it would be better to believe everything than to doubt everything. Universal doubt leaves us with no basis for advance. We must allow historians to be educated, socialized, etc. even though this will involve them in error. They write in the light of all they know, think they know or unconsciously take for granted. History written with such presuppositions may result in different notions of history, different methods of hist. investigation, incompatible standpoints, irreconcilable histories.
- 309 I) Methods to help historians avoid incoherent assumptions and procedures, and to iron out differences of incompatible histories, not Foundations of History but Dialectical Foundations. For any notable change of horizon is done, not on basis of that horizon, but by envisaging a quite different and, at first sight, incomprehensible alternative and then undergoing conversion.

HISTORY AND HISTORIANS

7. Heuristic Structures

309 I'll work out the elements in historical method by answering a set of questions.

310 1) Has the historian philosophic commitments?

Yes, when "philosophy" is understood as the set of real conditions of the possibility of historical inquiry (Human race), remains from its past, the community of historians, their intentional operations especially insofar as they occur in historical investigation). History is related to philosophy, as historical method to transcendental method.

311 2) Does the historian employ analogies?

He does, when he proceeds from the ~~present~~ present to the past. The past is ^{to be} assumed similar to the present, except insofar there is evidence of dissimilarity.

312 Insofar as evidence is produced for dissimilarity, the historian is talking history.

313 Moreover, the historian can learn history and then construct further history on the analogy of the known past.

Mistaken assumption: there must be similarity; there cannot be dissimilarity!

314 3) Do historians use ideal-types?

I-T: "A theoretical construct in which possible events are intelligibly related to constitute an internally coherent system" (Max Weber; M. Marrou). Utility:

- Heuristic: it suggests and helps formulate hypotheses.

- Expository: it guides an analysis and promotes an understanding ^{of} the situation, when a concrete situation approximates to the theoretical construct.

(Marrou took Fustel de Coulanges' La cite' antique as an Ideal type)

315 But: - Ideal-types are not to be mistaken for descriptions of reality.

↳ It is difficult to work out appropriate ideal-types.

Toynbee's Study of History might be regarded as a source-book of ideal-types.

316 4) Does the historian follow some theory of history?

By a theory of history I understand a theory that goes beyond its scientific, philosophic, or theological basis to make statements about the actual course of human

7. Heuristic Structures (page 2)

events. For instance the theories set forth by Bruce Mazlish in his discussion of the great speculators from Vico to Freud (The Riddle of History, New York 1961⁶). They possess the utility of grand-scale ideal-types; they tend to throw in high relief certain ~~xxx~~ aspects of historical reality; but also disregard others.

317

5) Does the historian explain?

Natural scientists^{tists} explain (erklären); but historians only understand (verstehen).

This is a somewhat artificial distinction. Both understand. The difference lies in the kind of intelligibility grasped:

- Scientific intelligibility aims at an internally coherent system valid in any instance. Expressed in a technical vocabulary. Tested by confronting its every implication with data.

- Historical intelligibility is like the intelligibility reached by common sense: a habitual accumulation of insights, not to be applied in any situation without the pause that grasps how relevant they are, and, if needed, adds a few more insights derived from the situation in hand.

318

6) The historian does not determine laws (This is the work of the natural or human scientist).

He does investigate causes; when "cause" is taken in the ordinary language meaning of "because".

319

8) Is the historian devoted to social and cultural goals?

Insofar as the historian is practising the functional specialty, history, his devotion is not proximate but remote. His immediate purpose is to settle what was going forward in the past. If he does his job properly, he will supply the materials for promoting social and cultural goals.

Therefore we distinguish between social science and social policy.

7. Heuristic Structures (page 3).

321 8) Is history value-free?

History aims at settling matters of fact by appealing to empirical evidence.

The more adequate that encounter with the past, the more fruitful it can prove to be.

It is not directed to promote social and cultural values.

The task of passing judgments on the values offered us by the past pertains to the

further specialties of dialectic and foundations.

322 On the other hand it is through value-judgments that the historian selects the things that are worth knowing. Insofar as these value-judgments are true, they are not opposed to the objectivity of true judgments of facts.

323 9) Do historians know or do ~~not~~ they believe?

They believe, because: - no experiment as in natural sciences,

- historians depends on another's critically evaluated work and participate in an ongoing collaboration.

8. Science and Scholarship.

A convention:

- Science: Knowledge that is contained in principles and laws, and either verified universally or else is revised.

- Scholarship: The learning that consists in a commonsense grasp of the commonsense thought, speech, action of distant places and/or times.