

B. Jansen, SJ, Beiträge zur geschichtlichen Entwicklung der Distinctio formalis, Zeit f. kath. Theol., 53 1929 317-44, 517-44

Divisio: Scotus 321-32; Bonav 332-44; Olivi 517-28; Matthaeus von Aquasparta 529-32; Alexander von Alessandria 532-43.

Scotus, Op Ox, 1 d 2 q 7 [Vives 8 1893 602-5; Fern §§325-27]
Rep Par, 1 d 45 q 2 [Vives 22 503]
Op Ox, 1 d 8 q 4 [Fern §§651-77]

324: "... in essentia divina ante actum intellectus est entitas A et est entitas B, et haec non est formaliter illa, ita quod intellectus paternus considerans A et considerans B habet ex natura rei, unde ista compositio sit vera, A non est formaliter B, non autem praecise ex aliquo actu voluntatis circa A et B." [Fern §326 fin]

NB Scotus supposes intuitive knowledge in God the Father (all abstractive knowledge is imperfect; intuitive is of the object as object present in actual existence). He argues either A (essence) and B (~~essence~~ incommunicable property of Father) are formally distinct ante actum intellectus or not; if they are, he has his point; if they are not, then B is ens rationis and distinguishing relation is not real §325.

325: "Intelligo per non identitatem formalem aliquorum, quando unum non est de formali ratione alterius, ita quod si definiuntur, non pertineret ad definitionem eius. Igitur per non identitatem formalem intelligo non identitatem quidditativam non pertinentem ad definitionem alterius, si definiretur." Rep Par 1 d 45 q 2.

326 f: Non-identitas formalis does not involve a compositio formalis in God, for each perfection is infinite and so not a part of total perfection; in creatures each perfection is limited, and so there is formal composition, ~~still this does not hold with regard to transcendentals~~ (ens unum verum bonum) [1 d 2 q 7 [8 604]] [4 Met q 2 [7 171]] *compatible with real identity.*

328: cf 1 d 8 q 4 [Fern §669] ubi seliguntur
"Ita concedo per identitatem veritatem (divinam) esse bonitatem in re, non tamen formaliter veritatem esse bonitatem"
This formal difference is not merely in concepts; it is in intuitive knowledge; and there is nothing in intuitive knowledge that is not in the object intuitively known: "distinctio... numquam est in cognitione intuitiva nisi sit in objecto intuitive cognito"
"Definitio autem non tantum indicat rationem causatam ab intellectu sed quidditatem rei; ergo est non identitas formalis ex parte rei. Et intelligo sic: quod intellectus componens istam, sapientia non est bonitas formaliter, non causat actu suo collativo veritatem istius compositionis, sed in objecto invenit extrema, ex quorum compositione fit actus verus."
Begriffsrealismus based on non-existent intellectual intuition, ie confrontation.

NB. Scotus used supposition of intuitive knowledge in arguing against possible "relations rationis" in divine essence: known in object prior to act & therefore real
NB₂ Possibility of this intuition knowledge argument depends on agent-object view also developed by Olivi