For in man there ~~is~~ are to be found, not only the knowing constituted by intelligent and reasonable questions and answers, but also the unquestionable knowing that is complete on the level of experience and common among animals as well as men. This ambiguity of the name, knowing, corresponds to an ambivalence of the operation. The real oscillates between the universe of being and the animal's world of sense. The objective swings between the reasonably affirmed and the unquestionably looked at. Syncretists of many hues successively try to make their incoherent best of radically disparate realms. Skeptic and Academic, Cynic and Cyrenaic, Stoic and Epicurean, Scotist and Nominalist, Rationalist and Empiricist, Idealist and Positivist, Relativist and Existentialist, issue their claims and counter-claims. But the concrete procedure of the method we are proposing will be invoke

stream that can flow in a biological, an aesthetic, an artistic, a dramatic, a practical, a mystical, or an intellectual pattern; these patterns can alternate; they can blend or mix; they can interfere, conflict, lose their way, break down. Our account of self-affirmation, of being, of objectivity, supposes and expresses the intellectual pattern of experience. But man is not born in that pattern, nor does he reach it easily, nor can he remain within it long; ~~and~~ until it has been reached and grown familiar, our account can seem no more than a set of pretty theorems; even when the intellectual pattern is familiar, it remains intermittent and, in the intervals when it is absent, the self of self-affirmation does not seem myself, the universe of being is as remote and unreal as Plato's noetic heaven, and objectivity is a matter of meeting persons and dealing with things that are "really out there."

If an etymology were more than an initial convention that has long ago has been dropped, philosophy would be the love of wisdom, the detached and disinterested unfolding of the detached and disinterested desire to know. One would ~~disinguish~~ distinguish between philosophy and counter-philosophy, between the expression of the intellectual pattern of experience and the aberrant opposition and confusion that arise from the other patterns. But language is not a law but a tool, and usage has given the name, philosophy, to any ultimate view. It is in this sense that there is a dialectic ~~of philosophy, a compounded genesis and interaction of conjoined opposites that can progress as a balanced unity in tension but also can relieve the tension by a bias that brings about its own reversal.~~

of philosophy, a unity in tension of ~~unfolding~~ unfolding opposites, a possibility of progress through the maintenance both of~~k~~ the unity and of the tension, a possibility of bias, decline, and reversal that breaks the unity to relieve the tension and restores the tension to recover the unity.

A study of this dialectic ~~process~~ envisages primarily the activity of philosophizing and only secondarily the resultant philosophies. It is concerned more with the ideas formulated in philosophic concepts and affirmations than with the formulations, more with the orientations in which the ideas emerge than with the ideas themselves, more with the relations between typical orientations than with the exact, historical, almost personal standpoints ~~of~~ of individual thinkers. Behind the words of any philosopher, there are his thoughts; weaving his thoughts into some measure of unity, there is his intelligence; prior to his fully developed understanding, there is the cumulative process of discovery and learning; and in this process there is an orientation that can survive disassociation from the influences peculiar to a particular region and epoch and so can attain a permanent significance for every future attempt to philosophize. The issues of the Academy and the Lyceum, of Stoic and Epicurean, of medieval ~~M~~ Islam and Christendom, of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, of nineteenth century idealism and irrationalism, are so many objects of historical investigation. Still they are not merely that, even for the historian, for he can understand what he is to discover or learn only if his own intelligence has attained at least an equivalent development; he can understand what he is to recount only inasmuch as his own intelligence unravels the polymorphism

We now have to indicate the initial field of their application. It is not to words or symbols nor even to conceptual formulations or affirmations. It is to the concrete inevitabilities of the empirically, intelligently, rationally conscious subject. It is there that resides the constant structure that is concretely operative in all human knowing, that solely is operative in the intellectual pattern of experience, that progressively is revealed as human knowledge develops and more accurately is known as introspective techniques improve.

As the reader will observe, without any of M. Jourdain's surprise, the first move of the abstract procedure was performed in the chapter on Self-Affirmation. But from a patterned set of acts of experiencing, formulating, affirming, one may proceed to a similarly patterned set of contents defined heuristically by the acts. The pattern of the knowing is transmitted into the structure of the known; and what is true of every known, in an especial manner will be true of actions known because they are based on knowledge. Such is the strategy of the abstract procedure.

~~There is also a concrete procedure that drops the condition of the intellectual pattern of experience. Obviously, it becomes relevant when the skeptic points with scorn to the Babel of philosophies. No less, it is relevant to the solution of every philosophic question.~~

The significance of that strategy is not to be overlooked. Since the days of Kant there has been sought for philosophy ~~apragmatic~~ a criterion that could be invoked to end philosophic disputes with the peremptory finality that science enjoys when the appeal is made to observation or experiment. Now the strategy implies such a criterion for

philosophy. For the constrant structures in the fields of the known and of action are derived from the constant structure in the field of knowing; and that constant structure is a set of inevitabilities that each can discover in himself in the measure that he ~~xxxi~~ actuates his own intelligence and reasonableness. It follows that questions of Metaphysics and of Ethics admit a reduction or transposition to questions of knowing and that the latter questions are questions of conditionally inevitable consciousness.

There is a further and somewhat more palpable component to the strategy. While the transposition of philosophic issues to concrete questions about intelligent and rational consciousness provides a sufficient criterion for those in whom the pure desire to know is effectively dominant, something more is needed when unconsciously the pure desire is being reinforced or inhibited by other desire. Then there is to be invoked the concrete procedure of the method we are proposing. As there is an intellectual pattern of experience, so also there are its typical perturbations. As the dominance of the pure desire yields a constant structure in knowing, in the known, and in action based on knowledge, so also the typical perturbations yield their characteristic theories of knowledge, their corresponding views of metaphysics, their appropriate pronouncements upon ethical questions. The concrete procedure is to study the typical perturbations and their consequences. The function of the concrete procedure is to enable the sincere inquirer to discover in himself the duality in tension that gives rise to the perturbations and to recognize in positions, which otherwise would seem too obvious to be questioned, the errors that arise when

in fact the pure desire is not dominant.

Thus, the concrete procedure transforms the history of philosophy from a scandal into a lesson. In every man there is operative the spirit of inquiry and of critical reflection. But besides the knowing constituted by intelligent and reasonable questions and answers, there is another quite different knowing that is complete apart from any questioning. This concrete ambiguity makes the notion of the real oscillate between the universe of being and the human animal's world of sense. It makes the notion of objectivity swing blindly between the reasonably affirmed and the unquestionably experienced. ~~What is meant by knowing, by reality, by objectivity, automatically become questions, and then philosophy is reduced to a game of so defining knowing, reality, and objectivity that one's definitions can be said to refer objectively to the real, where "refer," "objectively," and "real" have the meanings assigned by the definitions.~~ In this fashion, "knowing," "reality," and "objectivity" become terms with as many different meanings as there are different blends or mixtures of the biological, aesthetic, artistic, dramatic, practical, and intellectual patterns of experience. To found a philosophic school it is enough to hit upon a blend that is something more than an individual idiosyncracy, to formulate with greater or less coherence what on that orientation knowing happens to mean and to be, to work out with rigor or persuasiveness the consequent views on the known and an action guided by knowledge. Still, this scandal of the philosophies can be transmuted into a lesson by a ~~dialectical analysis that relates the series of philosophies to a series.~~

trying to live without a known purpose, suffering despite an unmotivated will, threatened with death and, before death, perhaps with insanity. with disease and even insanity.

It is not surprising, then, that the philosophies are many, disparate, contradictory. For behind the welter of definitions and the conflict of arguments, there stands, not some simple entity to be observed or uttered by some simple mind, but a dialectical unity in tension of opposites

common rules
negative philosophies. Leave deeper significance

dialectical analysis that distinguishes between the sequence of ever better approximations to the conditionally ordered isomorphic invariance of the abstract procedure and, on the other hand, relates the series of aberrant philosophies to a corresponding series of typical perturbations of the intellectual pattern of experience.

philosophy. For the constant structures in the field of the known and of action are derived from the structure of knowing; and the structure of knowing is a set of inevitabilities immanent within knowing; it follows that questions in Metaphysics or Ethics admit reduction to questions about knowing, and that questions about knowing can be settled by an appeal to inner necessities that become operative in the measure in which we actuate our own intelligent and rational consciousness.

Nor is this appeal to the inner ~~form~~ forum unsupported by the loud-voiced market-place. Besides the abstract procedure, there is also the concrete procedure that does not suppose the condition of the intellectual pattern to be fulfilled. Besides the ~~unf~~ unruffled unfolding of empirical, intelligent, and rational consciousness, there are the perturbations that result from combining it, in fact or in reflection, with the ~~data~~ operations or data of the biological, the aesthetic, the artistic, the dramatic, or the practical patterns of experience. Just as the supposition of the intellectual pattern yields a constant structure in the field of knowing, in the field of the known, and in the field of acting on knowledge, so also there are typical perturbations that yield corresponding theories of knowledge, corresponding metaphysical views, and corresponding pronouncements upon ethical questions. If none of us can or will renounce intelligence or reasonableness, if all of us or, at least, most profess an ~~unswerving~~ unswerving devotion to their claims, still our attainment of the intellectual pattern of experience is intermittent; even when we attain it, our achievement varies in its purity in accord with the discipline learnt in our education and in accord with endless circumstances only partially under our control. What is worse is that we

easily overlook these oscillations of orientation, that we can mistakenly demand a synthesis that satisfies at once intelligent reasonableness and animal impulse vitality, that we can hesitate about the validity of the hegemony that the spirit of inquiry and criticism arrogates in the measure that the intellectual form of experience becomes dominant in us.

Now the business of philosophy is not to train nor to convert. Its concern is to enlighten those that care to be enlightened. It is up to educators to form their pupils in the habits that make the intellectual pattern of experience both easier and more readily sustained. It is the function of leaders to inspire men with an appreciation of the intelligent and the reasonable. Philosophy as a science does not dispute. With an impartial hand it points both to the conclusions to be reached on the supposition of the intellectual pattern of experience and to the conclusions to be reached on the supposition that that pattern is perturbed in any of the range of possible interferences. It reveals what you will hold if you are determined effectively to be intelligent and reasonable. Equally, it reveals what you will hold on any of a series of other suppositions. What it does not permit is pretence; what it opposes is the fond rationalization of the man that would utter the consequences of his bias in the name of intelligence and reason.

In brief, like all human activities, philosophizing is open to dialectical involvement. As a love of wisdom, philosophy is the effective dominance of the disinterested and detached desire to know. But the love of wisdom can be counterfeited. It can be blended with other loves. The blending can be more or less unconscious, more or less conscious.

one hand, there are the demand functions of the neural ~~pattern~~ patterns for conscious representation and integration; on the other hand, there are the patterns of experience in which these demands are met.

Besides the patterning that is brought about within experience through insights, judgments, and decisions, there is the prior patterning immanent in the sensitive ~~flow~~ stream of perceptions, images, affects, conations. This prior patterning has ~~its~~ two determinants: on the formal side there is the selecting and arranging unconsciously effected in accord with the ~~intellectual~~ dynamic orientation of (developed) intellectual effort; on the material side, there are the neural demand functions.

The formal determinant of the prior patterning may be positive or negative, effective or ineffective. As positive, it is the constructive censorship. As negative, it is repression. As effective in waking consciousness, it defines normality. As ineffective in waking consciousness, it defines abnormality. The parallel between normality and abnormality ~~is~~ lies in the similarity between the ~~ineffectiveness~~ phenomena of ineffectiveness in normal sleep and in abnormal waking consciousness. For in both these cases the major determinants are the neural demand functions at the point where further frustration would generate anxiety in the consciousness which is not meeting ~~the demands~~ neural demands.

From this structure there can be deduced the notions of inhibition, disassociation of affects, their combination with incongruous objects, their fixation, the phenomena of ~~resistance~~, the transference, the general nature of analytic therapy, and the peculiar relevance of sex. Moreover, the

in which both need of the analyst and memory of disturbing memories of the analysis pass away.

Before I conclude this study of the dramatic bias, certain comments are in order. For the development of this aspect of my study of intelligence, I am indebted to Dr. Stekel's use of such terms as the "lightning flash of illumination" and "scotoma." While I have compressed his position and presented it in the light of my own inquiry, I do not think that anyone can read his account of analytic therapy without finding the notions of insight and its refusal of to be fundamental. Indeed I may add that other techniques, since they are based on knowledge, must be based upon insight and, since they cure by knowledge, must aim at producing insight. Dr. Stekel's active method differs from other procedures, not by the use of insight, but rather by the full exploitation of its potentialities. I am not competent to judge whether that full exploitation is to be praised as apposite or discountenanced as too risky; but such a judgment is irrelevant to the present issue which concerns the nature of intelligence and its bearing on certain psychic aberrations. Finally, there are theoretical differences between the various schools of opinion on psychogenic disease. A history of these issues lies outside this inquiry. ~~But I may say that Dr. Stekel seems to me to proceed in some~~ accord with the canons of relevance and parsimony, to follow the lead of insight, and to abide by the experimental test. These criteria are criteria of science, and they are all the more significant when combined with Dr. Stekel's long experience, his numerous large works, and the recognition implicit in their translation into English.

2.7 Motion.

Motion is the fact that x upsets every attempt to propound a philosophy modelled on Euclid's Elements. On the one hand, the real both falls short of the definable and goes beyond it. On the other, the knower develops both in his knowledge and in his discrimination; ~~between the products of the disinterested and detached desire to know and the confused bias that results from biological, dramatic, and practical orientations, the~~ the advance of knowledge reveals more fully the resources of the disinterested and detached desire to know; and the refinement of discrimination places in a clearer light the contrast between that desire and the bias that results from the biological, aesthetic, artistic, dramatic, and practical orientations of the subject. Thus, motion provides us with four topics, and on x each something must be said.

First, the real falls short of the definable. It moves towards definable goals; but the goal does not exist as yet; and what exists ~~both~~ not only falls short of the definition of but also the goal ~~and~~ admits no adequate account apart from that definition. An eye is an organ of sight; sight is the concrete and proximate possibility of seeing; but we can speak of embryonic and foetal eyes in anticipation of a function that as yet cannot occur; we can speak of vestigial eyes in memory of a function that no longer can exist; and our only alternative to such anticipation or memory is an elaborate description of neural apparatus in which the only point in question is omitted.

Inasmuch as the real falls short of the definable, there is process. It is the becoming that is more than potency yet less than form. It is less than form, for it can be

understood only by supposing a greater perfection than actually exists. It is more than potency, for potency already is complete before process can begin.

Process may be discontinuous or continuous. If it is discontinuous, its goal is a unified set of parts, where the parts can be defined only by reference to the whole. Thus, to learn a science is a discontinuous process; its stages are marked by a succession of fresh insights, developing concepts, deepening perspectives; but what admits definition is the science; only by reference to the science can the stages be defined; and only within the whole of the science are the contributory insights significant and valuable, for a little learning is a dangerous thing. On the other hand, where process is continuous, differences are a non-countable infinity; stages can be marked only by the selection of arbitrary units; and the form to be reached stands to the field of observation much as a differential equation stands to its solutions.

a dangerous thing. However, even intellectual development is not simply a matter of discontinuous process with well-defined stages. It has to ~~be~~accompanied overcome the oscillations and distractions of man's polymorphic consciousness. It has to be accompanied by a development of specialized skills in observing, imagining, recalling, recognizing, uttering, and manipulating. In turn, these sensitive activities have their neural basis; the organism rests ~~of~~ on chemical change; and chemicals have physical presuppositions.

Finally, within the same species, developed eyes are similar; but within the same species, developing eyes exhibit an orderly sequence in which later stages differ from earlier yet all are understood by anticipating the same form.

Such anticipatory insight yields an addition to the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being. The classical and statistical laws of hard-headed scientists are based, not on the intentions of nature nor on the anticipations of human intelligence, but on the given and on the factual. There is sight in any given subject if, on the fulfilment of certain conditions, seeing invariably occurs. Such is the classical law that settles the meaning of sight and, if there are stages in the development of the embryo or foetus in which that law does not hold, then in those stages sight does not exist. Similarly, statistical law is concerned with the given and the factual; it presupposes alternatives defined by classical law, and it aims to settle the relative frequencies of events; so far from resting on anticipated events, statistical law appeals to events that occur and offers to provide a basis for reasonable anticipation. In contrast, anticipatory insight orders the given and the factual, not by its verifiable classical or statistical laws, but by appealing to a form that does not exist and, in any particular instance, may never be realized.

Chapter XIV: The Dialectic of Philosophy.

Since insight cannot be separated from its object, our study ~~of~~ has led us to speak of mathematics, of empirical method, of common sense, of human science and, in the last three chapters, of the philosophic topics of self-affirmation, being, and objectivity. However, our account of these topics ~~has~~ will be said to have been more fundamental one-sided. Against the objectivity of intelligent inquiry and critical reflection, there can be set the objectivity of ~~the~~ extroverted biological consciousness. Against the concrete universe of being, conceived as the objective of the detached and disinterested desire to know, there can be set the "real" that is divided against the "apparent" in the animal's world of sense, categorized as an "already, out, there, now." Against the self-affirmation of a single consciousness, at once empirical, intellectual, and rational, there can be set the existential subject, revolted by mere animality, unsure of his way through the bewildering maze of philosophies, cast into the world without being consulted, living without ~~a known purpose, suffering and dying against a will~~ a known purpose, suffering against his will though it remains unmotivated, threatened ultimately with death and, before death, with insanity.

These oppositions are not in the realm of pure theory. They do not represent alternatives, of which one is to be affirmed and the ~~the~~ other to be denied. Both of the contrary objedtivities, both of the contrary worlds, both of the contrary subjects, have to be affirmed, for both are facts. Human consciousness is polymorphic. It is a

choose. Finally, the initiative may spring from a change in one's material circumstances, in the perceptiveness or sentiments of another, in the discoveries of other minds and the decisions of other wills.

Still the initiation of a development is one thing and its integrated completion is another. One can adapt to external change out of deference to material necessity, or to social pressure; one's action, one's speech, one's countenance may be modified to meet the new situation but neither one's mind nor one's heart. One can make excellent resolutions that are written in sand, because the underlying psychic manifold of perceptions and feelings are not forthcoming and one does not know how to evoke them. One can have the perceptions and feelings, yet fail to understand oneself, to plan the strategy and execute the tactics that would put one in a position to enjoy congenial companionship and employment. Finally, the non-conscious neural basis can send up its signals in symbols that express a starved affectivity or other demands for fuller living, but the symbols need an interpreter and the interpreter needs an intelligent and willing pupil.

~~Fourthly, there is the law of limited transcendence.~~

Fourthly, there is the law of limitation and transcendence. The development of my body and my psyche are in and for me. But the development of my intelligence, of my rational consciousness, of my capacity to choose, rests upon the proper functioning of the disinterested, detached, unrestricted desire to know. In the light of such functioning, my reality is but an instance is a universe of being, my value is but a single and modest component within the order of the universe, my pleasure and my pain, my rest and my labor, my

that otherwise would be coincidental. The underlying manifold of the organism is an aggregate of cells, and we note that this aggregate is formed by division in the process named ~~the~~ growth. Further, in the organism events of the same kind ~~recur~~ recur regularly; such regular recurrence in a universe subject to statistical laws involves schemes of recurrence; the organism, however, is not simply a scheme of recurrence but an inter-related set of capacities ~~for~~ that function within any of a range of schemes of recurrence. This set of capacities are the organs, and their functioning determines the fixed part of the schemes into which the organism may enter. Adaptation is organic change that suitably modifies this determination of relevant schemes. Development is organic difference that enlarges the range of relevant ~~schemes and~~ concretely possible schemes. Again, besides their relations to the range of schemes within which they function, the organs are related to one another: each fulfils functions within the organism as a whole; each has to have a

capacities { not what is inspected felt smelt
but what is understood — understood by relations

relations
1° to possible schemes within schemes
2° ~~to functioning~~
3° ~~to functioning of whole~~
to growth nourishment growth reproduction of whole

This set of relations "dynamic ideas"

and the organism functions as a unity and for the nourishment, growth, and reproduction of the unity.

Thirdly, let us consider in slightly greater detail the relation between conjugate forms and conjugate acts, between capacities for functioning and the functioning itself.

Fifthly, it follows that different coincidental manifolds of lower conjugate acts will provide different conjugate potencies for different higher conjugate forms. Thus, specific difference of the higher conjugate forms has a basis in different underlying manifolds that the forms make systematic.

Sixthly, since the same data, as concrete and individual, can be unified only by the unity of one thing, and since things are defined by their conjugates, the existence of generically different conjugates, C_1 and C_j, will establish the existence of generically different things. Similarly, the existence of different conjugate forms, corresponding to different underlying manifolds of conjugate acts, will admit lead to specific differences of things within the same genus. Finally, such genera and species will not be based on merely descriptive classifications; they will be explanatory, for they are constructed in terms of conjugates that are defined implicitly by empirically established explanatory correlations.

Seventhly, the existence of such higher genera and of specific differences within the genera is a question of fact. In other words, our theory does not necessitate generic and specific differences of things; it admits such difference as a possibility, and so it differs from mechanist determinism; and it supplies criteria to which one can appeal in judging whether or not the possibility has been realized.

Eighthly, the theory can be applied over and over. Just as a first genus yields merely coincidental manifolds of conjugate acts that can be made systematic by higher conjugate forms, so the second genus similarly yields merely coincidental manifolds that can be made still systematic by higher conjugate forms. As the existence of

So it is that we seek to learn and to discover, but what is to be learnt or discovered can be indicated only in a vague and general way until the lesson is learnt or the discovery made. So the same subject can be taught in a variety of manners with more or less equivalent success, and so the manner of teaching best suited to one group need not be the manner best suited to another. So the same discovery can be made in answer to different problems and through a different succession of insights; so too it can be formulated in different terms that reflect the different contexts of different minds. Still in this genesis of insight in the pupil or the genius, it would be a mistake to suppose that nothing is determinate or determining. There is a determinate problem set by the data. There is the favorable or unfavorable milieu in the habitual context of previous insights which prefer new insights that enter easily into a coherent whole with themselves. But this determination is not comparable with the logical determination of conclusions by syllogistic premisses, for the new insight goes beyond the data to add an intelligible idea that reveals their significance and selects their relevant elements; and the coherence wanted by the mind is not fixed by the previous insights alone but by them in conjunction with their as yet unknown fellow.

If finality is illustrated by the emergence of insights and, again, in their accumulation and the subsequent transition to higher viewpoints, the illustration is far from unique. Just as intelligence is a drive to unknown insights, so the activities of the constructive and repressive censorship may be summed up by saying that the finality of neural demands for conscious representation and integration is conditioned by

the orientation of the consciousness in which the demands are to be met. Again, we have spoken of different patterns of experience, that is, of sets of psychic elements that stand in different characteristic relations; but this notion of the pattern is essentially static

At any stage of the development of the plant, animal, or man, there will be some flexible circle of ranges of schemes of recurrence in which the plant, animal, or man functions spontaneously, effectively, and economically. But such a flexible circle consists in explanatory relations; just as we introduced the scheme of recurrence initially by supposing a combination of classical laws, so inversely we can proceed from observed regularities to underlying schemes and circles of ranges of schemes; and from such circles we can conclude to genetic laws that implicitly define conjugate forms. Again, once conjugate forms are discovered, we can argue from their defining relations to the totality of manners in which they explanatorily relate conjugate acts; and so we can reconstruct the flexible circle of schemes of recurrence in which the conjugate acts occur.

spontaneously, effectively, and successfully. Moreover, this flexible circle is a ~~generalized~~ generalized set of intelligible relationships, and such relationships serve to define implicitly the conjugate forms. Inversely, the plant, animal, or man is differentiated by ~~its~~ conjugate forms; this differentiation consists in what the plant, animal, or man can or cannot do; but what the plant, animal, or man can do is function within a flexible circle of ranges of schemes; what the plant or animal, or man cannot do is function outside that flexible circle of ranges of schemes

the second genus raises a question of fact that is settled, not by the heuristic structure that is metaphysics, but by the evidence that is available to the sciences and to common sense, so the existence of a third and a ~~fer~~ fourth genus is to be settled in the same manner.

Ninthly, such recurrent application is possible only as long as the ~~him~~higher systematization is realized in the lower conjugate acts. Thus, it would seem that chemistry studies a higher systematization in sub-atomic events; biology studies a higher systematization in chemical processes; sensitive psychology studies a higher systematization in organic and neural events. On the other hand, though insight ~~occurs with respect to sensitive presentations and imaginative representations, insight cannot be described as a higher system immanent in sensitive events. What insight organizes, is not~~ the is a higher systematization, still it organizes not sensitive events but sensible contents. There does occur in man a higher organization of sensitive events, but this organization occurs preconsciously and it is the work of the constructive or repressive censorship. But insights are not preconscious, and what they systematize, is not the sequence of sensitive acts but the content of sensible presentations and imaginative representations. Precisely because insight organizes not acts but contents, it is relevant to knowledge, not of my sensitive processes, but of the universe of proportionate being.

Tenthly, it follows that, while a continuity can be recognized from the sub-atomic to the psychic level, inasmuch as manifolds of lower coin conjugate acts coincide with the potency to higher conjugate forms, there is a break when one turns to the relations between sense and intelligence. For the potency to insight is the individual, detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know; on that desire rests the whole unfolding of developing insight and of reflective reasonableness; and that unfolding constitutes knowledge both of itself and of the whole domain of proportionate being. In contrast, the potency that underlies the emergence of the successive genera and species of proportionate being is a potency, not to know, but to be. Just as the pure desire heads for knowing being, so the potency of this visible universe heads for being.

3. Explanatory Genera and Species.

If one ~~reviews~~ accepts the assumption of mechanist determinism, one is driven to the conclusion that, when proportionate being is explained fully, there will be but a single genus of things, namely, imaginable entities moving locally in accord with universals and necessary laws of the classical type. For without the imaginable entities, mechanism vanishes; and without classical laws concretely linking imaginable movements, determinism vanishes.

On the contrary, if one holds that genuine science affirms no more than it can verify, it follows that the imagined as imagined can be verified only if it is sensed and so the very small imaginable entities vanish. Further, it follows that classical laws, as verified, are general and abstract, and so one comes to the notion of conjugate forms implicitly defined by their empirically verified explanatory relations. Again, since classical laws are abstract, they are involved in the indeterminacy of the abstract; they can be applied to the concrete only through the addition of further determinations; and these further determinations in the limiting case cannot be related systematically to one another, for systematic relations are classical laws, and classical laws are abstract. Finally, as the foregoing application of the canon of parsimony forces the acknowledgement of statistical as well as classical laws, so our notion of potency opens the way to the recognition of different explanatory genera and species of things, and so brings scientific philosophy into accord with the immemorial convictions of common sense and ~~with~~ into accord with the present existence of different, autonomous departments of empirical science.

More precisely one may say that the problem of integrated development involves a law of transcendence, a law of ~~mix~~ balance, and a law of coherence.

First, there is a law of transcendence. All human development is an increase in one's own perfection. Human needs are all summed up in a need of functioning; functioning is conditioned by the ~~development~~ available circles of ranges of schemes and schemes become available through the twofold process of developing the individual and changing the environment It involves a transition from the generic, undifferentiated, awkward, incompetent, to the specific, adapted, skilful, effective.

First, there is a law of transcendence. All development is from the generic, undifferentiated, awkward, incompetent, to the specific, adapted, skilful, effective. On all three levels, the transition takes place spontaneously. On the organic level, there is the upwardly directed dynamism we have named finality. On the psychic level, this dynamism becomes conscious as vital need, vital ~~ax~~ anticipation, vital effort. On the intellectual level, it is the detached and disinterested desire to know. Moreover, the development not only rests on spontaneity but also consists in the differentiated unfolding of the spontaneity. But while the root of intellectual development is spontaneous, ~~the latter~~ while its unfolding is just as much an immanent perfection of the subject as organic and psychic development, none the less its direction and implications are transcendent. What heads for truth and being and value, is subsumed under them as a particular contributor to truth, a particular instance of being, a single value among many values. The detachment